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5Chapter 1: Introduction 
The breakup of the former Yugoslavia was a bloody ordeal which spanned four years 
and killed just under one hundred thousand people. The conflict was given a great deal of 
attention while it was unfolding, but after peace was established in 1995 study of the region 
was in large part abandoned. The Croatian and Bosnian wars are both relevant and important 
to studies of conflict today, but because little attention has been paid to them since the mid-
1990s they remain largely misunderstood. This paper seeks to rectify the situation, setting 
forth a thorough investigation of the causes of violence in the former Yugoslavia by 
examining events in the region before, during, and after the conflict. The Yugoslav wars may 
have ended eleven years ago, but it is precisely this distance and its accompanying hindsight 
which allow the Balkan example to be so instructive for future conflicts. 
The Yugoslav dissolution began as a war of secession. In 1991, Croatia opted to 
declare independence and leave Yugoslavia because it felt that Serbs were overly dominant 
in the federation. Serb and Yugoslav troops moved into Croatia to compel it to reenter the 
union, but by 1992 it became clear that Croatia’s independence was nonnegotiable. At this 
point, fighting between Serbs and Croats moved to Bosnia where both nations claimed 
territory because of the presence of their respective ethnic groups in the region. The Bosnian 
War pitted neighbors against neighbors and friends against friends as this formally multi-
ethnic society was fractured along ethnic and religious lines. Soon three distinct groups 
emerged: the Bosnian Serbs, supported by Serbia, the Bosnian Croats, supported by Croatia, 
and the Bosnian Muslims. As the war spread and intensified, so did the violence. It soon 
became clear that the wars in the former Yugoslavia would be the most brutal that Europe 
had seen since World War II.  
6During the conflict, ethnic groups were targeted for elimination via military tactics 
and concentration camps. The term “ethnic cleansing” was coined in May 1992 in reference 
to Serb attacks on Bosnian Muslims which were aimed at driving the Muslims from their 
home territories.1 As many as six thousand Bosnian Muslims were incarcerated by Serbs at 
the Omarska camp where guards “regularly and openly killed, raped, tortured, beat, and 
otherwise subjected prisoners to conditions of constant humiliation, degradation, and fear of 
death.”2 Tragically, this behavior is not shocking to readers today because it is reminiscent of 
the Holocaust. In fact, Goran Jelisic, commander of one notorious Serb concentration camp 
in Bosnia, actually described himself as the Serbian Adolf.3 However, the intense brutality 
exhibited in the former Yugoslavia went beyond ethnic cleansing and forced labor camps, 
reaching extremes that may actually have surpassed the grave crimes of the Nazis.  
As just one example of such unprecedented and inhumane behavior, rape was used as 
a weapon in Bosnia. This crime was committed by actors on all sides of the conflict, but most 
often Serb paramilitary officers were the perpetrators and Muslim women the victims. 
The rapes were intended to induce families to flee and never come back, not 
just for their lives but for the honor of their women…Interviewed women 
described how they were gang raped, taunted with ethnic slurs, and cursed by 
rapists who stated their intention to forcibly impregnate women as a haunting 
reminder of the rape and an intensification of the trauma it inflicts. The 
forcible impregnating of Muslim women and in some cases the incarceration 
of pregnant women in order to compel them to carry the pregnancy to term 
was part of the torture to which they were subjected. All this so that the 
women would bear “little Chetniks.”4
The importance of female purity among Muslims makes these actions particularly abhorrent, 
as many of these women would not be welcomed back into their homes and families after 
 
1 Norman M. Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 2. 
2 Ibid., 160. 
3 Ibid., 166. 
4 Ibid., 167-168. 
7they had been sexually abused. Perhaps most disturbing is the insistence that these women 
give birth to “little Chetniks,” a reference to Serb nationalists who committed atrocities 
against Croats and Muslims during World War II. The Serbs did not simply want Muslims to 
leave the territory they saw as rightfully belonging to Serbia; they wanted to humiliate 
Muslims, to violate them physically and emotionally, to literally penetrate them with hatred 
and force them to raise a child who would theoretically loathe them to the same degree as 
their rapist did. 
Rape was not used to express frustration by thoughtlessly hurting a stranger. Rather, 
it was perpetrated in an organized and premeditated way in so-called rape camps, where 
women were held captive and raped repeatedly throughout their stay. One 38-year-old 
Muslim reported that her 19-year-old former neighbor, who helped her with housework and 
had coffee at her kitchen table before the conflict, savagely raped her in one such camp.5 This 
is but one example of the atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia, which were not at 
all perpetrated exclusively by Serbs or exclusively towards Muslims. Croatians, Serbs, and 
Muslims alike took turns playing the role of aggressor and victim, all reaching unprecedented 
levels of hatred and brutality. 
 Over a decade later, the presidents of Croatia and Serbia, Stjepan Mesic and Boris 
Tadic, sat side by side on the John F. Kennedy School stage at Harvard University to address 
students on the progress both countries have made since the war. The two expressed great 
happiness at having found such a supportive partner in the other, and displayed a kind of 
comfortable friendship. President Tadic teased President Mesic for giving an overly lengthy 
response to one student’s query; President Mesic teased President Tadic for side-stepping a 
difficult question on the subject of Kosovo. President Tadic of Serbia reminded the audience 
 
5 Ibid., 169. 
8that he traveled to Srebrenica on the tenth anniversary of the major Muslim massacre 
perpetrated by Serbs which occurred there. He made this trip “to show that Serbs must mourn 
for all the victims of ethnic cleansing because what unites us should take precedence over 
what divides us.”6 The audience left this forum feeling hopeful and optimistic. It seemed 
clear that the people of the Balkans had resolved their differences, and that all were operating 
in a partnership towards peace and cooperation in the region. This feeling is echoed by 
scholars who have largely abandoned study of the region since peace was established. The 
problem is resolved, the fighting has stopped, and for many it is time to turn their attention to 
more pressing problems in the rest of the world. 
 In looking at these two portrayals of life in the Balkans, however, one notices the 
unmistakable presence of an enigma. How could people who hated each other so much learn 
to coexist in eleven years’ time? Why did people who lived in integrated peace for four 
decades following World War II launch into such violent expressions of hatred in the early 
1990s? Was the peace before and after the Croatian and Bosnian wars simply an illusion, or 
were the wars themselves typical disputes over political balance of power rather than 
anything originating from ethnic hatred? The events of this region seem to express a real 
disconnect that cannot be rationalized in any simple way. 
 The question then becomes, why does it matter what really happened in the former 
Yugoslavia? After all, the violence is over now, so why dwell on it? Unfortunately, the 
vindictive and brutal violence exhibited in the Balkans is not at all an isolated phenomenon. 
Ethnic cleansing is a technique used so often in the world today that the phrase itself has lost 
its shock value. To know what happened in the Balkans is to get one step closer to 
 
6 Stjepan Mesic and Boris Tadic, John F. Kennedy Jr. Forum at Harvard University, September 22, 2006, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
9understanding the phenomenon of ethnic feuds and genocide. Such knowledge can help to 
predict, control, or halt the future occurrence of mass murder for political purposes. Ethnic 
cleansing has happened before and will happen again. Understanding this phenomenon is 
essential to maintaining some degree of peace and humane behavior in our world today. 
 This study of the Yugoslav wars is essential not only for the broader world, but for 
the study of political science specifically. Political scientists have argued over the origins and 
nature of ethnic conflict for decades. What defines an ethnic group? When are such groups 
motivated to use violence? How integral is elite influence in compelling or preventing such 
groups from engaging in conflict? A proper and thorough study of the breakup of Yugoslavia 
gets to the very root of these questions and asks: does ethnic conflict really exist? Can one 
ever explain the outbreak of violence by saying that two groups intrinsically hate each other 
and will kill each other even if it is not in their best interest to do so? This explanation seems 
overly simplified and unfair to the people involved. 
Some argue that the violence in the former Yugoslavia was wholly unrelated to ethnic 
hatred and instead was an expression of pure power politics. Croatia seceded from 
Yugoslavia for fear of Serbian dominance in the federal government. Serbia tried to compel 
Croatia to stay so that it could exert control over the entire region using Yugoslav 
institutions. When it became clear that Croatia would not re-enter the union, Serbia and 
Croatia fought over territory in Bosnia. Both leaders convinced the corresponding minorities 
in Bosnia that they were being mistreated, manipulating them into action and using this 
action as an excuse for both leaders to claim the right to more territory. These events are 
textbook balance of power politics and seem straight-forward and irrelevant to ethnic 
matters. 
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At the same time, the explanation of ethnic tension can not be wholly dismissed. 
After all, what explains the extreme violence in these wars? Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo 
Tudjman may have emphasized the disadvantages of the Serb and Croatian minorities in 
Bosnia but no propaganda campaign can force individuals to rape, abuse, humiliate, and 
murder other human beings. To claim this would rob Balkan residents of their free will. 
Croats and Serbs do have a troubled past, particularly with the brutality and genocide 
exercised by the Ustashe and Chetnik groups during World War II. Is it possible that these 
people intrinsically hate each other and that the political circumstances surrounding the wars 
simply gave them an excuse to engage in the violence that they had been eager to participate 
in all along?  
To understand ethnic conflict from a political science perspective, one must begin by 
questioning its very existence as a relevant motivator for action. This question is raised not to 
suggest that ethnicity is completely unrelated to such conflicts, but rather as an exercise in 
challenging the reader to face the implications and inherent problems associated with 
describing a conflict as ethnic. It is easy to use this term to belittle the people involved and 
oversimplify the problem, but to face and grapple with the true meaning of ethnic conflict is 
much more challenging. This thesis will attempt to tease out the implications and inherent 
problems of defining a conflict as ethnic as well as the ways in which such an explanation 
may be applicable. Additionally, this project will explain more specifically the motivations 
for violence in the Balkans as a nuanced combination of different factors. The wars in 
Croatia and Bosnia can be used to both fundamentally question the legitimacy of ethnic 
conflict and then to further fine tune why such a conflict might occur and what could be done 
to prevent a similar event in the future. 
11
In the next chapter of this thesis, I will survey the relevant theories on the nature of 
ethnicity and ethnic conflict, putting forth a theoretical framework with which to further 
examine the case of Yugoslavia specifically. In chapter three, I will explore the history of the 
region before 1990 with particular focus on the twentieth century. This chapter will highlight 
the first Yugoslavia and its dissolution, the events of World War II, and the way in which 
nationality policy played out in Tito’s Yugoslavia. In chapter four, I will examine the conflict 
itself in detail, focusing on the war in Croatia and the war in Bosnia. I will highlight both 
events which indicate that the conflict was due to elite pressure and those which suggest that 
motivation for violence came from below.  
In chapter five, I will present the events in the region from the Dayton Accords to the 
present. Little scholarly work has been dedicated to this time period in the Balkans, as many 
assume that the problem has been resolved. I will closely examine the events of the last 
eleven years to determine whether the conflict stemmed from undying hatred, which would 
be indicated by continued anger and hostility in the region, or was simply due to specific 
circumstances which have since been resolved, making violence no longer a relevant 
concern. In the sixth and final chapter, I will use my understanding of the theories of ethnic 
conflict to draw conclusions about the nature of the Yugoslav dissolution. Ideas regarding the 
motivations for this conflict, along with an evaluation of the successes and failures of the 
region in the wake of the violence, will be highlighted and analyzed so that they may be used 
to promote understanding and find solutions for similar problems elsewhere in the world. 
Those who think that the events in the former Yugoslavia are no longer worth 
studying need only read an account of the atrocities committed to be reminded of their 
importance. Anything which can be done to prevent even a fraction of this suffering from 
12
occurring ever again can and should be done with commitment and vigor. Preventing future 
conflicts requires a grasp of the meaning and implications of each possible motivation for 
conflict, as well as a comprehensive understanding of the nuanced motivations for conflict in 
the Balkans specifically. One must evaluate the region’s recovery from violence and then 
extrapolate its reasons for success and failure, applying these lessons to the prevention of 
similar conflicts in the future. 
13
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
In this chapter, I will provide a basic summary of the major schools of thought on 
ethnic conflict, choosing one or two thinkers to represent each general category. One 
challenge in reviewing these theories is that rather than progressing from one extreme view 
to another, individual theories of ethnic conflict tend to approach the problem from wholly 
different angles. While one theory focuses on the origin of ethnic sentiment, another focuses 
on motivations for ethnic conflict. Both issues are relevant to the discussion at hand, but their 
distinct focuses must be highlighted to understand the arguments thoroughly. Rather than 
trying to relate all theories to each other, I have arranged theories in pairings of opposites to 
emphasize the unique angles with which each school of thought approaches the argument. By 
understanding first what one theory argues and then what its opponents have developed to 
counteract it, one gets an appreciation for the strengths and weaknesses of both sides without 
trying to force theories into an artificial construct that oversimplifies the arguments made. 
 
A Note on Terminology 
 Before diving into a review of the relevant theories, it is important to highlight some 
discrepancies in the field regarding terminology. The terms “constructivism” and 
“instrumentalism” are thrown around quite a bit to refer to general categories of ethnic 
conflict theory, but it seems the terms have different meanings for different people. Ted Gurr 
uses “constructivism” to refer to his own theory that ethnic conflict arises when pre-existing 
ethnic tensions are exacerbated by elites. He argues that ethnic identities are enduring yet 
somewhat malleable. “The content and significance of group identity can and do change but 
14
usually in response to changes in the group’s social and political environment.” 7 Gurr 
presents constructivism as the middle ground between primordialism and the belief that elites 
fabricate ethnic sentiments entirely. “Ethnic identities are not primordial but nonetheless 
based on common values, beliefs, and experiences. They are not instrumental but usually 
capable of being invoked by leaders and used to sustain social movements that are likely to 
be more resilient and persistent than movements based solely on material or political 
interests.”8
However, Stuart Kauffman uses the term “constructivism” to refer to theories which 
see ethnic hatreds as complete elite fabrications. For Kauffman, the constructivist position 
argues that ethnic identity is a set of ideas which are “generally either newly invented or 
newly interpreted by ethnic or nationalist intellectuals. It is therefore these intellectuals who 
‘construct’ ethnic identity, sometimes by inventing group history from whole cloth.”9 Gurr 
and Kauffman use constructivism to refer to two entirely different ethnic theories, illustrating 
that there is no official definition of the term and leaving its meaning unresolved. 
 The same can be said for the term “instrumentalism.” In Gurr’s 1993 and 1994 
publications on ethnic conflict, he presents instrumentalism as the belief that ethnic groups 
are rational actors. In instrumentalism “the main goals of a group are assumed to be material 
and political gains and cultural identity is invoked only as a means to attain those goals.”10 
Furthermore, instrumentalism “interprets ethnicity as ‘an exercise in boundary maintenance’ 
and assumes that communal movements are an instrumental response to differential 
 
7 Ted Robert Gurr, Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century, (Washington: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 2000), 4. 
8 Ibid., 5. 
9 Stuart J. Kauffman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2001), 23. 
10 Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 78. 
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treatment.”11 However, in Gurr’s 2000 publication People versus States, he defines 
instrumentalism as the belief that ethnicity is primarily elite driven. “The instrumental view 
is that ethnicity is one of many alternative bases of identity. It gains social significance 
mainly when ethnic symbols are invoked and manipulated by political entrepreneurs in 
response to threats or opportunities.”12 Stefan Wolff agrees with Gurr’s more recent 
interpretation. “The instrumentalist school argues that ethnicity is by no means an 
indisputable historical fact. Rather, instrumentalists suggest that ethnicity is first and 
foremost a resource in the hands of leaders to mobilize and organize followers in the pursuit 
of other interests, such as physical security, economic gain, or political power.”13 
Clearly, the field of political science has yet to pin down the definitions of these 
terms. For this reason, I will not use either “constructivism” or “instrumentalism” to describe 
any theories which I discuss, and will include these terms only when employed by the author 
in a direct quote. Instead, I have developed my own ways to identify theoretical categories 
which provide clarity in favor of academic air. 
 
Modernization Theory and its Opponents 
 I will begin this theoretical overview with modernization theory because it raises the 
fundamental question of whether ethnic conflict is a relevant problem in the modern era. 
Although modernization theory has largely been discredited, it is important to understand 
because it highlights some necessary questions about the nature of ethnic ties and groups. 
Gurr and Barbara Harff summarize the beliefs of modernization theory: “greater political and 
economic interaction among people and widespread communication networks would break 
 
11 Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts, (Washington: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 124. 
12 Gurr, People versus States, 4. 
13 Stefan Wolff, Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 33. 
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down people’s ‘parochial’ identities with ethnic groups and replace them with loyalties to 
larger communities such as Canada, the European Community, or an emerging pan-Africa.”14 
The theory argued that tribal tendencies typically associated with ethnic allegiances were part 
of a traditional society that was dying out. Educated elites, urban dwellers, and army officers 
were the most detribalized sectors of society and would lead people away from traditional 
ethnic loyalties.15 
However, since this theory was first conceptualized in the 1950s, events have served 
to contradict it. In the following decades, conflicts based on ethnic identities and interests 
increased rather than decreasing as the theory anticipated. “Ethnopolitical conflicts increased 
not only in modernizing societies but also in developed Western societies, which experienced 
an upsurge in regional separatist movements and ethnoclass protest in the 1960s.”16 While 
modernization theory predicted that newly established elites would lead people away from 
ethnic affiliations, instead it was these people who were often at the forefront of ethnic 
conflict. “Militantly ethnic political parties sometimes had their deepest roots among 
educated elites.”17 The very fact that violence broke out in the former Yugoslavia along 
ethnic lines as late as the 1990s directly contradicts modernization theory. 
 While it is clear that modernization has not lessened ethnic violence, many argue that 
it in fact exacerbates these tensions. “Whereas ethnic conflict was conceived earlier as a 
vestige destined to disappear and then as a vestige stubbornly resistant to change, recent 
theories of conflict view it as no vestige at all, but as part and parcel of the very process of 
 
14 Gurr and Harff, 78. 
15 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, (Berkely: University of California Press, 1985), 97. 
16 Gurr and Harff, 1994. 
17 Horowitz, 97. 
17
becoming modern.”18 Gurr and Harff argue that “modernization is a threat to ethnic 
solidarities that prompts minorities to mobilize in defense of their culture and way of life.”19 
In other words, forces of modernization actually strengthen ethnic bonds because they 
present a threat to the existence of the ethnic group.  
Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe argue that “people’s aspirations and expectations 
change as they are mobilized into the modernizing economy and polity. They come to want, 
and to demand, more—more goods, more recognition, more power…It is by making men 
more alike, in the sense of possessing the same wants, that modernization tends to promote 
conflict.”20 Modernization also results in new benefits being unevenly distributed among 
ethnic groups. This is because “some groups gain a head start in the competition for the 
rewards of the modern world and the social classes that emerge tend to overlap and reinforce 
ethnic group boundaries, thereby making ethnic group confrontations more intense.”21 It 
seems likely, then, that modernization serves to increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict 
rather than decrease it. Although this particular issue is no longer hotly contested, it is 
important to highlight the fact that experts in the field of ethnic conflict believe the problem 
is very relevant in the modern day and that it may actually get worse in the future. 
 
Primordialism 
Primordialism is the belief that ethnic identity is innate and that one’s identification 
with a specific ethnic group is natural and enduring; people of the same ethnicity are drawn 
together because of intrinsic similarities. The implication of this theory is that ethnic hatred, 
like ethnic identification, is eternal and unchanging. Primordialism argues that the motivation 
 
18 Ibid., 101. 
19 Gurr and Harff, 78. 
20 Robert Melson and Howard Molpe as quote in Horowitz, 100. 
21 Horowitz, 102. 
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for ethnic conflict comes completely from individuals and is an expression of one’s 
allegiance to his own ethnic group and a resulting hatred for others. Ethnic ties and 
grievances can be manipulated by elites, but these ties are legitimately and naturally felt by 
the people involved and are in no way fabricated for political gain. While all primordial 
theories share these basic assumptions, primordialism has two distinct manifestations. 
 The most extreme version of this theory is biological primordialism. Sociobiology 
claims that “ethnic groups and nations should be seen as forms of extended kin groups, and 
that both nations and ethnic groups, along with ‘races’, must be ultimately derived from 
individual genetic reproductive drives.”22 Biological primordialism argues that ethnic groups 
are enduring because members are literally linked together by blood ties. Pierre Van den 
Berghe argues that caste and race “tend to be ascriptive, defined by common descent, 
generally hereditary, and often endogamous.”23 Van den Berghe traces such groups from 
small tribes; “linked by ties of kinship, they made ‘the tribe in fact a superfamily’. It was 
only the cultural inventions of the unilineal descent and lineage exogamy that permitted the 
‘extension of that primordial model of social organization to much larger societies running 
into tens of thousands of people.’”24 Even Van den Berghe himself must admit that ethnic 
ties are in part formed by myths rather than biological reality. However, he maintains that 
biology is an integral element of ethnic identity. 
Myth will only be believed if members of an ethnic group are sufficiently 
alike in physical appearance and culture, and have lived together and 
intermarried for a sufficient period for the myth to have developed a 
substantial measure of biological truth…Ethnicity or race cannot be invented 
or imagined out of nothing. It can be manipulated, used, exploited, stressed, 
 
22Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and 
Nationalism, (London: Routledge Press, 1998), 147. 
23 Pierre Van den Berghe as quoted in Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, 147. 
24 Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, 147. 
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fused or subdivided, but it must correlate with a pre-existing population bound 
by preferential endogamy and a common historical experience.25 
While Van den Berghe must concede that ethnic ties are somewhat cultural, he maintains that 
cultural ties can only be maintained on the basis of genetic links. 
 Anthony Smith criticizes Van den Berghe’s biological argument. “How can we know 
that our sentiments of ethnic kinship have a genetic basis, or that family and clan ties can be 
extended through large-scale nepotism on the same physical and reproductive basis to 
relative strangers because they happen to speak the same language and share the same 
religion and customs?”26 If the ties are psychological, based on projection and identification, 
then the basis of ethnic kinship would be based on psychology rather than physical genetics, 
leading primordiality to be a purely cultural rather than biological phenomenon. This 
fundamental problem has led modern political scientists to largely disregard the theory of 
biological primordialism. 
 Rather than abandoning primordialism as a viable theory, however, political scientists 
began to explore its cultural elements. This exploration led to cultural primordialism, first 
articulated by Clifford Geertz. Geertz explains this theory quite clearly in his work The 
Interpretation of Cultures.
By a primordial attachment is meant one that stem from the “givens” of social 
existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them 
givenness that stems from being born in to a particular religious community, 
speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following 
particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, 
are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of 
themselves. One is bound to one’s kinsman, one’s neighbor, one’s fellow 
believer, ipso facto; as a result not merely of personal affection, practical 
necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation but at least in great part by 
virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself. The 
general strength of such primordial bonds, and the types of them that are 
 
25 Van den Berghe as quoted in Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, 148. 
26 Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, 150. 
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important, differ from person to person, from society to society, and from time to 
time. But for virtually every person, in every society, at almost all times, some 
attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural—some would say 
spiritual—affinity than from social interaction.27 
For Geertz, ethnic groups can be bonded by assumed blood ties, similar appearance in terms 
of skin and hair color, language, region, and culture. Cultural primordialism, then, does not 
completely disregard the legitimacy of blood ties or kinship among groups of people, but 
rather maintains that many other characteristics serve to bond people as well. The cultural 
primordialist view takes the concept presented in the biological view, that of enduring and 
innate bonds between people, and presents it in a manner that is easier to accept in today’s 
modern world. 
 Primordialism, however, extends far beyond these basic understandings of ethnic 
bonds. By stating that people of the same ethnicity are naturally and even spiritually linked, 
this theory argues that individuals have an innate desire to protect their cultural community 
against outsiders. Just as bonds between group members are natural and eternal, so too are 
feelings of hatred toward groups which appear to threaten that way of life. Because 
opponents seem to threaten bonds which are so intrinsic and personal to each individual, 
groups will go to any lengths to protect themselves. For primordialists, ethnic bonds and 
hatreds are fundamental to one’s identity, meaning that conflicts between ethnic groups are 
inevitable. Conflicts will by definition be extremely brutal and violent because there is no 
room for compromise on one’s spiritual ties and cultural beliefs. 
 Critics like John Stack argue that Geertz’s approach “infuses a romantic dimension 
into the study of ethnicity” which is inappropriate for the objectives of modern social 
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science.28 Stack also argues that Geertz comes “dangerously close to crude statements of 
cultural determinism. Therefore, an emphasis on primordial ties may lead one easily to the 
use of stereotypes or may be employed in conjunction with assessments of national character 
in which continents, countries, or ethnic groups have been ranked from civilized or superior 
to uncivilized or barbaric.”29 Furthermore, the primordial approach is at best static; “it fails to 
explain why ethnicity disappears during one historical period and reintensifies during 
another.”30 However, John Stack points out that the “non-rational, even irrational, 
dimensions of ethnicity are an undeniable aspect of contemporary ethnic mobilizations 
throughout the world.”31 Cultural primordialism, like all theories, has some definite flaws, 
but it also captures a fundamental truth about ethnic bonds and interactions; there is some 
dimension of ethnic conflict which is undeniably non-rational and primordialism is able to 
capture this quality in a way which other theories can not. 
 Before moving on to another cultural primordialist, it is important to understand how 
and why non-biological elements can bind people together so tightly. Anthony Smith helps to 
illustrate this fact in The Ethnic Origin of Nations. Smith explains that an ethnic 
community’s actual origins are not nearly as important as the myths associated with those 
origins. “Myths of origins and descent provide the means of collective location in the world 
and the character of the community which explains its origins, growth, and destiny.”32 A 
myth of descent answers questions about why people are all members of one community and 
how they are alike. “As they emerge from the collective experiences of successive 
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generations, the myths coalesce and are edited into chronicles, epics, and ballads, which 
combine cognitive maps of the community’s history and situation with poetic metaphors of 
its sense of dignity and identity. The fused and elaborated myths provide an overall 
framework of meaning for the ethnic community, a mythomoteur, which makes sense of its 
experiences and defines its essence.”33 A sense of common history unites successive 
generations and defines a population by its experience. “Historical sequences provide ‘forms’ 
for later experiences, channels and molds for their interpretation.”34 Furthermore, the shared 
elements of culture which Geertz highlighted bond groups together by giving them a sense 
that they have something unique to protect. “The desire to protect a cultural heritage and 
tradition inspires not only a sense of superiority and uniqueness and a belief in the rightness 
and value of the ethnie’s revelation and life-style.”35 These common cultural elements are the 
glue which holds the community together. When threatened, groups may do anything to 
protect them.  
Samuel Huntington, in his 1996 work The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of 
the World Order, takes the theory of cultural primordialism to an entirely new level. 
Huntington undoubtedly echoes Geertz to a certain extent. “In coping with identity crisis, 
what counts for people are blood and belief, faith and family. People rally to those with 
similar ancestry, religion, language, values, and institutions and distance themselves from 
those with different ones.”36 However, Huntington envisions these groups extending around 
the globe rather than existing within a specific region. “Politicians invoke and publics 
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identify with greater cultural communities that transcend nation state boundaries.”37 In other 
words, people are drawn so strongly to those with similar values, culture, and religion that 
primordial ties can stretch across the planet. Huntington believes that the world consists of 
seven primary civilizations distinguished primarily by religion. Fault line wars are those 
disputes which occur between groups of people from different civilizations. “Communal 
wars may occur between ethnic, religious, racial or linguistic groups. Since religion, 
however, is the principal defining characteristic of civilizations, fault line wars are almost 
always between peoples of different religions.”38 In this way, Huntington extends the concept 
of cultural primordialism across the globe to include Western populations in a discussion of 
intrinsic cultural and religious ties.  
 Huntington uses the situation in Bosnia to illustrate his theory. He argues that 
Catholic Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Orthodox Serbs are part of three different world-wide 
civilizations: the West, the Islamic world, and the Slavic or Orthodox world respectively.39 
Huntington shows that aid for these groups during the Bosnian war always came from 
countries of the corresponding civilization. For example, Germany was the first to recognize 
Croatia after it declared independence. Austria, Italy, and the US soon followed. Even the 
Vatican sided with Croatia: “the Pope declared Croatia to be the ‘rampart of Western 
Christianity’ and rushed to extend diplomatic recognition to the state before the European 
Union did.”40 The United States also joined in by supporting the Croatian military. “Ignoring 
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the massive Croatian violations of the UN arms embargo, the United States provided military 
training to the Croatians and authorized top-ranking retired US generals to advise them.”41 
Similarly, the Slavic world rallied behind Serbia. “Russian nationalists, military 
officers, parliamentarians, and Orthodox Church leaders were outspoken in their support for 
Serbia, their disparaging of the Bosnian Muslims, and their criticism of Western and NATO 
imperialism.”42 Furthermore, one thousand or more Russians, along with volunteers from 
Romania and Greece, enlisted in the Serbian forces to fight what they described as the 
“Catholic fascists” and “Islamic militants.”43 In spite of the arms embargo, Orthodox 
countries supplied Serbia with weapons and equipment. “In early 1993 Russian military and 
intelligence organizations apparently sold $300 million worth of T-55 tanks, antimissile 
missiles, and antiaircraft missiles to the Serbs.”44 Russia also used its position in the UN to 
defend Serbian interests and oppose more stringent economic sanctions. 
 Bosnian Muslims found the same kind of support from their global community.  
“Muslim governments, most notably those of Iran and Saudi Arabia, competed with each 
other in providing support. Sunni and Shi’ite, fundamentalist and secular, Arab and non-Arab 
Muslims societies from Morocco to Malaysia all joined in.”45 The Organization of the 
Islamic Conference created a group to lobby for the Bosnian case at the United Nations and 
offered to provide 18,000 peacekeeping troops from Iran, Turkey, Malaysia, Tunisia, 
Pakistan, and Bangladesh. “In the summer of 1995 the failure of the West to defend the safe 
areas against Serb attacks led Turkey to approve military aid to Bosnia and to train Bosnian 
troops, Malaysia to commit itself to selling them arms in violation of the UN embargo, and 
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the United Arab Emirates to agree to supply funds for military and humanitarian purposes.”46 
Saudi Arabia and Iran contributed huge amounts of money to develop Bosnian Muslim 
military strength. 
 While Geertz maintains that ties are somewhat based on kinship, Huntington’s 
extension of cultural primordialism to include the entire globe necessarily precludes kinship 
as a basis for unity, arguing that ethnic ties are based on shared beliefs and practices rather 
than blood. Despite the purely cultural ties which Huntington envisions, he argues that these 
bonds are nonetheless very strong. “Governments and people of one civilization do not 
expend blood or treasure to help people of another civilization fight a fault line war.”47 
Huntington believes that the bonds of religion and culture transcend national boundaries and 
greatly influence the choices of political leaders, who are likely to make sacrifices for people 
in their civilization but not for those outside of it. 
 Over all, primordialism argues that individuals of the same ethnicity are intrinsically 
bound to one another based on a sense of kinship, whether real or imagined, as well as shared 
beliefs and practices. The theory argues that leaders and citizens alike make decisions based 
on these ties, and are therefore driven by an unspoken feeling of affinity rather than by a 
wholly rational political agenda. Primordialists argue that the violence in the former 
Yugoslavia occurred because tightly-knit ethnic groups clashed and people acted not out of 
concern for the state, the international community, or even themselves, but rather out of 
concern for the ethnic group. By this understanding, people in the former Yugoslavia fought, 
killed, and died to ensure the survival and supremacy of their ethnic group on the basis of 
intrinsic identity and natural hatreds. 
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Elite Manipulation 
 For the purposes of this paper, elite manipulation will refer to the theory developed in 
direct opposition to primordialism, which holds that ethnic ties are constructed by elites in 
order to manipulate groups of people into action. This theory suggests that people do not 
have an innate connection with those who share their culture, language, and heritage. Instead, 
people who would not otherwise identify with their ethnic group are convinced to do so by 
outside sources. In the words of Kevin Avruch, “ethnicity is socially constructed: it is not a 
given but rather a thing which is made and thus potentially unstable, inconstant, and 
negotiable.”48 
Paul Brass supports this theory because he believes it is consistent with one’s 
experience of the world. Brass concedes that people form deep emotive attachments, but 
argues that these attachments are not constant. “Many people are bilingual, change or shift 
their language, or do not think about their language at all. Religions too are subject to change 
by reformers and to conversions and syncretism. Even place of birth and kinship may lose 
their emotional significance for many people.”49 Brass argues that elites often politicize the 
culture and change “the self-definition of the community from that of an ethnic group to one 
of a nationality competing with others in the political arena. Hence we may infer that it is the 
competition between elites within a community, and between the elites of different 
communities, using multiple symbol selection, that mobilizes the members of communities 
and forms them into cohesive nationalities.”50 
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V.P. Gagnon, Jr. is a clear supporter of elite manipulation theory. He argues that 
“violent conflict along ethnic cleavages is provoked by elites in order to create a domestic 
political context where ethnicity is the only politically relevant identity.”51 Fundamentally, 
Gagnon argues that rather than ethnic hatred and resentment naturally leading to a security 
dilemma, elites construct a security dilemma by inciting fear and highlighting external 
threats. The individual interest of the population then becomes focused on the threat to the 
community defined in ethnic terms and only then do people begin to divide themselves along 
ethnic lines.52 Elites use this strategy to respond to shifts in the structure of domestic power 
and to fend off domestic challengers who seek to mobilize people against the status quo.  
Gagnon’s argument is constructed on the basis of four basic assumptions. First, the 
domestic arena is the central concern for decision-makers and elites because it contains their 
power base; elites will therefore focus on maintaining this power. Secondly, “persuasion is 
the most effective and least costly means of influence in domestic politics.”53 One can use 
persuasion when appealing to the interests of politically relevant actors as members of a 
group. Thirdly, appeals for support within the domestic arena must be directed toward the 
values of the target audiences. “Ideas such as ethnicity, religion, culture, and class therefore 
play a key role as instruments of power and influence, in particular because of their centrality 
to legitimacy and authority.”54 Finally, the way in which ideas are framed determines the way 
political arguments are made and how interests are defined. “The challenge for elites is 
therefore to define the interest of the collective in a way that coincides with their own power 
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interests. In other words, they must express their interests in the language of the collective 
interest.”55 
Gagnon also lays out a number of hypotheses regarding the conditions under which 
national leaders will resort to conflictual policies. If ruling elites face challenger elites who 
seek to mobilize the population in a way which threatens the ruler’s power or the political 
structure, the ruler will be willing to respond with policies that are costly to society as a 
whole. In addition, “threatened elites will respond to domestic threats in a way that 
minimizes the danger to the bases of their domestic power.”56 Often, they will try to shift the 
focus of political debate away from issues where they are most threatened by appealing to the 
majority in different terms, often cultural or ethnic. “Competing elites will thus focus on 
defining the collective interest by drawing selectively on traditions and mythologies and in 
effect constructing particular versions of that interest.”57 Using this method, elites can 
identify themselves with the interest of the collective while still maximizing their abilities to 
achieve their own goals. By reframing the issue, elites can make challengers politically 
irrelevant and unable to mobilize the population. 
Furthermore, when elites engage in competition to define group interest in their favor, 
images of the outside world and alleged threats are key. “Elites must find issues of grievance 
unrelated to those issues on which they are most threatened, and construct a political context 
in which those issues become the center of political debate.”58 Often elites will frame the 
threat as applicable to the group as a whole, so that even if an individual does not feel 
personally in danger, he is led to believe that the group is under attack. “Moreover, if the 
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threat or grievance is outside the direct experience of the majority of politically relevant 
actors, there is no way to verify whether the grievance is real, or indeed whether it is being 
addressed or not.”59 By creating the illusion of a threat, group interest is placed above that of 
individuals, creating a context in which ethnicity is all that counts and other interests are no 
longer relevant. Also, the image of overwhelming threat to the group delegitimizes the 
dissent of challengers, who can then be branded as traitors. “Control or ownership of mass 
media, especially television, bestows an enormous political advantage where the wider 
population is involved in politics, and is a key element in the success of such a strategy.”60 
Elites tend to define the relevant collective in ethnic terms when past political 
participation has been so defined, when international circumstances encourage this definition, 
and when elites can be seen as credible defenders of ethnic interests. A majority of actors 
must be identifiable as members of said group, but this does not need to be their primary 
identity before elite involvement begins. This specific identity must be made the only one 
that matters; this often leads to “the impression of continuity between past conflicts and 
current ones.”61 
The intensity of a conflictual strategy will depend on the degree to which elites feel 
threatened. The larger and more immediate the threat, the more willing elites are to take 
measures which will maintain power in the short term but be very costly in the long term. 
The time frame of the threat and strength of challenger elites affect the willingness of rulers 
to discount future costs of their policies. Elites may also use neo-fascist parties in their 
strategy. The advantage of giving media coverage and weapons to small extremist groups 
interested in ethnic hatred and violence is that “by bringing extremists into the political 
 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., 139. 
61 Ibid., 140. 
30
realm, the right becomes the ‘center;’ a statement that ten years earlier may have been 
unacceptably racist may be perceived after this kind of strategy as relatively moderate.”62 
Elites must carefully monitor the internal costs of conflict and ensure that they are 
outweighed by the benefits so as to avoid popular mobilization against the conflictual 
external strategy. Rhetoric is basically costless, “but if military conflict is involved, the costs 
to the general population rapidly start to mount. Conflict will be undertaken with an eye 
toward minimizing the costs for those parts of the populations which are key for support.”63 
Elites must pay close attention to international costs, which have the potential to affect status 
quo elites’ domestic power positions. If international threats begin to loom large, elements of 
the status quo coalition may defect for fear that losses in the international realm would be 
greater than those in the domestic realm. 
Gagnon does not simply admit that elites attempt to take advantage of ethnic 
cleavages for personal gain. He argues that so-called ethnic conflicts are the direct and sole 
result of strategic policies. “The current major conflicts taking place along ethnic lines 
throughout the world have as their main cause not ancient hatreds, but rather the purposeful 
actions of political actors who actively create violence conflict, selectively drawing on 
history in order to portray it as historically inevitable.”64 Gagnon argues that “the violence in 
the former Yugoslavia was a strategic policy chosen by elites who were confronted with 
political pluralism and popular mobilization.”65 Violence is a good tool for eclipsing 
demands for change and redirecting the focus of politics towards the supposed threat. “Such 
violence is thus targeted at least as much against the home-state population, those defined as 
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‘us,’ as it is against the direct victims of violence, since the major intended effects of the 
violence—demobilization and homogenization of political space—are aimed at the home 
population; the impact on the direct victims may even be only a secondary effect.”66 In other 
words, Gagnon argues that when Slobodan Milosevic encouraged Serbs to use violence 
against Croats and Bosnian Muslims, that violence was as much, if not more so, directed at 
the Serbs than it was at their alleged enemies. As a result of Milosevic’s violent policies, 
Serbs were formed into a nationalistic whole, therefore making it easier for Milosevic to 
control them. 
Gagnon also explains that on the individual level, ethnicity is a fluid and complex 
relational mode of identification. In order to mobilize people based on an ethnic 
understanding, elites would need to tap into the relational senses of identity and self from 
which ethnicity originate. However, elites are unable to do this. “The violence of ethnic 
conflicts is thus not meant to mobilize people by appealing to ethnicity—that is, it does not 
tap into these relational processes. Rather, its goal is to fundamentally alter or destroy these 
social realities. Indeed, given the rootedness of such realities in peoples’ everyday lives, the 
only way to destroy them and to impose homogeneity onto existing, heterogeneous social 
spaces is through massive violence. In other words, it is the very inability of elites to ‘play 
the ethnic card’ as a means to mobilize the population that leads them to rely on violence.”67 
Gagnon does not argue that ethnic ties are nonexistent, but rather that such ties are too 
complex and malleable for elites to take advantage of. For Gagnon, ethnic identification is a 
dynamic rather than static experience. The ideas associated with a certain ethnicity change 
over time and in different contexts. As a result, individuals are constantly making a choice as 
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to whether they see themselves as part of an ethnic group. Ethnicity is not a state of being in 
which one is or is not a Serb but rather it is a choice and action, whereby one chooses to 
identify himself as a Serb at one point but reserves the right to choose not to do so in the 
future.68 Therefore, ethnicity as defined by elites represents a clear break with one’s own 
personal experience and the creation of a new ethnic reality. The elite version of ethnicity is a 
constant identity with clear definitions and requirements, which does not permit fluidity, 
uncertainty, or choice. Thus the ethnicity which is a basis for massive violence is purely an 
elite construct. 
While elites may seem to be pushing for ethnic homogeneity, what they really want 
according to Gagnon is a homogeneous political space to demobilize challengers. Gagnon 
supports this argument by noting that during the Balkan conflict elites relied heavily on terror 
and violence not only in areas that were ethnically heterogeneous but also in those regions 
which were ethnically “pure” before the conflict or had been “cleansed” by the conflict itself. 
“The homogeneity being sought is thus a political homogeneity; the means to such an end is 
the silencing, marginalizing, and demobilization of those voices that were calling for 
fundamental shifts in the structures of power.”69 In this sense, conflicts like the Bosnian and 
Croatian wars are not fought between ethnic groups but between elites and those who oppose 
their agenda, regardless of ethnicity. 
Gagnon argues that the overall goal of such a violent strategy is to redefine political 
space on two levels. In the short term, images of threat and violence silence and marginalize 
those who disagree with the people in power. In the long term, the strategy “seeks to 
reconfigure the borders of ‘our’ political community, to redefine them based on a ‘hard’ 
 
68 Gagnon, Lecture at Fletcher School. 
69 Gagnon, Myth of Ethnic War, 9. 
33
notion of culture or ethnicity, again based on fear, and to delegitimize other notions of 
political community. To do this, elites construct a threat defined in particular ways: ‘us’ 
versus ‘them.’ This constructed threat is not a reflection of some natural relationship, but 
rather is the product of fear, an image that is imposed and enforced.”70 Gagnon does not 
simply argue that elites use ethnic cleansing to frighten people into bonding with their ethnic 
group. Rather, such violent policies function to alter the demographic reality of the country to 
reflect the new notions of political community being communicated by elites. “Previously 
existing communities and bonds, which deny the reality or hardness of the newly 
constructed, culturally-defined political community are, in particular, targeted for 
destruction. Only violence and atrocities are sufficient to destroy these realities and to make 
real the new hard borders of the ethnic group.”71 
Gagnon is perhaps the best thinker to present elite manipulation because he accounts 
for a common objection to the theory. Opponents often argue that elite manipulation 
represents the masses as mindless sheep who foolishly believe the lies crafted by their leaders 
in spite of the fact that their own personal experience does not support these ideas. Gagnon 
argues, however, that elites are unable to tap into the emotional bonds of individuals or 
change the way that individuals see the world. Elite manipulation has its effect “mostly in 
perceptions about such relations outside of their own lived experiences. The impact on their 
perceptions of their own community is minimal. As will be seen, this also explains why these 
elites had to resort to violence; it was the only way to directly impinge on the everyday lived 
experiences of these communities in a way that had the potential to change such 
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perceptions.”72 Elites paint an image of a threatening outside world through the media “in 
order to create a context in which they attempt to affect processes of identification as a means 
of influence the behavior of their population.”73 
Gagnon argues that elites are only able to change people’s perceptions of what is 
going on “out there” rather than convincing them that their every day experiences constitute a 
threat. Gagnon assumes that people are intelligent enough to see the disconnect between their 
own experiences and beliefs and those being shouted from the rooftops by elites. However, 
the image of threats “out there” and the subsequent violence to confirm these threats creates a 
truly polarizing situation in which people bind themselves to an ethnic group for purposes of 
survival and protection. There is no doubt that Gagnon represents a somewhat extreme 
position by arguing that ethnic bonds are a wholly artificial construct. However, he sets forth 
one of the most thoughtful portrayals of elite manipulation, and therefore gives it as much 
credibility as possible. Both primordialism and elite manipulation have strong points and 
weaknesses, and comparing them forces readers to examine ways in which the positive 
aspects of one theory draw out negative aspects of the other. 
 
Moderates 
 The label of moderate will be used to refer to those theorists who take a page from 
primordialism and one from elite manipulation. These people argue that propaganda and 
manipulation from above, as well as structural and economic changes, can and do contribute 
to ethnic violence. However, they maintain that legitimate historical grievances and true 
ethnic ties must precede any outside changes for the latter to lead to violence. Because the 
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moderates represent a melding of two theories and are, by their definition, very middle-of-
the-road, this theory category will not be paired with an opposite. 
 Moderate theorist Michael Brown begins his argument by stating that the presence of 
historical grievances is not sufficient cause for conflict. While such grievances were present 
in Bosnia, he argues, they were also present between groups like the Czechs and Slovaks, and 
Ukrainians and Russians, who did not engage in conflict. “This single-factor explanation, in 
short, cannot account for significant variation in the incidence and intensity of internal and 
ethnic conflict.”74 Brown, therefore, proposes four clusters of factors that make an area more 
predisposed to violence than others: structural factors, political factors, economic or social 
factors, and cultural or perceptual factors. 
 Structural factors include weak states, intra-state security concerns, and ethnic 
geography. “If the state in question is very weak or if it is expected to become weaker with 
time, the incentives for groups to make independent military preparations grow. The problem 
is that, in taking steps to defend themselves, groups often threaten the security of others. This 
can lead neighboring groups to take steps that will diminish the security of the first group: 
this is the security dilemma.”75 In addressing the issue of ethnic geography, Brown argues 
that states with ethnic minorities are more prone to conflict than others, but does point out 
that ethnic homogeneity is no guarantee of internal harmony. If ethnic groups are highly 
inter-mingled, secessionist demands are less likely. However, if they do arise they are more 
likely to lead to brutality and violence. Countries with groups distributed along regional lines 
are more likely to face secessionist demands but warfare is more likely to be “conventional” 
in nature. 
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The second set of factors is political. This group includes discriminatory political 
institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, inter-group politics, and elite politics. Closed, 
authoritarian systems are likely to generate resentment overtime, especially if the interests of 
some groups are recognized while others are ignored. If national identity is based on ethnic 
distinctions rather than political equality, then conflict is more likely as well. The odds of 
violence occurring also increase if groups, no matter how they are defined, “have ambitious 
objectives, strong senses of identity, and confrontational strategies. Conflict is especially 
likely if objectives are incompatible, groups are strong and determined, action is feasible, 
success is possible, and if inter-group comparisons lead to competition, anxiety, and fears of 
being dominated.”76 Included in political factors is elite manipulation. “Ethnic conflict is 
often provoked by elites in times of political and economic turmoil in order to fend off 
domestic challengers. Ethnic bashing and scapegoating are tools of the trade.”77 
The third group of factors is economic and social; this includes economic problems, 
discriminatory economic systems, and the trials and tribulations of economic development 
and modernization. Economic problems can arise even in times of economic growth if said 
growth is not as fast as it once was or is not fast enough to keep pace with societal demands. 
Unequal economic opportunities, unequal access to resources like land and capital, and large 
differences in living standards can lead certain members of society to see the economic 
system as unfair and illegitimate. Economic development, industrialization, and the 
introduction of new technologies bring about profound social changes including migration 
and urbanization, better education, higher literacy rates, and improved media coverage 
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raising awareness. This places strains on existing social and political systems and can raise 
expectations which lead to frustration when they are not met.  
 Finally, Brown points to cultural and perceptual factors as predisposing an area to 
violent conflict. The cultural and perceptual factors include cultural discrimination against 
minorities and group histories that supply groups with positive perceptions of themselves and 
negative perceptions of others. Inequitable educational opportunities, legal and political 
constraints on the use and teaching of minority languages, and restrictions on religious 
freedom can all lead to resentment among minority groups. “Groups tend to whitewash and 
glorify their own histories, and they often demonize their neighbors, rivals, and 
adversaries…Stories that are passed down from generation to generation by word of mouth 
become part of a group’s lore. They often become distorted and exaggerated with time, and 
are treated as received wisdom by group members.”78 According to Brown and other 
moderates, legitimate ethnic grievances and rivalries contribute to violence but are not the 
sole cause of it as primordialists would argue. 
Brown argues that states are especially prone to violence if state structures are 
collapsing due to external developments, internal problems, or some combination of the two. 
When state structures weaken, groups have a heightened sense of potential security problems. 
They are more likely to take measures to protect themselves, which, in turn generates fear 
among other groups. Political transitions make states more prone to violence because they 
often result in the emergence of exclusionary national ideologies. The rise of new groups can 
intensify pre-existing hostilities. “The emergence of power struggles between and among 
elites can be particularly problematic, because desperate and opportunistic politicians are 
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particularly prone to employing divisive ethnic and nationalistic appeals.”79 Economic and 
social problems can result in violence when they cause discontent and unrest. Such problems 
include economic hardship, resource competition, income inequality, and fast-paced 
modernization. “States are especially prone to violence if discrimination against minorities 
intensifies or if politicians begin to blame some ethnic groups for whatever political and 
economic problems their country may be experiencing. Ethnic bashing and scapegoating are 
often precursors to violence.”80 
Despite an emphasis on legitimate ethnic grievances and outside factors, Brown 
makes sure to highlight the potential responsibility of elites in creating conflict. He argues 
that conflict often arises because of power struggles between competing elites, which are 
driven by personal, political motivations. Brown argues that power struggle conflicts begin 
with a lack of elite legitimacy, which leads to elite vulnerability. These vulnerabilities can be 
brought about by weakening state structures, political transitions, pressures for political 
reform, and economic powers. Those in power are determined to fend off potential political 
challengers and devise a new formula to legitimize their rule: playing the ethnic card and 
proclaiming themselves the champions of ethnic groups. This results in a shift from civic 
nationalism to ethnic nationalism. Politicians portray other ethnic groups in threatening terms 
to bolster group solidarity and their own political positions; “perceived threats are extremely 
powerful unifying devices. When leaders have control over the national media, these kinds of 
campaigns are particularly effective: a relentless drum beat of ethnic propaganda can distort 
political discourse quickly and dramatically.”81 
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While Brown may seem like a proponent of elite manipulation, he is quick to 
highlight his belief that the masses are only susceptible to ethnic propaganda and other 
manipulative devices when antagonistic group histories exist. Violent histories make ethnic 
bashing and threats seem plausible. He also points to economic trouble as essential in 
priming people to believe elite suggestions. If economic resources are short, people are more 
likely to accept a radical change and shift blame to one group for taking all the jobs, having 
the most money, etc. Brown argues that all three factors—intensifying elite competitions, 
problematic group histories, and economic problems—must be present for such violent 
ethnic conflicts to explode.82 
The moderate viewpoint is also expressed by political scientist Ted Gurr. Gurr and his 
colleague Barbara Harff begin their book Ethnic Conflict in World Politics with a definition 
of identity groups. “Identity groups are psychological communities whose members share a 
persisting sense of common interest and identity that is based on some combination of shared 
historical experience and valued cultural traits—beliefs, language, ways of life, a common 
homeland.”83 Gurr and Harff argue that ethnic ties are based on legitimate similarities but 
that ethnic identities become increasingly important when actual or perceived disadvantages 
exist in comparison with the central government, and when members of different ethnic 
groups are competing for scarce resources. In other words, ethnic ties have some basis in 
reality but can be intensified by outside factors. 
Gurr and Harff lay out a number of hypotheses for why ethnic conflict occurs. First, 
when people are discriminated against, they are likely to be resentful and angry. Some 
express anger through accommodation, others vent frustrations openly. For those people who 
 
82 Ibid., 21. 
83 Gurr and Harff, 5. 
40
express anger openly, the greater the discrimination they experience, the more likely they are 
to organize against the sources of discrimination. Furthermore, standing up to discrimination 
alone is difficult and scary. Therefore, “finding like-minded individuals with similar 
grievances intensifies discontent and increases willingness to take action. The more strongly 
a person identifies with an ethnic group that is subject to discrimination, the more likely he or 
she is to be motivated into action.”84 Here, Gurr and Harff suggest that one joins an ethnic 
group to be part of a larger whole rather than because of strong ethnic bonds. 
Furthermore, conflict is more likely when groups are cohesive and have strong, 
unified leadership. “Cohesive groups are those that have dense networks of communication 
and interaction that link leaders with followers. Strong ethnopolitical leaders generate the 
type of climate in which people willingly subordinate personal preferences to group 
preferences.”85 Many groups depend on external support for financial support, weaponry, 
military personnel, and verbal encouragement. “The greater their external support, the greater 
the chances groups will use violent means to challenge authorities.”86 However, even if a 
group is well-supported, minor grievances do not provoke violent political action. Finally, 
international status is given to groups and states based on the number and value of economic 
resources at their disposal. “States blessed with an abundance of resources are more likely to 
enjoy the support of the international community which is dependent on such resources…The 
greater international status accorded to a state, the less it is likely that its challengers are 
externally supported.”87 Throughout these hypotheses, Gurr and Harff reveal a belief that 
while ethnic groups are held together by a legitimate sense of common values and a shared 
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history, the likelihood that these groups will resort to violence depends greatly on outside 
factors and conditions, rather than ethnic hatreds alone. 
Gurr also expresses a moderate view in his 1993 book Minorities at Risk. “The most 
basic assumption of the theory is that ethnopolitical activism is motivated by people’s deep-
seated grievances about their collective status in combination with the situationally 
determined pursuit of political interests, as articulated by group leaders and political 
entrepreneurs.”88 Gurr finds that ethnic mobilization is based on both sets of factors. 
Grievances about differential treatment and the sense of group cultural identity are essential 
precursors of mobilization. If people’s grievances and group identities are weak, there is little 
chance that a political entrepreneur can mobilize them in opposition to an external threat. On 
the other hand, “the conjunction of shared grievances with a strong sense of group identity 
and common interest provides highly combustible material that fuels spontaneous action 
whenever external control weakens.”89 
Gurr lays out four factors which determine the likelihood that a group will resort to 
violence: the extent of collective disadvantage, the salience of group identity, the extent of 
group cohesion and mobilization, and the degree to which dominant groups impose 
repressive control. Groups must also be presented with an opportunity for political action. 
Global processes can intensify grievances such as the expansion of the state, or the 
development of a global economic system. Over all, Gurr again presents the view that some 
legitimate ethnic ties and grievances are necessary in order for elite manipulation and other 
outside factors to cause ethnic conflict.  
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Brown’s version of moderate theory in some ways seems to be a modified version of 
elite manipulation. He puts great emphasis on the role of leaders in exacerbating ethnic 
divisions and on other external factors in solidifying people’s feeling of allegiance toward 
their ethnic group. He seems to mention that ethnic ties and common history must precede 
violence as an after thought to avoid the standard criticism that elite manipulation theorists 
portray the masses as mindless sheep. In this way, it can be argued that Brown’s moderate 
theory is much closer to elite manipulation than primordialism and therefore is less middle-
of-the-road than Gurr’s. Gurr’s theory relies on the fact that ethnic ties are not simply present 
but extremely strong and coupled with legitimate and significant group grievances. As a 
result, Gurr presents the most wholly moderate view, which is truly a compromise between 
elite manipulation and primordialism. 
 
Emotion Theory 
 I will use the term emotion theory to refer to the argument that ethnic violence is 
motivated by emotion rather than rationality. This theory is somewhat similar to 
primordialism in the sense that both support the existence of a kind of nonrational, instinctual 
element at work in ethnic conflict. However, emotion theory is distinct from primordialism 
because it does not address the origin of ethnic sentiment. Rather than arguing that ethnic 
bonds are innate and enduring, emotion theory argues that ethnic groups are led to violence 
based on emotion regardless of the nature of the ethnic ties themselves. For this reason, it is 
more helpful to compare emotion theory with the opposing view that ethnic violence is 
motivated by rationality than it is try to equate emotion theory with primordialism. 
 The primary advocate of emotion theory is Roger Petersen. He takes an emotion-
based approach to ethnic conflict because “convincing theories of ethnic conflict must 
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provide some answer to the puzzling question of why any individual would go out and beat, 
humiliate, or discriminate against another human being.”90 Petersen argues that the 
rationality-based approach can not account for this phenomenon. First and foremost, 
according to Petersen, an emotion “raises the saliency of one’s desire/concern over others; in 
other words, emotion helps select among competing desires. An emotion heightens both 
cognitive and physical capabilities necessary to respond to the situational challenge.”91 
Petersen presents four primary emotions: fear, hatred, resentment, and rage. The first 
three he categorizes as instrumental, meaning that they motivate a person to act in a way 
which directly meets a pressing concern. “Fear prepares the individual to satisfy safety 
concerns; hatred prepares the individual to act on historical grievance; resentment prepares 
the individual to address status/self-esteem discrepancies.”92 Rage, on the other hand, “often 
produces cognitive distortions that can lead to irrelevant or counterproductive actions (such 
as searching for scapegoats). A primary benefit of the emotional approach is that it can 
accommodate both instrumental and noninstrumental action.”93 In other words, Petersen’s 
theory can explain actions taken to ensure one’s safety and to obtain what one desires, as 
well as actions which provide no clear benefit to the actor himself. A theory which provides 
an explanation for both types of actions is quite rare, thus giving a great deal of clout to 
Petersen’s argument. 
 Emotion theory can also explain shifts in motivation, which Petersen believes occur 
regularly in ethnic conflict. “The same individual may be driven to commit ethnic violence 
by different motivations at different times. The participant in ethnic violence may be acting 
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on revenge at one particular moment, on the desire to help preempt an attack on his or her 
own group at another time, and on the wish to ‘put members of another group in their place’ 
in yet another situation.”94 Emotional responses naturally result from one’s cognitive beliefs. 
“Beliefs about threat lead to fears; beliefs about status inconsistency lead to resentments; 
beliefs about history and vengeance lead to hatreds.”95 
Petersen also provides a detailed account of how these emotions are created. He 
argues that a structural change leads to information, which creates a belief, which engenders 
an emotion. The emotion then loops back to effect what information one absorbs and what 
beliefs one takes from it. Emotions themselves lead to concerns for safety, historical 
vengeance, and group status—stemming from fear, hatred, and resentment respectively—
which then affect one’s desires and lead one to act. “The emotion, once generated, produces 
feedback effects on information and belief. For the instrumental emotions, the beliefs that 
have already been formed become reinforced. For example, once one is in the grip of fear, 
reports about danger and threat will crowd out other information.”96 Instrumental emotions 
act to select the information that is most relevant to the elevated goal. “In the instrumental 
paths, emotion impacts cognition through a feedback loop. In rage, emotion dominates and 
distorts cognition.”97 In other words, instrumental emotions cause one to select the 
information he wants to hear, while rage causes one to change information entirely. 
Petersen provides some examples of structural changes which lead to each of the 
instrumental emotions. In the case of fear, the collapse of weakening of the political center 
can eliminate institutional constraints and guarantees to create a situation of anarchy. In this 
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situation, “fear heightens the desire for security. The target of ethnic violence will be the 
group that is the biggest threat.”98 The collapse of the center also eliminates constraints, 
which provides an opportunity to commit aggression and gives hatred free reign. “The target 
of ethnic violence will be the group that has frequently been attacked with similar 
justification over an extended time period.”99 In the case of resentment, the weakening of the 
central government can rearrange ethnic status hierarchies by changing sovereignty relations. 
“The predicted ethnic target will be the group perceived as farthest up the ethnic status 
hierarchy that can be most surely subordinated through violence.”100 If the target is lower on 
the status hierarchy, or higher but cannot be reduced through violence then resentment does 
not apply. 
Fear, hatred, and resentment all involve a desire to lash out, but this desire is linked to 
a specific concern and embedded in the context of group relations. However, if the desire to 
lash out arises from multiple sources and without a clear course of action, then rage is 
involved and aggression may be directed arbitrarily. “If the target of aggression is not related 
to the conditions that created frustration, the negative emotions may continue, or perhaps 
only temporarily subside.”101 In the case of rage, emotion precedes cognition, which leads to 
distortions in information collection and belief formation. This may lead to substitute targets 
rather than direct ones; “if the group that is the source of frustration is unavailable for attack, 
another group will be found to substitute for it.”102 Rage is distinguishable by cognitive 
distortions in the selection of targets, clear substitute targets, incoherent justifications for 
violence, and difficulty identifying the source of emotion.  
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Petersen also presents an argument for the superiority of the emotions-based approach 
over the rational choice approach. Rational choice assumes that the individual has one stable 
preference structure, such as a belief that safety is more important than revenge which is 
more important than self-esteem, and assumes that action can be predicted based on this 
structure. However, Petersen questions how realistically preferences relating to ethnic 
violence can be rank ordered. The emotion approach does not require creating such ranks, 
and thus in some ways can be seen as preferable to rational choice theory. “Emotions create a 
sense of urgency, they dramatically raise the salience of a particular desire, they explain 
compulsion.”103 
Furthermore, Petersen maintains that “any act by an individual against a large group 
is inherently irrational. One individual’s action will not change the power of status position 
of an ethnic group.”104 There must be an explanation for why an individual participates in 
group action with public goods characteristics. Some theorists stretch rational choice theory 
to include a value of the enjoyment of participation. However, “the benefit of this 
participation makes no sense without reference to emotion. Why does an individual value 
participation for its own sake?”105 It is misleading to assign “a hate filled action a certain 
participatory utility or value when the emotion of hate itself is the driving and determinative 
force.”106 Rational choice theory, according to Petersen, is most useful under stable 
institutional environments. However, most violent ethnic conflicts occur in periods of state 
collapse and it is in this situation that emotion theory is most salient. 
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Petersen also addresses critics who argue that elites are capable of creating these 
emotions. Petersen concedes that elites can influence ethnic relations through their grip on 
the media by cleverly framing the situation to their advantage and by appealing to norms. 
“With reference to nationalist myths and constant reminders of past and present 
victimizations, elites can inflame and intensify the emotions themselves.”107 However, if 
Petersen’s mass-oriented approach is able to correctly identify and explain patterns of ethnic 
conflict, then the role of elite influence must be questioned. “Elites must then be seen as 
responding to structural change and mass emotion rather than shaping it. Clearly, the 
influences go both ways, but it is an important matter to determine which direction is 
dominant.”108 
Finally, Petersen agrees with Ivelin Sardamov who said, “Portraying millions of 
individuals in many societies as mindless robots who can easily be duped into assuming 
fictitious identities and sacrificing their own and others’ lives for the purposes of a small 
group of skillful self-serving manipulators represents an extremely simplistic and 
condescending view.”109 The emotion-based approach presents people as responsible for 
their own actions, rather than placing the blame solely on elites who somehow tricked the 
masses into behaving a certain way. 
Emotion theory is unique in that it embraces the “unscientific” nature of ethnic 
conflict as well as both the instrumental and noninstrumental actions of individuals involved. 
For many, a comprehensive theory on ethnic conflict must make room for emotional 
motivation, as this is believed to be the only way to explain the brutality of such wars. “As 
Chateaubriand expressed it nearly 200 years ago, ‘Men don’t allow themselves to be killed 
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for their interests; they allow themselves to be killed for their passions.’ To phrase it 
differently, large numbers of people do not voluntarily die for things that are rational.”110 
Emotion theory captures an element of ethnic conflict which often eludes or is ignored by 
political scientists, but which is nonetheless an important element of such violence. 
 
Rational Choice Theory 
 Rational choice theory agrees that ethnic groups form of their own volition rather 
than by elite manipulation, but argues that these groups are fundamentally motivated by 
rational concerns rather than by emotion. To a certain extent, proponents of rational choice 
theory treat ethnic groups as states, seeking power, security, and survival rather than carrying 
out vendettas against others which would not serve concrete political purpose. The premier 
thinkers in this category are David Lake and Donald Rothchild, who argue that ethnic 
conflicts are caused by collective fears of the future. “As groups begin to fear for their safety, 
dangerous and difficult-to-resolve strategic dilemmas arise that contain within them the 
potential for tremendous violence. As information failures, problems of credible 
commitment, and the security dilemma take hold, groups become apprehensive, the state 
weakens, and conflict becomes more likely.”111 
Lake and Rothchild maintain that ethnic groups are formed originally because of 
legitimate historical grievances against other groups. In the words of Vesna Pesic, a professor 
at the University of Belgrade and a peace activist in the former Yugoslavia, “ethnic conflict 
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is caused by the fear of the future, lived through the past.”112 This is in some ways consistent 
with the arguments of primordialists, in that the masses choose to join ethnic groups for 
personal reasons rather than being duped by elites. However, the role of emotion and fear 
ends with the formation of ethnic groups. Individuals’ motivations for action, according to 
Lake and Rothchild, are rational and therefore similar to those experienced by state actors. 
Lake and Rothchild propose that “competition for resources typically lies at the heart 
of ethnic conflict.”113 Because the state controls access to scarce resources, those groups with 
more political power gain privileged access to resources, increasing their welfare and leading 
to resentment from other groups. “When groups conclude that they can improve their welfare 
only at the expense of others, they become locked into competitions for scarce resources and 
state power.”114 Pointing to the case of Czechoslovakia, where two ethnic groups had 
competing policy preferences but reached compromise to avoid violence, Lake and Rothchild 
state that “competing policy preferences by themselves can not explain the resort to 
violence.”115 They argue that in order for negotiations to fail, one of three strategic dilemmas 
must exist: information failure, problems of credible commitment, and the security dilemma. 
Lake and Rothchild begin by explaining their understanding of information failure. 
“Because violence is costly, groups can be expected to invest in acquiring knowledge about 
the preferences and capabilities of the opposing side and bargain hard, but eventually reach 
an agreement short of open conflict.”116 This strategy, however, requires that groups reveal 
information about themselves to the enemy, which they often feel uncomfortable doing. An 
information failure occurs when groups cannot acquire or share the information necessary to 
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reach a compromise. Groups have an incentive to misrepresent information when they feel 
they can gain in negotiations by bluffing. “By exaggerating their strengths, minimizing their 
weaknesses, and misstating their preferences, groups seek to achieve more favorable division 
of resources.”117 Misrepresentations, however, make conflict more likely. For example, 
groups may be truly aggressive but not want to be branded as such. These groups seek to 
minimize internal opposition and avoid repercussions in the broader international community 
and so misrepresent their character. This can lead opponents to be especially unyielding in 
negotiations, not knowing the likelihood that doing so will result in violence. 
In conflicts where groups are negotiating and preparing for war at the same time, any 
attempt to facilitate compromise will require that each side explain how it plans to win on the 
battlefield. However, doing so would seriously compromise one’s ability to win. Without 
being able to tell the truth, groups can not derive accurate predictions of their success. 
“Concerned that private information they provide on how they intend to protect themselves 
or attack others will work to their disadvantage, groups may refrain from revealing the 
information necessary to forge a mutually satisfactory compromise.”118 Furthermore, “if one 
group believes that the other is withholding information, it too may begin to hold back 
crucial data or anticipate the failure of negotiations.”119 Even the anticipation of an 
information failure may drive groups to undermine attempts at peace by withholding 
information on the suspicion that the other side is doing the same. 
The second cause of ethnic conflict according to Lake and Rothchild is the problem 
of credible commitment. “Ethnic conflicts also arise because groups cannot credibly commit 
themselves to uphold mutually beneficial agreements they might reach. In other words, at 
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least one group cannot effectively reassure the other that it will not renege on an agreement 
and exploit it at some future date.”120 The ability to uphold a peace agreement depends on the 
minority group, which is undoubtedly fearful of future exploitation and violence and may be 
reluctant to make compromises if it feels the other side will not uphold them. Lake and 
Rothchild are confident that “when the balance of ethnic power remains stable—and is 
expected to remain stable—well-crafted contracts enable ethnic groups to avoid conflict 
despite their differing policy preferences.”121 
However, this balance does shift over time, making such agreements more difficult. 
For example, when multi-ethnic federations like Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 
disintegrate, “the relevant political space alters rapidly and the various ethnic groups that 
once counted their numbers on a national scale must now calculate their kin in terms of the 
new, smaller territorial units, and may find themselves in a stronger or weaker position.”122 If 
a group believes that there is even a slight chance that it will become the target of a genocidal 
attack, it may choose conflict over compromise, which would involve the risk of future 
destruction. “To provoke conflict, one group need not believe that the other really is 
aggressive, only fear that it might be. With incomplete information even small changes in 
beliefs about the intentions of the other group can generate massive violence.”123 
The final catalyst to ethnic conflict is the security dilemma. States which feel their 
security is threatened or may soon be threatened tend to expand their military capabilities. 
This in turn is seen as threatening by the opposing group, which bulks up its forces and in 
doing so seems to confirm the suspicion of threat of the original group. “It is the inability 
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both to know with certainty the intentions and abilities of others, and to commit credibly not 
to arm for offensive purposes that drives the spiral.”124 Along with the security dilemma 
comes the issue of preemption; if one group fears the other will preempt then it might choose 
to strike first and negotiate later. “In ethnic relations, as in international relations, when there 
are significant advantages to preemptions, a cycle of violence can seize previously peaceful 
groups even as they seek nothing more than their own safety. By the same logic, previously 
satisfied groups can be driven to become aggressors, destroying ethnic harmony in the search 
for group security.”125 The three precursors to ethnic violence presented here—information 
failure, credible commitment, and the security dilemma—all can and have been applied to 
conflicts between states. This comparison emphasizes Lake and Rothchild’s point that ethnic 
groups are rational actors, as there is no actor more rational in a political system than a state. 
Lake and Rothchild do recognize that ethnic conflicts are more complex than 
interactions between states because ethnic groups are held together by more tenuous and 
unofficial bonds than nations are. The two theorists agree that political elites can aggravate a 
pre-existing problem; Lake and Rothchild coin the term “political entrepreneurs” to refer to 
those who do not share the beliefs of extremists but who seek to use extreme view points to 
gain political office and power. Some moderate leaders are forced to adopt more “ethnic” 
positions in response to militant political challengers in a process of “ethnic outbidding.” 
Political entrepreneurs can also reinforce processes of social polarization. When presenting 
issues to the public, such leaders can “exaggerate the hostility of others and magnify the 
likelihood of conflict—thereby distorting public debate and images of other groups and 
driving co-ethnics toward them for power and support…In short, political entrepreneurs both 
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reflect and stimulate ethnic fears for their own aggrandizement.”126 Lake and Rothchild 
maintain that leaders can not create ethnic hatred out of thin air. In the situation described 
leaders are playing on fears that primarily derive from rational safety concerns rather than 
emotion and hatred. 
Ethnic activists also play a strong role in the polarization. “By persuading others to 
increase their public ethnic activity in order to maintain standing within the group ethnic 
activists can drive individuals to represent falsely their true preferences. While they might 
prefer, for instance, not to associate exclusively with members of their own group, 
individuals are pressed by activists and the social pressures they spawn to alter their behavior 
in a more ‘ethnic’ direction.”127 Social polarization by itself does not lead to ethnic violence, 
and ethnic extremists seem to be generated by significant information failure, problems of 
credible commitment, and security dilemmas, rather than to create them. “Ethnic activists 
and political entrepreneurs are as much a product as a producer of ethnic fears and are 
dependent for their ‘success’ upon the underlying strategic dilemmas.”128 
Lake and Rothchild do make room for the roll of political memories and myths in 
exacerbating ethnic conflict. “Many analysts point to a deep psychological—perhaps even 
physiological—need for humans to belong to a group. In the process of drawing distinctions, 
however, individuals often overstate the goodness of their own group while simultaneously 
vilifying others.”129 However, Lake and Rothchild maintain that the fundamental precursors 
to ethnic violence are not based on emotion but rather rational security concerns. Emotion 
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may intensify these concerns and the unity of the group, but it is at best a secondary 
contributor which only has an affect when rational concerns exist previously.  
Fundamentally, Lake and Rothchild are not hopeful about the prospect of preventing 
ethnic conflicts in the future because “there is no form of insurance sufficient to protect 
against the dilemmas that produce collective fears and violence.”130 In this sense, ethnic 
conflict differs from those between states. While it can be hard for states to trust each other if 
they have an antagonistic relationship, the international community often serves to reinforce 
treaties and provide some deterrent to breaking them. For ethnic groups, these deterrents are 
not as strong, making the actions of such groups unpredictable and heightening fears about 
future actions. 
Daniel Byman, like Lake and Rothchild, supports the rational choice theory. He 
proposes four general causes of ethnic conflict, none of which are mutually exclusive. The 
first is the ethnic security dilemma, whereby groups make efforts to protect themselves 
because no sovereign authority can ensure their security. The second cause is a group’s status 
concerns; “ethnic conflict occurs as an outgrowth of group fears of being dominated, in both 
material and cultural ways, by other groups. The specific concern with regard to status is 
cultural, not physical, survival.”131 The third is a desire of one or several groups for 
hegemony. A fourth cause is the ambitions of ethnic elites who play on ethnic fears, hatreds, 
and ambitions to gain or maintain power.  
Byman begins with an examination of the ethnic security dilemma. While this factor 
is also highlighted by Lake and Rothchild, Byman highlights a few elements which the two 
omitted from their study. For example, Byman explains that the security dilemma for ethnic 
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groups, as opposed to states, begins when the government becomes too weak to protect one 
group from its rival. This encourages the group to arm itself and thus sets off the dilemma. 
Byman also emphasizes the distinction between the structural and perceptual approaches to 
the security dilemma. The structural view argues that security dilemmas are essentially 
inevitable in the correct circumstances; even two states fully satisfied with the status quo may 
begin a war simply because both believe that the state who strikes first will have a decisive 
advantage. The perceptual approach emphasizes the role of factors like the degree of ethnic 
chauvinism and level of elite manipulation in any specific situation. Even when 
circumstances may be primed for a security dilemma, one will not occur according to this 
understanding if groups favor peaceful means of resolving the conflict. Byman argues that in 
order to emphasize the security dilemma as a legitimate cause of conflict, it is important to 
use the perceptual approach which shows that the existence of the security dilemma is 
meaningful as opposed to rather than always being present. 
Byman also highlights the fact that preemptive action is especially likely in ethnic 
conflicts because they tend to be situations of offensive dominance. This means that it is 
relatively easy and costless for groups to act offensively, but dangerous and risky to act 
defensively. In most ethnic conflict, killing large numbers of the enemy is cheap and easy 
because defenders are unarmed civilians. Small bands of gunmen can easily create masses of 
refugees and little training is required. Weapons are inexpensive and widely available. 
Because of this characteristic of ethnic warfare, groups must be highly sensitive to the other’s 
efforts to arm and mobilize. “Even groups that do not seek to harm their neighbors have an 
incentive to mobilize and strike first before their opponent does the same to them.”132 
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Byman’s point is also an important addition because it presents a logical explanation for 
action which may otherwise seem illogically aggressive and brutal. 
The ease of offensive action in ethnic conflict can also be used to explain ethnic 
cleansing. “The settlements of rival ethnic groups in another group’s territory represent 
dangerous islands of potential traitors who, given arms and minimal training, will pose a 
serious military threat. ‘Cleansing’ such areas, from a military point of view is logical.”133 
Moderate voices are quickly silenced as atrocities, real and exaggerated, discredit peaceful 
solutions. “Even those who reject an exclusive ethnic identity and see themselves as 
cosmopolitan fear hostility both from their own people and from the enemy, which seldom 
distinguishes the assimilated from the non-assimilated.”134 There is also pressure to keep 
members of the group in the group, so that moderates are polarized by force. In this way, 
Byman provides a rational explanation for individuals to join violent groups. 
Byman also discusses ethnic status and strife as causes of conflict. “Status causes 
conflict when one distinguishable group blocks another’s quest for recognition or social 
legitimacy.”135 Nationalists glorify the dominant identity and play down rival claims to a 
state’s history. As a result, the minority group must organize to gain respect and recognition. 
“Status concerns differ from those of the security dilemma in that groups fear not only for 
their survival but also for their own cultural or social domination. Once a conflict begins, 
however, status concerns and security fears often become interwoven. Group fears of cultural 
extinction are reinforced by security fears that are often generated by actual violence.”136 
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Modernization often aggravates status concerns by bringing previously isolated 
groups in contact with each other, as well as encouraging mobility and undermining the 
existing ethnic division of labor. “The composition of a region can change due to the 
migration fostered by modernization. Protecting one’s traditional space and opportunities 
from migrants thus becomes a preoccupation of the local population.”137 Status conflicts 
usually occur between an advanced and a backward group. “The advanced groups in general 
tend to be more tied to the modern sector of the economy. Backward groups will strive to 
ensure their fair share in society and government, and they fear being overwhelmed by the 
advanced group.”138 
Byman also attributes ethnic conflict to hegemonic ambitions of ethnic groups. While 
both ethnic security dilemmas and status concerns have defensive motivations, hegemonic 
ambitions are offensive in nature. “For members of hegemonic groups, their language must 
be the only official language; their religion must be followed by all citizens; and their 
institutions must be enshrined in government and society.”139 The hegemonic group must 
assert that it deserves and can achieve political and social domination. Conflicts based on 
these ambitions generally occur when a group is numerically superior and considers itself 
more socially advanced. Minority resistance to attempted hegemony becomes increasingly 
likely when there has been past bloodshed, a strong established culture exists, and progress 
on minority rights has occurred elsewhere. 
Finally, Byman points to elite competition as a cause of ethnic conflict. When elites 
compete for power they often attempt to outbid each other. Elites try to make their 
interpretation of what ethnicity means the dominant political issue in order to increase their 
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power. “They try to manipulate existing identities, making certain ones more politically 
salient and weakening national or other identities that might bring people together.”140 Elite 
competition is far more focused on within-group tension than inter-group problems. Elites 
often try to convince individuals to identify themselves along ethnic lines and depoliticize 
other issues by emphasizing ethnicity to attract supporters. Control over information is 
essential for elite influence to take effect. Furthermore, elite competition can create a security 
dilemma by portraying aggression as more likely to succeed and other groups as more 
threatening than they really are. Elites even hire their own mobs or thugs to increase tension 
and protect themselves. 
Lake and Rothchild present ethnic conflict in a very straight-forward and rational 
manner. Groups are all interested in protecting themselves and their interests, and they resort 
to violence in these pursuits. Byman take a more risky approach to rational choice theory by 
trying to provide explanations for aspects of ethnic conflict which can not easily be described 
as rational. Groups may initiate violence in situations where the opposing group does not 
constitute an obvious threat because, in situations of offensive dominance, it is more logical 
to risk initiating a war that may not have otherwise happened than to sit back and allow for 
the minute possibility that the other group will act first. While Lake and Rothchild focus on 
ethnic groups’ attempts at physical survival, Byman makes room for cultural survival and 
dominance as motivations for violence. Byman still argues that groups act rationally rather 
than emotionally, but simply applies rational considerations to aspects of ethnic conflict that 
are often relegated to the emotional realm. 
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Conclusion 
 There is no question that some important scholars in the field of ethnic conflict have 
been omitted from this overview and that a number of theories exist which are not presented 
here. However, most of the absent theories propose combinations of those explored above, 
adding some nuances which, while intriguing, are more complex and detailed than this study 
permits. In examining the violence in the former Yugoslavia all theories will appear perfectly 
relevant at some points and completely wrong at others. A thorough examination of the 
events in the region will reveal that no theory is perfect but that each explains some essence 
of ethnic conflict which is otherwise difficult to understand. In a certain sense, it is only by 
recognizing the merit of each argument along with its weaknesses that a full picture of the 
forces behind ethnic conflict can ever be attained. 
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Chapter 3: Background of the Region 
This chapter will provide a historical background of the Balkans from the time that 
the Slavic people first migrated to the region in the sixth century to the rise of Slobodan 
Milosevic in the late 1980s. Focus must undoubtedly be placed on events of the twentieth 
century, primarily World War II, which saw great ethnic and nationalistic violence, and 
Tito’s Yugoslavia, the deterioration of which led to the conflicts of the 1990s. However, the 
fact that discussions of ethnic conflict contain endless references to “ancient hatreds” 
necessitates an examination of the early events of the Balkans to determine the true origins 
and histories of these groups, and to establish how far back mutual hatreds can reasonably be 
said to extend. It is impossible to truly understand and appreciate the complexities of the 
Croatian and Bosnian Wars without putting them in the context of fifteen centuries of life in 
the Balkans. 
 It should be noted that this chapter may at times seem to be arguing that fundamental 
ethnic hatreds exist in the region and at other times seem to be arguing just the opposite. My 
goal is to present an exhaustive and unbiased history of the Balkans rather than picking and 
choosing certain events to highlight in an attempt to support a specific interpretation. When 
appropriate, I will expand on historical facts to illustrate how they can be used to bolster one 
theory, but will try to balance out such statements with a counter-argument as well. This 
chapter, then, is meant to give the reader all the information he or she will need to develop a 
personal opinion on the subject without attempting to advocate one side over the other. 
 
The Origin of Ethnic Division in the Balkans 
People of Slavic descent first began emigrating to the Balkans in the sixth century. 
This group of migrants contained the ancestors of present-day Serbs and Croats, meaning that 
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the two groups have ties of kinship and were in fact originally one people. The Slavic 
immigrants were pagan upon arrival, but one group of Slavs settled in an area that was 
increasingly targeted by Orthodox missionaries from Constantinople, and another in an area 
which was growing increasingly Catholic.141 This means that the fundamental difference 
between Serbs and Croats is religion rather than ancestry. In the words of Robert Kaplan, 
“Were it not originally for religion, there would be little basis for Serb-Croat enmity.”142 
Furthermore, this distinction developed arbitrarily when modern-day Serbs settled in a region 
which fell under control of the Byzantine Empire and modern-day Croats settled in land 
which was soon to be controlled by the Roman church. The division between Serbs and 
Croats did not develop naturally but rather by chance. 
Before moving onto subsequent historical developments, it is important to understand 
how religious differences can develop into a sense of complete cultural separation. As 
Kaplan explains, the differences between Orthodoxy and Catholicism go beyond 
disagreements about religious interpretations and beliefs. The two represent fundamental 
opposites of East versus West, “beauty and magic” versus “ideas and deeds.” Eastern 
Orthodoxy is a re-creation of heaven on earth, and Catholicism, while often considered 
highly ritualistic in the West, is intellectual compared to Orthodoxy.143 Croats identify with 
Western Europe more so than with the Balkan region because they see themselves as distinct 
from the Eastern culture of Orthodoxy. In the words of one Croat, “I feel closer to Vienna 
than to Belgrade. Zagreb is still Europe.”144 
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Kaplan argues that Serbs and Croats are fundamentally divided by their religious 
differences, and in many ways have cultures which are at odds with one another. However, it 
is important to note that while Croats in Croatia cling to Western Catholicism as a defining 
characteristic, Croats in Bosnia tend to be more attached to their ethnicity than to their 
religion. Kaplan argues that Croatian Croats hold religion more highly because they are 
surrounded by people of their own ethnicity but are close to the Eastern Orthodox and 
Muslim worlds; this heightens their sense that Catholicism is important because it is the 
characteristic that makes them different. Similarly, Bosnian Croats live in and among other 
ethnic groups and therefore hold on to their ethnicity more fiercely than their religion 
because it defines them in their particular context.145 While this argument still describes 
Croats and Serbs as at odds with one another, it does suggest that one’s identity is malleable, 
based more on one’s context than on fundamental truths and differences. If people are able to 
vary the ways in which they see and understand themselves depending on their 
circumstances, then one can argue that ethnic and religious identities are too flexible to yield 
lasting and fundamental hatreds. 
In keeping with the argument that ethnicity is a constantly shift phenomenon, Noel 
Malcolm argues that in spite of ethnically divisive rhetoric, very few people in the Balkans 
can actually claim racially pure ancestry. “As anyone who has lived or traveled in the 
Balkans will know, there is no such thing as a racially homogenous province there, let along 
a racially homogeneous state…Even if it were right to conduct modern politics in terms of 
ancient racial origins, it would simply not be possible.”146 Malcolm concludes that as of 
1180, Bosnians may have had slightly closer associations to the Croats than to the Serbs in 
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their religious and political history, but that this can hardly be said to translate to a kinship 
with modern Croat identity. “All that one can sensibly say about the ethnic identity of the 
Bosnians is this: they were the Slavs who lived in Bosnia.”147 Bosnians came from the same 
Slavic ancestors of modern-day Croats and Serbs, and were similarly molded into a different 
group by conquering empires. 
Although the Byzantine Empire was able to exert great influence over the religious 
lives of Serb settlers through missionary work, Serbs were resistant to official Byzantine rule. 
In the tenth century, Serb tribes began organizing themselves into a loose alliance of chiefs in 
an attempt to oppose Byzantine forces. After many years of resistance, Serb independence 
became official when the first Serb monarch, King Michael, came to power in 1051.148 By 
1196, Serbia had consolidated a relatively small area of territory, including parts of present 
day Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Kosovo. The Serbian empire 
continued to thrive and by 1355, it controlled a larger chunk of present-day Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as all of Montenegro, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, and a large 
part of Greece.149 The growth and dominance of the Serbian Empire is important for the 
discussion at hand because for many Serbs this historical reality reflects the proper place of 
Serbs in the Balkans today. Some argue that Serbia’s experience with independence, and its 
former status as ruler of much of the region, entitles it to control of this territory and makes 
the idea of Serbia being equal partners with these other states unacceptable.  
In spite of Serbia’s great success as an independent state, the empire began to 
disintegrate when its two-hundred-year-old dynasty fell from power. This created a power  
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Map 2: Boundaries of Serbia 1196-1389 
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vacuum and allowed the Ottoman Turks to move in and exert dominance over the territory. 
Serbs took up arms in opposition to the Ottoman takeover and maintained this resistance for 
almost two decades. The Ottomans beat the Serbs in 1371 on the Maricsa River but the Serbs 
fought on until they were ultimately defeated on June 28, 1389 at the Battle of Kosovo. This 
date marked the official Ottoman Turkish takeover of Serbia. “After falling under Turkish 
rule the Serbs were to have no more independent existence until 1804.”150 
The Battle of Kosovo has immense importance in Serbian history. This is not because 
the battle was particularly significant at the time it occurred. While the Battle of Kosovo 
marked the official Ottoman takeover of Serbia, historians argue that the Battle of Maricsa 
was a much more decisive event, after which it was only a matter of time until Serbia fell to 
the Turkish conquerors. However, the Battle of Kosovo remains important today because of 
myths and legends which developed in the years which followed, primarily about Serb 
warrior Prince Lazar. As legend has it, Prince Lazar chose to lead a hopeless fight against the 
Ottoman sultan at Kosovo rather than suing for peace and compromising Serb honor. “At the 
start of the battle, the invading Turks offered Lazar the choice between fighting to the death 
and capitulation. They also offered a reward for his surrender. He refused, choosing the 
kingdom of heaven over worldly wealth and the betrayal of his nation to a foreign 
oppressor.”151 
Today, the Battle of Kosovo is charged with nationalistic pride and symbolism, 
reflecting the feelings and opinions of modern-day Serbs rather than any particular facts 
about the event itself. “The fact that Christians and Muslims fought on both sides of the 
battle—that Serbs, Croats, Albanians, and Turks could be found in both armies—was quickly 
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forgotten. That the battle was probably a stand-off, a draw, and not the epiphany of a tragic 
defeat also disappeared in the searing light of national self-sacrifice.”152 All of these facts 
support the theory that ethnic myths are based on present-day needs and views rather than 
past reality. As a result, when Serb nationalists invoke images of past Croat racism or vice 
versa, it is important to look at the specific events being referenced and judge whether 
historical facts support modern interpretations. 
Almost a full century after Serbia was taken over by the Ottoman Turks, modern-day 
Bosnia was absorbed into the empire as well. When the Ottomans took control of Bosnian 
territory in 1463 they brought Islam to the region. The new rulers did not force conversions 
on its people but rather stated that “any Christian member of the Ottoman Empire was free to 
join the privileged class simply by changing his faith.”153 Very few Serbs converted to Islam 
after their territory was absorbed into the empire, but in Bosnia “it has been estimated that 70 
percent of the people became Muslims.”154 It was at this point that the region of Bosnia 
became an eclectic mix of Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox inhabitants.  
Although divisions of the three major groups in Bosnia center on religious 
differences, scholars argue that feelings of separation originated due to economic rather than 
faith-related issues. Most Orthodox Serbs in Bosnia lived in the countryside, while a majority 
of the Muslim population lived in towns and owned the land that Serb peasants worked. This 
economic division was the basis for feelings of resentment by the oppressed peasant, which 
was experienced in much of Europe, and eventually took on religious and national 
dimensions. Noel Malcolm argues that the hostilities in Bosnia were malleable and not at all 
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the inevitable result of mixing different religious communities together. “The main basis of 
hostility was not ethnic or religious but economic: the resentment felt by the members of a 
mainly (but not exclusively) Christian peasantry towards their Muslim landowners. This 
hostility was not some absolute or irreducible force: it varied as economic circumstances 
changed, and was also subject to political pressures which significantly altered the attitude of 
the landowning class during the first half of the nineteenth century.”155 While Malcolm does 
suggest that resentment between ethnic groups in Bosnia reaches back to their ancient past, 
his suggestion that these sentiments were originally economic rather than ethnic in character 
still brings primordialism into question. After all, by his account these groups did not bind 
together because of some unspoken psychological and spiritual connection but because of 
common logical resentment.  
 
The Expansion of Nationalism 
For hundreds of years, the Slavic groups of the Balkans were ruled by large empires; 
the Serbs and Bosnians lived under Ottoman rule, while the Croats were controlled by the 
Austrians. Because the Ottoman Empire was the first to decline and the Serbs were unusually 
powerful for a subjugated group, the Serbs were the first Slavic group to fight for their 
independence. In 1804, the Serbs rose up in revolt to protest the poor administration and 
oppressive acts of the local Turkish officials of the Ottoman Empire. “By 1806 the Ottoman 
government, worried by the progress of the revolt, offered to grant autonomy to Serbia. 
Meanwhile, the Serbs had been able to gain an alliance with Russia, herself at war with the 
Ottoman Empire, and they now demanded complete independence.”156 Russia, however, 
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turned out to be an unreliable ally and concluded its war with the Ottomans without the Serbs 
in mind. The Serbs fought the Ottomans until 1813 when they were defeated. 
When the Turks reoccupied Serbia, they did so in such a violent manner that Serbs 
rebelled again in 1815. Because France had since been defeated and Russia was therefore a 
more powerful force than it had previously been, the Ottomans feared Russian intervention 
and thus granted Serb autonomy. The Ottoman Empire continued to levy a tribute on the 
Serbs and to occupy certain fortresses in Serbia, but for all intents and purposes the Serbs had 
secured an independent state. The agreement was solidified by the Treaty of Akkerman of 
1826 and the Treaty of Adrianople of 1829, making the Serbs the first Balkan ethnic group to 
forge their own autonomous state in the modern era.157 This put Serbs in a powerful place 
vis-à-vis Croats and Slovenes who were not in a position to gain independence in the near 
future. This development also set the stage for later Serb claims that they were the only group 
fit to rule Yugoslavia as they had the most experience at self-government.158 
Despite Serbia’s advantageous position, however, the country was still somewhat 
dependent on its former occupier because its supply routes ran through the Ottoman Empire. 
If Serbia could acquire its own outlet to the sea, the country would attain economic 
independence; this would lead to more autonomy and an opportunity for greater power. 
Because Bosnia lay between Serbia and the coast, Serbs recognized the necessity to possess 
Bosnia in order to gain water access and Serb leaders soon set their sights on this goal. “The 
idea of a Greater Serbia had been born.”159 This historical development supports rational 
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choice theory as it shows that Serb interest in Bosnia originated from strategic considerations 
rather than emotional impulses. Based on this knowledge, one can assert that in the 1990s 
Serbia coveted Bosnian territory as a means to increase its own power, rather than seeking 
the territory with the hopes of “saving” Bosnian Serbs from government abuse and 
mistreatment. 
Although the Serbs had broken free from Ottoman rule, Bosnia was still occupied by 
the Turkish Empire. Few Bosnians felt allegiance to an Ottoman identity because the empire 
was a huge entity with few concrete characteristics or goals. Instead, people turned to 
ethnicity and nationalism for their identity. “Identity was defined in the first instance by 
confessional affiliation. But this was complicated by language, by social and economic 
considerations, and by the construction of historical myths.”160 Because ethnic groups did not 
have corresponding nations in this period, such identities were initially pliable but elites soon 
began using ethnicity to their advantage. “Lacking the dense network of social and economic 
relationships of a France or Britain, the young elites among both Christians and Muslims 
seized upon exclusivist nationalism as a means of ensuring the survival of the imagined 
nation. To join the national community implied subordination of class or regional interests to 
those of the embryonic state.”161 
Misha Glenny thus argues that awareness of ethnic division within Bosnia did not 
develop until Bosnian elites began highlighting ethnic and religious differences in an attempt 
to provide people with an identity. Glenny admits that terrible atrocities were committed in 
the Balkans prior to the development of this identity, but argues that in the 1860s violence 
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took on racial and religious dimensions which were not present previously.162 This can be 
used to respond to those who argue that great brutality and violence prove a conflict is ethnic: 
according to Glenny, groups can commit terrible atrocities even without ethnic division. 
However, one can also use Glenny’s idea to argue that ethnic and religious hostility has 
existed since the 1860s and therefore can not be eliminated quickly or easily. 
In 1876, agrarian discontent led to a series of peasant uprisings in Bosnia. This was 
an especially exciting development for Serbia because the outbreak of violence in Bosnia 
made the region unstable and provided a potential opportunity for the Serbs to take control. 
“The basic cause of the popular discontent was agrarian but this discontent was harnessed in 
some parts of Bosnia by members of the Orthodox population who had been in contact with 
Serbia, and who now publicly declared their loyalty to the Serbian state.”163 This conflict, 
then, quickly moved beyond peasant grievances to encompass larger issues. “During 1876, 
hundreds of villages were burnt down and at least 5,000 peasants killed; by the end of the 
year, the number of refugees from Bosnia was probably 100,000 at least, and possibly 
250,000.”164 
In 1876, this previously local crisis became international when, in July, Serbia and 
Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The two agreed that upon victory Serbia 
would take over Bosnia and Montenegro would take over Herzegovina. Croatia, Slavonia, 
and Dalmatia were all provinces in the Hapsburg Empire of Austria-Hungary rather than in 
the Ottoman Empire, but all felt some allegiance to their fellow Slavs. People from all three 
provinces offered their services to the Serbian military in its fight against the Turks due to 
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“an emerging, if ill defined sense of south Slavic brotherhood.”165 However, in the midst of 
budding Slavic unity Serbia was pulling away from the pack very dramatically. “Given its 
vanguard role in challenging Ottoman power, Serbia was now developing its own great-
power aspirations.”166 The Serbs believed that armed struggle was decisive in establishing 
state power, and were very proud of the fact that they “had fought their way, if not yet to 
statehood, then at least to an autonomy which was virtually indistinguishable from 
statehood.”167 Serbia’s ambition was increasing along with its power. 
Serbia’s move towards militarization, however, “created a dangerous illusion. Sheer 
numbers did not make an army. Discipline, clothing, medical support, proper logistics, and 
above all, an abundant supply of weapons and well-trained officers did.”168 The Serbian 
military could meet none of these requirements, and their military inadequacy became 
quickly apparent during the war with the Turks. “When war broke out, the Serbian army 
could field only 460 poorly trained officers and a force of 125,000 undisciplined 
peasants.”169 The Serbs’ military weakness quickly led to a disastrous defeat at the hands of 
the Turks. Support from Russia prevented the complete collapse of the Serbian state and on 
February 17, 1877 a peace agreement was signed which enforced the status quo ante.   
In 1877, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire in an attempt to take Turkish 
territory under its own control. Russia imposed a peace settlement in March 1878 called the 
Treaty of San Stefan, but this agreement drew a strong reaction from the great powers 
because it upset the balance of power of the international community. At the Congress of 
Berlin in July 1878, the great powers met and sought to mitigate Russian influence and block 
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its drive to the Mediterranean by forcing Russia to accede some of the territory it had gained 
from the Ottomans. Some land was taken from the Russians and given to Serbia and 
Montenegro, while Austria-Hungary was given the right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, a strip of land separating Serbia and Montenegro. “While still 
in theory under Ottoman suzerainty, Bosnia and Herzegovina would be occupied and 
administered by Austria-Hungary.”170 This decision unquestionably angered Serbs, who felt 
that it was their right to control Bosnia. The Berlin settlement was an example of major 
powers dictating to smaller regions in the Balkans what their reality would be. “The new 
elites on the Balkan periphery learnt the lesson beaten into them at the Congress: the 
consolidation and expansion of the state could best be achieved by finding a mighty sponsor, 
not by cooperating with one’s neighbors.”171 
The shift of power in Bosnia re-awakened Bosnian ambition for independence. The 
population, although divided amongst themselves, were united in their resentment towards 
Austrian rule. While Austria-Hungary assumed that the Bosnian population would welcome 
its leadership, the Bosnians had just thrown off Ottoman rule and were not about to simply 
submit to a new conqueror. When Bosnia refused to give in quietly, Austria invaded on July 
27, 1878.172 Although the Ottomans were losing control of the territory, they clandestinely 
provided arms to Bosnian rebels hoping that the Hapsburgs would at least get beaten up a bit 
in their occupation process. “By the time the first four divisions of the Hapsburg army finally 
crossed the Sava from Croatian into Bosnia, however, many Serbs and Muslims were 
preparing for a long war against the occupation.”173 
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In spite of differences in the past, the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats of Bosnia were 
united in their opposition to Austrian rule. The unification of the Muslims and Serbs was 
unexpected and “reflected a temporary coincidence of interests between the two groups, 
rather than a basis for a future alliance.”174 This cooperation does, however, show that 
despite modern animosity between Serbs and Muslims, the two groups were able to work 
together when it was in the best interest of both to do so. Despite widespread opposition to 
Austrian rule, and the formation of a number of guerilla groups which opposed the invasion, 
Austria took over Bosnia incredibly quickly, spending no more than two days on any one 
town and finishing the entire conquest in three months on October 20, 1878.175 Bosnia was 
officially occupied by Austria- Hungary, but not fully annexed. 
Despite the speed with which Austria took over, it did so with reluctance and 
uncertainty. Some worried that taking Bosnia into the fold and adding another million Slavs 
to the empire’s population would give more clout to Croatian demands for a larger voice in 
the empire or, worse yet, for their own independent state. However, as reluctant as the 
Austrians were, a much more pressing concern prompted them to occupy Bosnia in spite of 
concerns about Croatia. “For Croatia to expand into a South Slav state would be bad enough; 
but for Serbia to do it, first absorbing Bosnia and then undermining Austro-Hungarian rule in 
Croatia, would be far worse. It was Serbia’s declaration of war against the Ottomans in 1876 
that had finally made the Austrians think seriously about taking Bosnia; had they been sure 
that the Sultan could retain power indefinitely over Bosnia, they would not have  
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Map 3: The Balkans in the Nineteenth Century 
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bothered.”176 Yet again, concerns of power and territory rather than those of religion or 
ethnicity dominated fights for control of Bosnia. 
Not surprisingly, Serbs reacted very strongly to the Austrian occupation of Bosnia. 
Serbia had long coveted Bosnia-Herzegovina because Serbia’s “most direct route to the 
sea—the economic obsession which was the core of modern Serbian nationalism—lay 
through the province.”177 This ambition and sense of entitlement drove Serbs to initiate a 
drive for Slavic unification of the region. However, Serbia insisted that it be the leader of this 
process; “the Croats, Serb nationalists argued, had no state with which to push forward the 
program of unification.”178 The arrogance of these Serb nationalists fueled the solidification 
of Croat nationalist sentiment. Croat leaders soon set their sights on creating their own 
Greater Croatia, which would comprise of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. “Two expansionist programs, one Serb, one Croat, would be competing with 
each other for territory, above all for Bosnia and Herzegovina.”179 
This dispute was somewhat similar to that which occurred in the 1990s, and 
encountered the same puzzling question: were the Muslims in Bosnia Croats or Serbs? 
Bosnian Muslims originate from the same group of Slavic settlers that Croats and Serbs 
emerged from, but the Bosnian Muslims never developed a clear ethnic identity like the other 
two groups did. Bosnian Muslims can be called Slav, Bosnian, or even Serbo-Croat, but there 
is no way to clearly identify them with either Serbs or Croats exclusively because “no 
distinct ‘Serb’ or ‘Croat’ identities existed in Bosnia in the period before Islamicization.”180 
To call one a Muslim Serb would suggest that his ancestors were Serbs before they were 
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Muslims and the same would be true for a Muslim Croat. More importantly, “when Bosnian 
Christians began, at a very late stage, to identify themselves as Serbs or Croats, they did so 
purely on grounds of religion. Thus the descendants of Catholic Hungarian or German 
settlers who came to Bosnia in the Austro-Hungarian period have come to identify 
themselves as Croats, and the descendants of Orthodox Romanian Gypsies have identified 
themselves as Serbs.”181 Without the guideline of religion with which to identify themselves 
with one group over another, Bosnian Muslims at this time and in the 1990s found 
themselves in a kind of limbo between the two groups, eventually having to develop into a 
force of their own. 
Still, in the nineteenth century both Croat and Serb nationalistic groups fought for the 
allegiance of the Muslims. When Austro-Hungarian troops occupied Bosnia and announced 
that all faiths would be treated equally, Muslim landowners became frightened. While only 
1.5% of Muslims enjoyed great privileges, Muslim peasants feared that this occupation 
would lead to the liberation of their inferiors, the Christian peasants, who were the last serfs 
in Europe. Both Serb and Croat expansionist programs played on these fears. “The Serbs 
warned the Muslims that if they made common cause with the Croats, they would face forced 
conversion to Catholicism and eventually assimilation. The Croats argued the opposite—that 
the Muslims could only hold on to their faith and traditions in the tolerant embrace of 
Croatdom.”182 Neither side had a real chance of winning Muslim allegiance, but the Muslim 
leaders took advantage of the situation, alternating allegiance between the two groups in 
order to gain leverage. In the end, the Bosnian Muslims were able to remain independent 
from the Serbs and Croats, and the latter two groups continued on their nationalistic quest to 
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gain control over Bosnia-Herzegovina without the support or blessing of the region’s Muslim 
inhabitants. 
 
The Balkan Wars 
As fights over Bosnia continued to rage, Austria-Hungary became increasingly 
nervous about its own ability to maintain power in the region. Soon the empire began 
considering formal annexation of Bosnia. In addition to concerns about Serb and Croat 
nationalist groups who wished to control the region, Austria-Hungary felt threatened by the 
Ottomans. In 1908, an organization called the Young Turks staged a coup and overthrew the 
Turkish government. Austro-Hungarian leaders worried that this new Turkish government 
would reclaim its rights to Bosnia and take over the territory by winning the allegiance of the 
Bosnian people and offering a more democratic constitution. Furthermore, Austria-Hungary 
believed that by annexing Bosnia, it could suck Serbia into its sphere of influence and 
perhaps into its empire. Austria-Hungary fully annexed Bosnia on October 5, 1908. 
Rather than being drawn toward Austria-Hungary, however, Serbia perceived this 
move “as a direct challenge to the country’s sovereignty and, indeed, its existence.”183 
Barbara Jelavich further articulates the Serb reaction to this move. “Despite the fact that the 
Hapsburg government had taken over the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbian 
nationalists still hoped that at some time, somehow, they would be able to acquire what they 
regarded as national lands. The annexation made this possibility even more remote.”184 The 
news of the annexation spread through Belgrade like wildfire. Within hours, cavalry units 
were marching through the streets of Belgrade and the population began preparing for a 
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massive demonstration on October 6. “Day in and day out, the crowds screamed for 
vengeance and called for Bosnia and Herzegovina to be saved ‘from the clutches of the 
loathsome Black Eagle.’ Politician after intellectual after diplomat after journalist denounced 
the annexation in ever more violent and emotive terms. The Hapsburg flag was burnt in 
public.”185 
Serbia was determined to fight a war with the Hapsburgs, and appealed to Russia for 
assistance. Unfortunately, Russia had just suffered defeat at the hands of the Japanese in 
1905 and was in no position to help. Without Russian aid, Serbia could not stand up to the 
entire Austro-Hungarian Empire and this goal was eventually abandoned. However, Russia 
did encourage the Balkan states to begin negotiations for an alliance amongst themselves. 
“The Russian aim was to establish a front against the Hapsburg Monarchy, not to foment a 
war or the final partition of the Ottoman lands in Europe. Nevertheless, with the active 
assistance of the Russian diplomatic agents, the Balkan governments concluded a series of 
agreements that were in fact war alliances directed against the Ottoman Empire.”186 The 
Balkan states could not realistically stand up to Austria-Hungary, but they could challenge 
the authority of the Ottomans and attempt to reclaim some power in the region by pushing 
the Turks out. In March 1912, Bulgaria and Serbia created a defense pact. In May, Greece 
and Bulgaria reached a similar agreement, which was echoed in October between 
Montenegro, Serbia, and Bulgaria. The Balkan states were now organized for war. On 
October 8, 1912, Montenegro launched an attack on the Ottoman Empire and was soon 
joined by Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia. 
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The First Balkan War was a relatively easy victory of the Balkan states, whose troops 
numbered 700,000 versus the 320,000 troops of their adversary. “The Ottoman military 
power had been weakened by the domestic political controversies and the financial problems 
that left the army short of modern equipment.”187 The weakness of the Ottoman Empire was 
made readily apparent by this conflict, and the European powers hastened to intervene as it 
became clear that the empire would collapse.  
In May 1913, the great European powers compelled the Balkan states to stop fighting 
and accept the Treaty of London. However, the Treaty of London denied Serbia and Greece 
the Albanian territory that each felt they deserved. As a result, the two sought compensation 
in the Macedonian territory given to Bulgaria in the settlement. Bulgaria was of course 
opposed to this demand, and although it had no great-power supporters and had incurred the 
jealousy of its former allies, Bulgaria launched a preventative attack on Greece and Serbia on 
June 29, 1913. This short-lived conflict is known as the Second Balkan War, and resulted in 
the complete defeat of Bulgaria on July 31, 1913. 
Between the two Balkan wars, 200,000 combatants were killed, and tens of thousands 
of civilians fell victim to disease.188 “The atrocities of bayoneted babies, gouged-out eyes, 
and live immolations in village after village shocked Europe.”189 In a sense, these wars 
prefigured the violence of the upcoming world wars. The conflicts involved large and 
complex alliances facing off in trench warfare, sieges, artillery assaults of civilians, bombing 
raids, and pamphlet propaganda. Bulgaria and Serbia had huge success in the first war, in 
large part due to rhetoric and ideological fervor. The complex causes of war were simplified 
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and pounded into soldiers again and again: “liberate our Christian brothers, liberate our 
historical lands. Simplicity was the key, and details were awkward. Nationalist romanticism, 
based on a dubious mixture of demographic and historical arguments, provided the 
justification for the war. The real aims were coldly strategic and expansionist.”190 Some say 
that for this reason the Balkans wars were similar to the events of the 1990s. This comparison 
suggests that the Bosnian War, while confused by ethnic and nationalistic propaganda, was 
fundamentally a conflict for strategic and territorial gain as well. 
 
World War I 
By the end of the Balkan Wars in 1913, Serbia had almost doubled in size territorially 
and its population had leapt from 2.9 million to 4.4 million. “Serbia’s stock with the 
monarchy’s south Slavs rose to new heights. It was no longer simply a beacon of Serb and 
south Slav freedom but a glorious liberating military power which demanded respect.”191 
While Serbia still stood in great opposition to Austria-Hungary after the latter’s annexation 
of Bosnia in 1908, Serbia was still unable to engage in a fight with the fifty-million-strong 
empire. Still, Serbia’s strength in the wake of the Balkan Wars did cause Austria-Hungary to 
see it as a potential future threat. By the spring of 1913 relations between the two were 
extremely tense. Serbia had already managed to significantly increase its territory, and if it 
acquired part of the Albanian coastland, as was one of its goals, Serbia might pose a strategic 
threat to the Austro-Hungarians in the Adriatic.192 The increasing atmosphere of anger and 
distrust set the stage for the beginning of World War I. 
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On June 28, 1914, Archduke Ferdinand, the heir to the Hapsburg throne, was 
assassinated by a Serb. While no evidence pointed to direct involvement of the Serbian 
government in the plot, the Austro-Hungarians were determined to use the assassination as an 
excuse to eliminate Serbia. The empire sent Serbia an outrageous and humiliating ultimatum, 
specifically written in such a way that the Serbs would be forced to reject it. The Serbian 
government, fearing war, accepted the ultimatum except for one point; Serbia was wiling to 
put the fate of the killers to arbitration but not to put them on trial and allow Austro-
Hungarian delegates to take part. “This reservation was enough for Vienna to consider that 
the Serbs had rejected the ultimatum and war was declared on July 28, 1914.”193 World War 
I, then, was at its core a dispute between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, with the other great 
powers joining in simply due to previously formed strategic alliances. 
When World War I began, Serbia had to decide what it wanted out of the conflict. 
Eventually, Serb leaders decided that they would call for the unification of Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes into a single nation. “It should be noted here that the absolutely vital question of 
whether this should be a federal or a centralized state received very little attention.” 194 
However, one can assume that Serbia had a centralized state in mind with itself at the helm. 
Serbia was an independent state; it had long historical and religious traditions that were not 
shared with the Croats or the Slovenes and it was therefore easy for the Serbs to think in 
more nationalist rather than federal terms. “The greater Serbian goal was thus a state based 
not on strictly ethnic principles, but on the acquisition of lands that had historic associations 
or that had at some time been under the jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox church. The 
ideal was the territory included in the empire of Stephen Dusan, the greatest of Serbia’s 
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medieval rulers.”195 Even before Yugoslavia came into existence, Serbs envisioned the state 
as a way for them to exert their power and dominance over a larger portion of territory, rather 
than an opportunity for Slavic brotherhood and unity. 
As World War I began to take hold, the other Balkan states were faced with the 
decision of how to react. Most of the Balkan states felt no strong affinity toward either set of 
great powers. “The attraction for a small Balkan country in declaring war lay in the 
possibility of furthering its regional goals, not in the fact that it particularly sympathized with 
its ally. These regional goals, however, often clashed with the overarching tactics of a great 
power ally.”196 These areas were for the most part too small to realistically concern 
themselves with forming international and ideological alliances, and therefore chose to focus 
on the regional politics of the Balkans instead. For example, Bulgaria joined World War I not 
because it cared about the global balance of power but because it wanted to regain 
Macedonia. “The Great War in the Balkans served chiefly to underline and deepen the deadly 
competition which had developed since the Congress of Berlin between Bulgaria and Serbia, 
who were now the two main competitors in a bitter struggle for regional hegemony. In 
October 1915, the Bulgarians prepared to avenge themselves for the perceived betrayal by 
the Serbs during the Second Balkan War.”197 
In Bosnia, the majority of citizens, whatever their misgivings, remained loyal to the 
Austro-Hungarian state. Some Muslims and even Bosnian Croats volunteered in the Serbian 
army, but most had no wish to see their country swallowed up in post-war Serbian expansion. 
Those who chose to join with Serbia did so because they saw Serb occupation as preferable  
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to Austrian rule.198 In Croatia, two major trends developed. One group called for the 
unification of “Croatian lands” which were defined as Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. “Their goal was the formation of a Croatian national state that could be 
associated in a federal relationship, but on an absolutely equal footing, with Austria and 
Hungary. These Croatian nationalists tended to have an antagonistic attitude toward 
Orthodox Serbs, whom some regarded merely as renegade Croats. The superiority of 
Hapsburg civilization over that of Orthodox, ex-Ottoman Serbia was also emphasized.”199 
The opposing view was advocated by the Croatian-Serbian Coalition. This group had no 
single program but was rooted in the belief that “Serbs and Croats within the empire should 
work together and not allow either Vienna or Budapest to play one against the other as had 
often been done in the past.”200 These two Croat groups prove that both exclusionary ethnic 
ideology and a drive for cooperation and unity existed among Croats and Serbs in the early 
twentieth century. 
Serbia enjoyed a number of victories early in World War I. However, after Bulgaria 
was enticed into fighting alongside Austria-Hungary with the promise of Macedonia, Serbia 
was no longer able to hold back its enemies. In October 1915, the combined forces of 
Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Bulgaria entered Serbia. Within six weeks, the country was 
occupied and divided between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. Some 30,000 Serbs were sent 
to Austrian camps or used as forced labor; thousands died in desperate uprisings. “During the 
Balkan Wars, Serbia lost some 30,000 men. The First World War cost it 275,000 men and 
wartime diseases another 800,000 civilians. These losses amounted to a quarter of the 
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population and two-thirds of its male population between the ages of fifteen and fifty-
five.”201 Without a doubt, Serbia suffered greatly during the First World War. 
However, the tide of the war soon turned and Austria-Hungary found itself greatly 
weakened. After four years of fighting it became apparent that Austria-Hungary would not 
only be defeated, but would collapse under the stresses of warfare.  “On October 29, 1918, 
the Croatian parliament formally renounced the rule of the Hapsburgs and handed over 
power to the National Council, declaring that a new sovereign state of Slovenes, Croats, and 
Serbs was now in existence. This announcement, although applying only to the former 
Austro-Hungarian lands, clearly signaled the imminent creation of a Yugoslav state.”202 On 
November 1, the Austrian regional leader stepped down from power and the First National 
Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina was formed. World War I was concluded by the 
Treaty of Paris. Soon after, on December 1, 1918, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes was officially created, combining the territory of the present day countries of 
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. In 
the wake of World War I, the first Yugoslav state was born. 
 
The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes 
The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes “emerged from the ashes of the 
Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires.”203 However, the creation of the Kingdom was also due in 
great part to Serbian military conquests of the past. “Yugoslavia was de facto created as the 
result of a Serbian mini-expansion as a stage in the process which began in the nineteenth  
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century.”204 For this reason, the Kingdom was heavily dominated by Serbs from the start. For 
many Serbs, in fact, the Kingdom was to be a buffer state that housed Serbian fighters; “the 
creation of Yugoslavia was at the moment regarded as a simple extension of the base of this 
Serbian army for its eventual role in some future conflict.”205 
Needless to say, Croats and Slovenes did not support Serb domination of the 
Kingdom. However, no agreements on the nature of the state had been reached before its 
creation. The country was designed “with clear borders but with no clear constitutional order. 
Had the Kingdom of Serbia merely absorbed the south Slav regions of the Hapsburg Empire 
and the Kingdom of Montenegro? Or was the country a novel entity in which Croatia, 
Slovenia, Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro would assume equal 
constitutional weight with Serbia?”206 Naturally, politicians in Croatia, Bosnia, and Slovenia 
who had worked towards a Yugoslav state were anxious to balance Serbian dominance with a 
federal state. Croats argued that the success of a federal legal system and parliament in their 
country proved the effectiveness of such political models. However, the Serbs were 
“convinced that their heroic contribution to the First World War earned them privileges in the 
new state” and also that their experience with de facto independence “should give them 
automatic seniority.”207 
In spite of strong protestations by Croats and Slovenes, Serbia’s vision of the 
Kingdom more or less came to fruition when a centralized monarchy was established. In part, 
this was due to the circumstances in which each group found themselves after World War I. 
Serbia was on the victorious side of the war, and was trusted by international leaders who 
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were comfortable with it taking centralized power. The political leaders of Croatia and 
Slovenia, however, were an appendage of the defeated Austria-Hungary, which made 
international leaders uncertain about the loyalties of such politicians.208 Alexander was 
chosen to be the Kingdom’s new leader and his role as prince-regent of Serbia’s exiled war 
time government clearly proved the reality of Serb dominance in the new Yugoslav state.  
The Kingdom’s constitution was created on June 28, 1921. This date marks the 
anniversary of the battle of Kosovo and of the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, two 
special events for Serbs specifically. The document did not impress the other groups in the 
region. “The constitution’s legality was questionable as it was passed by a simple majority 
and not the sixty per cent required by the Corfu Declaration, the agreement reached in 1917 
by the Serbs and Croats on the establishment of a Yugoslav state. Worse still, the two most 
powerful opposition parties did not participate in the vote of the Constituent Assembly.”209 
This meant that in the first five years of the Kingdom’s existence, Croat voices were not 
sufficiently heard, and Serbs continued to believe that such dissension was meaningless 
separatism rather than an expression of legitimate grievances.  
The fact that the Kingdom became a centralized state run by Alexander was not the 
only indicator of Serb power in the country. In fact, statistics show overwhelming Serb 
dominance at all levels of government in this time period. “Only one interwar government 
was headed by a non-Serb prime minister, and for the most part only Serbs were given the 
key portfolios in the governments. All seven prime ministers of the twenty-four cabinets 
holding office between December 1918 and January 1929, the period of parliamentary 
democracy, were Serbs. In the subsequent period, from January 1929 to March 1941, there 
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were fifteen different cabinets of whose ministers three-fifths (73) of the total of 121 were 
Serbs.”210 
This political situation quickly bred antagonisms between the Croats and Slovenes, on 
one hand, and the Serbs on the other. While nationalistic sentiment had existed on both sides 
prior to the creation of the Kingdom, during World War I and earlier “the popular 
nationalisms of the two nations were not directed against each other. At the elite level, we 
have anti-Croatianism and anti-Serbianism, which is the logical consequence of nation 
formation and consolidation in the nineteenth century. At the popular level, before the 
peasant masses in Croatia began to feel that Serbian domination in Yugoslavia was directed 
against their interest, there was no popular anti-Serbianism.”211 In other words, while 
nationalism was nothing new to the Balkan states, it was not until Serbs came to 
overwhelmingly dominate the Kingdom that any kind of popular ethnic tension and 
opposition came into being among the groups in the region. 
Throughout the 1920s, the Kingdom “was a poor, unstable and mostly sullen 
country.”212 The Croats and Slovenes continued to harbor grievances against the Serbs, and 
discontent was very prevalent. In addition, the region was suffering economically. The 
Kingdom was reeling from the Great Depression, and was heavily dependent on the German 
and Austrian economies for the success of their own. When banking crises occurred in both 
countries, the Kingdom’s economy was shattered. To make matters worse, France, Britain 
and the United States blocked all capital credits to the area, making it impossible for the 
region to get out of its hopeless amount of debt.213 Poor economic performance, coupled with 
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extensive and long-lasting political grievances, made the population of the Kingdom primed 
for violence and revolt. All of this came to a head in June of 1928, when a Radical Party 
delegate from Montenegro shot five Croatian Peasant Party representatives, including the 
beloved Stjepan Radic, during a session of the assembly. Three deaths resulted, Radic’s 
included. “Since official collusion in the shooting was strongly suspected by the Croatian 
representatives, the event ended their cooperation with the government. They withdrew from 
the assembly and the tenth anniversary of the founding of the state in December was marked 
by riots and demonstrations in Zagreb.”214 
King Alexander reacted by introducing an entirely new political system. In December 
of 1928, he initiated a royal coup, seizing full power and abolishing parliament. “Far from 
attempting to create a physical Greater Serbia, Alexander now launched into an attempt to 
create a genuine Yugoslavia—by force.”215 Alexander’s first symbolic act was to change the 
name of the state from “the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes,” to the much more 
unitary “Yugoslavia.” While this might seem to signal the creation of a more democratic 
grouping of states, in fact it signaled the end of the constitutional regime and the beginning 
of a personal dictatorship.  
 Alexander quickly set to work undermining traditional ethnic loyalties and 
nationalistic groupings. He abolished political parties and trade unions, viewing them as 
organizations which served only to exacerbate ethnic tensions. He personally chose all high 
officials, jailed opposition politicians, and did away with civil liberties. In addition, 
Alexander eliminated the traditional state boundaries on which nationalistic associations 
were based. “The country was divided into nine provinces, called banovinas, the boundaries 
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of which were drawn with the intention of weakening or destroying traditional loyalties.”216 
Alexander did provide an explanation to his subjects: “he presented the dictatorship as a 
necessary evil, unwillingly imposed. It was, he explained, a selfless act to prevent the tension 
provoked by Stjepan Radic’s death from tearing the country apart.”217 
In spite of Alexander’s alleged intention to eliminate ethnic dissension and hostility, 
his actions seemed to heighten it instead. Serbs saw themselves as being held down by a 
greater system in which they were no longer as dominant as they should be. After all, 
banovinas were placed under strong centralized control and had no local autonomous rights. 
Meanwhile, Croats “regarded this new unitary Yugoslavia as nothing less, in essence, than 
the realization of Serbia’s dreams.”218 In fact, both Croats and Bosnian Muslims had 
significant grievances regarding this new situation. “The boundaries of the banovinas were 
gerrymandered so that Serbs formed a majority in six, Croats in two, Slovenes in one, and 
Muslims in none. The principal offices in the state continued to be held by Serbs from Serbia, 
with the Slovenes receiving an adequate share. Muslims were allotted the lowest positions, 
whereas the Croats remained inadequately represented.”219 
In September 1931, Alexander issued a new constitution which was essentially a 
cover for his dictatorship. It established a bicameral legislature in which the king appointed 
half the members of the upper house. The elected representatives were chosen by voice vote 
and the assembly, once elected, did not have the power to legislate independently but merely 
to state its opinion. In order to run for election, a party had to demonstrate that it had 
sufficient support in each district. This law made it almost impossible for Croatian, 
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Slovenian, or Muslim groups to present their candidates due to the overwhelming dominance 
of Serbs in six banovinas.220 
Alexander’s repressive tactics, which included the arrest of many opposition leaders, 
led many such individuals to leave the country. This emigrating group included the 
controversial nationalist Croat leader Ante Pavelic, who left Yugoslavia in January 1929 and 
headed for Italy. Pavelic soon began working with Mussolini on the creation of an extreme 
Croat nationalist group called the Ustashe. “The goal was the achievement of Croatian 
independence, if necessary by means of revolution and violence…Mussolini used the 
Ustashe as a weapon in his diplomatic arsenal with which to threaten Belgrade.”221 In this 
way, Alexander not only heightened ethnic tensions within Yugoslavia, but allowed them to 
expand to an international scale. The Ustashe movement still haunts the Balkan region to this 
day, and would not have been possible without Alexander’s policies, because they both drove 
nationalist leaders out and primed the Yugoslav population to look to extremist groups to air 
their grievances. Although Alexander claimed that his intention was to assuage the concerns 
of all ethnic groups, his actions simply exacerbated an already tense situation and set 
Yugoslavia up for the horrors of the Second World War. 
 
World War II 
In January of 1933, Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany. Soon after, he identified 
Yugoslavia and Romania as keys to the success of the German strategy. Hitler was concerned 
about the effect that the defense pact signed by Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania in 
February 1933 would have on his ambitions to invade Czechoslovakia. He hoped to be able 
to isolate Czechoslovakia by improving his relations with Yugoslavia and Romania and 
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driving a wedge between the countries. Closer ties with Yugoslavia would also give 
Germany the agricultural and mineral resources it needed for rearmament and expansion.222 
Alexander was open to Hitler’s overtures of friendship. Trade with Germany was very 
important because Germany was one of the few countries which could assist Yugoslavia in 
its economic recovery in spite of the Great Depression. Through the German-Yugoslav 
Commercial Treaty of 1934, Alexander agreed to adjust Yugoslavia’s agricultural production 
to be weighted more heavily toward the crops Germany needed, and also gave Germany 
exclusive rights to trade for Yugoslav minerals. Hitler agreed to exchange finished industrial 
products for these minerals, and to give Yugoslavia diplomatic support.223 
In October of 1934 Alexander was assassinated and the leadership of Yugoslavia was 
assumed by Prince Regent Paul. Paul “was not dictatorial in temperament” and popular 
criticism of Alexander’s policies further forced a relaxation of government power.224 In June 
1935 a new government was formed under the premiership of Milan Stojadinovic, which 
lasted three years and brought relative calm to the region. However, national conflicts 
continued to dominate political life. In 1937, in an attempt to appease Croats, the Yugoslav 
government concluded a concordat with the Vatican that defined the privileges of the 
Catholic Church in Yugoslavia and placed it on an equal footing with the Orthodox Church. 
The Orthodox hierarchy opposed this agreement so violently that the concordat had to be 
withdrawn.225 This illustrates the increasingly extreme and blatant nature of nationalist 
sentiment in Yugoslavia prior to World War II. On February 3, 1939, a Serbian minister 
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made a speech in parliament about the superiority of Serbs.226 Exclusivist national sentiment 
was becoming so prevalent that it was acceptable to voice in public, even by members of the 
Yugoslav government. 
Although domestic issues continued to plague Yugoslavia, international events 
presented an increasing cause for concern. German occupation of Austria in March of 1938 
did not arouse official anxiety in Belgrade, but as the Nazis moved towards Prague, 
Yugoslavia felt increasingly threatened. Serbs were concerned that if Yugoslavia became 
embroiled in a conflict, which seemed increasingly likely as the Germans advanced, then the 
federation would fall apart. This was not in the best interest of Serbs, who would control less 
territory if the federation split. As a result, Serbs became much more willing to appease 
Croatia in the late 1930s.  
In February 1939 a new ministry was formed under Dragisa Cvetkovic “with the 
objective of coming to an understanding with the Croatian opposition.”227 In August, 
Cvetkovic formed an agreement with Vladko Macek, the leader of the Croatian Peasant 
Party. “The Sporazum or agreement created an autonomous Croatia within Yugoslavia, to 
include not only Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, but a large part of Bosnia. Of its population 
of 4.4 million, some 866,000 were Serbs. The agreement was not supposed to be the end of 
the matter but rather the beginning of a thoroughgoing reorganization of Yugoslavia.”228 
Although this agreement posed problems for the future, especially with Bosnia, “it was on 
the whole a radical and successful means of preventing civil war between Serbs and Croats in 
the troubled international atmosphere of the late 1930s.”229 
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Meanwhile, the threat from Germany continued to loom large. On September 1, 1939, 
Hitler invaded Poland. Two days later, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and 
France declared war on Germany. While Yugoslav public opinion was strongly against the 
Axis powers by the end of 1940, Hitler pressured leaders in Bulgaria, Turkey, and 
Yugoslavia to ally themselves with Germany, Italy, and Japan. Prince Paul and his ministers 
remained sympathetic to the Western allies, but Britain was in no position to aid Yugoslavia 
and Hitler continued to threaten invasion if Yugoslavia did not cooperate. Prince Paul was 
terrified of Communism and feared his dictatorship would suffer in refusing Hitler, so he 
agreed to a compromise. On March 26, 1941, Yugoslavia signed the Tripartite Pact subject to 
reservations which released them from its military obligation.230 As part of this agreement, 
Yugoslavia declared neutrality so as to deny its territory to the allies.231 
After the humiliating experience of occupation during World War I, many Serbs were 
opposed to this pact. They saw it as the first step toward submitting to Nazi rule and were in 
no way willing to sit back and allow such a thing to happen. In an attempt at resistance, a 
group of renegade Serbs organized a coup, declared 17-year-old King Peter ready to rule, and 
set about creating a new government that would not capitulate to the Nazis. Hitler was so 
enraged when he heard of this resistance that he demanded that Yugoslavia be invaded “with 
inexorable severity and that the military destruction be carried out in a lightning-like 
operation.”232 On April 6, 1941, the Germans began their assault on Belgrade. A few hours 
later, the city was in ruins and 17,000 people were dead. An act of capitulation was signed on  
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April 17, 1941, and “the Balkans faced four years of occupation, resistance, fratricide, and 
genocide.”233 
After the Germans and Italians began their occupation of Yugoslavia, the region was 
split into nine units. Slovenia was split into two, with Italy annexing the southwest and 
Germany administering the north east. Italy seized Dalmatia. Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, and 
Herzegovina were divided into Italian and German spheres of influence. Montenegro lost 
some territory to Albania and became an Italian protectorate. Italy annexed part of Kosovo 
and western Macedonia. Bulgaria reclaimed Macedonia and parts of Serbia. The rest of 
Serbia was under direct German military rule. As part of this process, the Germans 
proclaimed a new Independent State of Croatia (NDH) on April 10, 1941, which included all 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.234 The state was hardly independent, and was divided into 
occupation zones for Germany and Italy, but Croatians saw this as a cause for celebration as 
it signified the first independent Croatian state in history.  
With the German occupation of Yugoslavia came widespread violence and 
destruction. Persecution of Jews began immediately upon German arrival, as did the 
destruction of synagogues. Internment camps were established two months into the 
occupation period. “By the end of the war it was calculated that out of 14,000 Jews in Bosnia 
nearly 12,000 had been killed.”235 Yugoslav citizens, however, did not simply submit to Nazi 
rule. Yugoslavia was taken over by the Germans so rapidly that although 375,000 soldiers 
and officers were captured as POWs, hundreds of thousands of other combatants simply 
returned home. In addition, the speed of collapse meant that much of Yugoslavia, especially 
rural areas, was not physically occupied and therefore was not officially disarmed. Hitler’s 
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failure to fully incapacitate Yugoslavia left the area in utter chaos within a matter of months. 
“In Serbia rebellions were breaking out and in Croatia and Bosnia fanatical Serb-hating 
groups were on the loose, perpetrating appalling massacres which quickly led to Serbian 
uprisings and the loss of control over large areas.”236 
When Yugoslavia was initially divided, Hitler assigned a German military 
commander to Zagreb, but let Mussolini choose the leader of the NDH. Officially, Croatia 
was ruled by Prince Aimone of Savoy, the Duke of Spoleto. This ruler, who took the name 
Tomislav II, was absent to say the least; in his lifetime, he did not once set foot in Yugoslavia 
even once. Unofficially, however, Mussolini supported Ante Pavelic as ruler of Croatia, the 
Ustashe leader whom he had been periodically supporting for the past twelve years. The 
Ustashe were a group of Nazi fanatics who supported Croat domination. This group never 
enjoyed mass support within Croatia, finding its roots in the nineteenth-century nationalist 
politics of Ante Starcevic. “The installation of the NDH regime meant that fanatics were now 
in power in a state where law and order rapidly collapsed and whose population was barely 
50 percent Croat.” 237 
In the early years of the twentieth century, hostility existed between Serbs and Croats 
but the two had also found ways to cooperate.  
Between 1918 and 1941 many Croats resented Serbian domination in the new 
Yugoslav state and welcomed the birth of the NDH, but there was no reason 
for Serbs—or the vast majority of Croats for that matter—to have any inkling 
of the fanatical hatred that was about to be unleashed by the Ustashe. Whereas 
there had been a long history of bloodshed between Serbs and Muslims and 
Serbs and Albanians, the genocidal wave begun by the Ustashe in 1941 was 
an aberration and a break with history. In the new Croatian state Serbs would 
have had good reason to suspect they would be second-class citizens but not 
that their lives were in danger.238 
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The Ustashe did not represent the views of the average Croat, nor were their actions a 
foreseeable extension of ethnic tension over the past half century. Even for those who argue 
that ethnic hostility has always existed between these groups, the acts of the Ustashe can not 
be seen as the next logical step in a progression of hatred. Although evidence suggests that 
popular thought at the time was in some ways nationalist and hostile, the Ustashe 
undoubtedly brought ethnic hatred to an entirely new dimension that was previously foreign 
to the Balkan people. 
Pavelic and his Ustashe followers “launched a campaign of appalling and mindless 
terrorism against Jews, in deference to Nazi and Fascist anti-Semitism, and against Orthodox 
Serbs, in the name of the Catholic Church and in revenge for the ‘Serb imperialism’ of the 
inter-war years.”239 The Ustashe felt that they were “solving the problem of the large Serb 
minority (1.9 million out of a total of 6.3 million) in the territory of the NDH.”240 
Widespread acts of terror against Serbs began in May of 1941, with mass arrests and murders 
by June. “By July, even the Germans were complaining about the brutality of these 
attacks.”241 
Mile Budak, a Croatian writer who became the NDH minister of education, is alleged 
to have said that the Ustashe planned that “one-third of the Serbs would be killed, one-third 
expelled, and one-third converted to Catholicism.”242 The exact number who converted is 
unknown but is believed to be between 200,000 and 300,000. The prospect of conversion 
may sound relatively harmless in light of the other options, but there was no easy way to 
escape Ustashe brutality. On August 5, 1941, “some 1,200 Serbs dressed in their Sunday best 
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were called to the church from surrounding villages to be ‘converted’ to Catholicism. 
Instead, they were locked inside the church and murdered.”243 Government was replaced by 
state terror on a horrifying scale; “the Ustashe turned their territory into one great 
slaughterhouse.”244 Some reports even describe Ustashe units in Bosnia throwing Serbian 
Orthodox women and children off cliffs.245 
In addition to spontaneous murders, the Ustashe government set up extermination 
camps as part of a plan to kill one and a half million Balkan Jews. The Ustashe, after all, was 
not simply a Croat nationalist group but a Nazi group as well. Some Yugoslav Jews found 
temporary safety in the Italian occupied areas of the Balkans, where anti-Semitic measures 
were put in place but were not life threatening. However, after the Italians capitulated to the 
Nazis, Jews had to either seek safe haven in southern Italy or go to concentration camps, as 
many of them did. Labor camps were numerous in the NDH, but the Jasenovac camp is most 
well known. After Jasenovac prisoners were worked for all the energy they had, these people 
were burned in brick ovens or shot in the back of the head and dumped in the Sava River. 
“Being far less organized than their mentors, or lacking the technology, they often resorted in 
these camps to knives with which to murder Serbs, Jews, Gypsies, and undesirable 
Croats.”246 There is no agreement as to the number killed in such camps; Serbs estimate 
700,000, Croats 40,000, and independent researchers 250,000.247 
Despite these horrible atrocities, the Ustashe did gain some popular support among 
select Croats. When Italy surrendered to the Allies in 1943, the territory in Dalmatia that it 
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had occupied was handed over to Croatia. “The Greater Croatia of this year was thus 
composed of all the lands, except Istria and Rijeka, to which the Croatian nationalists had 
previously laid claims.”248 This accomplishment helped to arouse support for the regime 
among Croats who had long felt bullied by Serbs and now felt that they had a strong 
nationalist movement to rally behind. Such sentiment was by no means felt by all Croats, but 
was certainly felt by some.  
Many people who supported the regime believed that the atrocities it committed were 
horrible, but felt that supporting the greater Croat nationalist cause was their duty. This is 
exemplified by the statement of a devout Catholic Ustashe guard when asked if he feared 
punishment from God for the crimes he had committed. “Don’t talk to me about that, for I 
am perfectly aware of what is in store for me. For my past, present, and future deeds I shall 
burn in hell, but at least I shall burn for Croatia.”249 Without a doubt, the behavior of the 
Ustashe regime was completely unacceptable and not in keeping with Croat nationalist 
movements of the past. Still, Croat nationalist movements subsequent to World War II would 
never be able to escape this legacy, and for some Croats the experience of Ustashe rule 
redefined what behavior they found acceptable to engage in on behalf of their people. 
The Ustashe, for all their aggressive behavior, were not in power throughout 
Yugoslavia. In fact, many Yugoslavs spent the years of World War II fighting German 
occupation rather than facing elimination at the hands of the Ustashe. Opposition to the 
German presence was prevalent among Yugoslavs and two primary groups formed in 
reaction to the Nazi presence. The first was the Chetniks. This group was founded in 1941 
when Colonel Milhailovic and a small group of Serbian officers fled Serbia after the 
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Yugoslav surrender and went into the hills to organize a center of resistance. Mihailovic 
chose the term Chetnik to recall similar groups that had fought against Ottoman rule in the 
fourteenth century.250 The Chetniks were closely associated with the exiled government of 
King Peter, and thus attracted an almost exclusively Serbian following. “Its members tended 
to be both anti-Croat and anti-Communist. The Chetnik army became primarily an 
association of individual bands under local leaders who confined their activities to their own 
territories.”251 
Mihailovic’s allegiance to the old regime translated to consistent support for the 
traditional political and social system. The Chetniks sought to build up superior power and 
maintain it throughout the war so that “when the occupying armies were thrown out and the 
quisling governments collapsed, the Chetniks would be the strongest claimant to control of 
the postwar Yugoslav government.”252 The Chetniks also sought the creation of Greater 
Serbia which, according to Dr. Stevan Moljevic, a member of the Chetnik National 
Committee, required the creation of a homogenous Serbia. “Transfers and exchanges of 
population, especially of Croats from Serbia and of Serbs from the Croatian areas, is the only 
way to arrive at their separation.”253 Dr. Zivko Topalovic, another leading Chetnik, put it 
more bluntly: “Anti-Croatianism, anti-Muslimism, and anti-Yugoslavism, this is the ideology 
of the Serbian Chetniks.”254 
This ideology, not surprisingly, led the Chetniks to commit a number of ethnically 
based atrocities during World War II. “One of the worst Chetnik outbursts against the 
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Croatian population in Dalmatia took place in the first days of October 1942 at the village of 
Gata south of Split, in reprisal against the people of this village and other villages nearby for 
destroying some roads in the area. In all, about one hundred people were killed, and many 
homes were burned.”255 In early 1943 Chetnik forces entered Sandjak in Bosnia, to undergo 
“cleansing actions;” thirty-three Muslim villages were burned down and 1,200 Muslim 
fighters as well as 8,000 elderly, women, and children were killed.256 Nearly forty years later, 
journalist Cornelia Sorabji spoke with Hamida, a Bosnian Muslim who survived Chetnik 
attacks during World War II as a child. 
“I can see it before my eyes now,” she said of the burning tapers that had been 
applied to the roof of her family's house to burn it down. She told of family 
members who had escaped when the Chetniks were distracted from their task 
by the sight of a stash of gold ducats, and of others who did not. Her narrative 
involved flight to the woods, a mother's desperate thought of strangling a 
toddler whose cries might reveal their position, and eventual rescue by an 
Italian truck which drove them to the nearest town. A baby sister had been left 
behind in the home of a sympathetic Serb who was later forced by Chetniks to 
kill the baby.257 
Without question, the Ustashe regime was a more destructive force than the Chetniks. 
However, this does not mean that Croat nationalism was more dangerous or destructive than 
Serb nationalism, or that Serbs can shift all blame on to the Ustashe. Fundamentally, the 
Ustashe were more destructive because they were instated as a government during World 
War II, and therefore had greater power and opportunity to hurt people. The Chetniks, on the 
other hand, were a group of rebels without the far-reaching power of a state government. 
Both groups, however, were equally violent, destructive, racist, and fascist in their goals and 
behavior.  
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Political scientist V.P. Gagnon Jr. points out that while both Ustashe and Chetnik 
groups perpetuated ethnically-based atrocities during World War II, neither enjoyed large 
popular support. The Ustashe were a marginal group imposed by the Germans and Italians 
after the popular Croatian Peasant Party refused to collaborate. In spite of some supporters, 
the Ustashe alienated most of the state’s population with its violence. Similarly, most Serbs 
in Bosnia joined the partisan forces rather than the Chetniks. “Thus the image of ‘ethnic 
groups’ in conflict even during World War II must be seen as part of a selective, ideological 
construct in which ‘ethnic groups’ are portrayed as actors by nationalist politicians and 
historians.”258 This is an extremely important point because to this day, accounts of Chetnik 
and Ustashe behavior are used to accuse members of both ethnic groups of hatred and 
violence. The legacy of both the Ustashe and the Chetniks still exist as a source of fear 
among the Balkan population, but it must be remembered that at the time these groups 
represented extreme points of view rather than the norm. 
 The other group which stood in opposition to German occupation during World War 
II was the Yugoslav Communist Party. On June 22, 1941, the Nazis attacked the Soviet 
Union; in response, Stalin appealed to communists around the globe to attack the Nazis 
wherever possible. This helped to unify the communists in Yugoslavia and inspire them to 
rise up in an attempt to overturn Nazi rule. The Yugoslav Communists soon became known 
as the Partisans and were organized under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito. Tito established 
his headquarters in western Serbia in September 1941. “Hampered too often by a sectarian 
devotion to Leninism and Stalin, the Yugoslav Communists nonetheless recognized that an 
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unhappy warrior was an unreliable one.”259 As a result, railways were constructed, schools 
functioned normally and cinemas and dance halls were opened. “The Germans’ failure to 
occupy the whole country and the fact that so many of their best troops had quickly been 
moved off to attack the Soviet Union meant that by September Tito’s Partisans were in 
control of Uzice and a large area around it.”260 Still, the Germans were by no means easy to 
defeat. In mid October of 1941, a joint Partisan-Chetnik resistance force fought against the 
Germans in Kraljevo. After the Germans put down the resistance, orders were made for the 
arrest and execution of 300 Serbs, who were selected at random.261 
In spite of some discouraging defeats, Tito was committed to mobilizing popular 
support in Yugoslavia for reunification under a Communist government. Tito established 
himself in Bosnia and began recruiting on a national basis rather than based on ethnicity. 
“The wholesale persecution and slaughter of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia led most of those 
who wished to survive to seek Partisan protection and join Partisan troops. The Ustashe in 
fact forced upon Tito the doctrine which he would probably have adopted anyhow—that 
Serbs, Croats, and Muslims must sink their racial and social differences in fighting the 
Germans and Italians, and the Ustashe and Chetnik allies.”262 In fact, this policy of 
advocating universal Slav ideology over national loyalties contributed greatly to Partisan 
success during the war. The communists were able to draw recruits from all of Yugoslavia’s 
Slav people, giving them a much larger pool of potential soldiers. “The Communist Party 
was a club anyone could join, irrespective of national origins, with a mission to mold history. 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the main theatre of war, partisan units contained all three major 
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national groups, Serbs, Croats, and Muslim Slavs, fighting together under the slogan 
‘brotherhood and unity.’”263 
Tito and his Partisans laid the foundation of their future government in November 
1942 in Bihac where they established a central authority called the Anti-Fascist Council for 
the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ). This organization was an assembly of fifty-
four representatives from different sections of the country and was dominated by the 
Communist Party. “The popular-front program, which was announced at the conference, 
called for the establishment of a freely elected government after the war, and most important, 
a federal organization of the state.”264 In November 1943 AVNOJ was declared the 
government of Yugoslavia and Tito received the title of marshal and remained in command 
of the armed forces. “In 1943 Italy had collapsed, which enabled the Partisans in Yugoslavia 
to seize a large amount of their weaponry.”265 
Although Tito and his armies liberated many areas of Yugoslavia during German 
occupation, this had little effect on German control of the region. “The Germans and Italians 
continued to control the large towns, the major roads and railways, and the mines.”266 The 
Allies began shifting their support from Chetnik leader Mihailovic to Tito in 1943, when it 
became clear that Mihailovic was reluctant to launch a large scale attack on the Germans. 
Tito accepted assistance from the Allies because the position of German and Italian troops 
made it necessary for him to do so, but he became increasingly worried that the Allies would 
take over Yugoslavia after the war. This would certainly lead to the restoration of the king’s 
government and not to a communist state. “In 1944 there were moments when Partisans 
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worried less about the Germans than about the Allied landing.”267 In 1944, Allied support for 
Tito increased, and as German troops pulled out, Soviet forces took over much of the east of 
the country. “Communist rule in Yugoslavia was now assured.”268 
With the communists in control, the extreme nationalist groups of World War II 
quickly fell apart. The NDH, which by the end of the war controlled very little of its own 
territory, was to linger on until May 9, 1945, two days after the German surrender. Tens of 
thousands of Croats fled, fearing that after serving in the NDH regime they would be marked 
for execution. The British returned these refugees and, just as predicted, between 20,000 and 
40,000 were executed by the Partisans.269 In addition, by the end of the war Chetnik forces 
were reduced to between 10,000 and 12,000 troops, most of whom were subsequently caught 
and killed. Milahilovic himself was captured, tried, and executed in July of 1946.  
Of the 40,000 Jews in Croatia, Slavonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, between 20,000 
and 31,000 were killed by the Ustashe during World War II.270 Despite great suffering and 
death, the legacy of Nazi and ethnic war crimes was left remarkably unresolved in 
Yugoslavia. People spent many decades arguing over the number of people killed, but 
apologies were slow in coming. Suffering under Tito and the stifling of ethnic concerns 
further postponed the Yugoslav examination of World War II atrocities, allowing this issue to 
haunt the region for decades. 
 
Tito’s Yugoslavia 
In April and May of 1945, Partisan forces broke through the enemy fronts in Bosnia, 
Croatia, and Slovenia. On September 21, 1944, Tito concluded a Soviet-Yugoslav military  
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agreement, calling for the entry of Soviet troops into Serbia; by October Soviet troops were 
joining Partisans in suppressing Chetnik organizations and pursuing the retreating Germans. 
At the end of the war, Partisan forces numbered 800,000 men and were in full military 
control. The central government was in the hands of AVNOJ, with Tito at the helm, and an 
effective administrative structure encompassing the entire country had been established 
during the war. In March 1945 a regency of one Serb, one Croat, and one Slovene was 
created; this group named Tito premier and charged him with the formation of a government.  
The new unified Yugoslavia took shape as a highly centralized one-party state. In 
November 1945 a constitutional assembly met, at which time the monarchy was abolished 
and the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was proclaimed. The center of political 
power in 1945 was the Politburo of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY). Its main 
instruments were the army and the CPY itself, operating largely through the local “people’s 
committees.” A strong central government was important to preserve order. Tito went about 
stripping the former middle class of all remaining strength by confiscating property of former 
collaborators, nationalizing industry, and controlling rents. “The implicit assumption behind 
this policy, probably held with deep conviction, was that the Yugoslav civil war was not 
over. The ‘bourgeoisie’ would easily revive, and would receive backing from the Western 
powers.”271 Serbia experienced widespread opposition to Tito and backing for King Peter, 
but elsewhere Tito was a genuinely popular national leader. “He had fought his own war and 
won his own victories. He had attracted a large number of peasants, impoverished during the 
inter-war years, to the Partisan movement. He had achieved a new relationship between the 
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nationalities of Yugoslavia.”272 Tito had put a stop to nationalist violence and driven out the 
German occupiers; many people were optimistic about the future changes Tito would bring.  
Norman Naimark lays out two models for interpreting Tito’s contribution to the 
Balkans. The first is the freezer model, which praises Tito for holding separatist strivings in 
check and forcing inhabitants of the region to be Yugoslavs. “The proponents of this model 
argue that once the constraints imposed by Tito’s rule dissolved, nationalism reared its ugly 
head and resumed its destructive force, picking up where the World War II interethnic 
fighting left off.”273 The second model is the incubator model, which argues that Tito’s 
attempt to maintain a balance between nationalities ended up antagonizing all of them and 
exacerbating resentments. “His support for satisfying national interest up to a point in Croatia 
and Slovenia built up expectations for autonomy and wound up alienating local nationalists 
who were unwilling to accept limitations on their activities especially in the cultural realm. 
At the same time, this policy provoked Serb unitarists, who already thought of themselves as 
exploited and maligned by ungrateful Croats and Slovenes.”274 These models represent the 
two diametrically opposed interpretations of Tito’s affect on Yugoslavia, neither of which 
can be advocated without careful thought. In fact, this entire section will attempt to tease out 
the true consequences of Tito’s rule. In order to do so, one must examine Tito’s nationality 
policy, known as “brotherhood and unity,” to determine whether ethnic tension and hostility 
still existed but were kept dormant by Tito’s policies, or whether this time really did 
represent one of genuine ethnic harmony and cooperation in Yugoslavia. 
According to Marxist-Leninist dogma, “nationalism was a feature of bourgeois 
society which would disappear as soon as the proletariat won power and the inequalities 
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which had bred nationalism in the first place were eradicated…As far as Yugoslavia’s 
communists were concerned, their triumph was part of the march of history and the 
nationalisms which had torn Yugoslavia apart between 1941 and 1945 were sure to fade 
away.”275 In a speech on May 22, 1945, Tito explained his vision of Yugoslavia. “Those 
border lines, as I see them, must be something like the white veins in a marble staircase. The 
lines between the federated states in a federal Yugoslavia are not lines of separation, but of 
union. This community is a house, one whole, but inside, each must be master of himself and 
develop culturally and economically in a new federative Yugoslavia.”276 On December 5, 
1945, Tito’s associate Edvard Kardelj further articulated the nationality vision. 
The old system of hegemonistic greater-Serb cliques upheld by reactionary 
anti-national Croat, Slovene and other influences has been done away with. 
The Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia has grown out of the 
voluntary unification of our peoples according to the principles of self-
determination and equality of rights. Our peoples have signed their act of 
unification with their blood and have put the principles of self-determination 
and equality of rights into practice by building up the federal units and the 
united federative state community. In this way they have created all the 
conditions necessary for the liquidation of the nationality problem which 
constantly shook and undermined the old Yugoslavia.277 
Communist rhetoric told the story of a peaceful Yugoslavia where people of different 
ethnicities would live in harmony and cooperation. The Communists would not allow any 
one nation to dominate Yugoslavia the way that Serbs had dominated the Kingdom; they 
were determined to unite the Yugoslav people through the patriotism of a wartime struggle 
for national liberation. “According to the official interpretation of the Second World War, all 
Yugoslavia’s peoples had contributed equally to the defeat of fascism. While, strictly 
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speaking, this may not have been the case, it was an attempt to wipe the national slate clean 
and allow all peoples to join the new state free from any historical mortgage.”278 
Tito made a number of changes in Yugoslavia to help make this vision a reality. 
Based on the wartime decisions of the communists, the new Yugoslavia was made up of six 
republics and two autonomous regions. This arrangement was confirmed by the new 
constitution passed in January of 1946. The republics were Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Slovenia. Serbia contained two autonomous 
regions, Kosovo and Vojvodina.279 The people of Yugoslavia were categorized either as 
nations, those people who had a corresponding home republic, or national minorities, those 
who did not. For example, Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, Macedonians, and Montenegrins were 
nations, while Hungarians and Albanians were national minorities. According to Article 
Twelve of the 1946 constitution, inter-republican borders could only be altered after 
negotiations between the republics themselves and an agreement on all sides. The new 
constitution also established the Yugoslav Congress. This was a bicameral body composed of 
the Federal Council, an all-Yugoslav chamber containing one representative for every 50,000 
inhabitants, and the Council of Nationalities, representing the various People’s Republics.280 
In this way, the ethnic divisions established by republic divisions were institutionalized in the 
operation of the central government itself. 
Christopher Bennett argues that the division of Yugoslavia into republics “was not 
meant to divide the country but to create as equitable a balance as possible between 
Yugoslavia’s peoples and to prevent conflict over disputed territories. Borders between 
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republics were drawn up on a mixture of ethnic and historic principles.”281 However, Gojko 
Vuckovic points out that Tito made these divisions based on Stalin’s precedent. This was 
logical from Tito’s perspective, as the Soviet Union was the only socialist country available 
to use as a model for the nationality problem. However, Stalin’s own policy for his national 
minorities was to keep them fighting amongst themselves so that they would not challenge 
his authority. “Stalin divided nationalities into two or more republics and also moved large 
numbers of people into these republics. The result has been that any former Soviet Republic 
attempting to secede from the larger political system must immediately confront one or more 
dissident minorities—a perfect formula for civil war.”282 
The inherent problems of Tito’s republic division are clear from the fact that the new 
Yugoslav constitution assumed the existence of five component people and yet divided the 
country into six republics, further dividing Serbia by creating two autonomous provinces. 
“The new Yugoslavia was not created by integration of independent states with defined 
territories and internationally recognized boundaries. It was rather a partitioning of the 
Yugoslav state recognized by Yalta and the international community, based on the political 
power of members of the Communist leadership. It also reflected the intention of the political 
leadership to fight perceived Serbian hegemonism by partitioning Serbia.”283 In some ways, 
the new Yugoslav state structure emphasized ethnic divisions and kept tensions alive in spite 
of rhetoric to the contrary. 
Although the republic divisions of Yugoslavia suggest a less than complete 
commitment to ethnic unity, there is no doubt that policies were put into place to mitigate 
national rivalries and perceived inequalities. Yugoslavia’s Council of Nationalities 
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represented each of Yugoslavia’s constituent nations evenly, with slightly less representation 
for the autonomous regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo. “Between the new units there was at 
first ‘brotherhood and unity’ in the sense that they were all equally powerless vis-à-vis an 
energetic and highly centralized Party leadership. More positively, there was some balance 
within the Politburo, where Tito’s chief lieutenants were chosen roughly in accordance with 
the principle of nationality.”284 Tito’s close associates included: Mosa Pijade (Serbian Jew), 
Edvard Kardelj (Slovenian), Aleksandar Rankovic (Serb), Milovan Djilas (Montenegrin), 
Rade Koncar (Croat), and Ivo-Lola Ribar (Croat from Serbia).285 Beyond Tito’s inner-circle, 
ethnic affirmative action was used to appoint people to cabinet posts, ambassadorships, and 
other important federal appointments between cadres from the republics and provinces. 
Offices were often rotational so that every republic had equal access to positions of power. 
The parliament and other federal institutions made major efforts to be multilingual and these 
policies led to the near-equal distribution of different ethnicities in government posts.286 
While moves towards ethnic unity suggest Tito was a benevolent ruler, he was first 
and foremost a Communist leader, and as such used repressive tactics to achieve his goals. 
Tito wanted brotherhood and unity, and he would achieve this with or without the support of 
the population. “All expression of economic resentment, together with nationalist 
consciousness itself, came under Tito’s ban. The society marched forward, willingly or 
unwillingly, under the banner of ‘brotherhood and unity.’ To call yourself a Croat or Serb 
first and a Yugoslav second was to risk arrest as a nationalist and a chauvinist.”287 Although 
little evidence suggests that there was ethnic tension in Tito’s Yugoslavia, one might argue 
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that this is less an indication that people were living in harmony and unity and more an 
indication that Tito’s repressive tactics instilled people with fear of expressing their true 
sentiments. 
Yugoslavia operated under the principle of Roman law which states that the burden of 
proof rests on the accused. Prisoners were often held in confinement for months or even 
years before coming to trial, which was often private. “Once in power, the Titoists shot 
thousands of actual or potential opponents. Many of these fell even prior to the formal 
organization of the state. Scarcely is there a city or town in Yugoslavia where a number of 
leading citizens were not summarily liquidated, many of them without benefit of judicial 
process.”288 In addition, Tito often staged show trials to make examples of controversial 
figures and to discourage national sentiments.289 
Tito tried to be “fair” in his repression, balancing out purges equally between all 
ethnic groups. “Tito believed that only drastic measures could erase the memory of hatred. 
As a consequence, until the late 1980s, if a Bosnian Serb were tried in Sarajevo for political 
crimes then surely, in a few weeks, there would be a trial of a Bosnian Croat and a Bosnian 
Muslim, regardless of whether the latter two had been involved in any political activity or 
not...The theory assumed that a few juridical indiscretions were preferable to a fratricidal 
blood-bath.”290 This shows both an extreme dedication to suppressing ethnic dissent, and the 
existence of a constant source of ethnic tension. After all, how could an innocent Croat or 
Muslim help but to be bitter toward the Serb whose guilt made it necessary for the former to 
be punished out of principle? By treating people in different ethnic groups as though they 
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belonged in separate categories from their fellow Yugoslavs, Tito in many ways kept ethnic 
hostility alive. 
Tito’s repressive measures no doubt frightened people from outwardly expressing 
their true feelings. Yugoslavia, like all Communist countries, had its own secret police force 
called the Department for the Protection of the People (OZNa). Up to 250,000 people were 
killed by Tito’s secret police forces between 1945 and 1946 alone. OZNa existed, in Tito’s 
words, “to strike terror into the bones of those who do not like this kind of Yugoslavia.”291 
Clearly, the secret police was meant to specifically target those people who expressed ethnic 
nationalism rather than a sense of unity. Physical beatings were systematically organized by 
Communist youth leaders in the winter of 1946 to 1947. Students were told to report to 
school in the late evening where they would find a Communist squad waiting for them. The 
squad would call names one by one, providing the most generic accusations. There was no 
opportunity for defense; the student would immediately be beaten by the leader, who would 
then pass the youth to the group outside which would beat him again. “Students who dared 
voice any protest and even some who did not applaud the bestial actions of the Communists, 
were put through the same routine.”292 
As in the Soviet Union, people in Yugoslavia were subjected to torture to secure 
confessions. “Hot needles were driven under fingernails; hot irons were applied to legs; 
persons were forced to spend as long as three days and nights in water up to their necks; men 
were put on tables with heads hanging down over the edge and water poured into mouths and 
nostrils; in summer victims were wrapped in winter overcoats and placed near hot stoves 
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later to be throw on cement floors while cold water was poured on them.”293 The secret 
police also established a ring of informants to report on fellow citizens. As popular resistance 
broke down further and people faced imprisonment and economic discrimination, more and 
more Yugoslavs were forced to become informants. This meant that no trust existed between 
Yugoslavs, and a person could not feel safe revealing feelings of ethnic hostility even in his 
own home. This is just one aspect of Tito’s Yugoslavia that makes it incredibly difficult to 
judge true ethnic sentiments during this period. 
In spite of the similarities between Tito’s repressive measures and Stalin’s own 
tactics, tensions existed between the two. Stalin did not trust the Yugoslav communists, and 
Russian officials penetrated the highest organs of the Yugoslav state apparatus. Tito angered 
Stalin when he rejected a Soviet plan for a joint-stock exchange program. Stalin was further 
displeased with the militancy of the Yugoslav leadership. “He found it impossible to corrupt 
an indigenous Yugoslav Stalinism whose leaders placed both revolutionary purity and 
Yugoslav national interests above Soviet strategic requirements.”294 Yet the most 
unacceptable derivation from Stalin’s instructions was the idea of a Balkan federation, which 
was promoted by both Tito and the Bulgarian leader Georgi Dimitrov. Stalin accused Tito of 
heresy and demanded his immediate obeisance.  
When Tito refused to succumb to Stalin, the great rift between the leaders grew 
deeper. Soon Yugoslavia was accused of slandering the Soviet Union and was denounced as 
having abandoned Marxism. The Soviet Union froze all trade with Yugoslavia; “Stalin was 
convinced he could bring the country to its knees in a matter of days.”295 The economic 
blockade had severe consequences, but the US devised a policy to keep Tito afloat because 
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he was seen as a potential ally against the Soviets. Yugoslavia agreed to this Western trade 
relationship but remained true to Stalinist practices domestically, reinvigorating denunciation 
and political persecution. In June 1948, after Tito refused to submit to Stalin’s will, 
Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform. 
Despite unifying rhetoric in the mid 1940s, the issue of developing a unitary 
Yugoslav identity did not become a pressing concern until Yugoslavia was no longer under 
the Soviet wing. This situation forced Tito to develop a theory of the specifically Yugoslav 
road to communism, a task which would require greater national unity among the people. 
Clearly previous efforts at Yugoslav brotherhood had not been entirely successful. The 1948 
census revealed that the number of people identifying themselves as “Yugoslav” as opposed 
to a more specific ethnic identity was as low as 5.1 percent of the population.296 
“Accordingly, the regime launched a campaign to promote the idea of integral Yugoslavism 
as a common culture. The foundations for this were provided by the Partisan philosophy of 
brotherhood and unity which conveniently bridged the notion of the particularist identities 
derived from ethnic and national loyalties with a supranational Yugoslav identity into which 
the separate national culture would eventually merge.”297 
This campaign for ethnic unity was supported by extensive propaganda. From an 
early age Yugoslavs were indoctrinated, via their schooling and the media, with love for Tito, 
Yugoslavia, and Titoism. Yugoslavs were also taught to love one another. In school, children 
studied the histories and cultures of all Yugoslavia’s people. Education was multicultural and 
aimed at unifying the Yugoslav population. From the day children started school, they began 
to learn of the National Liberation War and the contribution that all Yugoslavia’s peoples had 
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made to the defeat of fascism. School trips took children on visits to neighboring republics, 
and traditionally conscripts completed military service outside their home republic to get to 
know another part of the country. “All people living in Yugoslavia, including the non-Slav 
Albanians and Hungarians, were taught that they could be their own nationality and 
Yugoslav at the same time and that they should be proud of both.”298 These policies of 
tolerance allowed Yugoslavia’s smaller ethnic groups, like the Macedonians and Muslim 
Slavs, to thrive culturally and evolve a modern identity without fear of aggressive Croat and 
Serb nationalism.  
Tito’s policies brought great hope to the Yugoslav people. “The first version of 
Yugoslavia, poor and riven by nationalist tensions, had failed to persuade non-Serbs within 
the Yugoslav community, especially Croats, that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia really was their 
country.”299 The new Yugoslavia, however, had the potential to get the union right and truly 
bring the Slavic people together as Tito worked toward removing feelings of ethnic injustice. 
“In this way, the Communists were able to create a broad base of support because they 
identified their aims with those of most of the people and without their cause being the 
property of any particular ethnicity.”300 The people of Yugoslavia looked forward to great 
things developing from Tito’s rule. “Phoenix-like, a new Yugoslavia was rising from the 
ashes.”301 
Alex Dragnich, however, believes that Tito’s rule was a curse for Yugoslavia, 
aggravating the ethnic problem rather than solving it. In his opinion, Tito made it “impossible 
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to discuss unresolved issues. In such an atmosphere suspicion and rumor produced anything 
but mutual confidence.”302 In 1954, both Serbs and Croats told Dragnich that the nationality 
problem had never been more acute. Norman Naimark explains these tensions by pointing 
out that Serbs and Croats looked at the new Yugoslavia differently. “The Serbs saw the 
state’s creation as a final reward for their long history of battle and sacrifice on behalf of the 
south Slavs and they assumed Serbs would govern and rule it as a unitary, centralist polity, as 
befitted their history and experience. From the very start, Croats and Slovenes, among others, 
contested this vision, looking to protect their interests through decentralization and 
confederation, an equal union of equal peoples.”303 In this sense, Tito’s Yugoslavia faced 
many of the same disagreements which arose during the Kingdom’s existence. 
The new Yugoslav government also posed problems for Bosnia. Despite attempts to 
put all the people of Yugoslavia on an equal footing, Bosnia was “regarded as somehow 
lower in status than the other republics of Yugoslavia. This inferior treatment had come 
about, Bosnians felt, because Bosnia was seen as containing not a distinctive nation but 
merely fragments of two other nations (Serbs and Croats) and a non-nation.”304 Bosnia was 
not fully developed under Tito, and was left with “new and often unfinished factories 
established in splendid isolation from markets, roads, or skilled manpower.”305 Bosnia had 
the lowest rate of economic growth of all the Yugoslav republics from 1952 to 1968. With 
the exception of Kosovo, by the early 1970s Bosnia had the highest infant mortality rate, 
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illiteracy rate, and proportion of people with only a primary school education in all of 
Yugoslavia.306 
The problems facing Bosnia in this era suggest that Tito neglected the republic in 
favor of others. However, in reality Tito enacted policies to try to counteract the economic 
disparities in Bosnia and other poor regions. Tito put in place a policy whereby the poorest 
republics—Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina—would get the most federal 
aid while the richest republics—Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia—would contribute the most 
back to the government.307 While this policy was in the best interest of Yugoslavia as a 
whole, the richer republics were incredibly resentful of the arrangement and this attempt at 
equality ended up exacerbating ethnic tensions further.  
In the interest of healing old wounds and encouraging Yugoslav unity, Tito made an 
effort to acknowledge and move past the atrocities of World War II by building a memorial 
for all those killed at the Ustashe extermination camp in Jasenovac. However, Tito’s 
commemorations were very one-sided. He made no attempts to honor those Croats who were 
killed during World War II and this led to increased resentment. Michael Ignatieff explains 
why Tito’s behavior was hurtful to Croats. 
If Croats cannot bear Jasenovac, it is not merely because of what was done in 
their name but also because of the partiality of what is remembered. At 
Jasenovac, Tito’s Yugoslavia remembered Croatians only as murderers, never 
as victims. Tito never built a memorial center at any of the mass graves of the 
thousands of Croatians massacred as they fled before his Communist partisans 
on the roads of northeastern Croatia and Slovenia in May 1945. The guilt of 
Jasenovac became unbearable, not merely because it was great but also 
because it was unjust.308 
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Ignatieff argues that a nation can not hope to hold together unless it comes to a common and 
truthful version of its past. In trying to accept the past and move on, Tito perpetuated a biased 
understanding of World War II which encouraged the nationalist atrocities of this period to 
be misinterpreted and fueled future resentment. 
In April 1963, a new constitution was adopted in Yugoslavia. This legislation 
introduced a real measure of decentralization, changed the state name to the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, and introduced personnel rotation for all elective functions except 
the presidency. Tito effectively became president for life, as the constitution stated that no 
limitations of the office applied to him.309 This constitution encouraged a close association 
between nationality and territory, and the regime simply turned a blind eye to sectional 
national differences which began infiltrating the power structure. “It had actively discouraged 
all integrative forces other than Communism, and separate nationalisms were surfacing again 
with decentralization.”310 
For the most part, Tito acted as the final arbiter in the countless clashes between the 
ethnic groups of Yugoslavia. Tito could have resolved the national problems permanently 
through democratization, but his power and prestige were more important than ethnic 
harmony. Tito “played Zagreb against Belgrade to stir up animosities in order to consolidate 
his own authority.”311 In addition, Tito’s repressive tactics drove both Serbian and Croatian 
national movements underground and “when they emerged from hibernation in the mid and 
late 1980s, they had lost their modernizing and liberal characteristics.”312 In the words of Tito 
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loyalist Dobrivoj Radosavljevic, “Tito committed a historical error by encouraging Albanian-
Serb and Croatian-Serb conflict. Yugoslavia will pay a heavy price for it.”313 
It soon became clear that while no nationality dominated the government as a whole, 
each was developing its own niche. “During most of the 1960s and 1970s, a 
disproportionately influential role in the federal center was played by the cadres from the 
smaller republics of Macedonia and Slovenia. The same was the case with economic 
policy.”314 On the other hand Serbs and Montenegrins dominated the officer corps, and Serbs 
dominated the political police. Croats were routinely resentful of the police because up until 
1990, Serbs formed about seventy percent of the police force but only twelve percent of 
Croatia’s total population.315 “This power arrangement was the result of Tito’s deliberate 
policy of trying to keep the center from being dominated by one national group and giving all 
a stake.”316 Although all groups had a stake in the government, they were not distributed 
evenly throughout the administration. As a result, instead of working together throughout the 
government, each group controlled certain state organs and was completely excluded from 
others. Every group felt alienated from the state organs it did not control, and used the ones it 
did to express resentment toward the ethnic groups it saw as having the most power. 
Alienation and resentment created by ethnic imbalances in the organs of power paved 
the way for a rebirth of Croat nationalism in the late 1960s. In March 1967, seventeen 
leading cultural organizations in Croatia including the literary society Matica Hrvatska 
published a manifesto demanding that the constitution provide better protection for the 
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literary languages of Yugoslavia, particularly the Croatian language.317 The group requested 
an affirmation of Croatian national culture due to what they saw as the dominance of Serbian 
literary language. The organizations also demanded that all those with official functions in 
Croatia speak only Croatian. This was interpreted as an anti-Serbian request because of the 
high proportion of Serb, albeit Croatian Serb, civil servants in employment.  
In making these demands, the group essentially proclaimed that Croatian was a 
distinct language from Serbian and that attempts to harmonize the two languages were really 
attempts to Serbianize it. The absurdity of such demands becomes clear when one notes that 
the difference between the Croatian and Serbian dialects is “significantly less than that 
between British English and Scottish English.”318 However, Serbs were quick to respond 
with similarly absurd demands. Serbian intellectuals soon began to insist that Serbian 
children living in Croatia be taught in the Serbian language rather than the Croatian one. 
Serbs also demanded the use of Cyrillic script as a way to further distinguish between the two 
languages and be true to Serb cultural roots. “The revival of the language problem was 
echoed around the other parts of the country.”319 Nationalism had reared its ugly head and 
would not be quickly silenced. 
Tito’s dismissal of these demands as a stab in the back of Yugoslav unity did nothing 
to placate the nationalists and instead led Croats to increase their requests for reform. Croat 
leaders pushed for a reallocation of federal funds so that the richest republics, Croatia 
included, would receive federal investments proportionate to their own contributions rather 
than allowing their wealth to benefit the poorest republics only. Croatians felt that this was 
only fair because they were suffering due to this lack of federal funds. During the 1960s, the 
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republic of Croatia had the highest number of emigrants and one of the lowest birth rates. In 
1971, over five percent of the population worked abroad; of these, fifty percent were below 
the age of thirty, sixty-three percent of whom were men. These statistics, according to Ann 
Lane, are a reflection of the lack of career opportunities in Croatia at this time.320 Croats held 
Serbs responsible for their less-than-ideal circumstances. “Belgrade remained the metaphor 
for all that was outdated, centralist, and authoritarian while the perceived extent of Serbian 
influence in the federal government was blamed for the fact that Croatia was not as rich as 
some of the small Western European states. The Croats resented the fact that the 
headquarters of the large banks and the most prosperous enterprises were located in 
Belgrade, symbolizing the centralization of Yugoslavia’s financial life away from the regions 
which generated much of the country’s wealth.”321 
Croats pushed to restructure the federal decision-making mechanism and create 
conditions in which one could write about Croatian history objectively.322 They also objected 
to Serbian dominance in the Yugoslav Army and police force, though it must be noted that 
Croats were dominant in the officer corps of both the navy and air force. This upsurge of 
Croat nationalism reflected the “perennial fear among Croats that they risked losing their 
separate national identity within a unitary Yugoslav state.”323 The more that Tito tried to 
dismiss these concerns as unimportant, the more intensely Croats were determined to fight 
for the preservation of their national identity and the implementation of economic reforms. 
Croat leaders attempted to harness this nationalist upsurge for their own benefit rather 
than subduing it. “At the federal level Yugoslavia was divided between economic reformers 
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in the wealthier republics and economic conservatives in the more backward regions, and the 
result was deadlock. Croatia’s leaders were prepared to use the threat of the nationalist card 
to back up the demands of their economic program. However, their gamble failed as the 
national movement rapidly gained a momentum of its own.”324 Soon, ethnic resentment 
towards Serbs began to take on a threatening character. Riots at football matches, the 
destruction of signs in the Cyrillic alphabet, and inflammatory articles in the Croatian press 
all served to make Croatia’s Serb population increasingly nervous. 
In 1968, the Matica Hrvatska published a periodical that focused on the 
disadvantageous position of Croat minorities in other republics, particularly Bosnia. Soon, 
the nationalist cause was taken up not just by non-governmental organizations but by the 
Croatian League of Communists itself. Tito attempted to scare the Croatian elite into 
obeisance with a series of threats but the party was so deeply divided that it was unable to act 
even in the face of intimidation. Tito became convinced that the central organization of 
Yugoslavia must be strengthened to combat nationalist sentiments in the republics; this was 
ensured with the passing of twenty-three amendments to the constitution in 1971.  
Furthermore, in 1972 Tito engineered an extensive purge of the Croatian League of 
Communists, expelling prominent party leaders and their associates accused of nationalist 
sentiments. Thousands of Croats were punished. Fifty thousand Croatian communists lost 
their party cards, twelve thousand directors and engineers were fired, and two to five 
thousand people were imprisoned. “But the purge did not liquidate Croatian nationalism; it 
only drove it underground.”325 Judah argues that these seemingly petty arguments were an 
expression of the brewing disturbance in Serbo-Croat relations. “In the wake of the collapse 
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of Yugoslavia, it can now be seen that many of the debates of the period 1970-1971 in 
Croatia were simply a dress rehearsal for those of the late 1980s. Without Tito to draw 
everyone back from the brink the second time around, the national questions were pushed 
relentlessly to their bloody conclusions.”326 
Hindsight allows scholars like Judah to identify ways in which the violence of the 
1990s was pre-figured by events in the 1960s and 1970s, but statistics from this period 
suggest the situation may have been more harmonious than some would lead you to believe. 
For example, from the late 1960s onward, Bosnia-Herzegovina witnessed a remarkable social 
and cultural renaissance focused on Sarajevo. Social and ethnic barriers began to break down 
in urban areas as the number of mixed marriages and the number of those who chose to 
identify as Yugoslavs increased. “By the 1981 census, those who for census purposes called 
themselves Yugoslavs constituted 7.9 percent of the population. Mixed marriages accounted 
for 15.3 percent of the total number of marriages in the republic in 1981.”327 Intermarriage 
rates were lower among Muslims than among Serbs and Croats, but if one included children 
of mixed marriages in 1981, “over half the population of Bosnia had a close relative of a 
different nationality.”328 These statistics serve to remind readers that even as ethnic 
resentments were stirred among elites and certain sectors of the population, such extremism 
did not reach all people during this period. For many, it seems, Tito’s rule really did bring a 
kind of natural tolerance and inter-mingling of ethnic groups. For these individuals, the 
violence of the 1990s was far from expected. 
 
326 Judah, 146. 
327 Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International 
Intervention, (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1999): 42. 
328 Ibid. 
129
In 1974 a new constitution was passed in response to the republics’ demand for 
greater autonomy. The Constitution of 1974 invested each Yugoslav republic and province 
with theoretical statehood and effectively created a semi-confederative political structure in 
which powerful sectional leadership emerged. This new decentralization created even more 
problems. “Just enough of a principle of separate national political identities was conceded to 
whet the appetite for more.”329 Furthermore, the new government was far from a democratic 
union of equal states; the ever-present government oppression in Yugoslavia worsened 
nationalistic antagonism. “It is easy to persuade one nation that it is being oppressed or 
connived against by another when the whole political system in which both nations are 
locked is undemocratic and intrinsically oppressive. And the natural breeding ground for all 
kinds of discontent is a weak and malfunctioning economy—something which was also 
guaranteed under the Yugoslav Communist system.”330 No amount of minor compromise 
would placate the demands of the growing nationalist groups in Yugoslavia. 
Serbia had fewer reasons for discontent than any other Yugoslav republic during the 
first twenty years of Communist rule. Nonetheless, Serbian nationalism grew rapidly in this 
period. Macedonia had been conquered by the Serbs in 1912, but it was established as a 
separate region by Tito after the war. This was seen as a theft of Serbian territory and was a 
source of Serb resentment for many years. Ethnic tension throughout Yugoslavia led the 
Serbian League of Communists to fragment along ethnic lines in the 1970s. Ignatieff argues 
that groups based on political ideology fell apart during this period because people were 
never given the opportunity to develop non-ethnic political affiliations based on civic multi-
party competition. People resorted to their ethnic identity not because they had strong hatred 
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for other groups but rather because they knew no other ways to identify themselves.331 As the 
1970s wore on and nationalist sentiments heightened, the state became weaker and fear more 
prevalent. “If Yugoslavia no longer protected you, perhaps your fellow Croats, Serbs, or 
Slovenes might. Fear, more than conviction, made unwilling nationalists of ordinary 
people.”332 
In this atmosphere of turmoil and discontent, it was Tito who maintained relative 
order in Yugoslavia. The constantly renewed and updated Yugoslav constitutions “were little 
more than window dressing.”333 Tito was in charge of all policy decisions and government 
structures were essentially for show; the force holding Yugoslavia together in the late 1970s 
was not its institutions or laws but its leader. As one can imagine, people grew concerned that 
after Tito’s death the country would fall apart. However, in Tito’s last years, no heir apparent 
emerged. “Tito was frequently likened to a great oak tree, in the shade of whose immense 
branches nothing else could grow.”334 In reality, Tito was not eager to appoint a successor 
because he feared such a person would threaten his power during his lifetime. As a result, 
Tito created a collective head of state to succeed him. This would be an eight-member 
presidency, comprising one representative from each of the six republics and one from each 
of Serbia’s provinces. The presidency would rotate annually between its members. This was 
explained as a mechanism to prevent any single republic or politician from accumulating too 
much power, but it was not a lasting solution to a leadership problem.  
Tito died in Ljubljana on May 4, 1980 at the age of 87. Thanks to the opacity of the 
government during his life and the extreme inefficiency of the government established to 
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replace him, Tito’s death left Yugoslavia in a difficult situation. The population was 
devastated by the loss of the only leader many had ever known, and comforted each other 
with the slogan, “After Tito—Tito.” In reality, Tito’s absence left a political void in which 
the federal presidency passed from one uninspiring and little known politician to another. 
“Until the second half of the 1980s these complex arrangements had produced a stable 
multinational federation where, whatever else was wrong (and a great many things were 
wrong), the national question seemed to be settled.”335 However, the system continued to 
decay and the ideology which originally held party cadres together began to crumble. Soon, 
republic leaders discovered that it was in their own best interest to represent the interests of 
their power base, their own republics, against the center.  This was a sure way for such 
politicians to gain local popularity as well as a sure way to exacerbate ethnic tensions and 
disputes. 
In addition, Tito left Yugoslavia’s economy in shambles. The country suffered from 
massive unemployment and the government responded by borrowing heavily on international 
money markets. By 1982, Yugoslavia’s debt stood at $18.5 billion.336 Each year, the 
government had to get new loans simply to finance interest payments. “The country was 
littered with giant factories which would have run at a loss even without the interest 
payments on the loans which had financed their creation.”337 The whole Titoist economic 
system was in a state of terminal decline with a steep and steady fall in real wages. By 1986, 
unemployment and strikes had become endemic. Inflation was incredibly problematic; it rose 
120 percent in 1987 and 250 percent in 1988. By the end of 1988, Yugoslavia’s total foreign 
debt totaled $33 billion. “In this way, the long-term legacy of Tito’s economic policies had 
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been to create an increasingly discontented and impoverished population—the perfect place 
for demagogues to get to work, stirring up the politics of resentment.”338 
On top of economic troubles, Yugoslavia faced great problems with corruption. By 
the 1980s, those who had fought the revolution were reaching retirement age. The new 
generation of workers had been raised under communism, and therefore had learned to kill 
and bribe to get to the top rather than working for what they wanted. “The disillusionment of 
ordinary Yugoslavs was almost universal. For many, this took the form of a withdrawal from 
any kind of political life.”339 Great unhappiness with an inefficient government and failing 
economy, coupled with a desire to find someone to blame, made the population of 
Yugoslavia primed for the introduction of an extremist leader in Tito’s wake. 
 
Slobodan Milosevic’s Rise to Power 
With such widespread discontent among the population, it is no wonder that the years 
following Tito’s death saw a surge of nationalist sentiment in Yugoslavia. In 1985, the 
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts met to discuss various national and social problems 
facing their people and put together a written statement. On September 25, 1986, a Belgrade 
newspaper published leaked extracts of the unfinished Memorandum. The document stated, 
“Except for the time under the Independent State of Croatia, the Serbs in Croatia have never 
before been as jeopardized as they are today. A resolution of their national status is a 
question of overriding political importance.”340 The document went on to say, “A nation 
which after a long and bloody struggle regained its own state, which fought for and achieved 
a civil democracy, and which in the last two wars lost 2.5 million of its members, has lived to 
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see the day when a Party committee of apparatchiks decrees that after four decades in the 
new Yugoslavia it alone is not allowed to have its own state. A worse historical defeat in 
peacetime cannot be imagined.”341 
Up until this point, the Serbian Academy was an upstanding organization without a 
reputation for nationalism. To hear such a statement from an august body like the Academy 
was shocking and illustrates the pervasive nature of ethnic hostility in Yugoslavia at the time. 
“Genuine grievances suddenly became genocide, Croatia was compared to the NDH, 
Serbia’s leaders were apparatchiks.”342 The document concluded, “The Serbian people 
cannot stand idly by and wait for the future in such a state of uncertainty. Naturally, Serbia 
must not be passive and wait and see what the others will say, as it has done so often in the 
past.”343 This expression of blatant Serbian nationalism was widely condemned by the 
communist leadership, with the exception of one lower-level communist who remained 
silent: Slobodan Milseovic. “He let others speak in his place, making sure the document was 
condemned—this was, after all, his duty—but shied away from a public expression of his 
views.”344 
Milosevic, however, would not remain silent for long. On December 14, 1987, after 
dedicating many years to the party, Milosevic replaced his long-time mentor Ivan Stambolic 
as president of the Serbian Communist Party. In this new position, Milosevic exercised great 
power in the country. He had superior organizational skills and promoted people to senior 
positions whose main attribute was personal loyalty. He also understood the power of the 
media and was a skilled propaganda expert. After assuming the leadership of the Communist 
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Party, Milosevic criticized his predecessor's policy on Kosovo, a region which is dominated 
by Albanians but contains a minority of Serbs and Montenegrins. Milosevic called for justice 
for the Kosovo Serbs, which in reality meant that he wanted Kosovo to become part of Serbia 
proper. This policy allowed Milosevic to gain the allegiance of Serb intellectuals, who were 
familiar with the ancient Serbian desire to possess Kosovo. The Central Committee 
supported Milosevic’s plan and raised his nationalist demand to the top of the Serb agenda. 
“This was a challenge to all other republics: their choice was to recognize Serbia's seniority 
within Yugoslavia and by implication the dominance of a Serbian-dominated unitarist state, 
or to respond with a nationalist agenda of their own.”345 
All the pieces of the puzzle were now in place. There was an ambitious politician in 
Belgrade who had learned the methods of Communist power politics as he worked his way 
up the system. There was general economic malaise and discontent, which made people 
yearn for decisive leadership. Finally, the ideology of Serb nationalism, so long frustrated, 
was now finding an expression in a policy which restored Vojvodina and Kosovo to Serbian 
control. “Two processes seemed fused into one: the gathering of power into Milosevic’s 
hands, and the gathering of the Serbs in a single political unit which could either dominate 
Yugoslavia or break it apart.”346 
Milosevic took full advantage of his unique circumstances. Immediately, he began 
working to include Serb communities outside of Serbia proper in the nationalist goals of the 
region. Milosevic organized protests and rallies by encouraging businesses to support these 
events financially and paying unemployed young men to travel the country and participate. 
“The demonstrations were part of a well-organized plan designed to intimidate the non-Serb 
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peoples of Yugoslavia, instill among Serbs the idea that their fellow Serbs were being widely 
discriminated against, but on a higher political plane, to underline Milosevic's determination 
to mark his territory as the undisputed master of post-Titoist Yugoslavia.”347 Milosevic also 
made great efforts to radicalize the Serb population; even those who argue that true ethnic 
tensions existed have difficulty denying that Milosevic used the media to exaggerate threats. 
Every action of the Croatian government was presented as an act of Ustashe terror. Although 
Milosevic was the mastermind behind these Serb policies, he was always careful not to bear 
apparent responsibility. When a particular policy came under scrutiny or attack, “he would 
simply point out that as president, he enjoyed few if any executive powers so he could not 
accept responsibility.”348 
Milosevic played the role of the people’s leader well. In April 1987, he visited the 
sight of the epic Battle of Kosovo and pledged to aggrieved Serb protestors, “No one will 
ever beat this people again.”349 Two years later, on June 28, 1989, Milosevic returned to 
Blackbird Field for an official appearance at the six-hundredth anniversary of Serbia’s defeat 
by the Turks. “Against a backdrop of posters of himself and the fourteenth-century tsar 
Lazar, he gambled on going further. The audience of a million Serbs greeted him with wild 
cheers when he threatened, for the first time, that future ‘armed battles cannot be 
excluded.’”350 Milosevic’s ability to play with the heart strings of his people is highlighted by 
an appreciation of the symbols being evoked. In the words of Bishop Emilijan, “Beside the 
name of Christ, no other name is more beautiful or more sacred than that of Lazar.”351 
Milosevic used the image of Lazar and his refusal to give in to foreign rulers to encourage 
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Serbs to “eat roots rather than betray their nation by accepting foreign dictates.”352 As 
Elizabeth Pond explains, “Milosevic’s theatrical summons at Blackbird Field touched 
perfectly the chord of victimization that has long coexisted with the Serbs superiority 
complex.”353 
By 1989, Milosevic had acquired an unchallengeable personal standing in Serbia 
through a combination of Communist methods and nationalist rhetoric. Out of the eight votes 
in the federal government, he now controlled four: Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo, and 
Montenegro. “He had only to reduce Macedonia to client status as well to be able to do what 
he wanted with the federal government; and the federal constitution could then be rewritten 
to entrench the dominance of Serbia.”354 Milosevic presented himself as the defender of 
Yugoslavia against the secessionist ambitions of Croatia and Slovenia, as well as the avenger 
of wrongs done to Serbia by that very Yugoslavia.  
Milosevic also worked towards a Greater Serbia. “If the other republics would not 
agree to a new Yugoslavia dominated by the Serbs, Milosevic was prepared to incite the 
Serbian minorities in Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina to rise up and demand 
Serbian protection. These minorities served as Milosevic’s Sudeten Germans—pretext and 
justification for his expansionary design.”355 Milosevic was adamantly opposed to 
Yugoslavia becoming a loose confederation of sovereign states because such a situation 
would minimize his power. He also worked hard to prevent any states from leaving the 
federation because this would reduce the territory that he might control if he took over the 
Yugoslav federal government. “Every time Croatia and Slovenia pushed their claims for 
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independence, Milosevic simply said that Croatia could go but without the regions where 
Serbs live.”356 By making demands of Croatia that he knew it would never accept, Milosevic 
made it clear that he was well-prepared to accept war as a solution to the Yugoslav problem.  
Unsurprisingly, Milosevic’s authoritarian ways made the other Yugoslav republics 
very nervous. In spite of their differences, the republics were united in their condemnation of 
Milosevic’s unitarist Yugoslavia. Ignatieff believes that in spite of Croat and Slovene 
rhetoric supporting a loose Yugoslav confederation, the two were on a course towards 
independence beginning in the 1980s. As the two richest republics in Yugoslavia, Croatia 
and Slovenia were resentful that their economic success was used to pay for “backward 
Bosnia and Balkan Serbia.”357 Between Tito’s suppression of the Croatian spring in 1970 and 
Milosevic’s expansionist behavior, absorbing Kosovo and Vojvodina, Croatian and 
Slovenian leaders saw no future in a federal Yugoslavia. It is important to note that many 
Serbs were outraged at the prospect of Croat and Slovene independence even without the 
influence of Milosevic’s propaganda. Serbs felt they had fought on behalf of all the Balkan 
nations and yet were not rewarded for their efforts. Croats and Slovenes lived better than 
Serbs but still sought control of resources. “Even more galling to the Serbs was the sense that 
the growing nationalism of the other peoples of Yugoslavia jeopardized the life and property 
of Serbs who lived outside of Serbia proper.”358 
The spiral of nationalist tension continued, and as Milosevic became more extreme in 
his public views, so did his opponents. Milosevic’s increasingly forceful insistence that Serbs 
control Yugoslavia simply made the other republics more unwilling to submit to his power. 
Croatian nationalism increased in the face of Milosevic’s bullying, and Serb and Croat 
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nationalism began to feed off each other, pushing each other to more and more extreme 
views. When hard nationalists won elections in Croatia and took over the media, the rhetoric 
only got worse. “By 1989 the nationalist disputes between Serbs and Croats had begun to 
metastasize at a breakneck speed that was even further accelerated by wild, jingoist 
campaigns in the controlled mass media.”359 Meanwhile, the most Westernized and 
independent-minded of the republics, Slovenia, was making arrangements to protect itself. In 
September and October 1989 it drafted and passed a new Slovenian constitution, giving itself 
legislative sovereignty—in other words, saying that its own laws would take precedence over 
those of the federal state—and explicitly declaring its right to secede. 
To get a full picture of the nationalist Yugoslav fervor of the 1980s, one must take a 
step back and look at how the population itself viewed these events. Ignatieff argues that 
ethnic divisions in Yugoslavia arose because of elite manipulation rather than due to ethnic 
hostility. “Consciousness of ethnic difference turned into nationalist hatred only when the 
surviving Communist elites, beginning with Serbia, began manipulating nationalist emotions 
in order to cling to power.”360 Ignatieff maintains that by looking to the Yugoslav population, 
one can dispel the common misperception that people of the region are incorrigibly 
nationalist. “Many people bitterly lament the passing of Yugoslavia, precisely because it was 
a state that once gave them room to define themselves in non-nationalist ways.”361 He points 
to the essay “Overcome by Nationhood” by Croatian writer Slavenka Drakulic, in which 
Drakulic explains that until the late 1980s she had always defined herself in terms of her 
“education, profession, gender, and personality. It was only the maddened atmosphere of the 
Croatian-Serbia war of 1991 that finally stripped her of all of these defining marks of identity 
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except simply being a Croatian.”362 The nationalist rhetoric of the 1980s gave a voice only to 
the population’s fear and pride. “In reality, nationalism ended up imprisoning everyone in the 
Balkans in the fiction of ‘pure’ ethnic identity. Those with multiple identities—for example, 
from mixed marriages—were forced to choose between inherited and adopted families, and 
thus between two fused elements of their own selves.”363 
To verify Ignatieff’s claims, it is helpful to look at some opinion polls conducted in 
the region in the late 1980s. In Croatia in 1989, 66 percent of Croats and 72 percent of Serbs 
characterized ethnic relations in their community as good or mainly good. “They did, 
however, perceive that relations between nationalities at the level of Yugoslavia were mostly 
bad (77.6 percent as very bad or mostly bad).”364 In a November 1989 survey given in 
Bosnia, 80 percent of the wider population surveyed considered interethnic relations in the 
places where they lived to be positive, and 66 percent saw interethnic relations in Bosnia-
Herzegovina as the most stable in Yugoslavia. “When asked whether ethnicity should be 
taken into account when choosing marriage partners, 80 percent of Serbs, 77 percent of 
Muslims, 93.4 percent of Yugoslavs, and 66 percent of Croats replied negatively.”365 All 
three ethnic groups in Bosnia were highly integrated and in many places lived side by side as 
friends and neighbors. This data supports an elite manipulation theory of the Yugoslav 
conflict, as the general populous does not exhibit the ethnic hatred expressed by leaders and 
institutions at the time.  Such statistics support Gagnon’s theory that elite manipulation can 
only change people’s perceptions of what is going on “out there” but is unable to shake how 
people view their own personal experiences and communities. 
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Map 8: Balkan Ethnic Distribution in 1990 
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Gagnon points out that supporters of nationalist parties in Serbia and Croatia tended 
to be rural Yugoslavs, pensioners, and other groups of the population who would be most 
negatively affected by a shift to a liberal economic system. “The support that these people 
provided the ruling parties could thus just as easily be attributed to their economic interests 
as to their ethnic identities. The other much smaller segment that actively supported and 
participated in the strategy of violence included those for whom war represented glory and  
heroism or, conversely, the opportunity to partake in looting and bloody killing.”366 Gagnon 
points out that most people in Yugoslavia were not mobilized for ethnic conflict, and 
understands this to mean that images of ethnic war did not appeal to people’s lived 
experiences or self-identification. “Indeed, the evidence points to the opposite: that 
conservative elites were using violence to demobilize people precisely because they were not 
able to use appeals to ethnic identity as the basis for mobilization.”367 
Before assuming that ethnic tensions were completely fabricated by elites, it is worth 
examining hard evidence which struck fear into the hearts of people throughout Yugoslavia 
and made nationalist rhetoric believable to many. In the 1980s, the Croat republic adopted 
the red-and-white checkered shield of Sahovnica as their flag. While this is an innocently 
traditional Croat emblem, it was also the flag used by the Ustashe during World War II; this 
is a connection that many Serbs had trouble viewing as meaningless. In May 1990, Croat 
elections removed the communists from office and installed Franjo Tudjman’s Croatian 
Democratic Union party which campaigned on nationalist euphoria. One of the party’s first 
acts was to demote Serbs, about 600,000 people and twelve percent of the population, from 
the Croatian constitution. “Croatia was the ‘national state of the Croatian people’ and only 
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then of the other nations who lived in it.”368 The new party also dismissed Serbs from the 
Croatian police and judiciary. All this helped to convince Serbs that they were witnessing the 
return of an ethnic state with a genocidal past. Certainly Milosevic played on these fears, but 
many Serbs were also frightened for good reason and without his encouragement. These fears 
arose inevitably out of the collapse of Tito’s Yugoslavia. “Once the multi-ethnic state 
disintegrated, every national group outside its republic’s borders suddenly found itself an 
endangered national minority. As the largest such group, the Serbs felt particularly 
vulnerable to the rise of Croatian nationalism.”369 
While this evidence does provide reasons why Serbs were willing to accept 
Milosevic’s rhetoric, it is important to note that such developments do not preclude elite 
manipulation as a valid explanation for the conflict. Serbs may have been reasonable to fear 
Croatian nationalism, but this does not mean that the Croats actually meant them harm, or 
that Serbs wished to aggressively target Croats. In fact, the existence of these legitimate fears 
can enforce elite manipulation theory by showing that people were primed for exploitation by 
propaganda and nationalist rhetoric without necessarily wishing physical harm on members 
of another ethnic group. 
As the ethnic turmoil of the 1980s dragged on, it became increasingly clear that 
Milosevic would not be able to gain full control of Yugoslavia under the already established 
system of government and Communist Party. As the government deteriorated, the republics 
began rebelling, and nationalist rhetoric took on further escalating dimensions, Milosevic 
began to think seriously about a second option. “If Yugoslavia could not be controlled as a 
single entity, then he would carve out of it a new entity, an extended Serbian territory, which 
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would be his and his alone.”370 The stage was set for all-out war. In the words of Ignatieff, 
“The tragedy for the Balkans was that, when democracy at least became possible, the only 
language that existed to mobilize people into a shared social project as the rhetoric of ethnic 
difference.”371 
Conclusion 
The Balkan region has a long and complex history which is by no means fully 
explored in the preceding pages. Still, this chapter seeks to provide a sense of the life and 
evolution of ethnic sentiment in the area. It is difficult to argue that the Slavic people of the 
Balkans have always hated each other and always will, but evidence does suggest an on-
going journey of tension and distrust. This may simply prove that the population was primed 
to accept the propaganda and manipulation of Milosevic and Tudjman, rather than the fact 
that such leaders accurately reflected popular sentiments. However, no conclusions about the 
nature of the violence in the 1990s can be drawn without first examining the conflict itself as 
well as the region’s post-war transition period. This chapter provides one piece to a complex 
puzzle which is not yet ready to be solved. 
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Chapter 4: The Breakup of Yugoslavia 
 The wars that took place in Croatia and Bosnia in the early 1990s were extremely 
destructive and brutal conflicts. Suffering went far beyond those killed in battle, extending to 
every facet of civilian life and leaving physical, psychological, and emotional wounds which 
will not heal for years to come. This chapter attempts to both capture the political events of 
the war and highlight the suffering endured by individuals on all sides. An examination of the 
nature of this conflict requires looking at it from above, in terms of elite actions and 
motivations, as well as from below, in terms of the civilian experience. As in the last chapter, 
this presentation will inform the reader about all events relating to the conflict, regardless of 
the theory they seem to support. Each group involved in the war counted victims and villains 
among its ranks, and a truthful understanding of this tragedy requires that one embrace its 
complexities rather than ignoring them.  
 
Yugoslavia’s Path to War 
As the 1980s came to a close ethnic tensions and fears were running rampant in 
Yugoslavia. The harder Milosevic and Serb nationalists pushed the other republics to submit 
to their rule, the more fervently other republics fought back with their own nationalist 
agendas. It is no surprise, then, that Croatia and Slovenia, the richest republics of the 
federation, soon began contemplating secession from Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, this served 
only to complicate matters further because the 1974 Yugoslav constitution was unclear on 
the legality of secession. The constitution itself stated, “The nations of Yugoslavia, 
proceeding from the right of every nation to self-determination, including the right to 
secession, have united in a federal republic of free and equal nations and nationalities and 
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founded a socialist federal community.”372 The question became: is there a difference 
between a republic and a nation?  In the case of Slovenia, it seemed clear that they were one 
in the same. Slovenia had no native-born minorities and there were no pockets of Slovenes 
outside the republic. However, Milosevic argued that while Croats as a nation had a right to 
self-determination, the republic of Croatia was a different story. The Croats themselves could 
secede but Milosevic insisted that they would have to leave areas with Serb populations 
behind. Some believe that Milosevic was trying to save ethnic Serbs from abuse at the hands 
of the Croatian government, while others claim that Milosevic simply used the presence of 
Serbs in Croatia as an excuse to pressure the Croats to remain in Yugoslavia. Either way, 
Milosevic would not allow the Croats to leave without a fight. 
As nationalist tensions grew, Milosevic became anxious to tighten his control of the 
Yugoslav military; violent conflict was imminent, and he was eager to prepare. Luckily for 
Milosevic, Serbs had made up the great majority of both soldiers and army officers in the 
Yugoslav National Army (JNA) for decades. This was not because Serbs were particularly 
militaristic but rather because of the circumstances surrounding army recruitment. The most 
underdeveloped areas of Yugoslavia tended to be Serb-dominated. It was these areas which 
had the highest unemployment and therefore the most inhabitants interested in a military 
career. Conversely, the most highly industrialized areas of the country, where populations 
were not eager to serve in the army, had small numbers of Serb inhabitants. Also, Kraina and 
Montenegro contributed greatly to partisan forces during World War II, so the children in 
these regions, mostly Serbs, had an advantage in getting admitted to military academies. All 
these factors led to an overwhelming dominance of Serbs in the Yugoslav army throughout 
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Tito’s rule and beyond. Bogdan Denitch argues that even before Milosevic entered the scene 
these Serbs were not neutral representatives of Yugoslavia. They were excessively “sensitive 
about the policies of the new anti-Communist nationalist government in Croatia toward the 
Serbian minority,” which was concentrated in Kraina where many officers were from.373 
These circumstances played perfectly into Milosevic hands. He sought a military 
force which would loyally serve Serb nationalist interests but which he could still command 
under the guise of seeking to preserve the Yugoslav state. If Milosevic could gain the loyalty 
of Serb soldiers, he could essentially have his own army and control much of the federation. 
The Yugoslav military was based on the concept of Total National Defense, meaning that 
apart from the regular army each republic had reserve forces it could call on in the event of 
war. These Territorial Defense Forces were meant to protect the republics even if there were 
a break down in communication from the center. The defense forces worked closely with the 
Communist Party so by substituting Serb leadership for that of the Communist Party, 
Milosevic was able to disarm the non-Serb Territorial Defense Forces throughout the 
country.374 This left the other republics unprepared to defend themselves. 
Milosevic also worked toward arming Serbs throughout Yugoslavia. In late 1989 and 
early 1990 Serb nationalist Mil Martic set to work selecting Serb-loyal generals from the 
Yugoslav military to create a clandestine Serb defense network known as the Vojna Linija or 
Military Line. The main purpose of this group was to arm Serb populations in Croatia and 
Bosnia so that if the republics chose to secede, they would face resistance from within their 
own borders. This plan, dubbed RAM, required Serb leaders to organize all Serbs outside of 
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Serbia, take control of the fledgling Serb nationalist groups, and gather ammunition. In June 
of 1990, senior Serb police officer Mihaijlo Kertes began covertly funneling arms to militant 
Serbs in the Krajina region of Croatia. Once armed, these rebel Serbs quickly began driving 
Croats off the land.375 In July, Radovan Karadzic established the Serb Democratic Party or 
SDS, which functioned as the nationalist leadership for the Serbs in Bosnia. This group was 
opposed to any form of Bosnian independence from Yugoslavia and to any changes in 
Bosnia that might subject the Serb minority to rule by another ethnicity. 
In the midst of this tumultuous time, Bosnia held the first democratic elections in the 
history of the republic. These elections brought Alija Izetbegovic to the presidency. The 
electorate also voted three nationalist parties to power which claimed to represent the three 
ethnic communities rather than voting for either of the non-nationalist forces, democratic or 
former communist. While this can be interpreted as evidence of the natural ethnic divisions 
within Bosnia, Stephen Burg and Paul Shoup suggest that perhaps it is more a reflection of 
the electoral system than voter preference. “Results for the individual assemblies reveal that 
the non-nationalist parties secured 25 percent or more of the seats in 31 out of 109 
assemblies. These results, together with available data for the elections to the Chamber of 
Municipalities of the republic parliament, suggest that had a proportionality rule been 
adopted for the republic-level elections, the non-nationalist parties would have secured a 
significantly greater voice in Bosnian politics in 1990.”376 
Even votes in support of nationalist parties may not accurately reflect support for the 
platforms of these organizations. Burg and Shoup argue that many of the nationalist votes 
were cast due to fear rather than popular support. For instance, a Serb might think that even if 
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he withheld his vote from the SDS, his Muslim neighbor would still vote for the Muslim 
Bosniak Organization. “In the end they were afraid of weakening their own nation in an hour 
presaging the ultimate confrontation.”377 Furthermore, “the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
were characterized by the phenomenon of ‘negative voting,’ in which a significant number of 
citizens voted for one party only in order to prevent the victory of some other, and not 
because of the quality of the program or candidate of that party.”378 In this sense, the victory 
of nationalists in Bosnia does not necessarily reflect extremist views of the population but 
rather the fear and tension of the time.  
Croatian elections also brought nationalists to power in 1990 in the form of president 
Franjo Tudjman and his party the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). Although Croatia’s 
Serb nationalist party was vocal during elections and no doubt frightened many Croats into 
giving their support to the HDZ, the majority of Serbs living in Croatia supported the civil 
democracy coalition rather than their corresponding nationalist party. While Tudjman could 
have used his position to appeal to Croatia’s cosmopolitan and liberal-minded Serbs, he 
instead acted as though the actions of ultra-nationalist Krajina Serbs were representative of 
all Croatia’s Serb people. Following in this vein, the HDZ “practiced the ‘systematic’ 
infringement of Serbs’ civil, property, and employment rights.”379 Tudjman glossed over the 
Ustashe’s brutality toward the Chetniks during World War II. He described the Ustashe as 
“not simply a quisling creation and a fascist crime, but also an expression of the historical 
aspirations of the Croatian people,” and then proceeded to rename Croatian streets to honor 
members of the Ustashe regime.380 
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In Michael Ignatieff’s estimation, the Croatian state’s biggest mistake was “its failure 
to publicly disavow the Ustashe state and what it did at Jasenovac.”381 Tudjman fought the 
Ustashe as a young partisan, but rather than highlighting this “he tried to unite all of 
Croatia’s tortured past into what was called a national synthesis. So he never came to 
Jasenovac…Because Tudjman did not come here, Serbs in Croatia were manipulated by 
Belgrade and by their local leaders into believing that the new Croatia was the fascist 
Ustashe come again.”382 
To be fair, Tudjman was in a sense forced to embrace the Ustashe regime. He was 
financed by Croatians abroad, most of whom were old Ustashe. More importantly, the 
wartime Ustashe state was Croatia’s first experience of independent nationhood, making it 
difficult to disavow. “Instead, Croatians evade the issue altogether, either by dismissing tales 
of Ustashe atrocity as Serbian propaganda, or by attempting to airbrush atrocity into crime by 
playing statistical sleight of hand with the numbers who died.”383 Misha Glenny does not 
suggest that the Croatian state of the 1990s was actually the Ustashe regime come again, but 
he argues that Tudjman should have been more sensitive to Serb fears. This mistake greatly 
contributed to the violence that followed. 
Serbs believed they fought two world wars in order to preserve that equality 
and now the separatist will of the Croatian government was attempting to strip 
them of their hard-won prize. It does not matter how close to the truth this is. 
It does not matter that Tudjman’s government was not a fascist one—the point 
is enough Serbs believed it to be so and Tudjman bore a considerable 
responsibility for not allaying the fears of what is historically an almost 
psychotic part of the Serbian nation’s make up. Croatia had no hope of leaving 
Yugoslavia peacefully (regardless of the help received by the local Serbs from 
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Belgrade) without striking a deal with the Serbs in Krajina, Lika, Kordun, 
Banija, western and eastern Slavonia.384 
Tudjman sought recognition of Croatia as a sovereign republic in a looser Yugoslav 
confederation and was not looking for outright independence. However, Tudjman’s actions 
would eventually force him to secede by fueling Milosevic’s radical claims that Croatia was 
being led by an anti-Serb coalition and encouraging Tudjman’s own Serb population that 
“the interests of Serbia must be above all others.”385 
As the Yugoslav people became more fearful of one another, ethnic violence took 
hold, particularly in Croatia’s Serb-dominated region of Krajina. In 1990, Martic’s Krajina 
Militia of Serbs took over the Plitvice National Park. On March 31, the Croatian police 
attempted to reassert their authority, which resulted in the death of one Croat and one Serb 
and eventually required the intervention of the Yugoslav Army. This established a precedent 
for the following months, in which Serbian rebels or Croatian police would begin a fight and 
the Yugoslav Army would move in to separate the parties.386 In August Krajina Serbs staged 
a referendum supporting an initiative to make Krajina an autonomous region. At the polls, 
Krajina Serbs chanted, “Kill the Ustashe!” and a number of anti-Croat acts were committed. 
“Serb nationalist symbols were daubed onto Croat houses; some Croat-stores were looted; 
Croats prudently began moving away.”387 
Hate-filled rhetoric continued to encourage a climate of fear and violence, and 
Milosevic was quick to take advantage of this extremist climate. By early 1991, he publicly 
stated that if any attempt were made to replace the federal structure of Yugoslavia with a 
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looser confederal arrangement, he would seek to annex whole areas of Croatia and Bosnia.388 
Bosnia had no clear allies in this ever-escalating dispute. In any debate about changing the 
federal structure of Yugoslavia into a looser confederation, Bosnia would be on the side of 
Slovenia and Croatia, as it too wanted to reduce Serb domination. However, Bosnia was not 
prepared to declare full independence from the Yugoslav state. Regardless of Bosnian 
wishes, the actions of Croatia and Slovenia put it in a difficult situation. “The prospect of 
those two republics actually carrying out their threat to leave Yugoslavia was deeply 
alarming to most Bosnians since they would then be left, together with another weak 
republic, Macedonia, entirely under Serbia’s thumb.”389 
The more this ethnic situation intensified, the more difficult it became for people to 
see the situation clearly. A trade war began between Serbia and Slovenia, along with an 
avalanche of nationalist propaganda and battles over the control of tax revenues. “Together 
these and other disputes suffocated rational political debate, opening the way for the 
propaganda of extremist organizations. They swamped the public arena with 
instrumentalized historical memories.”390 It seemed there was no turning back; war was 
becoming more and more a matter of certainty. 
On March 9, 1991, demonstrators took to the streets to protest Milosevic’s 
manipulation of state television. Running battles soon broke out in the center of Belgrade. 
That evening Milosevic sent tanks in to Belgrade to quell the violence, however Laura Silber 
and Allan Little argue that “the display of force was planned well before the anti-government 
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demonstration, which supposedly provoked it, got out of hand.”391 The next day hundreds of 
thousands gathered in Belgrade to demonstrate against Milosevic. On Sunday night, one 
thousand students broke through police barricades and headed for the city center where they 
were beaten by police armed with night sticks, tear-gas, and shields. In spite of all these 
obstacles, by midnight hundreds of students had reached the center. Over the next week, tens 
of thousands of Belgrade’s liberal elite made their last stand. “Singing ‘Give Peace a 
Chance,’ they re-created, fleetingly, the atmosphere of tolerance that had once been a 
hallmark of Belgrade, but which had disappeared from public life under Milosevic. The city 
seemed transformed. People would stop by to bring food and blankets to the students…Each 
night professors, writers, and actors would address the crowd from a platform on the 
fountain.”392 The students demanded democracy, which Milosevic would not give. 
Eventually Milosevic was able to put down protests and these tolerant voices were silenced. 
However, this peaceful expression in the midst of such chaos and resentment provides an 
important reminder that the nationalist and hateful actions of some do not always represent 
the opinions of many.  
Ethnic violence began in Croatia in the spring of 1991, before war had officially been 
declared. From May onwards, Serb property in crisis regions under Croat control became the 
target of regular bomb attacks and the Serbs who remained were ostracized. “In Croat 
nationalist strongholds like Split, open intimidation was reported much earlier.”393 Serbs 
were soon run out of their homes by former Croat neighbors. In one woman’s words “We are 
almost more afraid of the people we used to call our neighbors than their special police 
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units.”394 Croats were victimized in this period as well; many were terrorized by Serbs who 
hoped to drive them from their homes and then take the territory for themselves. This kind of 
violence on both sides led ordinary citizens to become fearful and seek ways to protect 
themselves. Croatian civilians began enrolling in Voluntary Units of National Protection with 
the slogan “Everything for Croatia! All for Croatia!”395 On May 2, 1991, the first Serb 
paramilitary probe in Croatia massacred a dozen Croat policemen in Borovo Selo. “By the 
yardstick of the next few years, this was only a small atrocity, but it set ugly precedents. The 
twelve had their throats slit, their noses sliced off, and their eyes gouged out.”396 
In this atmosphere of fear, hatred, and violence, it is no surprise that in mid-1991 
Slovenia and Croatia began taking steps to secede from Yugoslavia. On June 24, the prime 
minister of Yugoslavia, Ante Markovic, issued an unambiguous warning to both the Croats 
and Slovenes: “The federal government will counter unilateral secession with all available 
means.” 397 This warning fell on deaf ears. Croatia declared independence from the federation 
on June 25, 1991 and Slovenia followed suit the next day. The federal government responded 
by declaring the acts of Croatia and Slovenia illegal and unconstitutional, and with that 
Yugoslavia began to crumble. Thomas Hobbes once said “when people are sufficiently 
afraid, they will do anything.”398 As Michael Ignatieff points out, “there is one type of fear 
more devastating in its impact than any other: the systematic fear that arises when a state 
begins to collapse. Ethnic hatred is the result of the terror that arises when legitimate 
authority disintegrates.”399 By this argument, the collapse of the Yugoslav state served only 
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to exacerbate the fears and tensions that were pervasive before these secessions occurred. 
Ethnic violence had shown itself to be an ugly phenomenon, but it would only get worse. 
 
The War in Croatia 
The Croatian War officially began when the Yugoslav National Army entered the 
republic in an attempt to prevent its secession and preserve the federation. In the summer of 
1991, battles in Serbian areas of Croatia broke out over control of the key seat of local 
power, the police station. In villages where Serb policeman had been dismissed, these same 
men armed themselves and set up as vigilantes. “When Croats tried to restore their authority 
in Serbian areas, they were fired upon and roadblocks were set up at the entrances to villages. 
Because Croatia was unable to control parts of its state, the Yugoslav National Army stepped 
in, first to restore order and then to smash Croatian independence. Croatia then had no option 
but to fight for its survival.”400 
As fighting became more pervasive, Croats and Serbs from the diaspora in Germany, 
Canada, and Australia returned to their homelands ready to fight. This fueled the chain 
reaction of revenge for the torture and death of comrades in arms, and increasingly of 
mothers, children, and the elderly. Groups like the Serbian volunteer military unit Arkan’s 
Tigers “terrorized Croats into abandoning their homes to create homogenous Serb villages—
and also terrorized any local Serbs who were squeamish about killing their Croat 
neighbors.”401 As Glenny explains, ethnic cleansing often begins as a military tactic; one side 
sees that a group of people is in the way of their strategic goal, so they eliminate them. “Of 
course, as the war continues, dragging in most areas of the republic, the hostility between the 
nationalities reaches fever pitch. The idea of including a minority population in the 
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conquered territory becomes less acceptable as the doctrine of ‘national purity’ 
strengthens.”402 By this interpretation, war does not originate from ethnic hatred, but rather 
ethnic hatred originates from war. 
After Slovenia and Croatia seceded, Slovenes, Croats, Muslims, and Macedonians 
exited the army. With its two largest opponents out of the country and the army more 
dominated by Serbs than ever before, Serbia inherited its own army in all but name. 
Milosevic was eager to use this situation to his advantage and quickly set about increasing 
the population’s involvement in the war. One technique, called compromising the villages, 
involved going to a Croatian settlement, staging an incident meant to invite a crackdown or 
reprisal, and then distributing arms to villagers with the explanation that the police were 
planning to attack. “When armed police do arrive, it is easy to spark off a gun battle; and 
suddenly a whole village, previously uncommitted, is now on the side of the insurgents.”403 
Milosevic also incited violent incidents and then asked the army to intervene as an impartial 
arbiter when it was clear that the army was acting on behalf of Milosevic and the Serbs.  
Under Milosevic, the JNA engaged in “intimidation and, if necessary, liquidation of 
any local Serbs who refused to participate in the attack on the non-Serb population.”404 By 
forcing as many Serbs as possible to engage in the atrocities, the organizers guaranteed that a 
wide section of the population would be compliant and thereafter have a vested interest in 
denying what happened and in obstructing investigations into the violence. As the property of 
non-Serbs was distributed to the local Serb population, the circle of complicity and solidarity 
was further strengthened. Milosevic reinforced such tactics through his control of the media, 
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which quickly became propagandistic and nationalist. “Whereas Hitler had told the Germans 
that it was Versailles which had been their undoing, Serbian nationalists said that Tito’s 
Yugoslavia had been a gigantic plot to keep the Serbs from their rightful place in the sun.”405 
The Serbian media portrayed Croatia as a fascist state, showing violent images on television 
and reminding people that Croatia had adopted the Ustashe symbol as its flag and that some 
Croats openly admired the former Ustashe regime. Nationalist rhetoric in the Serb media was 
met by a comparable response in the Croat media, further contributing to an atmosphere of 
fear and hatred. 
And yet, in spite of Serbia’s convincing and aggressive media campaign, the nation’s 
attempt to bring men in to the army led to “one of the most massive campaigns of draft 
resistance in modern history.”406 The vast majority of young men who were called up went 
into hiding, spending each night in a different place in order to avoid detection by the 
military police. Others, by some estimates over 200,000, left the country rather than fight, 
fleeing to Western Europe, North America, and Australia. According to the Center for Peace 
in Belgrade, 85 to 90 percent of the young men of Belgrade who were called up to fight 
refused to serve. In Serbia as a whole, the figure was between 50 percent and 80 percent. 
Even those who did serve often participated in massive desertions from the battlefield.407 The 
majority of Serbs were not overcome with desire to seek bloody revenge on their ethnic 
enemies, but instead were so opposed to the war that they chose to break the law and risk 
their own well-being rather than participating. “The inability of the JNA to mobilize, train, 
and motivate Serb recruits from Serbia proper to fight in Croatia was critical. The notion of a 
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greater Serbia was fatally flawed if Serbs would not fight for one another.”408 This data 
suggests that Milosevic’s picture of the aggrieved Serb was wildly inconsistent with the 
actual experiences of his people. 
While these statistics are remarkable, it bears repeating that in spite of this massive 
resistance many Serbs were more than willing to fight the Croats and to do so in an 
incredibly violent way. Croat Tomislav Marekovic describes a time when Serbian 
paramilitaries were targeting Croat houses in the city of Lipik. His parents were dragged out 
of their house by Serbs from their village. “That is where they left my father. There, in the 
street, for three weeks, before someone buried the body. And my mother, they took her to a 
barn and set her on fire.”409 This kind of hateful and cruel behavior suggests that, at least for 
those who actually chose to serve in the army, a genuine loathing for other ethnic groups may 
have been at work. 
As fighting continued in Croatia, the war became more violent and destructive. In 
August of 1991, the JNA laid siege to the Croatian town of Vukovar. The city held out for 
three months, but fell in November after some 90 percent of its buildings had been destroyed. 
“Serb forces moved in, spirited two hundred patients out the back door of the Vukovar 
hospital, transported them to the Ovcara farm, beat them, murdered them, and then dumped 
their corpses into mass graves.”410 While the destruction of the city was mainly carried out by 
the Yugoslav National Army, the Croatians also dynamited parts of it as they withdrew, “so 
that the Serbs would gain nothing but rubble for their pains. The pulverization of Vukovar 
made no military sense…In a nationalist war, military objectives were driven by a desire to 
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hurt, humiliate, and punish.”411 This behavior suggests true hatred among individual citizens, 
reaching beyond military strategy into the realm of revenge. In October 1991, during the 
JNA’s six-month siege of Dubrovnik, Serb forces gratuitously shelled the beautiful and 
historic Croatian city but never occupied it. This too is an example of behavior designed to 
inflict pain and suffering without a clear military purpose.  
By the end of 1991 Serb rebels had gained control of almost one-fifth of Croatia’s 
territory, centered in the Krajina district. Serbia eventually agreed not to support these rebels, 
but the region remained out of the Croatian government’s control until the summer of 1995. 
Although Serbia and Croatia did not reach an official peace agreement, after a year of 
horrific and destructive fighting it was clear that Croatia would never again re-join 
Yugoslavia. Too many people had died and too much destruction had been wrought for 
Croats and Serbs to reasonably co-exist within the same state. As this reality became 
increasingly clear, fighting began to shift to a new theatre: that of Bosnia. 
The war in Croatia was relatively short-lived but still thought-provoking. V.P. 
Gagnon Jr. argues that ethnic-based hatred did not exist at all in this conflict. Both Serb and 
Croat forces participated in ethnic cleansing of each other’s ethnic members, but there is also 
evidence of both sides killing their own people when those people did not agree with 
government policy. After all, violence continued in Krajina even after the region had been 
cleansed of Croats as moderate Serbs who had criticized the Krajina leadership were 
harassed, threatened, and killed. “Consistently in the four years of the existence of the 
Krajina Republic, extremists in the ruling political parties used terror and violence against 
those Serbs who called for a more moderate policy that reflected the values and priorities of 
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the Serb population of Croatia prior to the war.”412 Even when the conflict moved to Bosnia, 
Croatian nationalists’ ethnic cleansing did not stop with non-Croats. Anti-regime intellectuals 
and politicians were threatened if they were suspected of speaking out against the regime, 
“daring to express what polling before the war indicated were the preferences of the large 
majority of Bosnia’s Croat population.”413 Nationalist groups used brutal violence against 
those who stood in their way, even if such individuals were part of their own ethnic group. 
This suggests that the war was centered on strategic political purposes rather than those of 
irrational ethnic hatred. 
Other thinkers tend to be less extreme than Gagnon and argue that ethnically based 
hatred did exist during the war, but that it was caused by fear and circumstances rather than 
by legitimate and long-lasting hostility. As Tim Judah explains, the conflict began with 
Croats fleeing from Serb militias out of fear, and then taking revenge on Serbs in Croatian 
controlled territory as a mode of retaliation for what was done by the militias. This led the 
Croatian Serb populations to flee and eventually become angry and radicalized after being 
forced from their homes and losing their jobs. As people became more angry and bitter, the 
appeal of violence increased; “thousands of Serbian houses were blown up in villages and 
angry people demanded to know when their neighbors, to whom they had lived next door all 
their lives, were going to go.”414 Ignatieff expands on the idea of spiraling fear and anger 
resulting in ethnic hatred. 
If your enemies call you a fascist enough times, you will begin to call yourself 
one too. Take your enemies’ insult and turn it into a badge of pride. How 
many times in the weeks ahead do I meet Croats at checkpoints who say, 
“They call us Ustashe. Well, then that is what we are.” And likewise, the 
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Serbs: “You call us Chetniks, Well, that is what we are.” The two sides 
conspire in a downward spiral of mutually interacting self-degradation.415 
Unlike Gagnon, Ignatieff and Judah agree that ethnic hatred existed during the wars, but they 
maintain that this was a result of miscommunication, anger, and distrust, rather than a 
reflection of undying hatred between two groups. By this logic, if violence had been stopped 
early and fears assuaged, these groups would have been able to go on living together 
peacefully. 
 Ignatieff expands on his argument, describing ethnic cleansing as having a “deep 
logic.”416 By 1990, no one in Yugoslavia could be sure who would protect them. If Serbs 
living in Croatia were attacked, would the Croatian police protect them? If Croats lived in a 
Serbian village, would their neighbors stand up for them against a paramilitary team led by a 
former policeman? “This is how ethnic cleansing began to acquire its logic. If you can’t trust 
your neighbors, drive them out. If you can’t live among them, live only among your own. 
This alone appeared to offer people security.”417 Warlords became a significant force in the 
region for the same protection concerns which led to ethnic cleansing. Ethnic minorities were 
no longer guaranteed protection because the state which used to enforce the inter-ethnic 
bargain had been eliminated. “As a result, every individual rushed, pell-mell, to the next 
available source of protection: the warlord. For the warlord not only offers protection, he 
offers a solution. He tells his people: If we cannot trust our neighbors, we must rid ourselves 
of them. If we cannot live together in a single state, we must create clean state of our 
own.”418 
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Ignatieff also attempts to explain the nationalist mindset. According to this belief, no 
one is responsible for anything except the other side; all action is compelled by tragic 
necessity. “Towns must be destroyed in order to liberate them. Hostages must be shot. 
Massacres must be undertaken. Why? Because the other side started it first. Because the 
other side are beasts and understand no language but violence and reprisal.”419 Nationalism 
also directs the mind to higher things and offers an identity and an opportunity for self-
affirmation. “Instead of the interminable politics of interest and conciliation, there are 
enemies within and without to defeat; there is the immortal cause, the martyrs of the past and 
the present, to keep faith with.”420 
While Ignatieff may be able to illustrate the appeal and experience of nationalism, he 
still argues that its origins are in myth not fact. “Freud once argued that the smaller the real 
difference between two peoples, the larger it was bound to loom in their imagination.”421 
Based on this logic, enemies need each other to remind them of who they really are. A Croat, 
thus, is someone who is not a Serb. A Serb is someone who is not a Croat. Without hatred of 
the other, there would be no clearly defined national self to worship and adore. The 
similarities between the Serb and Croat people are striking: they speak the same language 
give or take a few hundred words and have shared the same village way of life for centuries. 
“Nationalist politicians on both sides took the narcissism of minor difference and turned it 
into a monstrous fable according to which their own side appeared as blameless victims, the 
other side as genocidal killers. All Croats became Ustashe assassins; all Serbs became 
Chetnik beasts. Such rhetorical preliminaries, needless to say, were an essential precondition 
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of the slaughter that followed.”422 Although fighting concluded in Croatia after only a year, 
the hatred that developed there lived on in Bosnia. 
 
Prelude to War in Bosnia 
The war did not officially begin in Bosnia until 1992, but preparations for the 
conflict’s expansion began well before then. By mid-1991, the JNA was moving troops from 
Serbia and Montenegro into Bosnia, mobilizing Bosnian Serbs into autonomous forces under 
Ratko Mladic, disarming non-Serb Territorial Defense Forces, and conducting 
“peacekeeping” maneuvers in Bosnia.423 The situation was quickly becoming intolerable for 
the Bosnian government. The battle between Croatia and Serbia was especially threatening 
because Bosnia was, and had been for many decades, a hotly contested region with various 
actors claiming a right to control its territory. “President Izetbegovic, who had once remarked 
that choosing between Tudjman and Milosevic was like having to choose between leukemia 
and a brain tumor, declared in early October that Bosnia was neutral between Serbia and 
Croatia.”424 Because only a sovereign region can declare official neutrality, Izetbegovic 
thought it prudent to declare sovereignty on October 14, 1991. This declaration was not 
equivalent to one of independence but rather legislative sovereignty within Yugoslavia, 
giving Bosnia the power to override the federal army’s rights to use its territory. Yugoslavia 
had once provided a protective bubble for Bosnia, but now it posed a threat. “The only way 
for Bosnia to exit the country was to get secession approval from both Croatia and Serbia 
which it would never receive.”425 Bosnia was in a very difficult situation. 
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Violence began to peter off in Croatia as it became clear that no amount of Serb 
bullying would convince the state to rejoin the federation. Although violence still occurred in 
Croatia, the two sides began discussing the resolution of another dispute, this time regarding 
the potential division of Bosnia. President Izetbegovic of Bosnia would gladly have accepted 
a loose confederation if it included all of the old Yugoslav republics, but he knew that if he 
maintained an association with Belgrade it would mean, in his words, “a colonial feudal 
status within Greater Serbia…We are not against Greater Serbia, only it cannot be achieved 
at our expense.”426 However, it was clear that Bosnia would not be permitted to leave 
Yugoslavia either. On January 9, 1992, the Serb Democratic Party declared the foundation of 
the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, later renamed the Republika Srpska (RS). The 
RS was composed of approximately half of Bosnian territory where much of the Serb 
population was located. This was a final threat to Bosnia, for Karadzic explained that the 
SDS would begin to build the institutions of its republic only if “the Croats or Muslims try to 
separate from Yugoslavia or if they are recognized.”427 
According to Glenny, the death sentence for Bosnia-Herzegovina was passed in 
January of 1992 when Germany recognized Slovenia and Croatia’s independence.428 This 
was problematic because it undermined the European Council’s agreement not to recognize 
republics unless they had control over their own territory and could assure safety to their 
minorities, which Croatia clearly could not yet do. Germany chose to recognize Croatia and 
Slovenia because of strong economic ties with the region and a resulting interest in 
maintaining sound relationships. The United States and European Community followed suit, 
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believing that recognition of Croatia would encourage the JNA to stop resisting Croat 
secession and end the violence once and for all.429 
However, recognition of Croatia and Slovenia put Bosnia in a difficult situation by 
stripping it of the “constitutional protection it still enjoyed from the territorial claims of the 
two regional imperia, Serbia and Croatia.”430 The international community’s decision forced 
Bosnia to choose between staying in the rump Yugoslavia under the control of Milosevic and 
Serbia, accepting the territorial division of Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia, or applying 
for recognition as an independent state. No matter what path Bosnia chose, it would most 
likely lead to war. The first option was opposed by Muslims and Croats, the second by 
Muslims and Yugoslavs, and the third by Serbs; none of these groups would let Bosnia make 
a choice contrary to their interests without a fight. “The international community sanctioned 
the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation without paying any heed to this system which 
had guaranteed peace, albeit an uneasy one, between the country’s various peoples over a 
forty-year period.”431 
The international community was correct; their recognition of Croatia helped to 
unequivocally end the violence there by highlighting the reality of the situation. “Any idea 
that Croatia could have been persuaded to rejoin a federal Yugoslavia after cities such as 
Vukovar had been reduced to rubble was utterly unreal.”432 In February 1992, a cease-fire 
was finally passed, officially ending the war in Croatia. The republic was left with a third of 
its national territory occupied by Serbian Krajina and its supply routes to the Dalmatian coast 
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blockaded by Serbian paramilitaries. Some 6,000 people had been killed, 15,000 wounded, 
550,000 displaced and over 700,000 left homeless. Every seventh Croat was a refugee.433 
With the Croatian war over, and Croatia and Slovenia officially recognized as 
independent states, Bosnia was left in a dwindling Yugoslavia dominated by Serbia. Bosnia 
moved towards independence as indeed it had to in its current situation, but this move “was 
used as a pretext by Milosevic and Karadzic to begin the military phase of their carve-up of 
Bosnia.”434 Noel Malcolm argues that Bosnians themselves were uninterested in dividing 
their country into three parts; “the majority of Bosnians had in any case voted for a 
democratic and independent Bosnia of equal citizens.”435 However, Serb media rhetoric was 
fierce, insisting that the Bosnian government was an Ustashe fundamentalist coalition which 
discriminated against its Serb population without any supporting evidence. “But a kind of 
political psychosis had been created by the Serb and Serbian politicians and media, in which 
the defense of the rights of the Bosnian Serbs was given such absolute status that people 
ceased even to wonder whether they were really under attack.”436 
Glenny argues that both the nationalist rhetoric and the circumstances themselves 
affected Bosnian identity. Bosnian Serbs and Croats began to see their Muslim neighbors 
differently. “Serbs and Croats under the influence of war psychosis revived their dangerous 
belief that Muslims remain at heart Orthodox or Catholic Christians who will at some future 
point return to the fold, willingly or otherwise.”437 People began identifying with their 
respective republics more and more as war approached, and the sense of a Bosnian 
community began to disappear. “Soon in Bosnia people stopped calling themselves Bosnians. 
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Instead most became Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, or Muslims. The Serbs and the Croats 
later dropped the auxiliary word Bosnian.”438 Although this shift no doubt represented a 
move toward ethnic division, the fact that these ethnic self-identities were something new 
suggests that at one point Bosnians saw themselves as one community rather than a 
collection of distinct ethnicities. It can be argued that this shift represents the inevitable result 
of fear and propaganda, but that the existence of Bosnian unity before the war illustrates the 
transient nature of such divisions within the country. 
In the midst of this crisis, the Croatian and Bosnian Croat leaderships tried to 
convince Izetbegovic to declare a federation of Bosnia and Croatia. He refused this, both 
because he feared eventual absorption of Bosnia into a Greater Croatia and because he 
thought such a move would give weight to Serb claims about the Bosnian government having 
Ustashe links. Fundamentally, he also believed that his government had a duty to represent 
Serbs, Muslims, and Croats collectively.439 This left Izetbegovic with one clear choice. In 
February of 1992, the Bosnian government conducted a referendum in which 90 percent of 
those who voted chose in favor of independence. While it is true that only 64 percent of the 
Bosnian electorate participated in the referendum, this represents a significant turnout 
considering that Bosnian Serbs were intimidated and pressured to stay away from the polls 
by nationalist groups. Many thousands of Serbs in major cities did participate in the 
referendum, and a poll of Bosnian students in November 1991 showed that 43.38 percent of 
Serbs approved of an independent Bosnia.440 This may not be a majority, but it does question 
the belief that Bosnian loyalties were determined based on ethnicity alone. In the face of a 
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deluge of nationalist rhetoric and propaganda, a majority of Bosnians still chose their state 
over their ethnicity. In March 1992, Izetbegovic officially declared Bosnian independence. 
On April 6, Bosnia was recognized as an independent state by the European 
Community. Many argued that Bosnia could never stand on its own because it was composed 
of three nationalities, but Malcolm argues that “the history of Bosnia shows that, leaving 
aside the economic conflict between landowners and peasants, the national animosities 
within the country have reached the point of inter-ethnic violence only as a result of 
pressures coming from outside Bosnia’s borders.”441 In response to EC recognition, 
Milosevic officially recognized Bosnian independence. Throughout the Croatian conflict, 
Milosevic denied Serbia’s involvement publicly by claiming that the issue was between the 
Yugoslav National Army and Croatia. While this was true, Serbia’s control of the JNA made 
it deeply involved in this dispute. In the same way, Milosevic chose to recognize Bosnia so 
that “Serbia could not be accused of promoting the Bosnian Serb war effort because the 
Bosnian Serbs were involved in a civil war in a neighboring state.”442 In reality, however, 
Milosevic and Serbia would be greatly involved in the Bosnian conflict. 
The day after Bosnia’s recognition by the EC, Bosnian Serb leaders in Banja Luka 
followed through on their threat and declared the Republika Srpska’s independence from 
Bosnia. The Bosnian Croats, not to be outdone, laid claim to their own swath of territory in 
Herzegovina, naming it the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosnia. They saw the creation of 
this community as the first step toward Croatia absorbing a chunk of Bosnian territory. “Its 
founders saw their ultimate goal as a Greater Croatia, whose boundaries would approximate 
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those of Ustashe Croatia and, as much as possible, medieval Croatia.”443 Bosnian Serb 
leaders also delineated the RS in the hopes that it would later be absorbed by Serbia proper. 
While Bosnia’s independence no doubt provided great motivation for a Serb invasion, 
Burg and Shoup argue that “Serb preparations for war in Bosnia pre-dated the German 
decision.”444 This could be used to support a primordial argument; Serbs knew they wished 
to invade Bosnia early on because a sense of community and unspoken connection drove 
them to protect their Serb brethren. Early Serb preparations for war could also be used to 
support an elite manipulation argument; the Bosnian invasion was planned ahead of time 
because Milosevic desired power and would use any possible excuse to invade Bosnia and 
claim more territory. Either way, Malcolm is certain that it was pressure from Serbia which 
led to violence in Bosnia, rather than the desires of the Bosnian people themselves. Bosnia’s 
three ethnic communities were so intermingled that their separation could occur only at 
appalling cost. “The price demanded of ordinary Bosnians that would have enabled them to 
live together in peace, on the other hand, was a comparatively small contribution of 
normality and goodwill. The majority were happy to pay that contribution. A minority, acting 
under the direction of a neighboring state, were not; and they had the guns.”445 
The Bosnian War 
Fighting began in Bosnia on March 22, 1992. By the end of the month, the country 
was in disarray. On April 4, Izetbegovic ordered the mobilization of all police and reservists 
in Sarajevo. The SDS, in turn, issued a covert call for all Bosnian Serbs to evacuate the city 
and two days later began shelling the capital. “On April 7 and 8, following international 
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recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serb forces crossed the Drina from Serbia proper and lay 
siege to the Muslim cities of Zvornik, Visegrad, and Foca. By mid-April all of Bosnia was 
engulfed in war.”446 The Serbs’ main aim, according to Malcolm, was to terrify the local 
Muslims into fleeing and to radicalize the local Serb populations. Malcolm characterizes 
these actions as being necessary “to convince the local Serbs that they had to ‘defend’ 
themselves against their Muslim neighbors.”447 Malcolm maintains that despite the 
involvement of Bosnian Serbs, “this was predominantly an invasion of Bosnia planned and 
directed from Serbian soil.”448 
Burg and Shoup, however, argue that the violence was initiated by Bosnian Serbs 
who sought a three-way partition of Bosnia and the ethnic domination of their territory via 
the cleansing of Muslims.449 Sumantra Bose also argues that the war was primarily a civil 
one. In a study conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross in late 1998, it 
was discovered that 87 percent of Bosnian Serbs, 72 percent of Bosnian Muslims, and 70 
percent of Bosnian Croats identified with their respective sides during the war. This, along 
with significant military mobilization among all three groups—38 percent of Serbs, 30 
percent of Croats, and 26 percent of Muslims—suggests that the Bosnian war was more than 
just a result of interference by Serbia and Croatia.450 
Still, there is no denying that Serbia and Croatia played a role in the conflict. Croatia 
initially supported the division of Bosnian territory by ethnicity, and later supported full-
blown independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. After all, Croatia could only exert maximum 
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influence over the Croatian population of Bosnia if the republic were independent, just as it 
would be easier for the Serbs to control Bosnia if it remained part of the Yugoslav federation. 
Izetbegovic aimed for the restoration of a unitary state with a relatively centralized 
government in Sarajevo. This was very much opposed to the ultimate aims of the Croats, but 
because both required an independent Bosnia before pursuing their final goals, Bosnia and 
Croatia became temporary allies. In the eyes of Bosnia, “good relations with Croatia were a 
matter of life and death, both as an assurance that arms would reach the Bosnian forces and 
as a guarantee that Bosnia would not be partitioned.”451 
The Serb-Croat relationship remained somewhat ambiguous at the start of the 
Bosnian war. Enmity between the two nations had been fueled by the great violence in 
Croatia and the occupation of one-third of Croatian territory by the Krajina Serbs, who were 
assisted by Serbia proper. At the same time, Milosevic and Tudjman were eager to exploit 
the breakup of Yugoslavia and the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina to create a Greater Serbia 
and a Greater Croatia. Croatia’s overriding interest was to regain control over the areas of its 
own territory which were still under Serb occupation. It also sought to consolidate its 
influence in those parts of Bosnia it considered vital to its interests, and to cultivate ties with 
the United States to win support for retaking the areas of Croatia under Serb control. These 
considerations discouraged an outright alliance with Serbia. Still, in the interest of 
establishing a Greater Croatia, Croats began blocking the transport of weapons to Bosnian 
Muslims, their supposed allies against the besieging Serbs, and expelling Muslims from the 
region. By the spring of 1992, Croatia was committing violence against the Bosnian 
Muslims, also known as Bosniaks, in tacit alliance with the Serbs.452 
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The Bosnian Serbs were incredibly aggressive, swiftly conquering two-thirds of 
Bosnia and taking over not just primarily Serb villages but also key economic, geographic, 
and military areas. They established more than 400 detention centers in Bosnia, at least two 
of which, in the Prijedor area, would qualify as death camps. They razed mosques, Catholic 
churches, and 47,000 homes, killing and expelling virtually all Muslims and more than half 
of Croats.453 Even within portions of Bosnia that were already under Serb control, violence 
broke out between different Serb groups who disagreed over which one was in charge; 
“scores of Serbian groups were out to control and rape was widespread.”454 Malcolm argues 
that Bosnia was led to war by Serbian leaders, who took over the media and convinced the 
Bosnian Serbs that they had something to fear. Malcolm applies the words of historian 
Richard Pipes to describe the Bosnian Serbs’ situation: “There was no retreating, no 
faltering, no compromising…they were inextricably bound to their leaders, and could only 
march with them to ‘total victory’ regardless of the cost.”455 By the end of 1992 the 
Republika Srpska covered almost three-quarters of Bosnian territory.  
Hostility between the Serb and Muslim communities in Bosnia rose rapidly during the 
war. The Bosnian Muslims claimed an identity close to that of Europe, distancing themselves 
from the Islamic world in their dress, diet, customs, and thoughts. “Bosnian Muslims seemed 
unaware of what claiming their European identity meant for the Bosnian Serb. The Bosnian 
Serb, more rural and more oriented toward the Orthodox cultures of the East, associated 
European identity with the Nazis, the Italian Fascists, and the Croatian Ustashe. To them, 
expressing an allegiance to Europe hearkened back to the suppressed collective memories of 
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World War II and Serbian suffering in general.”456 This miscommunication bred distrust, 
which quickly got out of control. Serbian Orthodox clergy and University of Belgrade 
academics soon began accusing Muslims of race-treason and Christ-killing. Elites began to 
claim that “contemporary Slavic Muslims are responsible for the death of the Christ-Prince 
Lazar and the other Serbian martyrs of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.”457 
The situation took on even more outrageous proportions when Serbian religious 
nationalists developed Christoslavism. This doctrine argued that “Slavic Muslims suffered 
from a ‘defective gene’ probably inherited from North Africa that rendered them genetically 
incapable of reason.”458 Former dean of the Faculty of Natural Science and Mathematics in 
Sarajevo, Biljana Plavsic, adopted this theory with great enthusiasm. Plavsic was a formerly 
respected biologist who had in the past subscribed to the multi-religious ethos of Yugoslavia. 
However, within a few months of hearing arguments about the defective gene, Plavsic and 
some of her well-respected colleagues converted to “violent Christoslavism and a racialist 
ideology so crude and so blatant that it reveals a complete break with every aspect of the 
academic ideals and standards of reason they had spent their lives professing.”459 Suddenly, 
these former intellectuals began organizing campaigns to destroy rare books, manuscripts, 
and works of art. “A number of their own former students were killed as they retrieved 
cultural treasures in the midst of these attacks by the Serb army. The sudden conversion and 
subsequent acts of such people indicate just how fragile can be the thread of rationality in the 
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face of a resurgent and militant religious mythology.”460 For many, ethnic hatred was very 
strong, and very real. 
Ethnic cleansing was carried out in Serb-held areas of Bosnia until only a few 
thousand Muslims and Croats were left in all Serb-occupied regions. “The Serbs, 
furthermore, were guilty of the complete eradication of Muslim cultural monuments—
mosques, libraries, and the like—in territory under their control. The apparent scorched-earth 
approach of the Serbs to Muslim cultural and religious structures suggests either a total lack 
of control by Serb leaders over extremists, or an obsession with removing all signs of Muslim 
presence.”461 
Although such evidence seems to suggest that Serbs were unwavering in their 
opposition to the Muslim community, in reality Serb leaders went to great lengths to 
convince their population that Muslims were to be feared. Ejub Stitkovac recalls that Serb 
leaders told villagers in Bihac that Muslims were responsible for the murder of a Serb 
woman, who was actually the victim of Serb extremists, in an attempt to turn the tide of 
public opinion.462 UN observers described another tactic used to gain the support of local 
Serbs. Serb militias would broadcast to Serb villagers that their Muslim neighbors were 
preparing a massacre. “The Serbs would be told to leave, whereupon the village would be 
shelled and occupied, and the atrocities against the Muslim villagers would begin.”463 Often, 
militias did more than persuade local Serbs to join in persecutions. Serbs who resisted 
participation were subjected to ridicule, threats, and in some cases even murder. The fact that 
such brutal tactics were required to get Bosnian Serbs involved in these attacks suggests that 
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many were quite opposed to participating in the first place. This observation brings into 
question the idea that these acts were approved of by the entire Bosnian Serb community.  
In addition to the tactic of cultural destruction, Bosnian Serb militias used 
concentration camps in their war effort. During the war, as many as 6,000 Bosnian Muslims 
were incarcerated in the notorious Omarska camp where guards “regularly and openly killed, 
raped, tortured, beat, and otherwise subjected prisoners to conditions of constant humiliation, 
degradation, and fear of death.”464 Similarly, at a camp in Keraterm some 3,000 Bosnian 
Muslims and Bosnian Croats were interned. Here, as elsewhere, Serb guards and overseers 
seemed to derive pleasure from regularly beating, bloodying, and humiliating their prisoners. 
They hit and bludgeoned them with every imaginable implement: “wooden batons, metal 
rods, baseball bats, lengths of thick industrial cable that had metal balls affixed at their end, 
rifle butts, and knives. Night after night, the beatings would take place; young, old, men, 
women, boys, and girls were the victims. The beatings were sometimes so severe that those 
who endured them were injured for life. Many died as a result.”465 
One Bosnian Muslim man, in recounting his experience at Omarska, describes a 
particular incident in which 700 people were put into a four by four meter room and told to 
lie down while guards closed the windows and doors. “It was summer. We lay like sardines 
in a can. Those on top were in the best position. Every morning some on the bottom were 
dead. Every morning a guard came with a list and called people’s names. Those they brought 
out never came back.”466 Another survivor recalls a time when guards brought 174 people 
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outside and started shooting at them with automatic weapons. Only three survived.467 “The 
worst event was when I watched one young man as they castrated him. Right now I can hear 
his cry and his prayers to be killed…His executioner was his friend from school. The friend 
cut his body and licked his blood. The man asked his friend just to kill him and to stop all 
that suffering. All day and all night we heard his prayers and his crying until he died.”468 
Serb paramilitaries were very regular and organized in their brutality in these camps. 
“They beat young men more than the old, men more than women. They had lists of names, 
ostensibly of Bosnian Army soldiers, government agents, spies, and their families, whom 
they beat more viciously than others.”469 Like the Nazi policy toward German Jews in the 
late 1930s, Bosnian Serbs forced Muslims to systematically register their property in Banja 
Luka, and then took it away. Radoslav Brcanin, director of Banja Luka television, announced 
that no more than 2,000 elderly Muslims should remain in the area, “only enough to clean 
our streets and clean our shoes.”470 The commander of the camp at Banja Luka was Goran 
Jelisic, a man who described himself as the Serbian Adolf.  
However, Stevan Weine is wary of comparisons between the Serbs and Nazis. 
Auschwitz was a highly systematized death factory where Jews were brought to be killed en 
masse, but Bosnian concentration camps were primarily detention facilities. Civilians were 
brought against their will to live in harsh conditions and be subjected to starvation, illness, 
forced labor, physical abuse, and possibly death. “Omarska came closest to being a death 
camp, but none ever evolved to the degree of sophistication or mechanization of death that 
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was Auschwitz.”471 This is not meant to belittle the suffering of those who lived in the Serb 
camps, but rather to provide a frame of reference for the type of atrocities committed. 
While it is easy to paint the Serbs as the clear villains in Bosnia, as is often done, it 
must be emphasized that ethnic cleansing was practiced by all sides and against all sides 
during this conflict. For example, reports indicate a number of incidents during the war in 
which Croat authorities raped Muslim women.472 Muslim authorities in Sarajevo engaged in 
the ethnic cleansing of Serbs; these troops would block off a given area, burn down Serb 
homes, and then kill Serb habitants. “Serbs from the area were placed in a makeshift camp, 
and tortured by Croat extremist paramilitaries and Sandzak Muslims.”473 In Tarcin, Muslim 
authorities who wanted to minimize the number of Serb forces “arrested men of military age 
and placed them in a large, windowless grain silo…Prisoners might not see daylight for 
months at a time; some died of starvation.”474 In February 1993, a delegation to Sarajevo 
from Srebrenica proposed that “the Bosnian government arrest and execute a Serb from 
Sarajevo for every Muslim killed at Srebrenica. As a result of the mutual savagery, eastern 
Bosnia was largely depopulated of both Muslims and Serbs and its villages destroyed.”475 
In Herzegovina, Croat authorities initiated state-sponsored ethnic cleansing of 
Muslims after an attack on Mostar in May 1993. Muslims were evicted from the Croat 
section of Mostar and eventually interned. “Detention camps were set up by the Croats to 
house Muslims, many of whom had at one time or another fought on the Croat side. When 
detainees were set free in August, they told stories of torture, abominable living conditions, 
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and humiliation at the hands of the Croat prison authorities.”476 Just as Serb paramilitaries 
destroyed Muslims monuments and historical artifacts, Croats “shelled and destroyed the 
graceful sixteenth-century Mostar Bridge built by Suleiman the Magnificent, just because it 
was a Bosniak symbol.”477 One witness describes an incident in which Croat militiamen 
abducted a 17-year-old Bosniak schoolgirl, and then gang-raped her before throwing her out 
of a top floor window.478 At the Hague Tribunal, Croat commanders were accused of using at 
least a dozen Bosniak POWs as human shields in the fall of 1993 when a no-man’s land 
developed in the middle of Mostar.479 As Burg and Shoup correctly observe, “all three 
parties, including the Muslims, were behaving in ways that undermined any claim to moral 
superiority.”480 
In spite of the horrific brutality exercised on all side of the war, some still maintain 
that this violence was not ethnically based. Gagnon points out that, just as in the Croatian 
conflict, Serbia had great difficulty finding people to join the war effort in Bosnia. Serbian 
leaders recruited their own citizens for the war by “hunting them down, packing them into 
buses, and shipping them off to the Bosnian front against their wills.”481 The fundamental 
claim of primordialism is based on a sense of brotherhood among ethnically similar 
individuals, a phenomenon that seemed in many cases absent in Bosnia. 
In addition, Gagnon looks to the wartime treatment of refugees to support his 
argument that allies and enemies were not chosen based on ethnic distinctions in the Croatian 
and Bosnian wars. From 1991 onward, refugees from rural areas flooded Yugoslav cities. 
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These new arrivals were “ethnically correct;” refugees in Zagreb were Croat, those in 
Belgrade were Serbs, and those in Sarajevo were Bosniaks.482 And yet, in all of these major 
cities, inhabitants complained bitterly about the newcomers. Native Zagreb people 
complained about Croat refugees crowding the church on Easter. Belgrade residents 
complained about the “Croats” and “Bosnians;” in other words Serb refugees from Croatia 
and Bosnia who spoke in the accents of their native regions rather than with the nasal 
Belgrade pronunciation. In Sarajevo, people complained about the hicks: “Bosnian Muslims 
from the rural regions of the country who were seen as ‘destroying’ Sarajevo.”483 These 
reactions show not ethnic solidarity and bonds of emotional attachment, but instead a feeling 
that people of the same ethnic group were actually outsiders. The idea that the wars were 
motivated by ethnic solidarity seem hollow when those who suffer most for the cause “by 
being the worst victims of the ‘evil others’ who had expelled them, were seen not as heroes 
by their fellow ethnics but rather as undesirable refugees who were degrading the cities in 
which they sought refuge.”484 People felt closer with their neighbors than other members of 
their supposedly natural ethnic community. Based on this evidence, ethnic solidarity seems 
forced and contrived, a product of elite pressure rather than popular opinion. 
The elite manipulation theory is also supported by evidence that Bosnia was a place 
of ethnic harmony and tolerance before the war. Michael Sells maintains that in spite of 
suffering and violence in World War II, Bosnia shared a common cultural world “symbolized 
over centuries by bridges, libraries, artistic treasures, and the Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim, 
and Jewish houses of worship built side by side and sharing the same skyline in Mostar and 
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Sarajevo.”485 Sells further argues that nationalists specifically targeted historical, artistic, and 
religious monuments for destruction because they wanted to eliminate evidence that a shared 
culture ever existed in Bosnia.  
Weine’s accounts of Bosnian survivors and refugees also suggest a true feeling of 
solidarity before the war. One man explains, “We all lived together. Before the war, it was 
unnecessary to know if your neighbor was Serb, Croat, Muslim, or Jew. We looked only at 
what kind of person you were. We were all friends.”486 One Bosniak man tells of a time 
when he helped his Serb neighbor in the middle of the night when her son was sick; “only 
one year after that, this same person stole my apartment.”487 Another survivor states, “Our 
neighbors—we were like a family. Our flats were like one home. They had two kids. We 
lived together. We vacationed together. Spent holidays together. Overnight, they 
changed.”488 While the continual mention of change suggests the emergence of ethnic hatred 
during the war, the fact that people do not report its existence prior to violence suggests that 
it may have been created artificially rather than out of a natural animosity. 
Many Bosnians experienced true ethnic tolerance and integration before the war. For 
some, this feeling continued throughout the violence. One Muslim man remembers, “The 
man who saved my uncle was a Chetnik officer and he probably did many things that would 
qualify him for the War Crimes Tribunal. But he was our neighbor for many years. And as 
our neighbor, he rushed to help our family.”489 A Bosniak woman recalls that during the war 
a Bosnian Serb doctor whom she had not known previously gave her a sheet of paper 
explaining that she and her husband must be transported to Sarajevo for urgent surgery. 
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Using this slip, the woman arranged to vacate the city. “When I was leaving, the doctor told 
me: ‘Don’t tell anybody because my life will be in danger, but all the Muslims that remain 
here are meant to be shot dead.’ I just froze.”490 These stories show human compassion even 
in the midst of fear and violence. More importantly, they suggest that people did not feel 
drawn to each other based on ethnicity, but on friendship, history, and a sense of compassion.  
Those who prescribe to emotion theory argue that such acts of decency pale in 
comparison to the horrific crimes committed; they insist that the latter events prove the 
existence of illogical ethnic hatred. As mentioned earlier, one of the most upsetting and 
incomprehensible methods of abuse prevalent in the Bosnian war was the use of rape as a 
weapon. Women, primarily Muslims, were held in concentration camps like Omarska where 
the Serb guards would serially rape them. “In Serb-occupied areas such as Grbavica or 
Vogosce, women were taken from their homes to a flat or school that was set up like a 
brothel for Serb forces. There Serb troops would wantonly abuse the women before killing 
them or sending them back to their families.”491 Rape was not used as a means of release for 
the soldiers, but as a deliberate means of punishment for the enemy. As discussed previously, 
Bosnian Serbs sought to intentionally impregnate Bosniak women with “little Chetniks.” 
Some camps even had gynecologists on staff to ensure that those women who were 
impregnated remained healthy enough to carry their child to term, ensuring that these women 
would give birth to an infant who would, in theory, hate them as much as their rapists did. 
During the Hague Tribunal, women and girls testified to being held captive and serially raped 
between April 1992 and February 1993. This group “included one woman who reported 
being forced into sexual intercourse about 150 times over twenty days and one sixteen-year-
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old who was raped by a thirty-six-year-old former neighbor of the family who laughed as he 
deliberately humiliated her.”492 
For many, these stories of rape are conclusive proof that true and pervasive ethnic 
hatred existed. After all, this kind of behavior serves no military purpose and is exercised 
simply to be cruel; why would people do these things unless they felt personal hatred toward 
the victimized ethnic group? However, historian Todd Salzman seeks to explain the rationale 
behind such behavior. He points out that in Serbian patriarchal society “the female is reduced 
to her reproductive capacities in order to fulfill the overall objective of Serbian nationalism 
by producing more citizens to populate the nation. Limiting womanhood to a single 
physiological quality in this way proves nondiscriminatory in that not only are Serbian 
women thus perceived, but non-Serbian women are as well.”493 The traditional role of the 
Serbian woman is illustrated by the Mother of the Jugovici, the epic heroine from the Battle 
of Kosovo who, in spite of the death of her nine sons in the battle, did not weep. Her courage, 
self-sacrifice, altruism, and most of all, her fertility, have been used to inspire and serve as a 
paradigm for Serbian women and their responsibility as mothers of the nation. According to 
Serb belief, by reproducing, women can guarantee that Serbia will persevere against 
aggressors. To shirk one's duty of reproduction amounts to anti-patriotism and treason. The 
assertion of a Serb woman who claimed that she planned to “fire off one baby every year to 
spite the aggressors” reflects the power of this myth and its message.494 
In the years leading up to the war, other ethnic groups in Yugoslavia were growing 
faster than the Serbs. Serb leaders told their people that these groups were reproducing as 
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part of a political strategy to outgrow the Serbian nation. Such political rhetoric instilled the 
fear that the subtle, though very real, means of a shift in demography and population growth 
threatened the Serbian nation. This served to promote a nationalist sentiment and also singled 
out Serbian women and their responsibility to serve the nation through reproduction, insuring 
population expansion and providing future soldiers to defend the nation in times of war.495 
This belief and fear help to explain the way in which rape of Muslims women could be 
viewed as a military strategy. If Serbs believed that Muslims were trying to win the war by 
increasing their population quickly, then by impregnating Muslims with Serb children Serbs 
were both preventing Muslims from giving birth to children of their own ethnicity and 
increasing the number of Serb children being born. This explanation does not excuse Serb 
behavior, but it does illustrate a way in which rape could be understood as a legitimate 
military strategy rather than simply an example of illogical cruelty. 
Once rape is established as a potential military option the question becomes, was such 
abuse part of the official Serb strategy? The United Nations Commission of Experts looked 
in to this very question and determined that “the practices of ethnic cleansing, sexual assault, 
and rape have been carried out by some of the parties so systematically that they strongly 
appear to be the product of a policy.”496 This extends beyond the practice of rape to 
harassment of minorities and the destruction of their property. The UN found evidence that 
the RAM Plan in August of 1991 instructed Serbs to “target women, especially adolescents, 
and children, in order to cause fear and panic among the Muslims and bring about a Muslim 
retreat from the designated territories.”497 This evidence suggests that some of the most 
disturbing atrocities of the Bosnian War may have actually been motivated by official Serb 
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policies. In terrorizing the enemy, Serbs were not simply acting out of individual hatred but 
based on military orders.  
This is not to say that none of the individuals involved had the free will or human 
agency to choose to disobey these orders. It is not to suggest that systematic rape or abuse is 
excusable, or that the participants should be absolved from blame. This evidence does, 
however, suggest that these atrocities do not necessarily undermine the elite manipulation 
argument. These acts, while truly horrific, were committed with some strategic reasoning 
involved rather than wholly due to feelings of personal hatred. Those involved no doubt had 
anger and hostility, but if they were acting on orders from above then their actions may be 
less indicative of generalized ethnic hatred and more an illustration of what happens when 
aggressive and resentful soldiers are given orders and opportunities to commit heinous acts. 
By establishing that policies of rape and abuse were put in place, one establishes that these 
acts represent the aggression of some rather than the hatred of all. 
If most of the population did not support this horrific violence, then why did people in 
Bosnian Serb held territories not take a stand to prevent massacres, rapes, and executions? 
Tim Judah responds, “It is a legitimate question, but one which fails to grasp the sheer terror 
of those times and the fact that many of the most sadistic killings were done by dangerous 
men who, according to many testimonies, had been on extended drinking binges.”498 The 
bottom line is that people were afraid that by speaking up against the violence or actively 
trying to prevent it they would put themselves in danger. Some groups formed in Serbia in an 
effort to put an end to the violence, but “they failed to rouse the righteous indignation of 
people who increasingly came to be concerned with how to feed their family rather than with 
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the latest horror story from Bosnia.”499 While it is unfortunate that such groups were unable 
to stop the violence, the fact that they formed at all clearly supports the theory that the 
Bosnian War was not truly one of ethnic division and hatred. 
On May 18, 1992, Bosnia’s Muslims and Serbs signed a ceasefire agreement. 
However, on May 20, the war entered a new phase when General Ratko Mladic was made 
commander of the newly formed army of the Republika Srpska. In the next few days, a 
number of large-scale shelling attacks were directed at the outskirts of Sarajevo, beginning a 
Serb siege of the city that would last until the summer of 1995—even longer than the Nazi 
siege of Leningrad in World War II. The target was chosen not just because it is the capital of 
Bosnia but because Sarajevo represented the Bosnian ideal of ethnic groups coexisting, 
containing 260,000 Muslims, 158,000 Serbs and 36,000 Croats before the war.500 As 
Elizabeth Pond describes, the Serbs proceeded to “rain down artillery and mortar shells 
indiscriminately on civilian districts and deliberately hit public buildings of no military 
significance.”501 At one point, the UN command recorded 3,777 shells falling in the city in a 
sixteen-hour period.502 The presidency building, the parliament, and Muslim neighborhoods 
were specifically targeted. Serbs even aimed for hospitals, such as the Sarajevo University 
Clinical Center Kosevo, which was constantly under shell and sniper fire. Most shelling took 
place in the middle of the day when the hospital was busiest with visitors.  
According to the Hague Tribunal, Serb snipers “display an intent to hit civilian and 
non-combatant targets. In many cases snipers with a clear view from high rise buildings and 
the surrounding hillsides have targeted the most vulnerable of civilians including: children 
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(even infants); persons carrying heavy plastic containers filled with water; persons in queues; 
pedestrians at intersections; and rescuers attempting to come to the aid of sniping and 
shelling victims.”503 Often Serbs would set off a bomb in a city center, and then set off 
another a few minutes later in the same location to target those who came to the aid of the 
people injured in the first blast. By the fall of 1993, not even the halfway point of the siege, 
“10,000 Sarajevans were dead and 56,000 wounded, of whom 15,000 were children. The 
total mortality figure would rise to 12,000.”504 The siege of Sarajevo ended only after the 
massacre at Srebrenica, which will be explained subsequently. 
In August of 1992, the United Nations and European Community convened the 
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) in London. The international 
community reiterated its commitment to Bosnian sovereignty and its refusal to accept any 
territorial gain by force. However, the Bosnian government expected the conference to bring 
tough action against the Bosnian Serbs and was disappointed when this did not happen. 
Izetbegovic was not prepared to negotiate for political settlement without a condemnation of 
Serbia. Additionally, the night before the meeting, “Serb forces, in a reckless display of spite, 
shelled and completely gutted the National and University library in Sarajevo.”505 The 
conference displayed how far combatants were from reaching a compromise. The ICFY did 
adopt a general statement which included a call for the cessation of fighting, an end to the use 
of force, non-recognition of gains won by force, and recognition of the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of states. However, this declaration contained no enforcement provisions. 
The subsequent violence proved that these commitments were empty. “On August 30 the 
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Alipasino Polje market in Sarajevo was shelled, apparently by the Serbs. Fifteen persons 
were killed and 100 wounded.”506 
After the ICFY was unsuccessful, statesmen Vance and Owen were asked to come up 
with a comprehensive peace plan for the conflict, which they did late in 1992. Soon 
afterwards delegates came together in Geneva to debate the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) 
and suggest changes.  This was an incredibly complex process and the VOPP received much 
criticism. The plan proposed the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten provinces. Nine 
would be under the control of a specific national group, with three provinces accorded to 
each nation. The tenth province, Sarajevo, would be controlled by a body representing all 
three national groups. Both Bosnian Croats and the Croatian government supported the plan, 
but Serbs could not accept the VOPP provision that Bosnian Serbs give back sixty percent of 
the territory they had conquered militarily.507 Milosevic supported the plan in an attempt to 
distance himself from the conflict and claim noninvolvement, but in reality the Serbs were 
strongly opposed to the VOPP. Additionally, the Bosnian Muslim government was not 
pleased with a solution which denied their central war aim of a fully unified state. 
The VOPP proposed that the cantons would exercise almost all functions of 
government including policing; the central government of Bosnia would be concerned only 
with national defense and foreign affairs. After Serbs finished pressuring diplomats to adjust 
the VOPP, the final plan formed in January 1993 stripped even defense from the powers of 
the central government. The January version of the plan also gave cantons ethnic labels on 
the map and implied that the proposed borders were not final. “This had the entirely 
predictable effect of inciting renewed competition for territory. And, worst of all, it incited 
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competition between Croat and Muslim forces for parts of central Bosnia where there had 
been a mixed Muslim-Croat population.”508 Debate over the VOPP stimulated a genuine 
Bosnian civil war, and also broke down the Muslim-Croat alliance which was the only strong 
resistance to the Serbs. The January version of the VOPP “gave the Serbs enough to make 
the Muslims feel that Serbs were being rewarded for their actions, and enough also for the 
Serbs to feel that if they continued their actions they could press for more.”509 
Croatia attempted to implement the VOPP in its own areas of Bosnia, but Serb 
uncertainty continued to provide an obstacle. The Bosnian government signed the agreement 
in March 1993 but insisted on recording a list of their reservations. Milosevic was given 
economic incentives to back the VOPP but he stopped short of giving public support for the 
proposal.510 Burg and Shoup argue that the VOPP failed because the parties were ultimately 
not negotiating in good faith. In their opinion, the warring groups were not truly willing to 
compromise in 1993, and so would not have accepted a peace plan no matter what its 
provisions.511 Without any consensus, peace was cast aside and the violence continued. 
On April 12, 1993, Serbs launched artillery barrages on Sarajevo and Srebrenica. Just 
hours before NATO was to begin enforcing a no-fly zone over Bosnia, General Mladic 
suspended ceasefire talks and began shelling the two cities. “The attack on Srebrenica was 
devastating. According to press reports, at least fifty-six persons were killed in the densely 
packed streets of the town…The Serbs’ suspension of ceasefire talks and shelling of 
Srebrenica seemed a deliberate act of malice with political intent.”512 However, UN 
insistence that Serbs stop shelling was eventually effective, because Serbs were not eager to 
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defy the UN knowing that Muslim forces in the region were gaining strength. In spite of their 
former dominance, by 1994 Serb forces in Bosnia had become relatively weak compared to 
the Bosnian government. This was due to “the lack of political leadership, absence of clearly 
defined goals, demoralization of the troops, corruption on the civilian front, and the 
realization that territorial concessions were inevitable and would entail great political 
costs.”513 The Bosnian government, on the other hand, had increased its strength by 1994, 
due to the backing of the international community and the arms and financial support 
provided by the United States.  
The pervasive violence in Bosnia had a strong impact on all of its inhabitants whether 
they participated in the war or not. With the constant fear of paramilitary attacks hanging 
over their heads, many people left their former homes for the relative safety of a community 
in which they were part of the ethnic majority. While the war forced many refugees out of the 
country entirely, it also created a great deal of displacement within the region, significantly 
altering the ethnic composition of certain areas of the country. By 1994, the distribution of 
ethnic groups within Bosnia had undergone immense change since the start of violence just 
three years prior, leading to homogenization within Bosnia’s borders. 
As the international community worked toward a permanent peace plan, it was eager 
to see an agreement formed between Croatia and Bosnia. Tudjman and Izetbegovic had 
negotiated an alliance in May 1992 but it was never implemented and a number of 
subsequent efforts at cooperation failed. “Both the Croats and the Muslims realized that they 
were suffering a serious loss of credibility in the eyes of the international community while 
allowing the Serbs to consolidate their hold over almost three-quarters of Bosnia.  
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Map 9: Balkan Ethnic Distribution in 1994 
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Nonetheless, cease-fires failed to hold.”514 Finally, an agreement was signed on 
March 1, 1994 which created a Muslim-Croat federation. The agreement signaled that Croats 
had formally abandoned their demands to divide Bosnia into three entities: Croat, Muslim, 
and Serb. The new federation was based on a system of cantons, covering all areas of Bosnia-
Herzegovina which had a Muslim or Croat majority population before the war. “While the 
Federation government would have exclusive authority over the conduct of foreign affairs, 
defense policy, citizenship, economic and commercial policy, finance, energy policy and 
inter-cantonal policing, the cantons would have responsibility for all other areas of policy.”515 
On March 18, 1994, Bosnia adopted a new constitution to reflect its agreement with Croatia. 
This ended the Muslim-Croat war in Bosnia, and restored the two groups’ alliance in the face 
of Serb aggression.  
However, some saw this alliance as a step backwards. The relationship between the 
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Muslim-Croat Federation was unclear. The status of 
those Serbs within the borders of the Federation was also left unresolved; only Muslims and 
Croats were identified as constituent peoples.516 The constitution of the Federation did allow 
“others” i.e. Serbs to join at some future point, but this was purely theoretical. “The 
Federation agreement was seen, in the eyes of some critics, as a retrograde step, insofar as it 
established ethnic divisions of territory.”517 Another obstacle to Bosnian reunification was 
erected when plans were established to develop a confederation between the Federation and 
the Republic of Croatia. “It was hard to see how future Serb cantons of Bosnia could ever 
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join in such an arrangement.”518 In April 1994 Izetbegovic told ICFY co-chairs, “To be 
honest, if we could we would take land by force but we don’t have the means. We are only 
negotiating because we don’t think we can win militarily.”519 This suggests that the alliance 
between Croatia and Bosnia did not reflect real harmony and friendship between the nations, 
but also suggests that actions were based on military estimations rather than hatred. 
In March 1994, Serb forces began attacking the Gorazde enclave in eastern Bosnia in 
an attempt to neutralize the Bosnian forces and seize the north-south highway. The Serbs 
began shelling Gorazde on April 10 and the UN initiated air strikes shortly afterward in an 
attempt to deter continued shelling and induce a Serb retreat. However, the Serbs fired back, 
and began to take hostages in response to the air attacks. “Within days, some 200 UN and 
civilian personnel had been detained by the Bosnian Serbs.”520 Journalists noted the appalling 
carnage of these attacks; gunners targeted the hospital and, according to Dr. Mary 
McLaughlin, it seemed the Serbs were “prepared to level east Gorazde house by house in 
order to gain control over it.”521 One account from two UN doctors trapped in Gorazde reads 
as follows: “The wounded lie for hours in the debris as it is suicidal to try and bring them to 
the hospital…Twenty people were confirmed killed in one of the hospital apartments 
yesterday. The Serb excuse for targeting it is that it is a military institution. I’ve been in all 
pats of the hospital a hundred times in the last month and can assure the outside world that 
this is a lie.”522 On April 23, the shelling had tapered off and UN forces were permitted entry; 
by April 26, the fighting had ceased completely.523 
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After four years of war and diplomatic stalemate, a shift occurred in 1995. Aside from 
the fact that Croatia had become well-armed, Bosnian Serb morale was dropping 
significantly. Serbs felt that Milosevic was interested in consolidating his own power rather 
than defending them. Additionally, Serbs realized that many of their other leaders were after 
money and power as well. “This mood of defeatism was to fatally weaken the Serbs outside 
Serbia and to lead tens of thousands to vote with their feet.”524 As the war entered its third 
year in Bosnia, fewer Serbs were interested in fighting, let alone staying in the Republika 
Srpska or Krajina. “Reports frequently stated that hundreds, if not thousands, of people, 
especially those with a good education and qualifications, were leaving every month.”525 In 
Judah’s words, “Worn down by poverty, hopelessness, and the very public war-profiteering 
of the few, morale was at rock bottom.”526 
At the height of Serb nationalist euphoria in the late 1980s, Serbs could be relied 
upon to demonstrate for Serbian unity but Serbs now faced defeat. They were vilified 
throughout the world, hundreds of thousands of Serbs were refugees, and Serbia was 
bankrupt. “Ashamed, barely a couple of thousand Belgraders came out to demonstrate 
against their government, which had turned the Serbs into international pariahs and then 
nonetheless failed to hold on to what most of them believed was rightfully theirs.”527 The 
involvement of troops from Serbia was becoming deeply unpopular at home, and although 
professional commando and police units were still used for fighting, the increasing reluctance 
of ordinary Serbs to die for their brothers further hurt morale.  
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In spite of increasing Serb weakness, the group engaged in one final horrific act 
before the war’s end. In July 1995, Serb troops arrived outside the Muslim city of Srebrenica 
but were met with resistance by UN peacekeepers who refused to permit their entry. The 
Serbs responded by taking UN hostages. On July 13, peacekeeping troops decided to allow 
Serb entry on the condition that these individuals be returned. The Serbs entered Srebrenica, 
assuring its citizens that no harm would come to them and then immediately initiating a 
widespread and appalling massacre of the city’s inhabitants. Children and women, many of 
whom were raped, were loaded onto buses and moved out of the city. During the next five 
days, Serbs transported busloads of Muslim men and boys between the ages of twelve and 
seventy-seven to an athletic field in Srebrenica where they were systematically executed, 
their bodies stacked on top of one another to make room for more. Some sources place the 
death toll as low as 8,000,528 others claim it was as high as 20,000.529 No matter which 
statistics are correct, there is no denying that the Srebrenica murders, especially at this late 
date when the Serbs were slowly losing their strength and territory, were horrific and 
militarily unnecessary. 
 However, as was customary in the Bosnian conflict, just as the Serbs finished playing 
the role of villain they quickly adopted the role of victim. From 1991 to 1995, President 
Tudjman employed diplomatic negotiation and limited military action against rebel Serbs in 
the Krajina region of Croatia. In early 1995, Tudjman reluctantly agreed to extend an offer of 
substantial self-government rights to Krajina, but the agreement was rejected by its Serb 
inhabitants. As a result, Tudjman finally resorted to outright military action by launching an 
attack on the Krajina district in August of 1995. Only a few days later, the Croatian 
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government had regained control over the rebel capital of Knin and almost all of the Croatian 
territory which had previously been under Serb control.530 After Croats were victorious in 
Krajina, there was an exodus of almost the entire Serb population of the region. By the end of 
August 1995, “it was estimated that between 150,000 and 200,000 Krajina Serbs—
descendants of families that had first settled in Croatia over 400 years earlier—had fled the 
region.”531 Croat officials had previously announced that the Krajina Serbs were welcome to 
remain and that they would be fully protected by the government, but high-ranking American 
officials maintain that the Serbs left their homes involuntarily. The bombardment of the Serb 
civilian population during the military campaign against Knin and other Krajina towns and 
the subsequent strafing of fleeing refugees by the Croatian air force, as well as the 
harassment of Serb civilians by Croatian military personnel and civilians, undoubtedly sent a 
clear message to Serbs that they were unwelcome and hastened their departure.  
Publicly Croatian officials claimed that the Serbian exodus was completely 
unintended and unnecessary, but a more typical sentiment expressed by Croatian officials 
and citizens was that “the country’s ‘Serbian question’ had been favorably resolved.”532 
Reporters visiting the Knin area directly after its capture by Croatia witnessed “the 
systematic arson and razing of Serb homes, and heard versions of the representative view 
expressed by one Croat that the few hundred Serbian old people who remained should 
‘celebrate mass to President Tudjman’ for having spared their lives.”533 The head of Croatia’s 
Roman Catholic Church, Cardinal Kuharic, condemned reports of killing and looting but by 
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the fall of 1995 the Serbian population of Croatia, which before World War II had constituted 
over one-fifth of the region’s total population, had dwindled to under five percent.534 
Events like the Srebrenica massacre and Croat harassment of the Krajina Serbs lend 
themselves to a primordialist interpretation of the Bosnian conflict. Technically the Slavs of 
the Balkans all have the same ethnic ancestors, and therefore groups are divided primarily by 
religion rather than race. Glenny, however, argues that religious distinctions are actually 
more divisive than ethnic ones, making the groups in Bosnia more hostile and incapable of 
cooperation. After all, there is no room for compromise on the subject of God and religion. 
“The Orthodox, the Catholics, or the Muslims can only claim victory when the heretics have 
been wiped out or expelled from their homes. Ceasefires brokered by the United Nations may 
come and go in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the fighters on all three sides will almost certainly 
ignore them.”535 While Glenny’s point is a good one, opponents are certain to argue that 
because the Yugoslav violence was not based on religious disagreements, the issue of having 
to compromise on the subject of God is irrelevant in this instance. 
However, other factors contributed to the difficulty of compromise in Bosnia. 
Michael Sells explains the exclusive nature of the nationalist mindset by using the example 
of Serbia. The Serbian nationalist flag is emblazoned four Cyrillic S’s, which stand for “only 
unity saves the Serbs.”536 For Serbian nationalists, the term unity does not refer to a 
communal unity where different voices come together in harmony. “It means a homogenous 
unity in which the most extreme and brutal self-proclaimed defenders of Greater Serbia, such 
as General Ratko Mladic or those indicted for organized rape at Foca, must be supported by 
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all Serbs because they are Serbs and they committed their acts in the name of Serbia.”537 In 
the same vein, the Serbian Orthodox Church was fully supportive of the Serb war effort, 
regardless of the military tactics being implemented. “Serb partisanship was clear, for 
example, in late 1992, when Orthodox prelates issued a statement denying categorically that 
Serbs had organized rapes of Muslim or other women, while asserting that Muslims and 
Croats had raped many Serb women.”538 The Orthodox Church not only attacked the Hague 
Tribunal for investigating crimes committed by individual Serbs but also accused Serb 
dissidents who denounced the atrocities of being traitors to Serbia.539 Gagnon would argue 
that this is simply evidence of the strength and persistence of the elite-constructed Serb 
identity during the conflict. He would state that this identity is inconsistent with that of the 
majority of Serbs and exists only to homogenize the Serb population and demobilize those 
who oppose ruling elites. However, regardless of the opinions of individuals Serbs, or the 
origin of such Serb sentiments, the uncompromising nature of the newly constructed Serb 
community would make negotiating an end to violence a challenging prospect. 
The international community confronted a daunting task in brokering Bosnian peace. 
And yet, after four years of violence, it appeared that the combatants might finally be in a 
position to compromise. After a series of NATO air raids further weakened Bosnian Serb 
forces in 1995, the newly strengthened Croatian-Muslim forces pushed their enemy back 
until Serb-occupied territory in Bosnia had dropped from 70 to 49 percent of the republic’s 
territory. A ceasefire came into effect in Bosnia on October 5, 1995. The parties met in 
Dayton, Ohio in November of 1995 to begin a new round of peace negotiations. The major 
differences between Dayton and previous peace negotiations were “the willingness of the 
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United States to exert substantial pressure on the parties, especially the Bosnian Muslim 
leadership, to agree; and the fact that neither the Bosnian Serbs nor the Bosnian Croats—the 
parties least susceptible to US pressure—were a direct party to the negotiations.”540 Another 
crucial difference was that because Serbia controlled significantly less territory at this point 
than it had during previous negotiations, it had less power to change peace proposals. This 
being said, Milosevic and Tudjman drove the negotiations for the most part. “The final map 
appears to have been defined largely without Muslim participation. According to one 
account, ‘the Bosnians ended up being badgered into agreement,’ and according to another 
they were simply ‘broken.’”541 
Finally, on November 21, 1995 a general agreement was reached in Dayton. It was 
later signed as a treaty by the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia on December 14 in 
Paris. The Dayton Accords included a territorial settlement which split Bosnia between the 
Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb Republika Srpska, 
giving 51 and 49 percent of Bosnian territory to each respectively. The agreement also 
included “a new constitution, various mechanisms for the protection of human rights, the 
return of refugees and the reconstruction of the economy, and a plan for the deployment of an 
international force, under NATO leadership, of 60,000 troops to supervise the cessation of 
hostilities.”542 The Dayton Agreement brought the fighting to an end but was unclear about 
future plans for either keeping Bosnia intact or pursuing partition. The agreement was fragile, 
essentially making Bosnia a military protectorate and opening it up for another war if 
international troops were to leave. Malcolm argues that war-weariness and a continuing sense 
of underlying historic Bosnian identity may lead to a lasting peace in the region. However, he 
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warns that Dayton’s proximity to de facto partition may lead to the eventual secession of the 
Republika Srpska, “which, if contested by the Federation, would lead once again to war.”543 
The details of Dayton will be explored more fully in the following chapter. For the purposes 
of the current account, the most important part about the Dayton Accords is that this 
agreement brought an end to violence in Bosnia. 
There is no consensus on the number of people killed during the Bosnian War. The 
figure of 200,000 or more dead, injured, and missing was frequently cited in media reports on 
the war in Bosnia as late as 1994. The October 1995 bulletin of the Bosnian Institute for 
Public Health of the Republic Committee for Health and Social Welfare reported 146,340 
killed and 174,914 wounded on the territory under the control of the Bosnian army.544 In 
2005, the NGO Research and Documentation Center reported a total of 93,837 soldier and 
civilian deaths throughout the war.545 The number of rapes committed during the war has 
also been hotly contested. “The UN commission of Experts was able to identify 1,600 actual 
cases of rape. A study of rape victims in hospitals in Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia carried out 
by experts attached to the UN Human Rights Commission produced evidence of 
approximately 12,000 cases of rape, the majority of which had been committed by Serbs.”546 
Regardless of the actual number of people killed and raped, the extremely destructive nature 
of the Bosnian conflict remains most important. Nearly half of Bosnia’s 4.2 million people 
were displaced. Whole cities were destroyed, and countless villages disappeared from the 
map. In the words of one Macedonian officer in the Yugoslav army, “Once it had started the 
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massacres were unstoppable. It will never end whether they have a ceasefire, peace-keeping 
troops or whatever. This is not a war, this is extermination.”547 
Conclusion 
The wars in Croatia and Bosnia were truly tragic and horrific conflicts that left the 
populations of these regions physically, psychologically, and emotionally scarred. There is 
no doubt that a great deal of hatred was felt and expressed during this conflict. However, the 
simple fact that great atrocities were committed is not enough to prove that the Bosnian and 
Croatian Wars were primordial in nature, just as the existence of nationalist propaganda is 
not enough to prove that elite manipulation was responsible. One must take into 
consideration all dimensions of the conflict to produce an accurate interpretation of its 
causes. Such an interpretation also requires an examination of how the region has reacted to 
and reflected on the war in the wake of Dayton, and how radical or tolerant these populations 
are today. This question will be addressed in the following chapter, after which a thorough 
examination of the evidence thus provided will be set forth. 
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Map 10: The Balkans in the Present Day 
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Chapter 5: Events in the Balkans Post-Dayton 
 This chapter will explore developments in the Balkans from the signing of the Dayton 
Accords to the present day. While extensive research has been published detailing events in 
the region prior to and during conflict, little work has been done on the Balkans in the wake 
of Dayton. However, an examination of events after the violence of the 1990s can actually 
give one a better understanding of the violence itself. If evidence indicates that people in the 
region have re-integrated themselves into multi-ethnic communities and are cooperating to 
heal the wounds of the war, then perhaps the conflict itself was not motivated by ethnic 
hatred but by something more akin to elite manipulation. If, on the other hand, evidence 
indicates that ethnic tensions and hatred are rampant eleven years after the conflict and 
continue to divide these societies, then not only was the violence probably ethnically 
motivated, but it may resurface in the future. As with all other facets of this study, there is no 
black and white interpretation of post-Dayton events; evidence exists to support a number of 
different theories.  
This chapter will examine the politics and ethnic relations in both Croatia and Serbia 
from 1995 to the present day. However, the primary focus of this chapter will be on Bosnia-
Herzegovina, including a full explanation and assessment of the Dayton Accords, a 
discussion on the viability of other peace options like partition, and an overview of how the 
government and its people have survived in the wake of this tragedy. Bosnia was a multi-
ethnic society prior to the violence and is now divided into two ethnically based republics. As 
a result, it can be seen as a microcosm of the larger problem of ethnic tension in the region. If 
evidence suggests that today Bosnians are healing ethnic wounds and crossing ethnic 
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boundaries then this has very important implications for both the Balkan conflicts of the 
1990s and other “ethnic conflicts” throughout the world. 
 
Croatia After the Dayton Accords 
 Croatia no doubt saw its fair share of violence in the early 1990s. However, the 
country was able to make a relatively clean break from Yugoslavia in 1992 and did not 
experience nearly as much turmoil as Bosnia. The reduced severity of the Croatian 
experience helped the country to move past war resentments relatively quickly. Evidence 
suggests that as early as 1994 Croatia’s citizens were able to evaluate others based on 
personal experience rather than ethnicity. In his essay “Embattled Democracy: 
Postcommunist Croatia in Transition,” Lenard Cohen cites an opinion poll taken in Croatia in 
1994 which found that 94 percent of Croats surveyed viewed Krajina Serbs unfavorably, but 
only 52 percent viewed Croatian Serbs from urban areas unfavorably.548 Although a majority 
of Croats viewed Serbs negatively, the vast gap between evaluations of Krajina Serbs and 
urban Serbs shows that many Croats were able to distinguish between groups directly 
involved in the violence and those implicated by their ethnicity only. While Croat leader 
Franjo Tudjman failed to make the distinction between radical Krajina Serbs and moderate 
urban Serbs before the war, Croatian citizens saw this reality even in the wake of violence. 
This poll also revealed that 21 percent of respondents viewed Serbs from Serbia favorably. 
This is remarkable given the continued tension between Serbia and Croatia in 1994 and the 
fact that violence had ended in Croatia only two years prior. These statistics project a very 
hopeful image for Croatia and its ability to move past the violence of the early 1990s. 
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However, this kind of evidence must be viewed in the proper context, which in 
Croatia in the mid-1990s was one of rather widespread ethnic violence. For example, in May 
of 1995 when Croatia retook Donja Vrijeska from rebel Serbs, the United Nations received 
numerous reports of looting, physical abuse, and intimidations of Serbs by Croatian soldiers, 
police officers, and civilians.549 On August 9, 1995 thousands of Serbs streamed out of 
Croatia after a ceasefire ended the Croat offensive and made it safe for Serbs to leave. During 
this departure, a Danish soldier in the UN force reported seeing five elderly and handicapped 
Serbs pulled from a school and killed in Dvor. Angry crowds lined the exodus route to curse 
and jeer at the caravan of Croatian Serb families. Croatian Army soldiers hooted obscenities 
at the cars, while a Croatian woman heaved a stone. Men spat on the car windows and 
children waved the Croatian flag.550 These kinds of stories, which were all too common in 
Croatia in the mid-1990s, emphasize the fact that although some Croatians had an 
enlightened approach to the post-war period, others were still consumed with ethnic 
resentment and hostility. 
 By the beginning of 1996, fewer than half of the 600,000 Serbs who had lived in 
Croatia before the war remained there and the Croatian government seemed to be doing its 
part to drive out as many of the remaining Serbs as possible.551 Croatian government officials 
ignored petitions and legal proceedings brought by Serbs who wished to return to Croatia 
iand invalidated 4,000 applications by Croatian Serbs for returnee status despite the fact that 
they were hand-delivered to Zagreb by the US ambassador. A Serbian member of the 
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Croatian Parliament, Veselin Pejnovic, said, “All of the parties who signed the Dayton 
agreement know, quite cynically, that most of the refugees will never return to their homes. 
And the Serbs from the Krajina will now be the first to formally lose everything. President 
Tudjman has succeeded where the fascist government in Croatia during World War II failed. 
He has driven nearly all of the Serbs from the Croatian state.”552 
Under Tudjman’s leadership, ethnic violence in Croatia continued throughout the 
1990s. From May 12 to 15, 1997, Bosnian Croat refugees rampaged through at least four 
Serbian villages near Kostajnica, breaking into homes, smashing property, and forcing Serbs 
to flee to the surrounding woods. Chris Hedges, a reporter for the New York Times, argued 
that the attacks were “part of a mounting campaign to drive the Serbs who have remained in 
Croatia since the end of the Balkan war out of the country and to block any returning Serbs 
from resettling in their old communities.”553 Earlier in 1997, the government of Zagreb 
confiscated Serbian homes in Croatia and distributed them to returning ethnic Croats in spite 
of an outwardly tolerant policy toward the presence of Serbs in Croatia. Helsinki Watch 
officials cite disturbing reports of Serbs being beaten by Croats in military uniform. One 
Croat explains, “The Serbs forced our people out of Bosnia. And now these Serbs have the 
audacity to come in here like they own the place, spitting in our faces, insulting our 
country.”554 In May 1997, around one hundred Serb refugees were expelled after an attempt 
to return to their homes near Sisal. President Tudjman responded with an announcement that 
 
552 Chris Hedges, “Many Serbs of Croatia Find Misery in Belgrade,” New York Times, p. 18, December 17, 
1995, national edition.  
553 Chris Hedges, “Croat Refugees Rampage Through Four Serbian Villages in Croatia,” New York Times, sec. 
A, May 16, 1997, national edition. 
554 Ibid. 
205
it was “unreasonable” to expect that all of the 200,000 exiled Serbs would be able to 
return.555 
In the first quarter of 1998, international observers reported an increase in incidents of 
harassment, threats, and evictions of Serbs in Eastern Slavonia. Nationalist demonstrations 
were often held with the apparent intention of intimidating local Serbs. In January 1998 the 
Croatian Party of Rights held a rally outside Vukovar where approximately nine hundred 
demonstrators sang nationalist songs and gave fascist salutes. On January 22, 1998, a law 
was passed in Eastern Slavonia to allow pre-war tenants to regain their properties, while in 
areas of Croatia, such as Krajina, where the population was primarily Serb before the war, no 
such laws were passed. The Eastern Slavonia law was eventually revoked after international 
outrage, but it sent a “clear message of intolerance” according to Human Rights Watch.556 
Throughout his rule, Tudjman and his Croatian Democratic Union party (HDZ) 
continued to pursue the creation of a Greater Croatia, coveting the territory in Herzegovina 
proclaimed Herceg-Bosna in 1992. Tudjman and the HDZ unapologetically promoted the 
interests of Croat nationalists and failed to meet international commitments on the protection 
of human rights and democratic standards, particularly with regards to the remaining ethnic 
Serb population of Croatia. In December 1999, however, things changed dramatically for 
Croatia when President Franjo Tudjman died. Under his leadership, nationalism had persisted 
and the country had been unable to move past the violence of the early 1990s. However, 
Tudjman’s death gave Croatia the opportunity to chart a new course of tolerance and unity. 
In addition, Tudjman passed away before he could be indicted for war crimes, which was 
another blessing for Croatia. Although General Gotovina was responsible for the areas in 
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which the worst atrocities were committed, Tudjman was still commander-in-chief during the 
war. “Had he lived long enough, he too would have had to appear at the Hague, and the swell 
of patriotic support for Croatia’s modern founding father would have at least postponed 
remorse for crimes committed so recently in the name of Croatia.”557 Because of Tudjman’s 
premature death, rather than becoming an albatross for Croats, he “freed them from the past 
to look to the future.”558 
After Tudjman died “nationalism’s stranglehold on liberalism weakened; suddenly, 
chauvinist passions were no longer all-consuming.”559 On January 3, 2000 in parliamentary 
elections, Croatians voted the HDZ out of power after a decade of corruption and high 
unemployment. In Roland Paris’ words, popular rejection of the HDZ was “little short of a 
quiet revolution.”560 The newly elected regime of a coalition of liberal parties, led by newly 
elected President Stjepan Mesic, explicitly rejected Tudjman’s parochial nationalism and 
worked to eliminate legislative provisions that discriminated against non-Croat residents of 
the country. This new government, in fact, espoused a multi-ethnic conception of Croatian 
citizenship and sought to encourage the return of Serb refugees. 
Paris hypothesizes that the reason Croatian elections brought moderates to power 
rather than solidifying ethnic division, as occurred in Bosnian post-Dayton elections, is 
because most Serbs had left Croatia by 2000. “With a greatly diminished (and elderly) Serb 
population remaining in Croatia, and the government of Yugoslavia no longer offering 
military or political aid, the Serbian ‘side’ in the Croatian civil war had, in effect, quit the 
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country.”561 This meant that Croatians did not see political liberalization as quite so 
threatening anymore. “The residual Serbian community in Croatia did not pose a threat to the 
majority population within the country (unlike the situation in Bosnia, where Croats, 
Muslims, and Serbs continued to exist as vital communities and political actors). Under these 
conditions, voting for moderate candidates may have been more likely to occur.”562 
There was no shortage of politicians making ethnic nationalist and xenophobic 
appeals to the Croatian electorate during the 2000 balloting, including those who accused 
moderates of betraying the “heroes of the Homeland War.” However, “the de facto departure 
of one of the formerly warring parties in Croatia—the Serbs—seems to have reduced the 
political traction of ethnic nationalism.”563 Croats could not be convinced that Serbs posed a 
threat when there were so few Serbs present, and without that threat ethnic dominance lost its 
relevance and importance. In other words, according to Paris, Croats were manipulated into 
supporting ethnic nationalist positions out of fear, but when their fear was alleviated they 
chose to abandon such ethnically exclusive platforms. 
Once in office, President Mesic actively supported the institutional shrinkage of his 
own presidential power and the enhancement of parliamentary power, then in the hands of 
newly elected Prime Minister Ivica Racan. On his inauguration day in February 2000, Mesic 
announced his support for allowing Hague Tribunal investigators to inspect a mass grave 
thought to contain the bodies of Serbs murdered by Croats.564 The new president and prime 
minister opened the country to the West and brought Croatia into NATO’s Partnership for 
Peace within months of entering office. Mesic and Racan halted the worst harassment of 
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journalists, cut support for Croat separatists in Herzegovina, promised to cooperate with the 
Hague Tribunal, launched economic reforms, and initiated a rise in tourist revenues. By 
autumn Croatia had begun talks with the European Union on a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement, the Western Balkan precursor of membership negotiations.565 
However, these moderate reforms were slow in trickling down to local law 
enforcement officials. In July of 2000, NGOs in the coastal city of Split criticized Croatian 
authorities for failing to put an end to evictions of Croatian Serbs in the area. NGO 
representatives expressed a belief that evictions were perpetuated by remnants of the former 
HDZ-led law enforcement agencies intending to cause chaos in the wake of their defeat in 
2000 elections. Representatives from the Democracy Center, the Altruist Center, and the 
Dalmatian Human Rights Committee all confirmed that an eviction’s success in Split 
depended on nationality; “Serbs are thrown into the street on the first eviction order, whereas 
attempts to evict Croats are repeated up to ten or more times, until they are provided with 
alternate accommodation.”566 The NGOs accused authorities of using false testimonies to 
secure eviction orders, and of turning a deaf ear to appeals despite human rights and 
democracy rhetoric among leaders. Bringing moderates to power was not a final solution to 
tension in Croatia and such reports show that ethnic hostility was still alive and well in the 
country in 2000.  
As promised, once in office Mesic cooperated with the Hague Tribunal in locating 
those indicted for war crimes and bringing them to justice. When Serbs were the main 
indictees, Croats welcomed the proceedings. Even when the first indictment of Croats began 
there was little popular outrage since charges dealt with events in Bosnia-Herzegovina rather 
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than Croatia proper. However, “disquiet grew as the tribunal moved up the chain of 
responsibility from the lower ranks that physically executed atrocities to senior commanders 
in the Bosnia-Herzegovina and then the Croatian theatres.”567 This disapproval was 
unequivocally expressed in August 2000 when Milan Levar, a Croat who testified at the 
Hague Tribunal in 1997 about mass executions of Serbs by Croats, was murdered. The 
government responded by arresting 62 people, including the suspected assassins, some 
military officers, and more war crime suspects.  
When the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) began 
indicting heroes of the Homeland War, a storm of public demonstrations broke out headed by 
veterans’ associations and the HDZ. “To many Croats, the new indictments constituted 
‘criminalization’ of their war of survival and was manifestly unfair in equating the helpless 
victims with the aggressors.”568 Croats reached the final straw in February 2001 when an 
Eijeka court issued an arrest warrant for ex-general Mirko Norac, who was accused of killing 
Serb civilians in Gospic in 1991. In response, between 100,000 and 150,000 demonstrators 
turned up to protest for several days. A Croat witness to the central atrocity in the case was 
blown up by a bomb in front of his house. Protestors constructed road blocks and yelled 
insults at the leaders of the ruling coalition, demanding immunity from war crimes probes for 
all Croatian soldiers. 
This demonstration reflected both the complicated emotion of the war itself and, 
without a doubt, ethnic nationalism among the population. However, it must be noted that not 
all Croats commiserated with these demonstrators. On February 19, 2001, five thousand 
Croats gathered in Zagreb to oppose the views of the earlier demonstration and support the 
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rule of law. One of the rally’s organizers, Vesna Terselic, told the crowd, “Many of our 
defenders set out with the best of intentions. But it turns out that some of them committed 
war crimes and it is of the utmost importance that these crimes be processed.”569 Ethnic 
tension and nationalism were no doubt present in Croatia in 2001, but one must remember 
that the opinions of some can not be equated with the opinions of all.  
In June 2001, Ante Gotovina was indicted for war crimes, causing a new wave of 
outrage in Croatia. Within a few hours of the announcement, “hagiographic posters of 
Gotovina went up around the country, the Adriatic city of Zadar made its famous son an 
honorary citizen, and prominent personalities accused the Hague Tribunal of plotting to 
block Croatia’s entry into the EU.”570 As a professional courtesy, the Hague Tribunal 
confidentially informed the Zagreb government a few days beforehand that it would indict 
Gotovina. This advance warning gave the Croat security services, which operated more or 
less independently from Mesic and Racan, enough time to “whisk Gotovina away and 
arrange a luxury globe-trotting lifestyle for their war hero for the next four years, while he 
evaded capture.”571 
Although there is no doubt that some Croatian citizens supported the Hague’s efforts, 
the indictment of major Croat leaders inspired a resurgence of nationalist sentiment and a 
renewed expression of violence and resentment against ethnic Serbs. On August 27, 2001, an 
Ustashe symbol was spray-painted on the entrance to a Serb Orthodox church in the southern 
town of Split. A message was also painted on the door: “U, NDH—Serbs Get Out of 
Croatia,” with the letters NDH referring to the Independent State of Croatia which was ruled 
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by the Ustashe regime during World War II.572 In the town of Vukovar, segregation of Croats 
and Serbs became a way of life; the two groups had separate cafes, classrooms, sport clubs, 
and cultural societies. In 2001, the Serb population of Vukovar described ethnic relations as 
the worst since post-war reintegration.573 In this sense, the resurgence of ethnic tension in 
Croatia was felt even in areas where no overt violence actually occurred. 
This renewal of Croatian nationalism made things very difficult for Croatian Serbs 
attempting to return to their pre-war homes. In September 2003, Human Rights Watch 
presented its sixty-page evaluation of the ethnic Serb return process to Croatia. In this report, 
the organization accused the Croatian government of practicing ethnic discrimination against 
Serbs. Lotte Leicht, director of Human Rights Watch, said that the biggest problems Serb 
returnees faced were repossession of property, arbitrary arrests of Serbs suspected of war 
crimes, and employment discrimination. Leicht agreed that Croatia had made progress by 
adopting laws on the protection of minority rights, but she criticized obstacles in their 
enforcement, blaming both state and local authorities.574 
The following month, the Croatian government released its own statistics about the 
number of returnees to Croatia since the war. The Zagreb Ministry of Public Works reported 
that from the end of the war to October 2003, 105,805 ethnic Serbs had returned to Croatia, 
46,068 of whom had returned between January 2000 and October 2003 alone.575 As of 
October 2001, 50,993 people still needed to return to Croatia or be locally integrated into 
their pre-war homes. Of those people in Croatia waiting to be locally integrated, 22,058 were 
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in the system of care and accommodation, with 6,578 people receiving living 
accommodations from the organized facilities of the Ministry for Public Works, and the rest 
receiving other support through reconstruction and housing programs. In 2003, the Croatian 
Ministry for Public Works constructed eight thousand housing units, and planned to construct 
another nine thousand units in 2004. The majority of reconstruction beneficiaries in 2003 
were ethnic Serbs, making up 75 percent of beneficiaries in 2003 and more than 80 percent in 
2004.576 Although Human Rights Watch reported definite room for improvement in Croat 
treatment of Serb returnees, statistics show notable efforts being made to welcome Serbs 
back to Croatia. 
In November 2003, new parliamentary elections were held in Croatia. This time it 
was the previously victorious Social Democrats who were worn out from the strains of office 
and blamed by voters for all the hardships of transition. The HDZ was the fresh face, and it 
comfortably defeated the Racan coalition in the Croatian parliament.577 Stjepan Mesic, leader 
of the moderate coalition, remained president and would not be up for reelection until 2005. 
The new prime minister was HDZ leader Ivo Sanader. Despite the nationalist reputation of 
the Croatian Democratic Union, Sanader set a number of moderate goals for his government. 
He aimed to change the HDZ into a typical European Christian Democratic party, to bring 
Croatia into NATO, and to enter the EU by 2007. In a symbolic but still significant act, 
Sanader invited a small Serb party to join his coalition and fill one cabinet slot. On May 11, 
2004, Sanader paid an unprecedented visit to a family of ethnic Serbs who fled Croatia 
during the war and had since returned. At the event, Sanader said that the return of refugees 
was at the top of his cabinet’s agenda and continued, “Croatia’s future lies in reconciliation 
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and tolerance…The war is behind us. There is no alternative to peace and tolerance.” 578 In 
November, Sanader made the first postwar visit by a Croatian prime minister to Belgrade. 579 
With Sanader in the parliament and Mesic still in the presidency, the country moved along its 
current path of liberalization and integration. 
In mid-February 2004, the Ethnic Minorities Council of the United Nations 
commended Croatia for a number of positive steps it had taken over the previous four years 
toward exercising the rights of national minorities. Croatia had increased budgetary funds for 
minority associations and institutions and adopted a law on the rights of national minorities, 
which allowed for the use of minority languages in education. The council noted that 
implementation of the education law was slow, but that a political will existed to put it into 
action and the law was being implemented to the highest possible extent. Croatia was also 
commended for its decision to increase funds allocated to minorities by 10 percent over 
2003, and to earmark those funds for publishing activities and cultural events for minorities. 
The council noted that the government had not yet achieved proportional representation of 
minorities in state services and the judicial authority, or in local and regional government. 
However, other positive steps, like the possibility of co-financing local media to produce 
news programs in minority languages, were praised by the council.580 The Croatian 
government still had a number of kinks to work out, but it was making important steps which 
were recognized by the international community. 
Still, the Croatian government continued to faced nationalist sentiment among the 
general public. In August of 2004, the village of Sveti Rok established a memorial plaque in 
 
578 “Croatian PM Urges Tolerance for Ethnic Serb Returnees,” Agence France Presse, May 11, 2004. 
579 Pond, 134. 
580 “National Minorities Council Says Progress Made in Exercising Minority Rights,” Zagreb HINA, February 
20, 2004. 
214
tribute to Mile Budak, a senior official in the Ustashe regime during World War II. The 
plaque read “In memory of Dr. Mile Budak—a Croatian patriot, man of letters, and novel 
writer.”581 Budak was a minister in the regime of Ante Pavelic, the known architect of racial 
laws in the Independent State of Croatia, and the author of a number of inflammatory and 
racist speeches delivered during the Second World War. Supporters of the memorial argued 
that it was meant to commemorate his great talent as a writer, but there is no doubt that a 
great deal of nationalistic sentiment surrounded this act. In Vukovar, just a week prior to this 
memorial, Croat police spotted a Serb flag with the motto “United Serb Countries” flying in 
front of a private residence. The police confiscated the flag and pressed charges against the 
owner of the house on suspicion that he committed an offence.582 Although these acts did not 
involve violence, they no doubt prove that ethnic resentment and suspicion were still alive 
and well in Croatia in 2004.  
As the campaign for the next presidential election heated up, Croat leaders tried to 
walk a fine line between pleasing the West, which saw the glorification of Croatia’s Ustashe 
past as evidence of a non-democratic government, and right-wing Croats, who were fiercely 
nationalistic. In late 2004, Croat politicians tried to please Western leaders by stifling ethnic 
tensions. The government ordered the removal of the statue of Mile Budak, as well as that of 
Ustashe hero Jure Francetic. The police ripped down posters of Gotovina that remained on 
the walls in the center of Zadar since the 2001 protests, and leaders continued to make every 
effort to show a willingness to grant equal minority rights.583 
From November 11 to 13, 2004, an international conference on the participation of 
national minorities in political decision-making on the state and local levels was held in 
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Zagreb under Prime Minister Sanader. The conference was organized by the Robert Schuman 
Institute with the support of the EU and included minority representatives from throughout 
the Balkan area. Sanader said that minorities were represented very well in Parliament and at 
all levels of government, and announced the creation of a Council of National Minorities in 
Croatia. He later stated, “Croatia is developing as a multicultural society into which national 
minorities are fully integrated. National minorities are valuable, not a problem; they are 
bridges which connect and not separate.”584 Yet no amount of tolerant rhetoric could 
completely eliminate nationalist sentiment among the population. In December, World War 
II veterans marched through Zadar with pictures of Ustashe leader Ante Pavelic. When 
President Mesic testified at Hague prosecutions, Croatian citizens accused him of being an 
ICTY spy.585 
The fact that some members of the population responded to their government’s 
reforms with ethnic fear and resentment may lead some to believe that Croats would remove 
these leaders from power at the first opportunity. After all, it seems that in 2003 and 2004 the 
government continually pushed the population to accept reforms which people were not 
prepared for. However, on January 2, 2005 the Croatian electorate affirmed Mesic’s power 
yet again. On the first ballot, Mesic won 49 percent of the vote with the HDZ candidate 
Jadranka Kosar receiving only 20 percent. On the second ballot, held January 16, Mesic took 
66 percent of the vote over Kosar’s 34 percent.586 This does not represent a landslide victory 
for Mesic, but it does show a great deal of support for him among the Croatian populous. The 
2005 elections are perhaps more telling than those in 2000, because in the former case the 
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population chose to support Mesic after witnessing and experiencing his policies of 
aggressive reform. While protests and exhibitions of ethnic intolerance suggest that the 
population was at odds with Mesic’s liberal policies, the 2005 elections prove otherwise.  
In March 2005, the European Union delayed entry talks with Croatia after war crime 
fugitive Ante Gotovina still had not been brought to the Hague for prosecution. The 
international community believed that the Croatian government was hiding Gotovina based 
on UN reports that he was residing in the country. Croat citizens responded by showing their 
support for Gotovina. On March 16 and 17, 2005, posters and billboards praising the retired 
general were put up in Zagreb, Pula, Zadar, Split, Sibenik, Oroslavlje, and Darda, primarily 
funded by veterans of the Serbo-Croatian War. According to the Sarajevo newspaper 
ONASA, most Croatians regarded Gotovina as a hero of the war of independence despite the 
fact that he was accused of the murder of at least 150 ethnic Serbs in a 1995 operation to 
remove rebel Serbs from the Krajina.587 Of course, a Sarajevo newspaper can not be seen as 
an authority on Croatian public opinion. However, these events do show the existence of 
nationalist sentiment in Croatia even after Mesic’s re-election. 
In December of 2005, Gotovina was finally arrested and brought to the Hague for 
prosecution. In the wake of this event, Prime Minister Ivo Sanader was able to remain in 
office “despite what many in his own party deemed his betrayal of a larger-than-life Croat 
hero.”588 Tens of thousands Croats gathered in Sanader’s homeland Dalmatia to protest 
Gotovina’s arrest, and a journalist who had for years publicized Croat atrocities against Serb 
civilians was presented with a very serious death threat. However, Pond points out that the 
main demand in these protests was simply that the Croatian government help provide for 
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Gotovina’s legal defense and support his family.589 The fact that Sanader was able to turn 
Gotovina in without losing his position, and that protests were relatively moderate, indicates 
that Croatia was moving beyond the violence and hatred of the early 1990s. “With General 
Gotovina in the dock, the country was well on its way to becoming the second Yugoslav 
successor state, after Slovenia, to reach the holy grail of membership in the European 
Union.”590 This prediction is supported by the experience of eight former Croatian special 
police officers who were acquitted in 2002 for torturing and killing Serbs because witnesses 
were too intimidated to appear or to give detailed testimony. Several years later at the retrial 
enough evidence was provided to convict them all. In March 2006 the officers were 
sentenced to jail terms ranging from 6 to 8 years. No major public protests resulted, further 
supporting a belief in Croatia’s bright future.591 
Of course, the situation in Croatia is far from perfect. Despite a December 2000 law 
obliging the state to ensure proportional representation of minorities in government agencies, 
there are still limited job opportunities for returnees. The Croatian government calls this an 
economic rather than a human rights issue, but Serbs claim that it becomes the latter when 
laws are not implemented. A joint report by Minority Rights Group International and the 
Center for Peace, published in January 2006, reported that Serbs were still under-represented 
in Croatian judicial bodies. According to Snjezana Bokulic, Europe and Central Asia 
program-coordinator for Minority Rights Group, “the underlying problem is that minorities 
in Croatia are not really wanted.”592 This mentality is confirmed by occurrences like that of 
 
589 Ibid., 138. 
590 Pond, 121. 
591 Ibid., 137. 
592 “Serb Returnees Facing New Obstacles in Croatia, NGOs Say,” Belgrade Radio B92, January 23, 2006. 
218
July 15, 2006, when four houses of Serb returnees were stoned and a fire set in one yard.593 
In early 2006, a report compiled by the Ministry of the Interior revealed that only 26 out of 
65 cases of attacks on ethnic Serbs over the past year had been resolved. Jose Fuentes, the 
head of the OSCE Mission in Croatia stated that every three days a member of an ethnic 
minority is attacked in Croatia.594 
Government figures from April 2006 suggest that 120,549 out of 300,000 to 350,000 
Serb refugees have returned to Croatia since 1995. However, the actual number is believed to 
be much lower, because many of those registered as returnees make only occasional visits to 
Croatia; only 60 to 65 percent of registered returnees are believed to reside permanently in 
Croatia.595 The rate of return has slowed significantly in recent years, with 12,478 returnees 
in 2004 and 4,745 returnees in 2005. A recent Croatian government assessment suggests that 
only 20,000 to 25,000 Serb refugees remain interested in returning to Croatia.596 One must 
remember that many refugees found durable housing after the war and have chosen not to 
return to Croatia for personal reasons rather than out of fear of violence. 
Clearly nationalism and ethnic tension still exist in Croatia and cause problems 
among its population. However, Croatia has made great strides toward improving the 
situation of minorities and fostering a climate of tolerance in the country. There are still 
Croatian citizens who harbor great resentment toward Serbs, but a majority of the population 
support policies of unity and liberalization as evidenced by the electoral success of Mesic and 
Sanader. 597 Croatia certainly has room for improvement, but the ever-growing presence of 
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liberalism and tolerance in the country so soon after the violence of the 1990s provides a 
solid challenge to primordialist claims. 
 
Post-Dayton Serbia 
Although Croatia has made a great deal of progress since the end of the war, Serbia 
has been less successful in its recovery. In some ways, this is due to the situation in which 
Serbia found itself in the wake of Dayton. In spite of the great violence of the Croatian and 
Bosnian Wars, Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic was able to emerge from the conflicts with 
his political reputation intact. As discussed in the previous chapter, Milosevic maintained 
throughout the Bosnian conflict that Serbia was not in any way involved in this purely civil 
war. After Dayton, “the Belgrade media continued to maintain that Milosevic had taken no 
part in the war and that an agreement had finally been reached between the warring factions 
‘thanks to the consistently peaceful politics of Slobodan Milosevic.’”598 After Dayton, no 
victor or vanquished was announced, allowing each nation to believe in the triumph of its 
leaders and thus keeping wartime leaders in power.  
There were no doubt objections to the continued rule of Milosevic among the Serb 
population but they were quickly silenced. Given the strength of his propaganda support, it 
was a foregone conclusion that Milosevic would be proclaimed a permanent president, and 
although he was never awarded an unlimited mandate he behaved as though this were the 
case. “The majority of the Serbia people, even those who considered themselves to be 
members of the opposition, sincerely believed that Milosevic was irreplaceable. He was 
certainly not ideal, but the alternatives were even worse; he made mistakes, but others would 
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make worse ones.”599 Milosevic remained in power because no suitable replacements could 
be found. Unfortunately for Serbia, “as long as Milosevic and his executors were not accused 
of their crimes, the Serbian nation itself would be blamed for the war by the whole world.”600 
In spite of Milosevic’s promises of a better future, Serbia’s economy was on a steady 
decline in the mid-1990s. The average monthly salary was around 100 deutschmarks and 
inflation rendered this money almost worthless. Internationally, Serbia had been humiliated, 
had lost its former allies, and had used up all of its financial credit. Any political unrest led 
Milosevic to revive world conspiracy theories, which would then be blamed for the suffering 
of the masses. Vidosav Stevanovic argues that Milosevic perpetuated deception, blackmail, 
and plunder to prevent himself from becoming obsolete. “Milosevic still had a role to play—
his method was to create problems in order to solve them publicly and thereby regain the 
confidence of his people. If everything ran smoothly, the peacemaker would become 
insignificant.”601 Although Milosevic yielded to Western pressure during the Dayton 
negotiations, upon returning to Serbia he was much less pliable. The Hague spent two years 
drawing up a list of war crime suspects in Yugoslavia, which included Radovan Karadzic, 
Ratko Mladic, and Milan Martic. “With the excuse of desiring peace, Milosevic refused to 
hand over the accused. He considered the accusations an indictment of the whole Serbian 
nation.”602 This mentality would serve only to further tarnish Serbia’s international 
reputation. 
Milosevic called for elections in 1996 to affirm his power. While Milosevic won the 
presidential race by an overwhelming majority, the municipal elections held at the same time 
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brought the opposition coalition known as Zajedno to power. In response, Milosevic annulled 
the municipal elections, claiming that they had been rigged. The opposition responded by 
calling for demonstrations. Thousands of Belgrade citizens took to the streets to voice their 
discontent. The protestors soon began coming out every day, walking the streets without 
incident or outburst. Students began a parallel protest and the same pattern played itself out 
in dozens of Serbian cities. “Entirely different social groups found themselves walking in the 
same columns. They forgot their differences and joined together to ask for the same things: a 
change of regime, Milosevic’s departure, democracy, and entry to the European Union.”603 
Milosevic organized a number of counterdemonstrations composed of unemployed workers, 
poor peasants, and drunkards, but these protests were ineffective. Milosevic’s associates 
began preparing for their departure from Belgrade, and it was clear that they would change 
sides within seconds if Milosevic was overthrown.  
Milosevic turned to the demonstration leaders for a way out of the problem. 
Unfortunately for the people of Serbia, these leaders demanded nothing more than power in 
the cities where they had legitimately won elections and made no attempt to articulate 
discontent in broader political terms. In February 1997, Milosevic absolved all parties of 
blame for the “rigged” elections and called off the demonstrations after allowing opposition 
politicians to take their rightfully earned local leadership positions. In 1997, Milosevic called 
for elections again. He did not stand for election this time, but instead made himself the 
president of Yugoslavia under the authority of the federal government.604 Although the 1996 
protests were relatively ineffective, their occurrence indicated a willingness among Serbians 
to unite against Milosevic’s nationalist policies. 
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The population, however, would not remain displeased with Milosevic for long. In 
1997, the issue of Kosovo took center stage as Milosevic raised concerns about the well-
being of the province’s Serb minority. This issue rekindled both Serbia’s nationalist spirit 
and the image of Milosevic as a representative of the Serb people. On February 28, 1998, 
Serbia invaded Kosovo under Milosevic’s leadership. When Serb forces entered the 
province, Albanian soldiers and civilians began to flee after very little fighting. By the fall of 
1998, several hundred thousand refugees were trying to survive in the woods and forests of 
Kosovo. The Serbs had clearly been successful in their move to dominate and intimidate the 
Albanians, and Milosevic resisted international pressure to withdraw his troops for some 
time. Eventually, however, he agreed to pull Serb forces out of Kosovo. “The decision was 
interpreted in two ways: the Serbs believed he had not flinched in the confrontation with the 
pro-Albanian West, and the Western allies believed that the great tactician had convinced the 
Serbs to withdraw.”605 Milosevic, like leaders in Croatia, tried to walk the fine line between 
the nationalist sentiment of his population and the liberal views of the international 
community. However, Serbia’s confrontation from Kosovo was far from over. 
In 1998, Human Rights Watch published a report in which it noted a blatant 
disrespect for human rights in Serbia. The group compiled evidence that Serb troops had 
targeted civilians during operations in Kosovo and even engaged in summary executions. 
Outside of the Kosovo conflict, Human Rights Watch found that all citizens critical of 
Milosevic’s policies suffered human rights violations regardless of their ethnicity, and that 
ethnic minorities were targeted regardless of their political views. Ethnic Albanians, 
Hungarians, Muslims, Turks, and Roma within Serbia proper were subjected to persecution 
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ranging from discriminatory legislation to arbitrary arrests, torture, and death in detention.606 
Under Milosevic, Serbia was staunchly intolerant of minorities, and very few refugees were 
brave enough to try to return to their pre-war homes in Serbia. 
In spite of Milosevic’s removal of troops from Kosovo, tensions between Milosevic 
and the province’s leadership remained very high and attempts at negotiation and 
compromise between the two continually failed. Western governments resolved to take 
action, and on March 24, 1999, NATO began a bombing campaign of Serbia, Kosovo, and 
Montenegro. The allies maintained that their actions were “not a war against the Serbian 
people but against the criminal regime of Slobodan Milosevic,” which began a war against 
the Kosovo-Albanians by claiming it was fighting terrorism.607 This sort of tangible threat to 
the safety and beliefs of the Serb people was exactly what Milosevic needed to justify the 
further increase of his own power and the repression of his population. 
Milosevic declared a state of war and took the post of supreme commander. Ethnic 
cleansing then began in earnest in Kosovo. Military courts and censorship were introduced 
and the independent media was confined to releasing only the information that the official 
government news agency offered to them. Air raids continued, and Milosevic proclaimed that 
every man, woman, and child in Serbia was under attack. People believed that only 
Milosevic could secure their defense; “the cowering masses were sure of only one thing: 
Milosevic was Serbia.”608 And yet, as bombing continued, the situation worsened for the 
Serb people. Milosevic was no longer protecting them, but instead allowing the attacks to 
kill, injure, and maim the population by not agreeing to allied demands. The West had lost all 
confidence in Milosevic, and the Hague Tribunal finally brought charges of crimes against 
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humanity and war crimes against Milosevic. When NATO threatened to initiate a land 
invasion of Kosovo, it became clear to Milosevic that the international community was 
steadfast in their goal of ending the violence. On June 11, 1999, Milosevic agreed to a 
compromise involving the continued presence of UN and NATO troops in Kosovo and the 
bombing campaign was halted. 
In the wake of the Kosovo conflict, extensive unrest existed in Serbia. Milosevic soon 
accepted the fact that a multi-party system was inevitable in these tumultuous times and 
allowed the formation of as many as 180 political parties. Milosevic formed his own party, 
the Socialist Party of Serbia, which was the wealthiest, best-organized, and most efficient in 
the country. Milosevic, however, was primarily concerned with remaining in office rather 
than honing the influence and platform of his own party. Milosevic’s family controlled and 
directed almost everything in the country, with other loyalists occupying lower positions in 
the political hierarchy. The police, courts, and army supported and protected Milosevic’s 
mafia, and all other parties were either prepared to cooperate with Milosevic or were already 
collaborating, making the multi-party system essentially meaningless. 
Soon, Belgrade citizens began writing letters demanding that Milosevic be removed 
from the presidency; letters were even written by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the Literary Association of Serbia.609 These organizations 
had shown strong nationalistic views in the past, making their objection to Milosevic’s 
leadership even more surprising. On September 24, 2000 new elections were held and Serbia 
had the highest voter turnout ever witnessed by foreign observers. Milosevic’s opponent 
Vojislav Kostunica won the election but the government refused to make the official 
announcement, calling for a second round of elections, then rescinding them and postponing 
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elections for another year. The opposition, however, announced its victory and once again 
called for demonstrations. Suddenly Serbia had two presidents and two army commanders.  
On October 5, 2000, several hundred thousand Serbs assaulted Milosevic’s citadels in 
Belgrade. A construction worker rammed his bulldozer into the parliament building and 
Radio Television Serbia building; this broke the barricades and allowed the crowd to storm 
through. “Within a few hours, the insurgents completed what the voters began in electing 
Kostunica president, and the army, too, refused to save Milosevic.”610 In the streets, people 
joined with the police to congratulate each other on putting an end to Milosevic’s rule. 
Elizabeth Pond cites four primary reasons for the overthrow of Milosevice. The first 
was the shattering of his aura of invincibility through his defeats in Croatia, Bosnia, and 
Kosovo. Secondly, opposition factions finally found a single presidential candidate to unite 
behind in the person of Vojislav Kostunica, the moderate but impeccably nationalist law 
professor. Additionally, a deal was struck between former Belgrade mayor and DOS 
organizer Zoran Djindjic and the head of the Special Operations Unit the Red Berets Milorad 
Lukovic-Ulemek, or Legija. Legija promised to disobey Milosevic’s orders to break up 
dissident marches on Belgrade and clearly understood that in return Djindjic would not crack 
down on the security-criminal nexus once he was in office. Finally, Serb war fatigue was 
pervasive. It spread through provincial cities as more local sons died and more penniless Serb 
refugees from Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo flooded into Serbia, straining municipal budgets 
and patience with their demands for food and shelter.611 
Although opposition to Milosevic’s rule was certainly a positive development for 
Serbia, it must be noted that this coup did not necessarily indicate an abandonment of 
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nationalism. Pond points out that Kostunica was a less extreme and power-hungry politician 
than Milosevic, but still a fundamentally nationalist leader. She also emphasizes that 
opposition to Milosevic “did not by any means imply endorsement of the Hague Tribunal, 
which the church, too, regarded as an anti-Serb Western institution.”612 While the removal of 
Milosevic from office was no doubt an important step in Serbia’s recovery from the violence 
of the 1990s, it must not be seen as an indication that the Serb populous was wholly tolerant 
and liberal-minded at this point in time. 
Milosevic’s removal from office quickly enhanced Serbia’s international reputation; 
the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo, and between Serbia and the ICTY both 
improved almost immediately. With Kostunica in the presidency and Djindjic in the role of 
Prime Minister, Belgrade let Kosovo Serbs participate in the 2000 elections in Kosovo 
without punishment. Djindjic’s government dismissed Legija as commander of the Red 
Berets in May 2001, an act that would lead to further trouble after Djindjic and Legija’s 
earlier agreement. In June, Djindjic delivered Milosevic to the Hague as the first Serb to be 
so extradited and the first head of state ever to be brought before an international court.613 
Milosevic’s organization, the Socialist Party of Serbia, staged a protest rally in Belgrade’s 
Central Republic Square. At the rally, Ivica Dacic, the informal new party president, lashed 
out at members of ethnic minorities and then made statements in which he encouraged Serbs 
to “deal” with these minorities.614 Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia strongly 
condemned these actions and statements. However, this was just the tip of the iceberg of 
ethnic intolerance in Serbia in the new millennium. 
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In 2001, the day before Democratic Party of Serbia deputy Boris Tadic was scheduled 
to take over the Defense Ministry, Prime Minister Djindjic was assassinated. The official 
investigation identified three veteran Red Berets, led by Legija, as the guilty parties. 
Kostunica took over the role of prime minister, making Natasa Midic the acting Serbian 
president during the crisis. The Red Berets were disbanded and Midic declared a six-week 
state of emergency, during which more than 10,000 people were arrested. Tadic announced 
army reform, full cooperation with the ICTY, and a new goal to join NATO’s Partnership for 
Peace. The parliament passed new laws making it easier to remove judges, and many 
officials appointed by Milosevic were fired.615 This swift government response, and the 
moderate reforms that accompanied it, seemed a hopeful sign for Serbia.  
Another positive step taken by the Kostunica government involved police reform. In 
contrast to the other countries in transition, where personnel and structural reforms in the 
secret services were initiated after Dayton, the Serbian State Security Service (SDB) was left 
almost intact through the 1990s. The main tasks of the SDB were not preservation of law and 
order but rather the preservation of Milosevic’s power. The SDB remained in essence a 
typical authoritarian secret service, thus perpetuating the black market, organized crime, and 
other illegal activities throughout Milseovic’s rule.616 The new government, however, made 
strides toward reforming the security services in Serbia by improving their training and 
integrating minorities into the police. In October of 2001, Serbia successfully completed the 
training of a multiethnic police force for the southern portion of the country. The Yugoslav 
Minister for National Minorities and Ethnic Communities Rasim Ljajic said, “After this 
multiethnic concept is applied to the police, it will be easier to implement it in all other 
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spheres and will facilitate the full participation of minorities in the systems and state 
institutions of this country.”617 This was no doubt an important step toward creating a more 
tolerant and safe society in Serbia. 
However, in spite of new police reforms, security in Serbia was still poorly run and 
organized. In March 2002, the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, 
Jose Cutilero, gave a report to the UN Economic and Social Council on the status of human 
rights in Serbia from 2000 to 2002. Cutilero noted a number of troubling incidents during this 
period. On March 4, 2000, two grenades exploded in front of the headquarters of the 
Democratic Party of Serbia.618 Just a month earlier, Nebi Nuhiu, the owner of a fuel station in 
Presevo, was abducted. His family claimed to be able to identify at least six police officers 
involved in his disappearance but two years later the authorities had failed to bring any 
abduction charges. Although 306 bodies had been exhumed from mass graves by March 
2002, no real progress had been made in identifying the remains or investigating those 
criminally responsible.619 Thanks to the poor security provided by the Serbian police, as of 
March 2002 there were more than 400,000 refugees and 230,000 internally displaced people 
waiting to return to their pre-war homes in Serbia.620 
To make matters worse for Serbia, after Kostunica took Djidjic’s place as prime 
minister he declared that cooperation with the ICTY was not a priority. Kostunica did not 
campaign against the European Union, but he firmly rejected the EU conditionality of turning 
over war criminals in order to join; “he seemed quite willing to pay the price of forfeiting any 
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claim to EU membership and its privileges.”621 Kostunica told ICTY prosecutor Carla Del 
Ponte that the ICTY was anti-Serb and manipulated politically by the United States. He 
argued that “Serbia had the best record of cooperation with the ICTY, as more Serbs than 
indictees of any other nationality had gone to the Hague,” and yet Serbs were dubbed as 
uncooperative.622 
This mentality is understandable given the attachment of people to their war-time 
leaders, but some argue that Serbia was unable to move past the violence of the previous 
decades because of this refusal to cooperate with the Hague. As Benn Steil and Susan 
Woodward assert, “by distinguishing between culpable leaders and the Serbian people, and 
between specific indictable offenses and ethnically defined guilt, the West can construct a 
real policy toward Serbia as a normal part of the region.”623 By refusing to cooperate, 
Kostunica kept the Serbian people inextricably bound to the crimes committed by their 
leaders. Kostunica was, however, fully in keeping with Serb public opinion with his refusal. 
From its first indictments in 1995, Serbs saw the ICTY as prejudiced against them. While the 
tribunal intended to lift collective guilt by establishing individual guilt, it seemed instead to 
fuel the 20 to 30 percent of Serbs who perceived the investigation of individual Serbs as the 
demonization of all Serbs. Milosevic fueled this mentality by berating the tribunal and 
treating his trial at the Hague as a trial of the Serb people.624 
In late 2004, Kostunica’s attitude toward the Tribunal and the EU began to soften, 
and within a few months 16 Serbs indictees were brought to the Hague. “The effective lever 
seemed to be the refusal of Brussels to allow Belgrade even the first step toward eventual EU 
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membership, a Stabilization and Association Agreement—and NATO’s refusal to let Serbia 
join the Partnership for Peace—until senior suspects appeared at the court.”625 However, it 
must be noted that in spite of this cooperation the two most-wanted Serb indictees, Radovan 
Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, were not turned over. As of this writing, the two remain at large. 
While it is no doubt commendable that so many Serb indictees were turned over to 
the Hague, the fact that people dragged their heels and required multiple incentives to agree 
illustrates a pervasive unreadiness to face the recent past, wars, and war crimes figures. 
Helsinki Committee director Sonja Biserko argues that this destructive ethnic loyalty is in 
many ways perpetuated by the Serbian Orthodox Church, the values of which are “marked by 
archaism, collectivism, anti-Western stands and xenophobia. Extreme intolerance to 
everything belonging to Western culture is the message the church sends to believers.”626 The 
Church argues that “those Serb soldiers who were accused of having directly committed 
atrocities should go to the Hague to answer the charges, and be punished if they were guilty; 
but that senior commanders generally should not do so, since the just defensive war they 
were fighting on behalf of Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo must not be impugned.”627 
In mid-2003, some 68 percent of Serbs said they trusted the Serbian church more than any 
other institution in the country,628 illustrating the extensive influence of the church over the 
population. 
Nationalism was alive and well in Serbia at this time, with the Serb population 
rallying behind its war-time leaders, and the Orthodox Church confirming these sentiments. 
This mindset no doubt helped to perpetuate ethnic tension and hostility in the country. The 
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Helsinki Human Rights Committee in Serbia released a report in 2004 which noted a high 
degree of anti-Croat sentiment in the country. Tomislav Zigmanov, one of the authors of the 
report, wrote, “Croats in Vojvodina are not sufficiently involved in decision-making 
processes and they are poorly represented in public and state administration, notably in the 
police, the army, the judiciary, customs administration, and state-run companies.”629 The 
report stated that Croats were constantly portrayed as negative stereotypes, generating 
intimidation and insecurity among Croats. The group found that during the 1990s, “between 
35,000 and 40,000 Croats were forced to leave Vojvodina due to strong anti-Croat 
propaganda.”630 It is easy to see how Croats could feel unwelcome in Serbia. On June 13, 
2005, graffiti threatening the Croat community appeared on the wall of a high school in 
Subotica, a city in Northern Serbia. The messages read, “Croats, You are Lower Beings—the 
Serbian Kings,” and “Ustashe, you will be slaughtered.”631 The next month, graffiti was 
found on the building of Nis Television. The station’s glass façade was covered in big black 
letters, reading “General Mladic, Thank You for Srebrenica;” “The Only Solution is 100% 
Ethnic Cleansing;” “Knife, Wire, Srebrenica;” as well as a Nazi swastika.632 
In October of 2005, Human Rights Watch released a 52 page report on the status of 
ethnic minorities in Serbia. The report provided evidence of a number of crimes against 
minorities in 2003, including physical assaults, attacks on religious and cultural buildings, 
and the desecration of graves. The Hungarian minority in Vojvodina was most frequently 
targeted, but Slovaks, Croats, and Muslims were targeted as well. Human Rights Watch 
pointed to members of local minorities who reported that the police responded to attacks too 
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late, in some cases allowing the attackers to escape or even openly supporting them. “The 
absence of legislation on crimes committed out of ethnic intolerance or hatred and light 
sentences for such crimes send a clear message that the Serbian government is not taking 
violence against national minorities seriously.”633 
However, events soon transpired which would alter the Serb perception of the war 
and other ethnic groups’ suffering. In 1995, the Serbian Interior Minister’s paramilitary 
police, called the Scorpions, recorded a two-hour long videotape of the torture and execution 
of six Bosniaks in Srebrenica. Twenty copies of this tape, filmed by the Scorpions 
themselves, were available in one video store for loan exclusively to Scorpions for ten years. 
In 2005, word got out about the existence of these tapes and the Scorpions ordered that all 
copies be destroyed. However, human rights activist Natasa Kandic obtained one copy and 
passed it on to the Hague in May. Clips of the video were shown on independent and state 
television in Serbia. The tape showed uniformed Scorpions torturing Bosniaks, and opened 
with the blessing of an Orthodox priest who declared, “The Turks are rising again; they come 
to take our sacred places.” In the words of one businessman, “Most Serbs until now either 
believed nothing happened [at Srebrenica] or that the people who did the atrocities were 
Bosnian Serbs, wild guys from the mountains, or even French special forces—but this is 
forcing Serbs as a whole to come to grips with what happened.”634 Even the Serbian 
Orthodox church condemned “the cold-blooded killing of unarmed, defenseless civilians.”635 
While the revelation of the Scorpion video tape forced Serbs to come to grips with 
what happened in the early 1990s, the country is still torn between nationalist sentiment and 
the need for ethnic tolerance. The Serbian Orthodox church condemned the torture of 
 
633 “HRW Says Serbia Failing to Prevent Attacks on National Minorities,” Zagreb HINA, October 10, 2005. 
634 Pond, 231. 
635 Ibid. 
233
Bosniaks, but only a few weeks later senior clergy attended a Radical Party rally on the tenth 
anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre to celebrate the Serb victory there and to 
commemorate the victimization of Serbs in the Yugoslav wars.636 There is a general 
awareness that certain ethnic Serbs are indeed guilty of wartime atrocities and yet crimes of 
ethnic hatred still occur relatively routinely in Serbia. Today, a small Western-oriented group 
of elites in Belgrade argue that Serbs must move beyond their violent past just as Germans 
did. However, Elizabeth Pond states that “such humility born of shame was far easier for 
Germans, who lost completely, than for Serbs, who only partially lost their wars. Just as 
some Germans in the 1940s blamed all atrocities on Adolf Hitler to exonerate themselves, the 
temptation is strong today to blame all Serb brutality on Milosevic and ignore Serb voters’ 
acquiescence or even pride in lethal chauvinism as long as it was victorious.”637 In other 
words, part of moving beyond the war is not just embracing the guilt of Serb leaders, which 
has proved somewhat difficult, but also embracing the guilt of the Serb population in 
supporting those leaders’ decisions with nationalist fervor.  
This is not to say that all Serbs are guilty while all Croats and Bosniaks are victims. 
Rather, Pond and others argue that each population must accept its own guilt and 
responsibility in the conflict in order to embrace those of other ethnic groups and move 
beyond the violence of the previous decade. One young Serb reveals the following account of 
his wartime experience.  
When they mobilized us, I hid myself but my friends went to war. I always 
thought that I knew them as well as I knew myself, and I could not believe 
that they had killed whole families, but this was a fact. Now I think that I 
deserted not because I had feared for myself, but because I was afraid of 
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myself. I am terrified at the thought that if I had gone to the front, I would 
have turned into a killer too. I am not sure of myself anymore.638 
This account reveals the extent to which individuals were changed by the war. This 
experience of change does not endorse either primordialism or elite manipulation, but is 
rather the result of an experience of life-altering violence which affected people in ways they 
could not predict. It is this complex guilt which Pond encourages individuals to embrace in 
order to move beyond the violence of this period. 
Despite accounts which seem to suggest otherwise, it is important to note that radical 
nationalism is by no means wholly pervasive in Serbia. Sonja Licht of the Belgrade Fund for 
Political Excellence estimates that only some 15 percent of Serbians are real hard-liners, and 
polls in early 2006 indicated that more than half of the Serbian population would have 
welcomed packing Mladic off to the Hague.639 Unfortunately, moderate groups have done no 
more than passively survive since Milosevic’s removal. “Rather than taking initiatives of 
their own, Kostunica’s minority government and the Democratic Party of Serbia, in 
opposition, have been in defensive mode, simply reacting to the accusations of the 
Radicals.”640 Moderates, then, have not inspired their supporters to work for liberalism and 
change, instead leaving many disillusioned for the time being. 
To get a clearer view of how Serbia’s politics have changed since the Bosnian War, it 
is helpful to take a broad look at election trends in the country from Dayton to the present.641 
We will begin by looking at Serbian parliamentary elections over the past eleven years. In 
1997, the Republican Legislature of Serbia was dominated by a communist coalition of the 
Socialist Party of Serbia, Yugoslav Left, and New Democracy, which won 110 seats, and the 
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Serbian Radical Party, which took 82 seats. The communist coalition, because of its strong 
associations with Milosevic, represented a nationalist and ethnically exclusive force in 
Serbia. The Serbian Radical Party has an even more radical platform; it is a quasi-fascist 
advocate of Greater Serbia which was associated with the Chetniks as late as 1994.642 It is 
not surprising that the Serbian government was unequivocally nationalistic in the midst of 
Milosevic’s rule.  
 In 2000, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia took 58 seats in the parliament, the 
former communists took 44 and the Serbian Radical Party took only 5 seats.643 This shift in 
mentality clearly reflects the move toward more moderate politics in Serbia which 
accompanied the removal of Milosevic from power. Regardless of why people chose to 
support the non-nationalist Democratic Opposition coalition, its success indicates a 
willingness of the Serbian electorate to move away from exclusive and nationalist politics. In 
2003, the Serbian Radical Party took 82 seats in the parliament, the Democratic Party of 
Serbia took 53, and the Democratic Party took 37.644 While the electorate supported liberals 
in 2000, the 2003 elections show a split between support for nationalists, moderates, and 
liberals respectively. This is a step back from the forward thinking of 2000, but one must 
remember that in 2003 the parties which were once highly nationalist were becoming more 
moderate. In voting for a previously nationalist party, Serbs were actually supporting a more 
moderate view. In addition, the fact that these parties chose to move away from extremist 
positions reflects a desire among the electorate for parties to offer more moderate options. 
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Serbian presidential elections show a similarly optimistic trend. In 1997, elections 
brought Milan Milutinovic to the presidency on the ticket of Milosevic’s Socialist Party of 
Serbia. Because Milosevic was the undisputed leader of Serbia, Milutinovic’s win meant 
very little. However, support for the Socialist Party of Serbia indicates a support for 
nationalist sentiment. The second place finisher in 1997 was a candidate of the Serbian 
Radical Party, clearly a highly ethnically exclusive organization. Even those who chose not 
to vote for Milosevic’s party selected a highly nationalistic leader in Vojislav Seselj, with 
almost 76 percent of the electorate supporting one of two extremely ethnically exclusive and 
intolerant leaders.645 
In the 2000 elections, as discussed previously, the Democratic Party of Serbia ousted 
Milosevic with their candidate Kostunica. Dragoljub Micunovic described the Democratic 
Party of Serbia as follows; “we are equally Serbian and as patriotic as any other party, but we 
are also a modern democratic party which does not take the view that people can be treated 
as labels.”646 Although this win did represent a softening of nationalist sentiment, 
Micunovic’s own description of his party reveals the importance of being seen as patriotic 
and nationalistic to the Serb electorate. In 2002, the Democratic Party of Serbia won again 
with Kostunica taking 58 percent of the vote and the Serbian Radical Party taking 36 percent, 
again showing a strong proclivity toward nationalist views.647 
In 2003 the Serbian Radical Party candidate won 48 percent of the vote, representing 
a clear nationalist victory. However, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia took 37 percent of 
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the vote.648 This group ran as a coalition of liberal social-democratic parties which are 
members in the anti-nationalist Alliance for Change. The relative success of these parties in 
2003 is a hopeful sign for the softening of nationalist sentiment among the Serbian electorate.  
In 2004, the race was between the Serbian Radical Party’s Tomislav Nikolic and the 
Democratic Party’s Boris Tadic, with the latter finally winning on the second ballot. While 
the results were close, the victory of the social-liberal candidate shows great promise for 
Serbia’s future. Tadic has proved to be a tolerant leader, pursuing reconciliation with Croatia 
and eventual Serbian membership in the EU. On September 22, 2006, President Tadic took 
the stage with Croatia’s president Stjepan Mesic at the John F. Kennedy Jr. Forum at Harvard 
University. In his prepared remarks, Tadic stated, “Too often in our past Serbs and Croats 
have embraced hatred and rejected cooperation. Yet today I believe we stand before a new 
beginning because I believe in a better future for Serbia, for Croatia, and for all of 
Southeastern Europe. Our nations must put our divisive past behind us and embrace our 
common European and Euro-Atlantic future, a future where the region’s countries are fully 
democratic, fully free, fully secure, and fully prosperous.”649 
There is no doubt that Croatia has progressed further than Serbia in terms of ethnic 
tolerance, support for minority rights, and liberalism of society. However, in spite of the 
occurrence of ethnically-motivated violence and the continued support for nationalist 
politicians, Serbia’s experience over the past eleven years can be used to support the 
argument that violence in the 1990s was not ethnically motivated. The Serbian electorate 
continues to move toward more liberal leaders and is beginning to come to terms with both 
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the victimization and guilt of Serbs in the conflict. Ethnic tensions are no doubt higher in 
Serbia than in Croatia, but there are still a significant number of Serbian citizens who express 
ethnic tolerance, even if the political realization of this goal is a number of years away. 
 
The Dayton Accords 
 After completing a thorough investigation of events in both Croatia and Serbia over 
the past eleven years, it is time to turn our attention to Bosnia. However, before beginning a 
summary of recent events in the country, we must elaborate on the situation that Bosnia 
found itself in at the start of 1996. This will involve an examination of the provisions of the 
Dayton Accords as well as some scholarly opinions regarding the merits, or lack thereof, of 
the agreement. Certainly the best way to evaluate Dayton is to look at how successful Bosnia 
has been under its arrangements. However, it is helpful to first understand both the situation 
created by the Accords and the other potential options that exist for peaceful settlement, as 
these options could either reinforce the benefits of Dayton or highlight its weaknesses. 
 In the most general terms, the Dayton Accords divided Bosnia into two republics: the 
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, containing Croat and Muslim leadership, and the 
Republika Srpska, ruled by Serbs. The two groups split Bosnian territory almost in half, with 
the Federation getting 51 percent of the land and Republika Srpska 49 percent. Political 
scientist Steven Burg argues that the arrangements of Dayton “locate most of the power in 
the constituent units and the hands of the local, nationalist leaders.”650 The constitution of the 
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina establishes a bicameral parliament consisting of a House of 
Peoples and a House of Representatives. The House of Representatives is composed of 42  
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Map 11: Bosnia and Herzegovina After Dayton 
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members, 28 from the Muslim-Croat Federation and 14 from the Republika Srpska; these 
representatives are selected by direct elections. The House of Peoples consists of 15 
delegates: five Muslims, five Croats, and five Serbs, each selected by their respective 
regional parliament.  
Many scholars argue that this arrangement institutionalizes ethnic division because it 
encourages Bosnians to think in ethnic terms and also excludes ethnic minorities from 
representation in the House of Peoples.651 Parliamentary rules are adopted by a majority vote 
and all legislation is to be approved by both houses with a majority vote in each. Legislation 
can be vetoed by a vote of two-thirds of the delegates from either entity. “One provision of 
the Dayton agreement appears to grant each ethnic delegation in parliament a veto over all 
decision making.”652 Many argue that this set-up perpetuates ethnic division in the country by 
encouraging Bosnian citizens and politicians to continue to think and organize themselves 
along ethnic lines. 
The Bosnian presidency is composed of three members: one Bosniak and one Croat 
elected from the Federation, and one Serb elected from the Republika Srpska. Because 
citizens receive one vote, “this provision implies either that voters will have to ask for an 
ethnic ballot or that Croats and Muslim in the Federation will have to decide between 
candidates of their own group and those of the other, while only ethnically Serb candidates 
will be allowed to stand for election in the Serbian entity.”653 As with the House of Peoples, 
ethnic minorities are excluded from the presidency. The presidents are encouraged to make 
decisions based on consensus but each member of the presidency can block a decision by 
declaring it destructive of the vital interests of his entity; this statement must be approved by 
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a legislative body to constitute a veto. Such a declaration by a Serb president is referred to 
the parliament of the Republika Srpska while a Bosniak objection goes to the Bosniak 
delegation of the House of Peoples and a Croat objection to the Croat delegation, rather than 
to the parliament of the Federation. “These provisions reflect the priority of the ethnic 
cleavage in post-Dayton Bosnia Herzegovina even within the Muslim-Croat, or Bosnian 
Federation.”654 
The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has the authority to oversee foreign affairs, 
customs, monetary policy, immigration and citizenship, civilian coordination of the military, 
international criminal law enforcement, and air traffic control for the whole of Bosnia. The 
Federation and Republika Srpska are responsible for all other governmental functions within 
their territory including defense, internal affairs, justice, finance, commerce, agriculture, 
education and culture, and public health. The Republic, then, is effectively excluded from 
any internal affairs of state and society. Without a doubt, Dayton represents a careful balance 
between majoritarian principles that support the overall integrity of the Bosnian state and 
principles of ethnic-based decision making which serve to please each group and reassure 
them that their interests will be protected. It is important to remember that Dayton was not 
created because it was the best possible arrangement for the rehabilitation of Bosnia but 
rather because it was the best possible arrangement that all sides could agree on. 
Dayton was signed with two primary goals in mind. The military goal was to end the 
fighting and the civilian goal was to bring peace and tolerance to Bosnian society. The UN 
has played a major role in meeting Dayton’s military goal and keeping the peace in Bosnia. 
The United Nations organization UNPROFOR, which tried to regulate fighting between 
groups during the war, was replaced by the Implementation Force (IFOR) on December 20, 
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1995. IFOR was created by the Security Council of the UN and called for an end to 
hostilities, the withdrawal of foreign forces, and the demobilization of warring militaries and 
paramilitaries. IFOR was both a peace-keeping and peace-making group. In December of 
1996, IFOR was replaced by the Stabilization Force (SFOR), which worked to maintain 
peace and provide a secure climate within which the civilian-led rebuilding of civil society 
could proceed.655 Efforts were also made to undermine military ties created during the war 
between Bosnian forces and Arab states, particularly Iran. 
The civilian elements of Dayton have been put into effect by a variety of international 
organizations. This group includes the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), and the Peace Implementation Council (PIC). The PIC is composed of 52 countries 
and 21 NGOs and was created to replace the ICFY in 1995. In addition, the Dayton Accords 
established the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to manage peace in Bosnia. The 
High Representative (HR) is appointed by the PIC and the UN Security Council, and 
promotes full compliance with Dayton by all parties.656 
For many scholars, Dayton falls far short of an ideal solution for Bosnia in spite of 
the fact that it has brought peace to the region. As Francine Friedman points out, only 
consensus is acceptable in such a government; as a result, decision-making is incredibly 
difficult and the state is prone to inefficiencies. Furthermore, Dayton’s institutionalization of 
ethnic division is such that not only are ethnic minorities excluded from the presidency and 
House of Peoples, but so too are Serbs living in the Federation, Croats or Muslims living in 
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Republika Srpska, and children of mixed marriages.657 In many ways this discourages the 
kind of equality and ethnic tolerance that Dayton hoped to achieve. In Jane Sharp’s opinion, 
Dayton is a poor agreement because it embraces two sets of contradictory goals. First of all, 
Dayton partitions Bosnia into two political entities with separate armies while simultaneously 
seeking to create a single integrated state with central institutions. Secondly, Dayton imposes 
arms limits on both entities despite arming and training only one. In addition, the military 
and civilian aspects of the agreement are poorly coordinated, leading to a law enforcement 
gap and fragmented aid program.658 
However, Sumantra Bose disagrees. He asserts that while Dayton may not be a 
flawless solution, thanks to the agreement and the international involvement associated with 
it Bosnia is better off than it would otherwise be. Bose argues that Dayton has put Bosnia in a 
good position to foster multi-ethnic cooperation. He admits that Bosnia’s situation and future 
do present some obstacles. For example, a 1997 poll found that 91 percent of Bosnian Serbs 
and 84 percent of Bosnian Croats opposed a united Bosnian state while 98 percent of 
Bosnian Muslims supported such a state. This huge discrepancy does not bode well for the 
future of Bosnian democracy; “political scientists generally believe that a minimal consensus 
on borders and national unity is necessary for sustainable democratization in any society.”659 
However, Bose maintains that Bosnia’s problems are due to internal problems like the 
dynamic of its population, unemployment, and the economy, “not because of some original 
sin visited on it in Dayton, Ohio in November 1995.”660 
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Pond is more critical of Dayton than Bose, arguing that some rules set forth by the 
Accords present direct obstacles to the governing of Bosnia. Foreign powers seeking to 
encourage democracy in the region must persuade local actors to want change and then 
empower them to effect such change. This can only be done by blocking criminals and 
helping to introduce more open politics, rule of law, and responsive institutions. Such tasks 
are incredibly difficult to achieve, so foreign powers are often faced with the choice of 
accepting stagnation in Bosnia or ruling by fiat, which disempowers local leaders and 
reduces the likelihood of lasting democracy in the region.661 
Yet in spite of all the criticism Dayton has received, Pond willingly admits that 
Bosnia has achieved a great deal under its guidance. In the past eleven years, Bosnia has 
adopted a single currency and passport system, army command, and criminal intelligence 
agency, has procured the first apology by the Republika Srpska for the Srebrenica massacre, 
and has delivered a list of seventeen thousand perpetrators to prosecutors of the ICTY.662 
Dayton may not be perfect, but it has led to eleven years of peace and has allowed Bosnia to 
retain its identity as one sovereign state. These achievements must not be underestimated and 
in many ways embody the purpose for which Dayton was created.   
 
The Partition Debate 
For some, a preferable alternative to the Dayton arrangements would be the partition 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina along ethnic lines. Although there is little to suggest that partition is 
in Bosnia’s foreseeable future, it is worth taking a brief look at this potential solution as a 
way to put Dayton in perspective and provide a basis for comparison. During the 1970s and 
1980s, the notion that partition could be a solution to ethnic conflict was for the most part 
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disregarded. By the early 1990s, partition began regaining credibility as a solution to 
ethnopolitical strife, but was still considered to be legitimate only when achieved by peaceful 
negotiation, exemplified by Czechoslovakia’s velvet divorce in 1992.663 However, in 1995 
during negotiations in Dayton, some began to argue that partition was the best solution to 
Bosnia’s problems. 
The current version of the theory argues that partition is at best a lesser evil. It is the 
most humane form of intervention in an ethnic conflict because it attempts to achieve through 
negotiation what would otherwise be achieved through war. However, these justifications for 
partition are based on a primordialist understanding of ethnic conflict; they assume that 
ancient hatred and eternal hostility prevent groups from achieving permanent peace while 
remaining unified. Partition is based on the principle of getting out of a conflict as quickly 
and cheaply as possible, and for international actors is as close to laissez faire policy as is 
strategically feasible.664 Yet past partitions show local leaders unenthusiastic about partition 
and reveal that partition in highly integrated societies like Bosnia requires a lengthy military 
engagement, which in some respects defeats the purpose of this solution.665 
Sumantra Bose illustrates the shortcomings of partition by examining the detailed 
plan for Bosnian partition developed by John Mearsheimer and Robert Pape. These two 
scholars begin their plan by outlining the territories each of the three ethnic groups would 
receive in the partition settlement, assuming that populations which now live in areas given 
to the other ethnic group would have to relocate to their eponymous state. “If all went well, 
three absolutely homogeneous states would be born through organized transfers of 
population, and the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats would control respectively 45 percent, 35 
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percent, and 20 percent of the former republic’s territory…The actualization of the plan 
would require further seismic population movements among all three groups, on top of what 
had already occurred during the first year of war.”666 
Mearsheimer and Pape acknowledge that their plan would have to be implemented by 
the West given that several political parties in Bosnia oppose partition and the Bosnian 
Muslims are supportive of a multiethnic Bosnian state. Even groups like the Serbs, who 
generally support partition, would likely disagree with the plan because they would not be 
satisfied with the territorial allotments provided. In fact, Mearsheimer and Pape assume that 
Bosnian Serbs would not accept such a plan until their military had been sufficiently 
weakened. Therefore, their plan requires that the West ferry arms to Bosnian Muslim groups 
in preparation for large Serb offenses and engage in a bloodletting strategy to prove to Serbs 
that they have no alternative but to submit to the plan. Mearsheimer and Pape explain that 
even after the Serbs submit, there is no guarantee of lasting peace in the Balkans, “since 
Greater Serbia would still be the strongest state in the region and the Bosnian Muslim state 
would be among the weakest.”667 NATO would then have to issue a security guarantee to the 
Bosnian Muslim state. 
In many ways, a simple explanation of Mearsheimer and Pape’s plan provides a 
criticism for partition by bringing to light the logistical reality of such an undertaking. 
However, Bose goes on to highlight additional problems with this plan and the idea of 
partition in general. Bose points out the likely extreme reluctance of the United States to 
commit large-scale military resources to such a conflict and the unlikelihood that NATO 
guarantees of protection could be reasonably ensured. He questions where the funding for 
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these divisions would come from, and argues that the international community is unlikely to 
want to shoulder the responsibility of organizing which populations relocate when, especially 
with the increasing tensions and complexity of the constituent populations of the area. In the 
words of Chaim Kaufmann, “Separation and partition can be justified only if they save the 
lives of people who would otherwise be killed in ethnic violence.”668 It seems that 
Mearsheimer and Pape’s partition plan is likely to be more destructive of lives and property 
than integration would be. 
Kaufmann, however, does believe that partition is a legitimate solution, particularly 
when the security dilemma makes it the only way to ensure peace. When ethnic communities 
cannot rely on a strong and impartial central state to protect them, they begin to mobilize for 
their own defense, thus posing threats to other groups which then feel obligated to mobilize 
as well. This situation encourages groups to cleanse mixed areas of the enemy group and 
create “ethnically reliable, defensible enclaves.”669 However, Bose points out that without 
exploring the origin of the security dilemma, things remain murky. How could friends, 
neighbors, colleagues, and lovers suddenly come to regard each other’s presence as 
dangerous? Bose instead argues that the security dilemma is often itself caused by the 
looming possibility of partition, rather than vice versa.670 
Kaufmann argues that partition is desirable because it has a generally “dampening 
effect on the renewed incidence of violence in the long run, although the precise extent of the 
dampening effect depends on how completely the communities are separated from each other 
by the lines of partition.”671 He argues that the more complete partition of Cyprus allows for 
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its relative peace, while the patchy partition of Northern Ireland contributed to its continued 
violence. However, Bose maintains that Kaufmann’s argument does not hold water and his 
factual evidence is inaccurate and one-sided. “Academic proponents of partition like 
Kaufmann tend to minimize the short and long-term human costs and—more important from 
a realist point of view—the practical difficulties and dilemmas of drawing partition lines.”672 
Although Bose is critical of partitionist views, he does point to the arguments of 
partition supporter Robert Hayden as important and thoughtful. Hayden questions the 
“external insistence that Bosnia must continue to exist despite the wishes of the elected 
representatives of two of its three constituent groups.”673 Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats 
rejected a sovereign united Bosnia during the war, and the post-war years have provided 
evidence that many are still fundamentally reluctant participants in the union. Robert 
Schaeffer points out that “partition has never anywhere been subjected to a meaningful, 
indigenous electoral test,”674 but people like Hayden maintain that large numbers of Bosnian 
Serbs and Croats see the common state of Bosnia as an imposition. 
Bose admits that Bosnia exhibits many of the characteristics of a society on the verge 
of partition. It is fundamentally divided along the fault-line of ethnicity and religion, and the 
state has lost its pre-war multi-ethnic character. However, he criticizes the simple anti-
partition argument for three reasons. First of all, while Bosnia is not a single, sovereign state 
it has still managed to soften the borders of the immediate post-war period and encourage, if 
not ethnic integration, minority settlements in areas otherwise dominated by an opposing 
group. Secondly, events after Dayton prove that cooperation among ethnic leaders is both 
possible and productive; Bose points to the coordination and liberalization of trade, 
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transportation, and industry by the members of Bosnia’s presidency in the face of rioting. 
Finally, Bose argues that it is unfair and inaccurate to demonize the Dayton settlement. 
Dayton has elements of partition as well as elements of federalism and consociation. “The 
Bosnian state has dysfunctional symptoms, as do its parts—but it could hardly be otherwise 
in a post-civil war context of deep distrust and economic collapse.”675 
In the wake of Dayton, partition has been understood to mean not just a potential 
division of Bosnia into three ethnically exclusive parts but also a division along the republic 
lines created in the Accords. In the 2006 Bosnian presidential elections, Nebojsa Radmanovic 
became the Serb member of the presidency after a campaign built around the demand for a 
referendum on RS secession from Bosnia. Although the referendum was not held, 
Radmanovic’s electoral success brings to the forefront the question of whether the 
boundaries laid out by Dayton will, or should, become lines of partition in Bosnia. For many, 
this is without a doubt a situation to be avoided. Such circumstances would leave Bosnia as a 
rump Muslim state, “resentful, aligned to Iran, prone to violence, and bent on re-conquest of 
its lost territories.”676 In addition, if the Republika Srpska were to become independent, this 
might prompt Serbia to make claims to its territory on the grounds of ethnic affinity, most 
likely leading to further violence. Finally, such a partition would represent the abandonment 
of democracy, as it would grant full sovereignty to undemocratic states. Still, this version of 
Bosnian partition remains a possibility in Bosnia’s future. 
For some, partition of Bosnia remains a preferable solution to the current situation. 
However, the complications and pitfalls of partition along ethnic lines, as well as the 
potential consequences of partition along republic lines, require that one examine the 
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logistics of this solution carefully before advocating it. In light of the negative aspects of 
partition, the Dayton Accords become more impressive in their ability to satisfy ethnic 
demands and desire for autonomy while still keeping the Bosnian state intact. Dayton is by 
no means perfect, but one can more fully appreciate the Accords after coming to understand 
its alternatives. 
 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Wake of Dayton 
Regardless of one’s evaluation of the Dayton Accords, there is no denying that 
Bosnia was in shambles at the start of 1996. Approximately one half of Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s pre-war population of 4.3 million was displaced during the 43 months of war. 
Some one million of those displaced remained within the country, and more than 1.2 million 
refugees were dispersed throughout 25 host states. At the start of 1996, 80 percent of the 
approximately three million people remaining in Bosnia were dependent on some level of 
international humanitarian assistance.677 According to the NGO Research and Documentation 
center, 93,837 soldiers and civilians were killed in the Bosnian War.678 
While Croatia and Serbia took some time to get back on their feet after the conflict, 
Bosnia’s recovery proved to be much more complex because of the nature of its war 
experience and societal composition. Bosnian Serb Damjanac highlighted the unique 
problems that Bosnia would face in its war recovery by using the analogy of marriage. 
It’s normal that there have been moments when we were angry with each 
other and didn’t understand each other. In such situations I always used to say 
to my wife: when you are mad at me over something, or when I make a 
mistake, try not to lose your temper, and I will try not to lose my temper, 
because tomorrow morning we have to get up together again, sit at the table 
together, and think about our children and what is going to happen in our 
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lives. And if we have said things to hurt each other, it will be hard to 
overcome those words.679 
Croats, Serbs, and Muslims fought a truly brutal war against each other, and in 1996, when 
the dust cleared and the violence was over, these people had to learn to live together in spite 
of the past. For some, this seemed entirely possible. In late November 1995, Sarajevo 
resident and Muslim Almasa Mulic expressed great happiness at the peace agreement. Her 
husband was killed by a shell from a Bosnian Serb in 1993 but she showed no bitterness. “I 
am ready to live with the Serbs again,” she said. “Why shouldn’t I?”  For a great number of 
Bosnians, however, the past was not so easy to forget. On the same day that Mulic expressed 
her positive views Bosniak Mohamed Niksic said, “The evil that befell Yugoslavia will 
resurrect itself again. The Serbs will attempt another genocide, because that is what is in their 
blood. Hopefully I will be dead by then.”680 For society as a whole, reconciliation would 
prove difficult in the face of the atrocities of the mid-1990s. 
During the war, ethnic cleansing reduced the non-Serb population in what is now the 
Republika Srpska from its pre-war level of 46 percent to 3 percent, and reduced the Serb 
population in what is now the Federation from 17 percent to 3 percent. “Color-coded maps of 
before and after ethnic distribution graphically illustrate the phenomenon, shifting from a 
Jackson Pollock splattering in 1991 to Rorschach blobs in 1995.”681 Minorities continued to 
be pushed out of their homes even after peace was established. In February 1996, there was a 
mass exodus of Serbs from Sarajevo as the city became part of the Muslim-Croat Federation. 
UN officials reported that Serb leaders in Sarajevo were encouraging Serbs to leave because 
of pressure from ethnic leaders in the Republika Srpska who were interested in achieving 
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ethnic homogeneity. Kris Janowski, representative of the High Commissioner for Refugees 
reported, “Local Serb leaders are being threatened. A lot of them are under severe pressure. 
They are being told to organize an exodus.”682 The problem is well summarized by 
International Returnee Coordinator Carl Bildt who stated, “In addition to war refugees, we 
now have refugees from the peace.”683 
Under a threat by international donors to cut financial assistance if vigorous steps 
were not taken to restore multi-ethnicity, representatives of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Sarajevo Canton, and the international 
community signed the Sarajevo Declaration in 1996. This agreement called for the return of 
20,000 minorities to Sarajevo within the year, the employment of more Serbs and other 
minorities on the police forces, the protection of human rights, the teaching of tolerance in 
schools, and the restoration of the capital’s position as a model of coexistence and tolerance 
for the rest of the country. Although these goals were first set forth in Sarajevo, they spread 
to other areas of the country as well. In the wake of the Sarajevo Declaration, minorities 
began to return to their pre-war homes throughout Bosnia and today non-Serbs make up 15 to 
20 percent of the population in Republika Srpska, and Serbs make up the same percentage in 
the Federation.684 However, the simple presence of minorities did not mean that they were 
fully integrated into majority communities. In many cases, minorities lived in homogenous 
groups so that in their particular locale of each republic, they actually made up a majority of 
the population. 
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Oftentimes, minorities were scared to move into communities dominated by a 
different ethnic group because immediately after the war the police did not provide proper 
protection and security to minority citizens. In 1996, Bosnia had 44,000 local police forces 
which were essentially mono-ethnic paramilitary units organized in three parallel structures. 
Police discriminated against, harassed, and intimidated citizens who were not of their own 
ethnicity. Officers blocked checkpoints along the Inter-Ethnic Boundary Line thus making 
freedom of movement non-existent. Security organizations were fundamentally corrupt and 
politically dominated.685 
The lack of minority protection by Bosnian police, coupled with ethnic resentment 
among the population itself, led to a number of incidents in which majority populations tried 
to prevent minorities from returning to their pre-war homes. On April 21, 1996, one thousand 
Serbs marched on foot in an attempt to prevent hundreds of Muslims returnees from crossing 
a bridge into the town of Doboj. NATO troops were forced to intervene, using armored 
personnel carriers and six tanks to block the Serb protestors. The NATO troops fired warning 
shots after Serbs began throwing rocks at them. Also on April 21, Czech soldiers fired 
warning shots to hold back a crowd of Serbs trying to prevent Muslims returnees from 
reaching Bosanski Novi. On April 22, two busloads of Croat returnees were attacked by 
Serbs throwing rocks near Modrica. The same month, three busloads of Bosnian Serbs were 
able to visit Drvar in the Federation only after peacekeepers convinced Bosnian Croat 
authorities to allow the Serbs to enter without harassment.686 
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An official of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees explained these 
incidents by saying, “Nobody wants freedom of movement—nobody wants the other side’s 
refugees to come home.”687 However, as New York Times reporter Mike O’Connor explains, 
“Most of the homes to which refugees want to return are now occupied by refugees of 
another ethnic group. They feel they will be displaced if the refugees return and—because 
they are not being allowed to return to their homes either—that they will have no place to 
live.”688 This explanation is supported by an incident in Doboj also in April 1996 when Serbs 
in the town prevented a group of Muslims from returning to their pre-war homes. Following 
the incident, the Bosnian Serb media said that the group “heroically defended the town from 
Muslims who intended to occupy the town and to force Bosnian Serb refugees into the 
streets.”689 In this sense, incidents of blocking the entrance of returnees can be viewed not 
necessarily as acts of ethnic hatred, but rather of fear and self-preservation. For many 
refugees, their most pressing goal was to settle down to a normal life after the war and the 
thought of being uprooted again was more than they could bear. 
This being said, there is no denying that a number of troubling and violent incidents 
occurred in Bosnia throughout 1996. On April 29, 75 Muslim men entered Serb territory on 
their way to Lukavica, breaking through a Swedish IFOR roadblock and heading across 
mine-strewn land to visit their former homes. They were ambushed by 100 rebel Serbs who 
used hand grenades, automatic weapons, and sixty millimeter mortars against the Muslims, 
killing two and injuring five. NATO called this confrontation the most serious clash since 
Muslim refugees started returning to their former homes in the RS.690 Just two months later, 
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Serbs reacted violently to the creation of a UN bus service between Banja Luka in the RS and 
Zenica in the Federation. Bosnian Serbs harassed aid works in Banja Luka in an attempt to 
disrupt the bus schedule. In addition, a UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) staff 
member was beaten by a group of Serbs in a further attempt at intimidation. On July 4, a 
vehicle belonging to the International Crisis Group was taken at gun point.691 
There is no doubt that such incidents of violence had a dramatic effect on the number 
of refugees who chose to return to their pre-war homes. The UNHCR assumed at the 
beginning of 1996 that up to 500,000 internally displaced persons would return to their 
homes and 370,000 refugees would repatriate during the year. Not only did repatriation fall 
far short of these expectations, but during 1996 an additional 80,000 people were displaced 
as a result of the transfer of territories between the two entities provided for in the Dayton 
agreement. “The low number of returns resulted mainly from the local parties’ refusal to 
welcome minority refugees back into their home communities.”692 
With an atmosphere of ethnic intolerance, violence, and fear taking hold throughout 
Bosnia, it is no surprise that the first general elections held in 1996 brought nationalist parties 
to power. While the international community hoped that elections would lead to more 
moderate Bosnian leadership, instead the electorate legitimated the most belligerent and 
narrowly nationalist political parties within each of the three communities at both the 
national and entity level: the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDA). As Richard Holbrooke 
pointed out, “The election strengthened the very separatists who had started the war.”693 
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The new parliament was scheduled to hold its first meeting in October of 1996, but 
did not convene until January the following year because Serbian representatives refused to 
swear allegiance to a united Bosnia. Members of the new central bank were selected but they 
disagreed on the bank’s role and were unable to conduct business. Bosnian Serb and Croat 
leaders refused to appoint members to the new constitutional court. Similar stonewalling 
delayed efforts to endow the new council of ministers with effective authority. Within the 
Muslim-Croat Federation as well, Bosnian Croats attempted to retain their separate 
institutions rather than merging them into the new entity-level government.694 By electing 
three exclusive and nationalist groups, Bosnians had created a government which was 
inefficient and unable to cooperate on even the simplest matters. 
These newly elected leaders also made efforts to obstruct the return of minority 
refugees and displaced people to their pre-war homes. Returns that did take place consisted 
mainly of people going back to areas controlled by their own ethnic group; returns across 
ethnic lines proved nearly impossible. Many factors hindered the repatriation process, 
including fear of violent attacks, poor economic prospects, and lack of suitable housing. 
However, political leaders were also responsible for hampering returns by “failing to provide 
adequate security, by maintaining discriminatory property laws, and by transferring minority-
owned housing to members of their own ethnic group.”695 As a result, the same violence 
related to minority returns as seen in 1996 continued into 1997. In January, some 400 Croat 
civilians, led by women and children, massed on the bridge in the center of Stolac near 
Mostar to block the passage of two buses carrying 30 Muslims refugees. The Croat mob 
threw stones and eggs at the convoy for a full hour until the bus was finally forced to turn 
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around. Just a few days prior, a Serb mob attacked 40 Muslims who had returned to their 
home village of Bajevi under a pilot UN program.696 
One of the most problematic areas in Bosnia in terms of both day-to-day life and the 
blocking of returnees has been the city of Mostar in the Federation. Before the war, Mostar 
was one of the most diverse cities in all of Bosnia. In 1991, the city contained 76,000 citizens 
of whom 34 percent were Muslim, 29 percent Croat, and 19 percent Serb. The remaining 18 
percent chose the supranational identification of Yugoslav, an unusually high local 
proportion compared to the Bosnia-wide proportion of 5.5 percent and the Yugoslavia-wide 
average of 3 percent.697 After the great brutality which occurred in Mostar during the war, the 
city was divided into two parts; today Croats occupy the west bank of the Neretva River, 
while Bosniaks occupy the east. Mostar’s politics are highly polarized and its educational 
system and cultural life remain segregated into two separate spheres. The few plants and 
factories in operation in the city “belong” to one side or the other. The city continues to have 
duplicate sets of almost every kind of institution and facility, including two different 
telecommunications networks and two public health systems. Until 1998, stores on the 
Muslim east bank even refused to sell Croatian beer.698 
The tense situation in Mostar led to great violence in early 1997. In fact, the United 
Nations Security Council became so concerned about this violence that it asked the 
International Police Task Force and Human Rights Coordination Center to prepare a detailed 
report on ethnic tension in Mostar. The two organizations found that between January 1 and 
February 10, 1997, residents from both east and west Mostar, as well as travelers to the city, 
were subjected to criminal attacks. In the 28 recorded cases of threats and assaults, both 
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Bosniaks and Croats were victims in equal proportion. During the 41 days of the period 
examined, Mostar saw more than 40 explosions and firing incidents and 6 illegal evictions. In 
a number of these incidents, local police were implicated either through direct involvement 
or failure to act.699 
On February 10, one person was killed and 20 injured when Croats and Muslims 
clashed in Mostar. The conflict began when 100 Muslims visiting a cemetery in the west 
bank came face to face with a comparable number of Croats who were holding a carnival 
where they intended to burn Aija Izetbegovic in effigy. Witnesses say that Croats began the 
conflict by throwing stones at Muslims and eventually opening fire on them.700 This incident 
became an excuse for further abuse; in the five hours following the incident, there were 22 
cases of Croat travelers being stoned, threatened, robbed, or assaulted on the M-17 highway. 
In the same afternoon, 23 Bosniak families were forcibly evicted from their homes and even 
more attempted evictions were reported. Police were directly involved or failed to act in 
about half of these incidents.701 
The year 1997 brought continued ethnic violence not just in Mostar but throughout 
Bosnia. In March, 400 Bosniak returnees were expelled from the city of Jajce by Croat mobs. 
The next month a 65-year-old Muslim man was hospitalized after being severely beaten with 
sticks and robbed by a group of 20 Serbs on the outskirts of Brcko.702 In August, 13 Bosnian 
Serb refugees tried to return to their former homes in Sarajevo but were chased out by angry 
mobs of Muslim refugees who had moved to Sarajevo after leaving their homes in 
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Srebrenica.703 The same month one Muslim died and more than 500 fled from Jajce when 
Croats set returnees’ houses on fire; arson was also used to block returns in Drvar and 
Gajevi. Ethnically motivated murders occurred throughout 1997 in Mostar, Jajce, Travnik, 
Visoko, and Sarajevo. When cases were brought to trial, which occurred rarely, sentences 
were very short. An official UN spokesman described the events of 1997 as “ethnic re-
cleansing”704 and Human Rights Watch stated, “the rule of law simply does not exist in many 
communities.”705 
The lack of public order and failure to apprehend war criminals during 1996 and 1997 
had a devastating impact on the process of repatriation. Suspected war criminal Radovan 
Karadzic was still in charge of the RS at this time and other indicted war criminals continued 
to control many communities throughout Bosnia, making ethnic reconciliation within local 
communities next to impossible. Given the situation in Bosnia, many refugees opted to stay 
out of the country or remain in a Bosnian community where they were part of the majority 
rather than returning to their pre-war homes. In October 1997, the High Representative for 
the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Carlos Westendorp, 
informed the UN Security Council that as of that point, 80,000 refugees had repatriated to 
Bosnia from Europe but these returns were almost exclusively to majority areas, meaning 
areas administered by their own ethnic group.706 In 1997, efforts were made to permit more 
freedom of movement; airports were opened to civilian traffic, the Gradiska border between 
northern Bosnia and Croatia was opened, and border points between the RS and Croatia were 
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opened as well.707 However, the problems of 1997 would not be solved so easily and ethnic 
tension remained.  
All in all, it was immediately apparent to the international community that in Bosnia, 
democracy was not leading to liberalism. While Dayton’s sponsors envisioned the 
democratic creation of a tolerant government, the 1996 Bosnian elections “filled the new 
institutions with individuals who were openly opposed to cooperating with their ethnic 
adversaries.”708 Peace builders recognized that free and fair elections could impede rather 
than facilitate the consolidation of lasting peace in Bosnia and began to intervene in the 1997 
entity-level elections on the side of more moderate candidates who lacked popular support. 
“Only by rigging the democratic process in favor of moderate politicians did peace builders 
succeed in installing a government in Republika Srpska that supported the full 
implementation of the Dayton Accord.”709 
However, in spite of heavy international involvement in supporting moderate 
candidates, Bosnia’s nationalist groups remained in power in 1998. In the Federation, the 
Party of Democratic Action and Croatian Democratic Union increased their respective share 
of the vote for presidency; in the RS, Nikola Poplasen, a hard-line nationalist, defeated the 
Pavsic-Dodik ticket that the international community had heavily supported.710 It seemed that 
Bosnians were not prepared to give their support to moderate candidates in the current 
circumstances of fear and violence. Ironically, by attempting to stay safe in an environment 
of violence, the people of Bosnia ended up perpetuating the dangerous situation. 
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With nationalist leaders still in power, 1998 saw continued ethnic violence. In mid-
April, rioting Croats in Drvar burned down the local UN police station, beat up the Serb 
mayor, and ransacked apartments belonging to Serb returnees. However, Alenko Zornija 
argues that this violence was not based on ethnic hatred or intolerance but rather fear. In 
1998, Drvar was populated mostly by Croats who fled, were displaced, or were expelled 
from other areas of Bosnia during the war. Those Croats were from areas that had since come 
under control of Serbs. In the spring of 1998, the international community began to 
implement particularly draconian measures to ensure the return of Serbs to Drvar. This 
incited Croats to anger and violence “not due to the mere fact of the Serbs’ returning, but 
because of something one can hardly understand, that the very same ‘international 
representatives’ had not taken even remotely similar actions to provide for the return of the 
Croats now living in Drvar to their pre-war homes.”711 In addition, Croats feared that they 
would once again be thrown on to the street when the Serbs returned.  
Croats were also resentful of what they saw as preferential treatment for Serbs. In the 
spring of 1998 in Derventa, Serbs twice blocked Croats from attending church services and 
then trapped Sarajevo’s Cardinal Vinko Puljic inside a church for six hours.712 SFOR’s 
response showed little commitment to protecting Croats. “While in Drvar local officials were 
being removed from office and an effective state of emergency was being declared following 
the murder of two Serbs, at the same time, SFOR commanders in Derventa were claiming 
that their only duty was to protect their own troops, and in central Bosnia, after the murder of 
Croat returnees, local Bosniak officials remained in office.”713 Zornija’s argument takes a 
slightly different angle from those who claim that people blocked the return of refugees 
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simply because they themselves were refugees and did not want to end up on the street again. 
Instead, Zornija outwardly admits the existence of ethnic resentment, which no doubt played 
a role in such violence. However, he points out that such resentment can still be based in fear. 
Groups were not simply annoyed that others were receiving preferential treatment but instead 
feared that such treatment would result in the abuse of themselves and their loved ones. 
Zornija presents a theory which allows for ethnic resentment to partially explain violence 
against returnees but also remains consistent with the belief that such acts do not illustrate 
ethnic hatred but rather residual fear after the great abuses of the war. 
In August of 1998, the UNHCR reported that 500,000 refugees had returned to 
Bosnia since the end of the war but most had not moved back to their pre-war homes. As of 
1998, a total of 15,045 refugees had returned to an entity not controlled by their ethnic group; 
only 1,829 of those returnees included Muslims and Croats returning to the Republika 
Srpska. By mid-1998, 11,583 Muslims had returned to Croat-controlled areas and 26,210 
Croats had returned to Muslim-controlled areas.714 There is no doubt that returnee-centered 
violence played a large role in deterring people from returning to their pre-war homes.  
Regardless of the motivation for ethnically divisive behavior, it was prevalent in 
Bosnia in the years following Dayton. Some interesting examples of such refusal to integrate 
occurred, oddly enough, between the apparent Muslim and Croat allies of the Federation. 
When the Federation was created in March of 1994 it put an end to Croat-Muslim fighting. In 
building the Federation, local governments were often created under great pains; the two 
groups had trouble compromising and were constantly suspicious that if the other group had 
too much power it would become abusive. The Federation faced a great deal of trouble in 
creating a joint army from the Bosniak-dominated Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
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Croatian Defense Council. While a law was passed in 1997 that the two must officially 
integrate, this had not occurred at the lower levels as of 1998. In June 1998, the US briefly 
suspended aid to Federation forces until they agreed to fly the Federation flag at their 
installations and wear Federation insignia on their uniforms instead of using Bosniak or 
Herceg-Bosnia symbols.715 The refusal of soldiers to wear joint Croat-Muslim symbols 
displays a nationalism not based on self-preservation but on a feeling of ethnic divisiveness. 
Between March and August 1998 in the Croat-controlled town of Stolac, more than 50 
houses of Muslims hoping to return to the town were burned before they could be 
reclaimed.716 Croats did not try to keep Muslims out because they feared people of their own 
ethnicity would be evicted; rather, they destroyed much needed property rather than letting 
Muslims rejoin the community. These actions undoubtedly represent feelings of nationalism 
and ethnic exclusivity rather than simply fear. 
To a certain extent, Muslim-Croat tension still exists in Bosnia today. In fact, some 
Croats insist that the very survival of their people depends on the creation of a third Bosnian 
entity for Croats that excludes Muslims. These fears of cultural dominance are supported by 
the fact that Bosniaks outnumber Croats by at least four to one in the Federation; this has 
been further aggravated by Croat emigration after the war.717 The hostility between Croats 
and Muslims is illustrated by the fact that as of 2000, no communication or cooperation 
existed between the police of west and east Mostar. The east Mostar police stations have their 
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autopsies, as well as blood and DNA analyses done in Sarajevo while the west Mostar 
stations send their specimens to Split, the nearest large Croatian city.718 
In May 2001, the 1,200 Croat inhabitants of four mountain villages near Maglaj 
demanded that their area become part of the Zepce municipality, which has a Croat majority. 
This move, however, would cut off the Muslim majority town of Novi Seher from the rest of 
its municipality. Inhabitants of this town staged a protest on May 29. One Muslim involved 
in the protest stated, “I simply do not trust Croats any more. They betrayed us by joining with 
the Serbs in 1993.”719 One Croat in support of the move explained his opinion by saying, 
“We feel safer being with our ethnic group.”720 While this was not a major incident in 
Bosnian history, the opinions expressed within its context are representative of people 
throughout Bosnia who clung to their ethnic group out of concerns for safety. 
In 2000, the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia engaged in a confrontation with 
the international community. Despite great dissatisfaction among the Croat electorate with 
the corruption and self-enrichment of the party elite, the Croat community overwhelmingly 
supported the party. The party organized a referendum asking for the endorsement of its 
demand that the international community concede full political and cultural equality for 
Croats in Bosnia. This was code for the “third entity” demand. Although this referendum was 
declared illegal by several international bodies, 71 percent of the Bosnian Croat electorate 
participated in the referendum and 99 percent of those who voted endorsed the HDZ stand.721 
While it can be argued that some wanted to create their own entity for reasons of ethnic 
resentment or even hatred, one can speculate that many, like the Croat man in Maglaj, simply 
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felt safer with their own ethnic group. This conception of safety does not necessarily indicate 
a feeling of nationalism but rather a reasonable response to the violence of the 1990s and an 
attempt to ensure one’s physical safety in tumultuous times. 
In spite of this move for separatism, the 2000 elections brought Bosnia closer to 
democracy. The near monopolies of the SDS and HDZ were reaffirmed in their respective 
ethnic areas, but a full half of Muslim votes were cast for a change coalition that pledged to 
carry out reforms.722 Refugee return rates in 1998 and 1999 were much lower than expected, 
but in 2000 the number of returnees jumped from the 40,000 mark of the previous two years 
to 67,000, including almost 19,000 Serbs who returned to the Federation, 7,500 of whom 
returned to Bosniak-controlled Sarajevo. Also in 2000, 25,000 Bosniaks returned to the 
Republika Srpska, a majority of whom returned to Prijedor, Doboj, Bijeljina, and Zvornik, all 
areas with odious wartime reputations.723 More than 5,000 Bosniaks returned to Croat-
controlled municipalities, while over 4,000 Croats settled in Bosniak-controlled areas, 
including 1,477 Bosniaks who returned peacefully to their homes in west Mostar.724 
Without a doubt this upsurge of returns in 2000 was in large part due to a program 
introduced by the UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH) to encourage minority 
representation in police forces. According to a report delivered by Under Secretary-General 
for Peacekeeping Operations of the UNMIBH Bernard Miyet, as of August 2000 nearly 450 
minority officers were attending or had graduated from the two police academies, and 130 
minority officers were prepared for redeployment across entity lines.725 On June 27 the Joint 
Entity Task Force on Illegal Immigration and Organized Crime was established.  This 
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organization promoted inter-entity police cooperation and helped to ensure that the five year 
anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre was memorialized peacefully. More than three 
thousand people attended the ceremony and no violence erupted.  
On June 6, 2000, the State Border Service entry point was inaugurated at the Sarajevo 
airport. This was a significant step toward building state institutions because it enabled 
authorities and the UNMIBH to gather reliable data on movements through the Sarajevo 
airport and the use of the airport as a point of entry for illegal migration into Europe. These 
changes helped to ensure that in the first half of 2000, over 19,500 minority returns were 
registered in Bosnia, compared to two thousand returns during the same period in 1999.726 In 
2001, minority returns were similarly optimistic, totaling over 43,000. This figure includes 
19,500 Serb returnees to the Federation of whom 10,000 returned to Sarajevo. This figure 
also includes 14,000 Bosniaks who returned to the Republika Srpska, often to many of the 
same cities with poor war reputations as refugees returned to in 2000. By the end of 2001, 
minority returns across Bosnia-Herzegovina since the end of the war had reached 250,000.727 
In spite of these hopeful statistics, incidents of ethnic violence continued into the new 
millennium. On April 28, 2001, the barn of a Bosniak returnee in Knezina was set on fire by 
Serbs in the area. Earlier in the day, a Bosniak family traveling to Kaljina was harassed at the 
entrance to the village by a group of five men who verbally abused them and tried to 
physically prevent them from entering the village.728 In May 2001, a memorial plaque for 
members of the Bosnian Serb Republic Army killed in the war was damaged. Additionally, 
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headstones in a cemetery for Croats and Serbs were damaged in Lukavac. In Janja, the 
houses of returning Muslim families were stoned.729 
A particularly upsetting event occurred in Banja Luka in the spring of 2001. In 1992, 
Banja Luka had sixteen mosques including the Ferhadija mosque, built in 1578. In May 
1993, extremist Bosnian Serbs razed the Ferhadija mosque and by the end of the war, all 
sixteen Banja Luka mosques had been destroyed. On the eighth anniversary of the mosque’s 
demolition on May 7, 2001, a ceremony was held to lay the first stone of the new foundation 
for a mosque to be built in place of the Ferhadija. On the day of the ceremony a mob of Serb 
demonstrators, between 2,000 and 4,000 in total, disrupted the event by chanting Serb 
nationalist slogans and anti-Muslim taunts, throwing rocks, stones, bottles, and eggs, and 
gesticulating menacingly at those gathered to commemorate the new mosque. Some Bosniaks 
were physically attacked by Serbs and prayer carpets were set on fire. The green flag of the 
Islamic community center building was torn down and set ablaze and the Repulika Srpska 
flag was hoisted in its place. Demonstrators even brought a pig to the demonstration as an 
affront to Muslim religious sentiment, encouraging it to uproot the ground by the new 
cornerstone of the mosque.730 A number of UN officials and Western diplomats were trapped 
by Serb protesters who threw teargas and grenades. Buses which brought Muslims to the 
ceremony were set on fire.731 The Banja Luka demonstrations followed the pattern of those 
which occurred two days earlier during a ceremony to inaugurate the reconstruction of the 
Osman Pasha mosque in Trebinje. The Trebinje incident involved a few hundred rather than 
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a few thousand demonstrators, but was essentially just a smaller version of the events in 
Banja Luka.732 
On May 9, a crowd of 1,500 nationalist Muslims marched to Sarajevo to protest the 
violence in Banja Luka. Protestors waved Islamic flags and chanted “God is great” as they 
brought traffic to a halt. They also waved flags of the Party of Democratic Action which led 
Muslims through the war; one banner read “We shall rebuild Ferhadija.” The crowd also 
shouted “Arrest war crimes suspects” in protest of the fact that Karadzic and Mladic remain 
at large. One protestor, Samir Beganovic said, “I fought for four years and I am ready for 
fight another 200 years against the Serbs.”733 Six weeks later, in June 2001, the Ferhadija 
ceremony was held again, with nearly all top RS officials in attendance. Once again, between 
one and two thousand Bosnian Serb demonstrators arrived to disrupt the ceremony. They 
were held at bay by police, but fought against officers in riot gear in order to protest “the 
reconstruction of a mosque in ‘their’ city.”734 Without a doubt ethnic intolerance and hatred 
was expressed by these protests. However, the fact that the ceremony was eventually held, 
and that top Republika Srpska officials thought it important enough to show their support in 
spite of the danger of angering their constituents, must be seen as a somewhat hopeful sign. 
This optimistic view was confirmed by Jacques Paul Klein, Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General and Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, when he gave a status report on Bosnia to the United Nations Security Council 
in June 2001. Klein argued that in spite of acts of violence in the months prior to his 
presentation in Mostar, Trebinje, and Banja Luka, he believed that things were looking up for 
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Bosnia in 2001. He pointed out that “the decisive test of Dayton is whether the necessary 
conditions exist on the ground for people to return to their homes” and argued that many 
people were returning and those who were not often made their decision based on economic 
rather than political reasons.735 Klein argued that it is far more “prudent and effective to work 
on the integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina than its disintegration,” and highlighted the 
fact that towns which were once ethnically cleansed, like Drvar, were becoming mixed in 
2001. Inter-ethnic trade and commerce were re-established and ethnic partitionists were 
losing popularity. 736 
While ethnic tension still existed in Bosnia in the latter half of 2001, it began to take 
on subtler, less violent characteristics. In Brcko, the district assembly was liberal-minded 
enough to introduce a regimen of multiethnic education to the school system in an attempt to 
integrate children of different ethnicities in the classroom. The plan allowed language, 
modern European history, and some elements of music teaching to be studied separately 
because of cultural differences, but mandated that all other subjects be studied jointly. Serbs 
in the community objected because their children would not be taught in their mother tongue; 
the Serb Education Club even recommended that Serb children boycott school for one year in 
protest of the law.737 However, no violence ensued and the law was put into practice. 
In January 2002, a multi-ethnic museum was opened in Sarajevo displaying artifacts 
donated by Serbs from centuries of Ottoman Turk rule, as well as art created by Muslim 
craftsman. The museum is located in a church from the fifth century and its altar includes 
oriental ornaments under Islamic influence, as well as stars of David and crosses. One 
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Sarajevo Serb commended the creation of a museum celebrating the ethnic diversity of the 
city. “This means the continuation of a joint life, a general reconciliation without which there 
can be no progress for any people,” she said.738 Mirko Pejanovic, head of the Serb Civic 
Council and former Serb member of Bosnia’s multi-ethnic presidency, also praised the 
opening of the museum.  
However, in January a Serb terrorist organization sent death threats to Pejanovic and 
nine other Sarajevo Serbs who advocated tolerant co-existence by supporting the museum 
and other projects centered on integration. The terrorist group is named after Gavrilo Princip, 
the Bosnian Serb who assassinated Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914. Those 
targeted by the threats were denounced as “Muslim servants” and “Serb traitors.” The 
Orthodox Church also reacted strongly to the museum opening by threatening to withdraw 
altogether from the Muslim-Croat Federation because, according to figurehead Metropolitan 
Nikolaj, “the Serb Orthodox Church does not want to participate in the creation of a fake 
multi-ethnic image of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”739 Nikolaj refused to send a televised 
Christmas message to Orthodox believers in the Federation and forbade a televised broadcast 
of the Christmas prayer. For some Bosnians, ethnic integration and unity proved threatening 
and problematic. 
However, ethnic intolerance could not stand in the way of the positive developments 
occurring in Bosnia at this time, reflected not only in Brcko education reform and the 
Sarajevo museum, but also in refugee returns. In March 2002, Special Representative of the 
Commission, Jose Cutilero, presented a status report on Bosnia to the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council. According to the Office of the UNHCR, 2001 saw the highest 
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number of returns since Dayton with over 92,000 registered minority returns, including 
47,156 Bosniaks, 34,189 Serbs, and 9,587 Croats. It must be noted that this number does not 
distinguish between those who returned permanently and those who returned only to reclaim 
and sell their property. Cutilero also reported on property legislation implementation rates in 
Bosnia. These rates refer to the amount of territory in which reforms designed to ensure that 
property is returned to pre-war owners regardless of their ethnicity have been implemented. 
At the end of 2001, the RS had a property legislation implementation rate of only 30.64 
percent, although this was a definite improvement over the 2000 rate of 13.21 percent. The 
Federation’s implementation rate in 2001 was 49.40 percent.740 
Of course, Bosnia continued to face obstacles in its post-war recovery. The 
International Crisis Group observed, “War crimes in one entity or canton are still hailed as 
acts of heroism in another.”741 In spite of improved security throughout Bosnia, when the UN 
announced that SFOR troops would be cut from 19,000 to 12,000 by the end of 2002, 
Muslims in Voljevica said, “If they leave, all of us will leave.”742 Even at this late point, 
Bosnian citizens did not feel safe without international protection. Mark Wheeler of the 
International Crisis Group confirmed this sentiment by noting that the Serb-controlled 
municipality of Bratunac saw almost no non-Serb returnees before a US base was set up near 
the city in 2001.743 Even as late as 2002, minorities in Bosnia felt that they required 
international protection to be safe in their own communities. 
On December 24, 2002, Bosniak Muamer Topalovic perpetrated what Herzegovina 
Neretva Canton Interior Minister Goran Bilic described as “the gravest crime committed 
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since the signing of the Dayton peace agreement.”744 Topalovic entered the home of a Croat 
family that had recently returned to the village of Kostajnica and opened fire on them with an 
automatic gun. Three family members were killed and a fourth wounded. Muamer stated that 
his motive was to intimidate the Croat family and draw the attention of the public to injustice 
done to Muslims.745 Topalvoic was a member of the Active Islamic Youth organization 
which is believed to be connected with a series of incidents aimed against Croat returnees in 
Central Bosnia at this time. Leaders of the organization encouraged its members to commit 
violent acts against Croats to discourage them from returning to their pre-war homes at 
Christmas time. Another member of the Active Islamic Youth was suspected of setting a 
nativity scene on fire in Mostar.746 
Although the murders perpetrated by Topalovic make this difficult to believe, most 
ethnic tension and incidents in 2003 and 2004 were becoming increasingly mild. In Bocinja, 
a remote hamlet in central Bosnia, the Serb and Muslim communities butted heads 
throughout 2004. A car was set on fire by Serbs during a prayer, and Muslims began a fight 
with Serbs who they alleged were trying to provoke them by cooking pork. Enes Imamovic, a 
Muslim chief, said that Serbs should convert to Islam if the two communities are to live 
together, which was of course viewed as an incredibly offensive and inflammatory remark.747 
Although these events were relatively minor, they were still reported in the international 
media; this suggests that such minor events were becoming noteworthy and therefore that 
more destructive ethnic violence was becoming much less frequent. Similarly, on September 
 
744 “Suspect Admits to Killing B-H Croat Family for ‘Ideological, Religious’ Reasons,” Zagreb HINA,
December 26, 2002. 
745 “Trial of Bosniak Charged with Murder of Croat Family Starts in Mostar,” Zagreb HINA, March 10, 2003. 
746 “Suspect Admits to Killing.” 
747 Calin Neacsu, “Dormant War Between Orthodox Serbs and Islamists in Bosnian Village,” Agence France 
Presse, February 19, 2004. 
273
11, 2004, fifty Muslims surrounded fifty Serbs as they prepared to enter a Serb Orthodox 
church near Bratunac. Reports suggest that violence broke out because of Muslim anger 
about the illegal construction of the Orthodox church on land belonging to a Muslim refugee. 
Several cars were damaged, but no injuries were reported.748 The appearance of this story in 
the news again suggests that even minor incidents of ethnic violence were becoming unusual 
and noteworthy.  
Evidence also suggests that in 2003 and 2004 the Bosnian leadership was becoming 
increasingly sensitive to racial tensions, appearing eager to smooth over ethnic rifts to avoid 
violence and anger. On August 11, 2003, ethnic Serb Nihad Masic went to the home of his 
Muslim neighbor, hit the elderly woman in the head with a hard object, then raped and 
robbed her. At the victim’s funeral, Gorazde Mufti Hamed Efendic stated that “the old 
woman was killed by the people who expelled her in 1994, sending the message to villains to 
leave the Bosniak land.”749 Efendic was then charged with the criminal act of provoking 
racial and religious hatred. This clearly illustrates that preventing ethnic tension is becoming 
a government priority. It also shows a concerted effort to punish those who express 
intolerance, a clear sign that Bosnia is moving toward a more egalitarian society. 
On November 17, 2004, ethnic Serb Bogdan Gigovic was arrested on the suspicion of 
murdering Croat priest Kazimire Viseticki in Gradiska, located in Republika Srpska. 
Although the alleged motive was robbery rather than a hate crime, Bosnian Serb President 
Dragan Cavic quickly condemned the attack and called on the Catholic minority in the region 
to remain calm. He said that the murder should not be seen as “an attack on the national 
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status of Croats and Catholics in Republika Srpska.”750 Even though evidence suggested that 
this murder was not ethnically motivated, Cavic was quick to reassure everyone that the 
problem would be addressed. This extreme sensitivity to such a potentially irrelevant event 
shows a newfound concern among the Bosnian leadership over maintaining ethnic peace, 
cooperation, and even integration. 
Of course these improvements are not enough to solve all of Bosnia’s problems.  In 
January 2005 the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina released 
its report on the status of human rights in the country during 2004. The report gave a number 
of optimistic returnee statistics, highlighting the fact that 2004 saw the one millionth refugee 
return to Bosnia. In addition, the first ten months of 2004 saw 16,500 refugees return to their 
pre-war homes, 12,000 of which were located in areas where the group represented an ethnic 
minority. However, many returnees who regained their property sold it, exchanged it, used it 
only as a weekend living space, or simply rented it out; these people did not take up 
residence in their pre-war homes. In Srebrenica, 4,000 refugees had returned by 2004 but a 
full 60 percent of them stayed there only periodically. Realistically, total returnees at the end 
of 2004 totaled only 30 percent of the 2.2 million refugees. 751 As a result, the ethnic 
distribution in Bosnia at the close of 2004 was still very different from its pre-war situation. 
Only 20 municipalities in pre-war Bosnia had an ethnic composition such that one group was 
absolutely dominant over the other two. However, in 2004, Tuzla was the only area in which 
the majority population was below 90 percent of the total; in all other communities the 
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dominant group was between 92 and 99 percent of the community.752 Bosnia made progress 
in the realm of refugee returns during 2004, but it still was nowhere near full integration. 
The Helsinki Committee also highlighted a number of ethnic incidents which 
occurred in 2004. In March, the roof of the Orthodox Church of Birth of the Most Holy 
Virgin was set on fire, the seat of the Islamic religious community in Banja Luka was stoned, 
and two hand grenades were thrown into a mosque near Gradiska in the RS. In October, 
offensive graffiti appeared on a Catholic church in Kakanj, presumably written by Muslims 
in the area. More than ten attacks on mosques were reported during Ramadan in the RS. Also 
in October, Orthodox priest Zoran Perkovic was physically assaulted in Sarajevo by 
Bosniaks. In November, a fight occurred between Croat and Bosniak students in Gornji 
Vakuf; three pupils were injured by knife and baseball bat. 753 Clearly legitimate ethnic 
violence was still a concern in 2004, in spite of signs that ethnic tensions were softening. 
The Helsinki Committee, however, did praise the Law on Protection of the Rights of 
National Minorities, adopted in 2003. This legislation allowed minority languages to be used 
in the administration, judiciary, or education of a given area, and gave minority groups the 
opportunity to have their own printed media in their home town. The law had not yet been 
fully implemented in 2004, but its passing was no doubt a positive development. In addition, 
on August 14, 2004, the country-wide television station TV Bosnia-Herzegovina began 
broadcasting on its own network, which covered 97 percent of the country’s territory. 
Previously, the only television stations were either RS or Federation affiliated, and this was a 
step in the direction of Bosnian consolidation and unity.754 
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In October of 2004, a series of opinion polls were conducted in Bosnia on the subject 
of the Bosnian War as well as current views on ethnic relations within the country.755 Among 
Bosnian residents, a majority of Muslims blame the Serbs for starting the war, a majority of 
Serbs blame the United States, and a majority of Croats say that no one takes responsibility 
for beginning the conflict, although a large number of Croats blame the Serbs as well. Croats 
list Bosniaks as the sixth most important cause of war, while Bosniaks list Croats as the 
eleventh.756 These statistics show mixed feelings about the culpability of other ethnic groups, 
indicating that while some hold on to ethnic resentment, others have gained perspective in 
the years after the war and can evaluate the causes of the conflict with a cooler head. 
When asked what factors are most responsible for problems in inter-ethnic relations, 
most respondents said “lack of financial support for returnees,” with “ethnic stereotypes and 
prejudices are still very strong” coming in second. People cited “personal hatred and 
revenge” as the fifth most important factor, and “local communities do not want returnees” 
came in last.757 These statistics suggest that Bosnians believe prejudice and hatred exist in 
other people rather than feeling it within themselves. It is not that local communities do not 
want refugees to return but rather that hatred exists “out there.” In addition, while the second 
most popular response cited stereotypes and prejudices, it is important to note that these 
terms connote that such negative opinions are inaccurate and unfair. When Bosnians 
responded that ethnic stereotypes and prejudices were the second most significant cause of 
ethnic tension, they were exhibiting a belief that ethnic hatred and resentment are unjustified 
and perhaps even wrong. 
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The same opinion poll taken in October 2004 asked Bosnian citizens to evaluate 
options for improving inter-ethnic relations and designate each option as essential, desirable, 
acceptable, tolerable, or unacceptable. A full 90 percent of respondents agreed that it was 
either essential or desirable for all people to become equal citizens of Bosnia. Eighty-four 
percent thought it was essential or desirable to acknowledge the wrongs done by all groups 
involved in the war, and 72 percent agreed that there should be some dedicated reconciliation 
process. Although some categories were predominantly ranked as simply “acceptable,” no 
more than 3 percent of respondents rated any one option as “unacceptable.”758 There is no 
doubt that it is different to deem change desirable in an opinion poll than to support its actual 
implementation, but these statistics suggest that Bosnians are truly interested in reaching 
peace and finding some accord between the groups. Such a conclusion supports the theory 
that the violence of the 1990s was not about undying ethnic hatred, but rather confusion and 
misunderstanding that can be resolved. 
In 2005, another opinion poll was conducted in Bosnia to commemorate the tenth 
anniversary of the Dayton Accords.759 According to this poll, 66 percent of Republika Srpska 
citizens agree that “the sustainability of the Republika Srpska is the only guarantee for the 
sustainability of Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” while just under 26 percent believe that 
Bosnian integration into the EU is a guarantee of Serb protection in the region.760 This 
suggests that Serbs are still fearful of being abused if ruled by other ethnic groups, although 
this is not surprising given Bosnia’s recent past and is probably true of other ethnic groups in 
Bosnia as well. The poll also reported that almost 54 percent of Serbs would not support 
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surrendering Karadzic to the Hague even if this were a condition for Bosnia to join NATO 
and the EU.761 A majority of Bosnian Serbs, then, retain a sense of ethnic loyalty and do not 
put great importance on joining Western European institutions. However, the flip side of this 
poll is that 46 percent of Bosnian Serbs are undecided or would support Karadzic’s surrender 
which, given the extreme nationalism of the events just ten years earlier, is somewhat 
impressive. 
In another hopeful development, an official Republika Srpska commission admitted 
in November of 2004 for the first time that Serbs had massacred thousands of Muslims in 
Srebrenica. The RS handed over 600 war-related documents to the Hague Tribunal, provided 
a list of 17,000 Serbs who took part in the massacre, and made an official apology to the 
Muslim community for the Srebrenica killings.762 In July of 2005, on the tenth anniversary of 
the massacre, Serbian president Boris Tadic laid a wreath at the commemoration. A few 
hundred Serbs held a counter commemoration and held signs reading “Long live Karadzic,” 
but the protest did little to disrupt the ceremony itself. Of course no ceremony can make up 
for what happened during the war and Srebrenica is still reeling from the violence. The city 
that used to contain 37,000 is now home to less than 7,000 people, predominantly Serb. In 
the midst of the Srebrenica commemorations, the Red Cross still reported 16,600 Bosniaks 
missing, their bodies never identified from the war.763 
While the situation in Bosnia is by no means perfect, symbolic efforts by government 
officials are beginning to have a real effect on Bosnian society. At the time when Tadic 
appeared in Srebrenica, technically qualified Bosniaks were being hired by Serb business in 
Banja Luka, illustrating the easing of ethnic division and tension. As of January 31, 2005, 
 
761 Ibid., 72. 
762 Pond, 160. 
763 Ibid., 162. 
279
1,005,958 people had returned to their pre-war homes in Bosnia, 448,880 of whom were 
minority returns.764 Government and international affairs professor Gerard Toal considers 
this “a remarkable achievement” given the brutality of the Bosnian War, pointing out that 
people often made urban connections when they were refugees and therefore consciously 
chose not to return to their rural pre-war homes.765 Bosnia is slowly but surely moving along 
the road to recovery. 
Although many people in the RS were reluctant to join the European Union, Bosnia 
faced increasing international pressure to pursue entry in 2005. That year Croatia began 
negotiating a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU. When Serbia 
began such talks as well, it appeared that the stubbornness of Bosnian Serbs would isolate 
Bosnia as the only country in the Western Balkans not pursuing EU membership; this was a 
label that Bosnian leaders did not wish to assume. After the RS legislature approved High 
Representative Paddy Ashdown’s police reforms, the EU invited Bosnia-Herzegovina to 
begin negotiating its own SAA. These talks opened in January of 2006 and Bosnia’s 
agreement is expected to be signed in the summer of 2007, making a significant step in 
Bosnia’s journey toward recovering from its great war.766 
On January 17, 2006, the Helsinki Human Rights Committee presented its report on 
the human rights situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2005. According to the report, 
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity throughout 2005 practically prevented employment, 
adequate education, adequate health and social protection, and realization of the right of 
pension for certain Bosnians. Inter-ethnic relations were also burdened by nationalist parties 
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trying to preserve ethnic homogeneity such as the Party of Democratic Action, the Croat 
Democratic Union, and the Serb Democratic Party.767 However, it should be noted that all 
three highly nationalistic parties were defeated in presidential elections in October 2006. In 
addition, while ethnic minorities no doubt still face discrimination in Bosnia, the message of 
unity coming from the Bosnian leadership is a very hopeful development. 
Evidence even suggests that the parties which were highly nationalistic in the mid-
1990s may no longer be so. On May 26, 2005, the Muslim Party of Democratic Action held 
its congress and reelected Sulejman Tihic as president. The SDA presented a new party 
profile at the congress, focusing on Europe and the Bosnian identity and expressing 
commitment to reforms, EU membership, and a strong international presence in Bosnia. 
There were no extremist chants, religious flag-waving, representations of the Islamic 
community, or hate speeches at the event. The SDA also showed a commitment to 
multiethnic candidate lists in the 2006 elections.768 
In fact, a number of events in 2006 displayed an increased ethnic tolerance among the 
Bosnian people. For the first time a Bosniak became the acting RS police chief. Additionally, 
the new Bosnian youth group Dosta, meaning “enough,” staged a concert of twenty bands to 
call for moving beyond the fixation on ethnic clashes to the real issue of jobs.769 This 
illustrates a shift among the Bosnian populous of focusing on other issues facing the country 
rather than obsessing over ethnic squabbles. Also in 2006, the film Grbavica was released. 
This film is about the plight of Muslim women raped by Serbs during the Bosnian War and 
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won the Golden Bear prize for best picture at the 56th Berlin Film Festival. Cinemas in the 
Republika Srpska have been unable to show the film because the entity’s only film 
distributor withheld it on fears it could provoke unrest, but DVD copies of the film have sold 
well at street stalls in Banja Luka. One vendor reports that Grbavica is his best seller, and 
another admits that the DVD is sold primarily to Serbs.770 This development shows a real 
curiosity among Bosnian Serbs to learn about the crimes committed against other ethnic 
groups and therefore begin to accept that all Bosnians, regardless of their ethnicity, were 
victims in the war. 
As always, a number of events in 2006 displayed nationalistic sentiment among the 
Bosnian population. On March 24, a local nationalist-oriented magazine gave Radovan 
Karadzic an award for his “lifetime literary work,” which includes plays, a political satire, 
and children’s books. The magazine described Karadzic, alleged participant in the Srebrenica 
massacre, as a “paradigm of a civilization which has lost its compass.” Karadzic’s brother 
Luka, who accepted the award on his behalf, said, “This is more proof that the Serbs are not 
traitors and remember their heroes who have done something good for their people.”771 In 
October several Muslim places of worship in the Republika Srpska were attacked on the 
Muslim holiday of Eid-ul-Fitr. A mosque in Visegrad was slightly damaged by stone-
throwing youths on October 24, and a mosque in Prijedor, along with the house of an Imam, 
were stoned on October 23.772 
Perhaps the most disturbing development in 2006 involved Bosnian Serb leaders 
calling for the secession of the Republika Srpska from Bosnia. In the months before the new 
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elections, Bosniak and Croat leaders came out in favor of abolishing the two Bosnian entities 
and creating a centralized country. Serbs responded defensively, threatening to leave Bosnia 
entirely if such a plan were put into effect. In the words of political analyst Slobodan 
Vaskovic, “Serbs accept Bosnia only in one way and that is that within it there is Republika 
Srpska.”773 Bosnian Serb Prime Minister Milorad Dodik led the push toward organizing a 
referendum on RS independence. Bosnian Serbs even signed an agreement on economic and 
social cooperation with Serbia in September to show their commitment to remaining a Serb 
entity and maintaining ethnically homogeneous ties. While this could be written off as 
merely the ravings of another nationalist leader trying to incite fear for his own purposes, the 
Bosnian Serb electorate showed support for this platform. In the 2006 elections, the Alliance 
of Independent Social Democrats’ candidate Nebojsa Radmanovic won almost 55 percent of 
the vote for the Serb presidential position after a campaign built on the secession 
referendum.774 
While these recent developments certainly must not be ignored, they do not 
necessarily indicate an impending break up of Bosnia. Not all Serbs support secession and 
both the Federation, international community, and a number of leaders in the RS are 
dedicated to keeping Bosnia as a single integrated state. The overall temperament of the 
Bosnian population can be gauged by looking at the most recent returnee statistics, which 
show that the situation is not ideal, but neither is Bosnia about to collapse. According to the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as of October 
31, 2006, a total of 442,687 refugees and 572,707 displaced people had returned to their pre-
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war homes in Bosnia. Statistics suggest that this figure still represents less than half of the 2.2 
million refugees created by the war. The Federation has registered higher rates of return than 
the RS, with 387,608 refugee returns and 348,620 displaced person returns in comparison to 
Republika Sprka’s 53,115 refugee returns and 204,669 displaced person returns since 
January 1, 1996.775 
In 2006, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation conducted an opinion 
poll in Bosnia regarding the situation of returnees in the country. The study found that more 
than 90 percent of returnees say their return was voluntary while 10 percent say their choice 
was initiated by authorities. Ninety-five percent of refugees who returned to Bosnia report 
returning to their pre-war homes. Forty-one percent of former refugees have received 
assistance after their return, with higher percentages in rural areas. Approximately 90 percent 
of respondents feel safe from violent threats based on inter-ethnic tensions, a truly 
remarkable and hopeful statistic. Twelve percent of returnees fear such threats, compared to 
8 percent of domiciles. Around 80 percent of respondents believe that members of minority 
groups can pursue cultural and religious beliefs without facing problems. More than 70 
percent of people believe that the rights and opportunities of people to shape their lives are 
not equally distributed, although non-minorities believe in this inequality more so than 
minorities do.776 This illustrates a very hopeful trend of majority ethnic groups supporting 
equal rights for minority groups. 
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The study goes on to reveal that 54 percent of minority respondents believe that they 
face discrimination in job seeking, and 26 percent believe they face discrimination in public 
services. However, only 8 percent of minority respondents in the RS and 3 percent of 
minority respondents in the Federation report personal experiences of discrimination. This 
suggests that while people perceive discrimination to exist, it is much less prevalent than they 
imagine. Similarly, more than 40 percent believe that election processes are not fair and 
correct, but less than 2 percent of respondents report being personally hampered in exercising 
electoral rights and political freedoms. In addition, more than 60 percent of respondents 
report regular and voluntary contacts with people of other ethnic backgrounds.777 There is no 
denying that ethnic tension, hostility, and discrimination still exist in Bosnia. However, it 
seems that tolerance and unity are beginning to take hold. 
Before concluding the section, it is helpful to look at election results in Bosnia from 
Dayton to the present day in order to gauge the evolving opinions of the population.778 We 
will begin with the Bosnian Muslim presidency. In 1996, 1998, and 2002, the Bosniak 
president came from the Party of Democratic Action. This party was led by Muslim war-time 
leader Alija Izetbegovic. It called for the creation of an Islamic state in the 1970s, and has 
been dubbed “the party of the Muslim cultural historical circle.”779 However, in spite of its 
Muslim make-up it espouses the creation of a unitary Bosnia. The Party of Democratic 
Action won more than 80 percent of the Bosniak vote in 1996 and 1998, but in 2002 the SDA 
took only 37 percent of the vote with the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina taking 35 percent.780 
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The latter party campaigned on the slogan “Bosnia without entities”781 and is dedicated to 
“reconstructing a multi-ethnic rather than nationalist state.”782 The strong support for the 
Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina shows a movement among Bosnian Muslims to support more 
moderate and unifying politicians. 
In 2006, the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina finally defeated the Party of Democratic 
Action in the race for the Bosniak presidency, receiving 62.1 and 28.1 percent of the vote 
respectively.783 The winning candidate Haris Silajdzic called for the abolition of the RS and 
Federation and the reunification of Bosnia. This may be interpreted either as a hopeful shift 
toward unity in Bosnia or a reintroduction of ethnic antagonism in the region, as this platform 
is in some ways a deliberate jab against the Serb community. The latter interpretation is 
supported by the fact that in 2006 the Party of Democratic Action highlighted its multi-ethnic 
and pluralist characteristics, rather than highlighting its exclusively Muslim background, and 
yet lost the elections by a significant margin.784 However, even if Silajdzic’s victory did 
represent the Muslim community’s attempt to anger Serbs, the over all trend of voting does 
support the gradual liberalization of this electorate. 
For Bosnian Croats, presidential elections have consistently resulted in great 
majorities in favor of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia Herzegovina. This party is 
related to the Croatian Democratic Union of Croatia and is therefore highly nationalistic. It 
participated in declaring the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosnia in 1993 and helped to create 
the Muslim-Croat Federation of present-day Bosnia. It was also was accused of violating the 
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Dayton Accords in 2001 by asking for Croat self-administration. It is widely accepted that 
the HDZ of Bosnia is pursuing political separation of Croats in Bosnia and the group 
describes itself as “the only party which protects the rights of Croats in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.”785 The slightly less nationalist Economic Bloc for Progress Party won just 
over 17 percent of the vote in 2002, but the Croatian Democratic Union won by a strong 
margin and its success suggests a strong nationalist bent to Croats in Bosnia. However, in 
2006, the Croatian Democratic Union was defeated by the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, which took 40.8 percent of the vote over the Croatian Democratic Union’s 
25.1 percent.786 The Social Democratic Party is a multi-ethnic, anti-nationalist party whose 
victory indicates a shift away from the nationalism of the previous ten years and movement 
toward a more unitary mentality in the Bosnian Croat community. 
The Bosnian Serb electorate consistently supported the Serb Democratic Party in 
presidential elections in the years following the war. The SDS is Karadzic’s party, a highly 
nationalist organization which purged its moderate elements and then nominated its leader 
for president even after he was indicted for war crimes. The SDS received 67 percent of the 
vote in 1996, but lost to the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic by a small margin in 1998. 
The Socialist Party of the Serb Republic is a social democratic party associated with those in 
Europe; its victory indicated a major change from the hard-line nationalists of the Serb 
Democratic Party.787 The Socialist Party of the Serb Republic was victorious yet again in 
2002, winning 35 percent of the vote. However the Alliance of Independent Social 
Democrats (SNSD), an increasingly nationalist party, was close behind. 788 The SNSD was 
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victorious in 2006, bringing Sulejman Tihic to the presidency. As mentioned previously, in 
2006 the SNSD campaigned with nationalist rhetoric and the promise of a referendum for RS 
secession from Bosnia. Although Bosnian Serbs removed the highly-nationalist Serb 
Democratic Party from office, their approval of the SNSD in 2006 suggests that this 
particular community may be experiencing a resurgence of nationalist sentiment. 
To conclude this analysis, one must examine the elections for the Bosnian House of 
Representatives over the past ten years. In 1996 and 1998, elections for the House of 
Representatives were held separately for the Federation and the RS. The Federation elected 
the Party of Democratic Action and Croatian Democratic Union in 1996, the two most highly 
nationalistic parties of the Muslim and Croat communities respectively. Federation voters 
elected the Coalition for a Single and Democratic Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian 
Democratic Union in 1998. Although the Party of Democratic Action was removed from 
power, the Coalition was still a primarily Bosniak party and the 1998 Federation elections 
showed a tendency among both Croats and Bosniaks to remain loyal to their ethnic group 
rather than voting for the entire Bosnian community. In the RS, the highly nationalistic Serb 
Democratic Party came out on top in 1996 and in 1998, although it lost some seats between 
the two elections. 
In 2000 all Bosnians voted together for the House of Representatives. In this election, 
the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina won the most seats. This party is a 
multi-ethnic, anti-nationalist organization which absorbed the former communist party and 
its success is a hopeful sign for future moves toward Bosnian unity. Close behind it were the 
Party of Democratic Action and the Serb Democratic Party, which of course are very 
nationalist organizations. In 2002, the Party of Democratic Action came out on top with the 
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Serb Democratic Party close behind, again showing nationalist sentiment. In 2006, the Party 
of Democratic Action and Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina were the top two finishers. This 
almost even split between nationalist parties and parties like the latter which support multi-
ethnic unity, shows a move toward liberalism in the Bosnian electorate, but also illustrates 
that the country has much room for improvement.  
 
Conclusion 
On the whole, it can be concluded that Croatia has been most successful in its post-
war transition toward liberalism, Serbia least successful, and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
somewhere in the middle. However, it seems that this ranking is more a reflection of the 
political challenges each nation has faced in the post-war period than it is of the ethnic 
sentiment of each population. Croatia has a relatively small Serb minority living within its 
borders, making ethnic violence less frequent and less threatening. Its leaders and people are 
fully supportive of the pursuit of EU membership, which is a goal that unifies the country 
behind liberal reforms. Serbia, on the other hand, dealt with violence and military 
engagements as late as 1999, meaning that it has had significantly less time to peacefully 
recover than either Croatia or Bosnia. Serbia also contains a huge variety of ethnic 
minorities, which cause problems beyond those deriving from the violence of the early 
1990s. Especially in the wake of Milosevic, Serbia’s current state is entirely understandable, 
and in many respects the progress that the state has made is even more impressive given the 
additional challenges that it has faced. Bosnia has not dealt with additional violence, but it 
has been presented with the challenge of healing a multi-ethnic society in a way which 
Croatia has not. Bosnia has faced more obstacles than Croatia so that like Serbia, Bosnia’s 
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advancements and progress are remarkable given what it has had to deal with in the past 
eleven years. 
 It seems that in many ways analyzing post-conflict events is more helpful in 
understanding the violence of the 1990s than looking at events leading up to the wars. It is 
difficult to gauge the true opinions of the Balkan people under Tito; were they peaceful 
because of authoritarian threats or because of true ethnic harmony? In the 1980s, it is hard to 
know how much clout to give to nationalist sentiment. After all, many of the Yugoslav 
people were lost without Tito, the economy was in shambles and, like populations throughout 
history, people began turning toward leaders who incited resentment, told them who to 
blame, and gave them a purpose; this could be seen as ethnic hostility or just the natural 
reaction to an unstable situation. However, the developments in the former Yugoslavia over 
the past eleven years show a clearer picture of societies dealing with tragedy, moving beyond 
nationalistic leaders toward more tolerant futures, and coming to understand other ethnic 
groups and the suffering that all sides endured during the war. The situation in Serbia, 
Croatia, and Bosnia today is by no means perfect, but these countries have made remarkable 
progress in the past eleven years, suggesting that primordialist interpretations of the Croatian 
and Bosnian Wars must be reevaluated. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 In this chapter, one of the theories of ethnic conflict presented in chapter two will be 
selected as the most appropriate and helpful way to understand the Croatian and Bosnian 
wars. The choice of theory will be justified in terms of the general nature of modern conflict 
and in terms of the details surrounding the Yugoslav dissolution specifically. Seemingly 
contradictory events will be highlighted and explained in relation to the selected theory. The 
chapter will then explore the lessons to be learned from these conflicts, examining the ways 
in which these lessons can be applied to future outbreaks of violence in general and the 
current war in Iraq specifically.  
The conclusions drawn from this study will not be clear-cut or indisputable. In fact, 
the unbiased design of this work will allow readers to go back to earlier chapters and 
construct an argument to challenge the one presented here. However, the study of political 
science is based on digesting and learning from historical events regardless of their 
complexity and this chapter will do just that. I do not maintain that the ideas presented here 
are the only logical ways to understand the wars of Yugoslav dissolution. However, after 
many months of thought and research, I firmly believe that the conclusions presented here 
accurately describe what happened in the Balkans and realistically set forth the proper way to 
apply the lessons of this conflict to other outbreaks of violence.  
 
Can a Conflict Ever Be Truly Ethnic? 
 As a means of supporting this chapter’s choice of ethnic conflict theory, the first 
question to be posed deals with ethnic conflict as a broad concept. However, before delving 
into the issue at hand the definition of the term must be clarified. An ethnic conflict is one in 
which groups of people engage in violence because of mutual, deep-seated, and historical 
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hatreds for one another. To call a conflict ethnic implies that there are no strategic reasons for 
violence, or that such reasons exist but are incidental; the overriding motivation for violence 
is hatred for an entire ethnic group. A true ethnic conflict is one in which sides are divided 
neatly along ethnic lines. Violence is directed at members of the other ethnic group 
exclusively and people of one ethnicity do not have feelings of friendship or compassion for 
any individuals of the opposing ethnicity regardless of past experiences together. 
In an ethnic conflict, the groups involved have a kind of natural and enduring hatred 
for one another based on ethnicity alone. The implication is that these groups always have 
and always will hate each other. Because hatred is the basis for violence, and this hatred is 
eternal, one ethnic conflict will inevitably lead to another violent incident in the future. The 
groups will never be able to peacefully coexist and violence will persist until they are 
separated by means of partition. Even then, the persistence of hatred means that there are no 
guarantees of peace. The notion of ethnic conflict thus sets forth a deterministic view of 
history that eliminates individual choice and free will. First of all, it implies that an 
individual of one ethnicity will naturally hate all people of another regardless of his own 
personality, thoughts, or experiences. Secondly, it suggests that no individual leaders, groups, 
democratic ideals, or reforms can ever change the course of history and stop ethnic violence 
from rearing its ugly head in the future. 
 In light of this definition, the question becomes: can a conflict ever truly be ethnic? 
By simply reading the previous chapters, it is clear that the Bosnian and Croatian wars do not 
satisfy these criteria. Croats, Serbs, and Muslims peacefully coexisted before and after the 
conflict, making it an example of temporary rather than enduring violence. Evidence suggests 
that even in the midst of war friendships existed between individuals of different ethnicities 
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and soldiers were killing civilians of their own ethnicity. In many ways, the primary goals 
involved in the Croatian and Bosnian wars were strategic and therefore not driven by 
irrational anger and hatred. 
The task in this section, however, is to examine ethnic conflict in more general terms. 
This thesis addresses the Balkans only and I do not claim expertise on any other regions. 
However, it seems clear that this question can be answered on a global scale simply by 
looking at the meaning and implications of the term ethnic conflict. Most, if not all, conflicts 
have a kind of strategic component at the heart of motivation for violence, whether it be a 
desire for territory, power, or even cultural dominance. Few conflicts create clean ethnic 
divisions, where the groups involved never intermingle and violence is used solely against 
people of the opposite ethnicity. In many instances, conflicts have occurred roughly along 
ethnic lines and have been followed by years of relative peace and no resurgence of violence. 
When defining ethnic conflict in these strict terms it is difficult to identify any conflict that 
fits these criteria.  
 It is my assertion, therefore, that a conflict can never truly be ethnic. This by no 
means suggests that ethnic divisions, histories, and resentments never play a role in violent 
encounters. Rather, my argument seeks to challenge the conventional understanding of 
incidents which have historically been characterized in such a way. Too often conflicts are 
written off as “ethnic” by people who do not understand the implications of this label and are 
not interested in grasping the intricacies of the feud in question. The term ethnic conflict is 
used to oversimplify and categorize violence in a way that is not helpful in explaining the 
problem or finding a solution. This study seeks to prove, among other things, that the term 
ethnic conflict is not useful; it implies a cut and dry reality that rarely if ever accurately 
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explains modern-day violence. As such, we must work toward building new frameworks with 
which to understand conflict, ensuring that any potential solutions capture the complexities 
and nuances involved in such violence in a fair and helpful manner. 
 
Elite Manipulation in the Balkans 
 In light of these conclusions about conflict in general, I believe that the theory which 
most closely explains the Bosnian and Croatian wars is elite manipulation. Before explaining 
the relevance of elite manipulation, however, it is important to elucidate the ways in which 
the other theories presented are not helpful in understanding the Yugoslav wars. 
Primordialism sees violence within the frame work of ethnic conflict, an understanding 
which is problematic for the reasons explained above. In my opinion, the strongest claim 
made by primordialists is that certain examples of extreme violence in Bosnia can be 
explained only by individual hatred. After all, propaganda can not force one man to murder 
another. However, the most extreme examples of war brutality in Yugoslavia, including rape 
camps and ethnic cleansing, can actually be understood in strategic rather than hateful terms 
as explained in chapter four. This makes primordialist claims largely irrelevant.  
In some ways it is tempting to subscribe to moderate theory because it constructs a 
framework which can accommodate both events that seem ethnically motivated and those 
that do not. However, the same strategic explanation for rape camps and ethnic cleansing 
which undermines primordialism brings moderate theory into question as well. In a certain 
sense, moderate theory is a watered-down version of elite manipulation which seeks to cover 
all its bases by making room within elite manipulation for the existence of hateful acts. Yet if 
supposed acts of hatred can be explained using logic and reason, then the caveats of moderate 
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theory are no longer necessary and one can embrace the full-fledged elite manipulation 
argument instead.  
 In endorsing elite manipulation, rational choice theory and emotion theory become 
irrelevant as well. The theories of rational choice and emotion seek to explain a group’s 
motivation for violence while primordialism, moderate theory, and elite manipulation seek to 
explore the forces which created the group in the first place. This suggests that one theory 
from each grouping should be chosen to come to a coherent conclusion; if one asserted that 
elite manipulation explained group formation, he or she would then need to choose which 
theory explains group decision making. However, in reality both rational choice theory and 
emotion theory are constructed on the assumption that groups form of their own volition 
rather than due to outside forces. These theories assume that people choose to bond together 
to address certain personal concerns, whether those be concerns of emotion or strategic 
survival. Elite manipulation argues that people do not choose to join together but rather are 
unwillingly forced into group membership. As a result, groups can not be treated as one 
coherent unit at any point. For this reason, an endorsement of elite manipulation necessitates 
a rejection of both emotion theory and rational choice theory. 
However, elite manipulation was not chosen as the best theory to describe the 
Yugoslav dissolution due to process of elimination. Rather, it was chosen because V.P. 
Gagnon’s elite manipulation argument fully explains and captures the reality of the Bosnian 
and Croatian wars. Before delving in to the details of Yugoslav history and experience as 
they relate to elite manipulation, a short over view of Gagnon’s theory will be presented. For 
those who are interested, a more detailed account of Gagnon’s theory can be found in chapter 
two.  
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Gagnon argues that ethnic hatred and resentment do not exist prior to elite 
interference. A majority of people must be identifiable members of an ethnic group for elites 
to use this as a means of mobilization but this need not even be their primary identity prior to 
conflict. Gagnon believes that when power-seeking elites see an opportunity, they begin to 
shift the focus of political debate toward areas in which the population feels threatened. This 
causes people to feel as though they need said leaders for protection.789 Rather than ethnic 
hatred and distrust leading to a security dilemma between groups, Gagnon argues that elites 
fabricate the security dilemma by inciting fear through violence, and only then do ethnic 
divisions begin to form.790 Elites often give media coverage and weapons to small extremist 
groups to shift popular perception, making people believe the threat is larger than it is and 
changing the societal ideology so that what was unacceptably racist in the past becomes 
moderate in the present. Although the violence associated with these polarizing policies is 
directed against people of the opposing ethnic group, Gagnon argues that such violent 
policies are initiated for their desired effect on the home population. As people become more 
fearful of being victims of violence themselves, they bind together into a homogeneous 
whole in support of the leader.791 
Gagnon argues that in reality, ethnic relations and identities are highly complex. For 
example, to call oneself a Serb may mean one thing to a Bosnian Serb and another to a 
Serbian Serb; it may mean something else to an urban Serb and have an entirely different 
 
789 V.P. Gagnon, Jr., “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia,” Nationalism and 
Ethnic Conflict, ed. Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2001). 
790 V.P. Gagnon, Jr., Lecture at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, February 21, 2007, Medford, 
Massachusetts. 
791 V.P. Gagnon, Jr., The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2004). 
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meaning for a rural Serb.792 No ethnicity has a single identity or meaning attached to it at any 
one time. It is therefore impossible for elites to mobilize people by tapping into their actual 
ethnic identities because individual understandings of ethnicity are highly variable and would 
not lend themselves to the homogenization of the ethnic group. Instead, elites use violence to 
destroy actual ethnic ties and replace those complex understandings with more simple and 
absolute ones. As a result, the ethnic identities which are the basis for massive violence are 
actually elite constructs. However, even as elites create ethnic divisions, they do not allow 
themselves to be restricted by these precise divisions. The goal for such leaders is political 
rather than ethnic homogeneity. As a result, areas which were already ethnically homogenous 
are targeted for violence and elites seek to remove dissidents regardless of their ethnicity.793 
Violence is used to make the concepts of ethnic bonding and homogeneity a reality, 
bringing people together out of fear. Bonds and communities which deny the existence of 
ethnic division are targeted for destruction. Gagnon argues that in spite of these efforts, elites 
can only affect how people see what is going on “out there” but can not change how people 
see their communities and their own personal experience.794 However, Gagnon does not deny 
that a great deal of hateful violence occurred in the former Yugoslavia. Consistent with the 
arguments of Tim Judah and Michael Ignatieff explored in chapter four, Gagnon would argue 
that elites were unable to convince people to hate their neighbors using rhetoric alone, but 
when people were directly victimized some became angry and vengeful. People did not fear 
their friends and neighbors until they had personal experience with violence and saw with 
their own eyes that individuals were brutalizing them because of ethnicity. Only after elites 
created a security dilemma through fear, destroyed ethnic ties and reconstructed them in 
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793 Gagnon, The Myth of Ethnic War.
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exclusive ways, and began to directly alter people’s lives by inciting violence and 
encouraging hatred did people begin to behave in ways that could be seen as consistent with 
an ethnic conflict. 
 
Applying Gagnon’s Theory to Yugoslav History 
To illustrate the relevance of elite manipulation, Gagnon’s thoughts will be explained 
and supported through a high-level review of Balkan history. I will try to highlight events 
which otherwise seem inconsistent with elite manipulation theory in an attempt to support it 
further. This review will begin by examining Serbia’s early experience with statehood. For 
some, Serbia’s history as an independent state which in the twelfth century ruled and in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth coveted Bosnia is evidence of historical hatred in the region. 
However, it is important to note that Serbia wanted to control Bosnia for the strategic reason 
of gaining water access and economic independence rather than due to a sense of ethnic 
hatred. Furthermore, Bosnia contains ethnic Serbs as well as Croats and Muslims, so the Serb 
desire to rule this territory did not come from an urge to subjugate supposedly inferior ethnic 
groups but simply to gain more power.  
Serbia’s eagerness to dominate the other states in the Balkans came from rational 
rather than emotional considerations as well. When Serbia had its own empire in the twelfth 
century, it controlled much of the region. After several centuries under Ottoman rule, Serbia 
secured de facto independence in 1826 and proceeded to fight and win both Balkan Wars, 
bringing an empire to its knees and doubling its own population. When the Kingdom of the 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was formed after World War I, Serbia sought to dominate the 
federation, not because of feelings of superiority or hatred towards other ethnic groups but 
because it felt that it had earned the right to do so. After all, Serbia had the most experience 
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and power of any of the nations involved. In the same way, Croats and Slovenes were 
resistant to Serb domination not because of ethnic hatred but due to their leaders’ desire to 
exert power in the Kingdom and a fear among citizens that their concerns would be ignored 
in a Serb-dominated entity. These tensions no doubt existed in the years leading up to World 
War II but were both strategic and very common between groups competing for power; such 
tensions can not be seen as in any way prefiguring the great violence of the war.  
The events of World War II are historically very important in the Balkans and are an 
example of overwhelming hatred and brutality. This hatred began with the Ustashe regime of 
the Independent State of Croatia, a Nazi organization supported by Mussolini which was by 
all accounts unexpectedly fanatical and extreme. While accounts show that some Croats 
supported the Ustashe government, the population did not put the Ustashe in power and the 
great majority of Croats were disgusted by their tactics. There is no doubt that the individuals 
involved in the Ustashe were hateful and angry people, but this does not mean that their 
opinions or actions represented those of all Croats. While Hitler and the Nazi party were 
incredibly destructive and hateful, their existence is not used as evidence that all Germans 
always have and always will hate all Jews. Just as people attribute guilt for the Holocaust to 
the individual Nazi soldiers involved rather than the whole of the German people, so too 
should the guilt of the Ustashe terror be seen to rest on the shoulders of the individuals who 
perpetrated it rather than those they claimed to represent. The Serb Chetniks must be viewed 
in the same way; the horrific actions of a few can not be translated into the culpability of 
many. Neither the Ustashe nor the Chetniks accurately represented the sentiment of their 
corresponding ethnic groups. The violence of World War II should be seen not as yet another 
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chapter in the history of hatred between these groups but rather an aberration, a time of 
extreme violence which was inconsistent with the events which came before and after it. 
Although in some ways Tito ushered in an era of peace after World War II, scholars 
often argue over what kind of effect Tito’s rule really had on the region. For instance, recall 
that Norman Naimark presents two possible explanations for the influence of Tito. The first 
is the freezer model, which praises Tito for holding separatist strivings in check and forcing 
inhabitants of the region to be Yugoslavs. The second model is the incubator model, which 
argues that Tito’s attempt to maintain a balance between nationalities ended up antagonizing 
all of them and exacerbating resentments.795 However, both of these models assume that 
when Tito died in 1980 great ethnic hatred existed in the region. Instead, I would argue that 
while Tito’s Yugoslavia had its share of ethnic uprising and violence, for the most part the 
sentiment among Yugoslav people was one of genuine peace and cooperation. In Bosnia in 
particular, areas were highly integrated and many people had friends, neighbors, and even 
spouses of a different ethnicity than themselves.  
Problems arose primarily because of the same strategic concerns which plagued the 
region before Tito. While the ethnic groups of Yugoslavia were relatively tolerant of one 
another, the leadership of each entity retained nationalist sentiments, not because of ethnic 
hatred but due to their own desire for power. Serb leaders insisted that they had earned the 
right to rule over the entire region and Croat and Slovene leaders were determined not to be 
overrun by the dominant Serbs. Certainly the populations themselves were involved in these 
debates, especially in the Croatian language protests of the late 1960s, but it can be argued 
that their interest was peaked out of fear of being culturally dominated rather than out of 
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hatred. National leaders, in fact, probably could have easily subdued such protests and 
concerns but chose instead to exacerbate them for personal gain.  
In many ways, Tito’s policies also served to exacerbate such concerns rather than 
assuage them. For example, if a Serb was arrested and put to death for a crime under Tito, a 
Croat would be found and given the same punishment regardless of guilt in order to keep 
things “fair.” Of course, such policies led to ethnic resentment, as did policies of cracking 
down on protestors rather than addressing their concerns. Even more problematic was Tito’s 
division of Yugoslavia in such a way as to breed resentment between ethnic groups. Some 
view the period of Tito’s rule as the most peaceful time that Yugoslavia could hope to 
experience, and therefore see the incidents of ethnic resentment under Tito as indicative of an 
unavoidable hatred existing below the surface. However, I believe that the small number of 
ethnic incidents under Tito show the relative lack of ethnic hatred among the population. 
With Tito antagonizing ethnic groups, haphazardly dividing the country, and implementing 
policies of repression and misguided ethnic balance, and with ethnic leaders exacerbating 
strategic power and cultural concerns, it is a wonder that more nationalist protests did not 
occur in this period. From this perspective, the events of unrest under Tito show a very low 
level of ethnic hatred among the population in spite of many factors which could have 
contributed to extensive violence among a more hate-filled populous. 
However, in the years following Tito’s death the country found itself in a more 
precarious position. As a communist country in the 1980s, Yugoslavia dealt with severe 
economic stagnation. When new and ineffectual leaders came to power in Tito’s wake, 
borrowing more and more money to pay off old debt, the economic situation worsened. 
People were unemployed and angry, faced with a weak state that was too incompetent to 
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address their problems. This is the classic situation in which people become “true believers,” 
looking for a charismatic leader who will offer them a cause to fight for and scapegoats to 
blame their problems on. Slobodan Milosevic fit this role perfectly. Thus the growing ethnic 
resentment in the Balkans during the 1980s can be explained not by actual ethnic hatred but 
the existence of a vulnerable and resentful population faced with a power-hungry nationalist 
leader. Many people in Yugoslavia felt no such resentment during this time period and often 
times those who chose to follow Milosevic did so for the same reasons that many Germans 
chose to follow Hitler: not due to pre-existing ethnic or religious hatred but because 
individuals were looking for a cause to fight for and someone to blame for their problems. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Milosevic saw the perfect opportunity to shift the 
public’s focus away from economic and social concerns to issues of ethnic fear and 
resentment. While people did not always primarily identify themselves by ethnicity prior to 
the 1980s, these identifications were still salient enough for people to know what side they 
fell on and therefore who they should fear. Suddenly, ethnicity was the only form of identity 
available to individuals, and other means of identification became obsolete. By creating hard 
ethnic divisions and inciting fear through propaganda and reminders about past violence, 
elites constructed a security dilemma in Yugoslavia and the population reacted with 
predictable fear, distrust, and eventually violence. 
When violence began first in Croatia and then in Bosnia, it served not only to 
eliminate and frighten dissidents, those who would not submit to Milosevic’s rule, but also to 
solidify Serb identifications with their own ethnic group as they became more convinced that 
they needed the group for protection. People were not convinced that their ethnically distinct 
neighbors were the enemy, but they watched the news and saw the violence occurring “out 
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there.” As more horrible incidents occurred, people became more fearful for their own safety. 
Governments were not providing people with protection. If, for example, Serbs had just 
massacred Muslims in a different city, why should Muslims trust their Serb neighbors? Fear 
became pervasive and as people started breaking off by ethnicity to protect themselves, 
violence became even more prevalent. If one group feared that the other posed a threat and 
would attempt to hurt them, they would often act first in an act of preemption. Soon, the 
ethnic divisions that elites had claimed were there from the start actually began to form. 
One major argument against elite manipulation theory is that the degree of violence 
and brutality exhibited during the war can only be explained by personal hatred against an 
ethnic group. However, it must be remembered that the paramilitaries involved in fighting 
these wars in no way encompassed all of the region’s population. Desertion and draft 
dodging were a huge problem, so many of those who actually fought were hostile, 
aggressive, and deviant individuals before the war and simply used the conflict as an 
opportunity to play out sadistic desires or curiosities. Reports show that soldiers were often 
drunk while perpetrating atrocities. Some individuals entered the war without real ethnic 
resentments but saw the actions of enemy soldiers against innocent civilians and became wild 
with rage, vowing to take revenge and doing so in horrible ways against other innocent 
individuals. This, of course, simply perpetuated the cycle, angering individuals on the 
opposing side and motivating them to engage in vicious acts as well. In this way, it is easy to 
see how the actions of a few sick individuals, when seen to represent an entire ethnic group, 
can lead to growing hostility and anger among people who previously had no real 
resentments at all. 
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The systematic rape and impregnation of Muslim women by Serb soldiers is often 
cited as a particularly horrific part of the war. However, after looking at the Serb culture’s 
treatment of women and belief that wars could be won by producing children more rapidly 
than the enemy, it becomes clear how such a policy could have strategic basis. The 
individuals who actually perpetrated such acts must of course have either been sadistic to 
begin with or seeking revenge, as explained above. However, the pervasiveness of rape and 
insistence that women carry their children to term does have a strategic explanation and 
therefore can not by itself prove that ethnic hatred motivated such actions. 
Horrific things happen during wartime regardless of the motivation for fighting; think 
of the events in Vietnam, a conflict which has never been viewed as ethnic. In addition, the 
culture and history of the groups involved in Bosnia dictated a more brutal type of war. Many 
believed that they could defeat the enemy by having more children, and that by harassing 
innocent civilians they could drive the enemy off desired territory. These techniques do have 
a military logic, just one that is difficult to see at first glance. Furthermore, the elites involved 
in this conflict had a strong incentive to encourage horrific brutality. By motivating people to 
commit atrocities, elites could scare the population into following extremist leaders and 
convince individuals that they were in danger and needed to cling to their ethnic group for 
protection. There are many ways to explain the brutality of these wars without categorizing 
them as ethnic in nature. 
Regardless of the motivation for violence, the Bosnian and Croatian wars were brutal 
conflicts and the people involved were not able to bounce back from them quickly. Franjo 
Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic remained in power until 1999 and 2000 respectively, and 
the Bosnian electorate voted divisive and nationalist parties into power in 1996. However, all 
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countries have made great strides toward more tolerant governments and societies, 
encouraging the return of refugees and granting minority rights and representation. Incidents 
of ethnic violence still occur in all three countries with varying frequency. After such a brutal 
war, it is expected that just as people became resentful and sought revenge during the war, 
some will continue to do so even after war is over.  
Most importantly, however, the governments of these countries remain committed to 
reform and are working to encourage a tolerant society. The anger and divisiveness of some 
can not be understood to represent the opinions of all, and the positive steps being made by 
these countries reinforce the notion that the violence of the early 1990s was motivated by 
elite manipulation and fear rather than by enduring hatred. These countries still have many 
improvements to make, but their progress has been remarkable in only eleven years. It 
appears that the majority of the Balkan people are moving beyond this horrible chapter in 
their lives rather than clinging to feelings of hatred and resentment, as would be expected if 
the Croatian and Bosnian wars were truly ethnic conflicts. 
 
Lessons of the Yugoslav Conflict 
The framework of elite manipulation theory assists not only in understanding the 
Bosnian and Croatian wars but also in conceptualizing the lessons to be learned from the 
Yugoslav violence and the ways those lessons can be applied to conflict prevention and 
resolution more generally. The elite manipulation framework illustrates that groups in 
situations similar to that of Yugoslavia are not inevitably rushing toward violence but rather 
are being carefully led there by power-hungry elites. This means that conflict can be 
prevented by taking elites out of the picture or alleviating societal problems which allow such 
elites to gain power. However, the example of Yugoslavia also illustrates that once elite-led 
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violence begins, the hatred described through propaganda and other means becomes a reality 
due to fear, resentment, and desire for revenge. These conflicts remain brutal and difficult to 
recover from despite the fact that they are not originally motivated by hatred. Thus, while 
violence can be stopped in its early stages, the case of Yugoslavia illustrates that once the 
situation progresses and fear becomes internalized in the population, there is no turning back. 
Although prevention is possible, it requires considerable foresight and commitment. 
In Yugoslavia, ethnic resentment began to bubble up because of the confusion between 
strategic national goals and the goals of ethnic groups. The Serbian nation sought to 
dominate the federation out of strategic power concerns, but this domination was often 
viewed through an ethnic lens. Croatia became concerned for its cultural survival in a 
similarly strategic manner, but this too was understood in ethnic terms. Leaders were able to 
portray strategic goals as ethnic division and therefore drum up fear and encourage people to 
divide themselves along ethnic lines. One method of prevention, therefore, would involve 
clearly delineating between strategic national goals and those of ethnic groups crossing over 
national boundaries. In emphasizing and maintaining this distinction, it would be more 
difficult for leaders to use such events for their own purposes.  
More specifically, prevention would involve keeping an eye on societies with 
growing economic, social, and political upheaval and trying to prevent the rise of 
antagonistic national leaders before they incite too much fear in the population. Although 
Michael Brown’s moderate theory is not endorsed in this study, the four problems he 
identifies as being central to ethnic conflict do in fact match up with the conditions that allow 
nationalist leaders to take control. Structural problems include weak states and security 
concerns, political problems include discriminatory laws and exclusionary national 
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ideologies, economic problems include issues of economic development and discrimination, 
and cultural problems include ethnic discrimination.796 International leaders can look to these 
general problem areas for signs that conditions are ripening for the rise of a manipulative 
nationalist leader. This asks a great deal of world leaders, as it is impossible to monitor 
domestic politics all over the world at all times, but this is an important and reliable way to 
predict future violence. 
The case of Yugoslavia is also helpful in presenting a model for recovery from brutal 
war. Although the region still has its fair share of problems, it has moved remarkably quickly 
toward moderate and reform-minded leadership. This has in large part been due to the 
region’s desire to join the European Union. This desire is particularly strong in Croatia, 
where people have long felt a stronger affinity to Western Europe than to the Balkans. On 
September 22, 2006, Croatian President Stjepan Mesic spoke to this point at the John F. 
Kennedy, Jr. Forum at Harvard University.  
Today there is openness to the world and also awareness that we are a part of 
the world, of Europe in the first place. We need Europe and this is the reason 
why we want to become a member of the European Union. At the same time, 
however, we are aware that Europe needs us too, not only Croatia but all the 
countries of the region as well. Simply, the European integration project 
would not be complete and finished without us.797 
Furthermore, in 2004 former Bosnian prime minister Haris Silajdzic stated, “Now that we 
have put roofs back over most of the houses, we need to put a European roof over Bosnia.”798 
Without a doubt there are people in the Balkans today who are not interested in joining the 
EU, most notably those in the Republika Srpska region of Bosnia.  However, an ever-
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growing number of Balkan leaders and citizens are expressing a strong and open desire to 
attain EU membership. 
 This drive for EU membership is important because of the organization’s reform 
requirements prior to entry. In many ways the EU allows leaders with moderate and reform-
minded policies to appear less threatening to a population which remains frightened and 
defensive after war. In another situation, a leader who grants extensive minority rights and 
preaches equality may appear so threatening to those harboring war resentment that efforts 
would be made to remove said politician. However, EU demands for reform prior to entry 
both encourage leaders to take this path and allow them to assuage a fearful population with 
the reassurance that reforms are being made because the EU requires them. In this sense, the 
EU makes reform a less dangerous path for leaders to pursue by simultaneously giving them 
a reason to push their populations toward tolerant policies more quickly and allowing elites 
to place blame for any unwanted repercussions of reforms on the EU. Croatia is much more 
dedicated to EU membership than either Bosnia or Serbia, and it is no coincidence that 
Croatia has made the greatest strides toward reform and equality. 
 Some may argue that if these states are introducing reforms to please the EU rather 
than because they believe in equality, such moderate politics are not an indication of tolerant 
views of the population. However, to a certain extent, the motivations for reform are 
irrelevant. Leaders may espouse integration and equality because they want to be welcomed 
into Europe, but their populations accept such statements without dissent. Children all over 
the country see their leaders advocating equality and are starting to learn such lessons in 
school as well. People may begin by accepting elite reforms for the sake of the EU, but by 
the time such reforms are enacted an atmosphere of tolerance in speech and in deed will have 
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been created and the society, regardless of its initial motivations, will be transformed. In this 
way, the EU acts as a catalyst for moderate politics to blossom even in the wake of great 
violence.  
 While opponents of modernization theory prove that the modern world in many ways 
makes conflict between ethnic groups more likely, the case of Yugoslavia illustrates the ways 
in which inventions of modernity like the EU can actually help to heal these conflicts. Some 
will no doubt argue that not all countries have a desire to join the EU, thus making the 
organization’s reform requirements inconsequential. However, as more countries are 
permitted to join the EU, the Balkan states being a prime example, those nations which are 
currently uninterested in membership may have an incentive to join or simply attain the 
approval of the international community in a similar way. While scholars often bemoan the 
ineffectiveness of the international community in improving other countries’ domestic 
problems, the EU has found a way to provide incentives for reform without forcing change 
on unwilling populations. The Balkan states are a prime example of the potential benefits of 
encouraging post-conflict states to seek EU membership. 
 
Yugoslavia’s Relevance to Iraq 
 While the Yugoslav violence of the early 1990s can provide policymakers with 
general guidelines regarding conflict prevention and resolution, Bosnia’s experience can also 
be applied more concretely to the case of the current war in Iraq. The fact that this 
comparison can be made in spite of a number of differences between the two situations 
suggests that the Yugoslav conflict can and will be helpful in resolving other specific 
conflicts in the future. In this sense, the comparison between Bosnia and Iraq illustrates the 
broader relevance of the Yugoslav violence for conflicts throughout the world. 
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Before detailing the ways in which Bosnia’s experience can be applied in Iraq, it is 
important to get a sense of Iraq’s history and situation. As in Bosnia, Iraq’s population 
consists of three major groups: the Sunni Muslims, the Shiite Muslims, and the Kurds. From 
the sixteenth century to the fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, Iraq was governed 
by the Turks. In 1920, the British took over Iraq in an attempt to alleviate the power vacuum 
left by the Ottomans. The British, however, only stayed long enough to put the Sunni 
Muslims in control of the Iraq government; the Sunnis were the dominant group in Iraq for 
the better part of a century.799 When US troops entered Iraq in March of 2003, the primary 
threats to US soldiers were the Sunni-led insurgency and violent acts of foreign terrorists. 
However, since the initial entry of US troops, the Iraq conflict has evolved into a different 
type of challenge. For the first time in nearly one hundred years, the Shiites are in control of 
the Iraq government. This change has led to great sectarian violence, and today feuds 
between the Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd populations of Iraq are leading to more deaths and 
destabilization than the Sunni insurgency ever did.800 This violence, which can only be 
described as ethnic cleansing, is ripping Iraq apart and has already led to the exodus of 
millions of Iraqi people and a growing problem with refugees.801 
In some ways, there are great similarities between the situation facing Bosnia in the 
early 1990s and that which faces Iraq today. Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Donahoe, a US army 
officer who served as an army captain on a peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslavia 
and is now stationed in Iraq, recently noted, “You talk to people [in Iraq] and it’s literally the 
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same conversations I heard in Bosnia.”802 Colonel Donahoe’s observation makes sense due to 
a number of similarities between the Iraqi and Bosnian experience.  
 As in Bosnia, the three communities of Iraq were deeply integrated prior to violence, 
with high rates of intermarriage between Shiites and Sunnis. Today, this past cooperation 
seems to be forgotten, and the three groups are making great efforts to separate themselves. 
Elders in Hamiya, a Shiite sub-district of the predominantly Sunni city Jurf as-Sakhr, now 
want to secede from the area despite the fact that Hamiya has been part of the city for 
decades.803 This is reminiscent of the events in Bosnia in 2001 when Croat inhabitants of 
Maglaj asked to be separated from their Muslim municipality and merged with the 
predominantly Croat municipality Zepce. In this sense, Bosnia’s unique situation of 
individuals fighting their former friends and neighbors is also seen today in Iraq. 
Furthermore, both Bosnia and Iraq pose the same challenge to international leaders: that of 
building a democracy in a country deeply divided by ethnic cleavage which has limited prior 
experience with this system of government.804 Nicholas Bonsor points out that in both Iraq 
and Bosnia, peacemakers face guerrilla war tactics and terrorist activities, tribal and ethnic 
hostilities, and the need to rebuild both the physical infrastructure and the political system 
after a major conflict.805 
In spite of these similarities, there are important differences between the situation in 
Bosnia and that in Iraq. For starters, the Iraq conflict exists on a much larger scale; Iraq is 
eight times the size and has six times the population of Bosnia. The US furnished only fifteen 
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percent of the troops and funding in Bosnia, and spent $21 billion between 1992 and 2000. 
Today, the US spends the same amount on just one year of activity in Iraq.806 The 
circumstances surrounding international intervention in the two conflicts are also quite 
different. The occupation of Bosnia was carried out under UN auspices by multinational 
forces executing a treaty negotiated by the Bosnian people themselves; the Iraq invasion was 
overwhelmingly American and unwanted. As a result, Bosnia had more international and 
domestic legitimacy to its occupation. International troops also made a long-term 
commitment to see the occupation through to the establishment of a stable, peaceful, and 
multi-ethnic government in Bosnia rather than trying to get out as quickly as possible.807 
Foreign troops entered Bosnia when the country was unstable and in need of assistance, but 
troops entered Iraq when the country was already stable. Furthermore, Balkan citizens had a 
more European outlook and culture than occupants of Iraq, making them more welcoming to 
such troops.808 
In spite of the differences between Iraq and Bosnia, the two conflicts have enough in 
common for the lessons of Bosnia to be applied in Iraq. The link between the two situations 
is far from perfect, but this fact simply shows how the violence of the former Yugoslavia has 
broad relevance today, even for conflicts that are different from the Balkan situation in 
distinct ways. One of the benefits of hindsight is that Bosnia provides an example of both 
things to emulate and avoid in Iraq. Dayton led to eleven years of peace in Bosnia but it also 
had its problems; the Accords institutionalized ethnic division and therefore initially resulted 
in stalemate. To review, Dayton established the House of Peoples, a legislative body 
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consisting of five Muslims, five Croats, and five Serbs. The criterion for membership in this 
body is purely ethnic, as is the criterion for the three member Bosnian presidency. Such 
restrictions solidify ethnic divisions and encourage people to think along these lines. 
Furthermore, this arrangement excludes ethnic minorities from both the House of Peoples 
and the presidency. The presidency also excludes Croats and Muslims from the RS, Serbs 
from the Federation, and children of mixed marriages. In many ways, such arrangements 
serve as obstacles to unity which should be avoided in Iraq whenever possible. 
 Bosnian experience also shows that rigidly dividing government officials and then 
asking them to use compromise as a decision-making tool leads only to stalemate. Recall the 
great disagreements between the three members of the Bosnian presidency after 1996 
elections brought candidates from the three nationalist parties into power. As a result, John 
Lampe argues that Bosnia’s experience of executive stalemate and legislative inaction should 
stand as a cautionary tale for Iraq to avoid ethnic quotas for representation at every possible 
turn.809 Bosnia survived relatively unscathed, but Iraq could experience a more profound and 
problematic stalemate than Bosnia did, and this situation should therefore be avoided. 
 Furthermore, Bosnia’s failure to achieve peace with the Vance Owen Plan in 1993 
can also provide leaders with guidelines for avoiding such problems in Iraq. Many scholars 
argue that the Vance Owen Plan was a satisfactory option for peace but that it ultimately 
failed to end the conflict because the combatants were not yet prepared to compromise. Each 
group still believed that if it kept on fighting, it could reach its ultimate goal and avoid 
compromise altogether. This experience shows leader that the first step toward peace in Iraq 
is not developing a comprehensive peace plan but rather helping each group to see that 
compromise is inevitable. No matter how equitable a peace treaty may be, the case of Bosnia 
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illustrates that groups will not accept its terms unless they have already accepted that some 
sacrifices will have to be made. 
 Luckily, it appears that the Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds of Iraq have already begun to 
come to this realization. The Shiites originally wanted complete power of the Iraq 
government but now realize that they can rule only with Sunni approval because they are not 
powerful enough to defeat a Sunni insurrection. The Sunnis were previously fighting for a 
strong central government because they believed that they would retake power and thus 
control the country. However, they now see that the greatest danger to their interests would 
be a highly centralized Shiite-run state and thus are more apt to agree to a federalist system. 
The Kurds wanted to consolidate the autonomy that they have built up over the past fifteen 
years by breaking away from Iraq, but they now see that they require a united Iraq as 
protection from the Turks.810 It seems then, that all three groups are coming to realize that 
compromise is inevitable. The war in Bosnia illustrates that this is an important step toward 
brokering a peace arrangement, and that it is only by emphasizing these budding moves 
toward compromise that cooperation will become possible in Iraq. 
 As Iraqis begin to face the inevitability of compromise, the question becomes: what 
type of peace arrangement should be implemented in Iraq? Again, Bosnia provides a helpful 
example. While many endorse Iraq unity, the great sectarian violence and ethnic divisions in 
the country suggest that such a plan can not be feasibly implemented. “The Iraqis talk about 
national unity but their behavior suggests they want decentralization.”811 Bosnia faced a 
similar challenge; when the time came for compromise, the country had to reconcile present 
ethnic division with future goals of unity. In Bosnia, this challenge was solved with the 
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Dayton Accords, suggesting that a similar plan could serve useful in Iraq as well. Such an 
arrangement would “create a central government with a few key powers, reinforce strong 
regional governments, and separate the sectarian groups as much as possible.”812 The Iraqi 
constitution already gives the provinces the power to have their own security services, send 
ambassadors to foreign countries, and join together to form regions, so the decentralization of 
a soft partition agreement would not be a huge change in Iraq. 
 The main objection to soft partition in Iraq is that the Sunni and Shiite populations are 
too intermingled in Baghdad and elsewhere to truly separate. However, the Iraq population 
has become much more homogeneous since the start of violence, so while mixed 
communities remain, much of the country is already divided by ethnicity.813 Furthermore, the 
experience in Bosnia illustrates that soft partition can be achieved without creating ethnically 
exclusive regions. Serbs live in the Federation just as Croats and Muslims live in the RS. 
Still, the desired effect remains: each group feels they have a government which represents 
and protects them, regardless of where in Bosnia they choose to live. For this reason, 
integrated populations in Iraq would not have to be separated for a Dayton-like arrangement 
to work, and in fact such integration would be encouraged as a step toward eventual unity. 
 However, it remains important for policy makers to face the reality of mixed 
communities; Bosnia’s experience with this issue must also be applied in Iraq. Integrated 
areas must be monitored and protected by international peacekeepers not only as a precaution 
in case violence gets out of control, but also simply to keep people feeling safe in their own 
homes. Recall that in 2002, when the UN announced that SFOR troops in Bosnia would be 
reduced from 19,000 to 12,000, Bosnian Muslims in Voljevica said that if the troops left, 
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they would leave as well. This, along with other experiences where minority returns did not 
begin in earnest in Bosnia until international troops were present, show the importance of 
such protection in mixed areas. Iraqis must be confident that those who cooperate with the 
allies will be fully protected and that they will remain safe in their homes. 
 In addition to providing peacekeeping troops, the international community must be 
prepared to get involved in Iraq in other ways. While the prospect of future EU membership 
has had great and positive effects on the Balkan region, any comparison between Bosnia and 
Iraq “cannot, of course, include a conceivable path to EU membership for Iraq.”814 However, 
Bosnia’s experience with the international community has extended beyond a Stabilization 
and Association Agreement with the EU. In fact, much of Bosnia’s progress has been due to 
international groups working to improve the situation in the country. Recall that the United 
Nations organization UNPROFOR regulated fighting during the war, while the 
Implementation Force and Stabilization Force worked to maintain peace in its wake. A 
number of international groups have put great efforts toward bringing peace and tolerance to 
Bosnian society. Such groups include the United Nations, the European Union, the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, and the Peace Implementation Council, as well as the Office of the High 
Representative. Bosnia provides a shining example of the potential benefits of international 
cooperation and the ways in which similar success can be achieved in Iraq. 
 The experience of Bosnia illustrates the importance not just of international 
involvement in general but of multi-lateral cooperation more specifically. This suggests that 
part of resolving the Iraq conflict will require the participation of more countries than are 
currently involved. “The largest post-intervention lesson [the case of Bosnia] offers is that 
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the United States and its international partners can work effectively together once they are 
together. America will need more partners than it has in Iraq now.”815 As a result, the case of 
Bosnia reveals that the US exit strategy in Iraq must instead become a transition strategy, 
aiming to hand power over to a more multi-lateral force that can ease Iraq into a peaceful 
future and get it back on its feet slowly. As in Bosnia, international forces must become 
involved in Iraq with a long-term agenda of facilitating peace and tolerance for years to 
come, rather than one that involves leaving as soon as the violence itself is brought to an end. 
 
Conclusion 
 A thorough examination of the Croatian and Bosnian wars serves not only to facilitate 
a greater understanding of the region and its people but also to draw conclusions about 
conflict in general. The violence in Yugoslavia illustrates that conflicts can never be purely 
ethnic in nature, even if an ethnic component is present. This mandates more careful and 
thorough examinations of the true motivations for conflict and will hopefully lead to more 
thoughtful solutions to problems presented in the future. The wars of Yugoslav dissolution 
can be explained by elite manipulation not simply because other theories are inadequate, but 
because elite manipulation captures certain truths about the Balkans’ past and people which 
other theories tend to ignore. 
 It is important to study the Balkan conflicts of the early 1990s not just in order to 
understand the region itself but to understand future conflicts. Abstract lessons can be 
derived from the Yugoslav experience, such as the importance of alleviating domestic 
problems before they get out of hand and appreciating the power of EU membership 
standards in post-conflict recovery. The lessons of the Croatian and Bosnian wars can also be 
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applied to individual conflicts more specifically, as exemplified by the application of the 
Bosnian conflict to the current situation in Iraq. An understanding of the Balkan violence is 
important in understanding the region, conceptualizing conflict more generally, and dealing 
with the prevention and resolution of specific conflicts in the present and future. 
 The most important lesson to be derived from the Yugoslav experience is simply 
never to develop uninformed assumptions about the causes or circumstances surrounding a 
violent conflict. The motivation for violence is rarely simple and straight-forward, and to 
accept such an explanation at face value without investigating the situation for oneself is to 
short-change the fears and grievances of the perpetrators and cheapen the lives of the victims. 
The Bosnian and Croatian wars ultimately illustrate that things are not always as they seem 
and to assume otherwise is inaccurate, unfair, and potentially dangerous. 
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Historical Timeline 
576: Slavic people begin migrating to the Balkans. 
 
1051: The Serbian Empire officially comes into being when its first monarch is brought to 
power. 
 
1371: The Serbs are defeated by the Ottomans at the Battle of Maricsa. 
 
1389: The Serbian Empire is officially taken over by the Ottoman Turks at the Battle of 
Kosovo. 
 
1463: Bosnia is absorbed by the Ottoman Empire. 
 
1826: The Treaty of Akkerman establishes Serbian de facto independence from the Ottoman 
Empire. 
 
1876: Serbia and Montenegro declare war against the Ottoman Empire. 
 
1877: Serbia and Montenegro are defeated. 
 
1878: Bosnia-Herzegovina is officially occupied by the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. 
 
1908: Austria-Hungary formally annexes Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
 
1912: The First Balkan War begins when Montenegro launches an attack on the Ottoman 
Empire. 
 
1913: The Balkan states are victorious against the Ottoman Empire, and peace is established 
by the Treaty of London. Discontent over the details of this arrangement leads to the Second 
Balkan War, in which Bulgaria suffers a great defeat at the hands of Serbia and Greece. 
 
1914: Archduke Ferdinand is assassinated by an ethnic Serb. Austria-Hungary declares war 
on Serbia one month later. 
 
1915: Serbia is invaded and occupied by Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. 
 
1918: World War I is concluded by the Treaty of Paris and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, 
and Slovenes is officially created. 
 
1921: The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes creates its first constitution. 
 
1928: The shooting of five Croatian Peasant Party delegates in the parliament leads to riots in 
Zagreb. Alexander responds by installing a personal dictatorship and renaming the Kingdom 
Yugoslavia. 
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1929: Croat leader Ante Pavelic leaves Yugoslavia due to Alexander’s repressive tactics and 
takes initial steps in the creation of the Ustashe with the help of Mussolini. 
 
1933: Hitler comes to power in Germany. 
 
1934: Alexander is assassinated and Prince Regent Paul assumes the leadership of 
Yugoslavia.  
 
1935: A new Yugoslav government is formed under the premiership of Milan Stojadinovic. 
 
1939: The Sporazum creates an autonomous Croatia within Yugoslavia. Hitler invades 
Poland and the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and France declare war on 
Germany. 
 
1941: Yugoslavia signs the Tripartite Pact which commits it to support the Axis powers. 
Germany invades Yugoslavia and occupies it for the rest of the war. The region is divided 
into German and Italian occupation zones. The Independent State of Croatia is created, and 
the Ustashe put in power. 
 
1942: The Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) is 
created by Tito and his Partisans. 
 
1943: AVNOJ is declared the government of Yugoslavia. Tito receives the title of marshal 
and remains in command of the armed forces. 
 
1945: The Germans surrender and the Independent State of Croatia falls. Tito officially takes 
over the government of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. 
 
1946: A new Yugoslav constitution is passed which splits the country into federal republics. 
 
1948: A rift develops between Stalin and Tito; Yugoslavia is expelled from the Cominform. 
 
1963: A new constitution is adopted which increases decentralization, implements personnel 
rotation in elected positions, renames the state the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
and appoints Tito as president for life. 
 
1967: Seventeen leading cultural organizations in Croatia publish a manifesto demanding 
that the Croatian language and culture be better protected by the constitution. 
 
1968: Muslims are officially made a nationality in Yugoslavia. 
 
1971: The government passes twenty-three amendments to the 1963 constitution. 
 
1972: Tito implements a series of purges against suspected Croat nationalists in the Croatian 
League of Communists. 
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1974: A new constitution is passed which grants theoretical statehood to each republic and 
province in Yugoslavia. 
 
1980: Tito dies at the age of 87. 
 
1986: A Belgrade newspaper publishes excerpts from the Memorandum of the Serbian 
Academy of Sciences and Arts which reveals shockingly extreme ethnic resentment. 
 
1987: Slobodan Milosevic becomes president of the Serbian Communist Party. 
 
1989: Slovenia passes a new constitution, giving itself legislative sovereignty and declaring 
its right to secede. 
 
1990: Elections bring nationalist leaders to power in Croatia and Bosnia. 
 
1991: Croatia and Slovenia declare independence from Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav National 
Army, under the direction of Milosevic, invades Croatia and war begins. In August the Serbs 
lay siege to Vukovar; the city falls in November after ninety percent of it is destroyed. By 
December, Serb rebels control one-fifth of Croatia’s territory. 
 
1992: The Republika Srpska is founded. Germany, the European Union, and the United 
States recognize Croatia and Slovenia’s independence. A ceasefire is signed in February to 
end fighting in Croatia. Bosnia declares independence from Yugoslavia. The RS declares its 
independence from Bosnia and the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna is created. 
Fighting begins in Bosnia in March. In May, Ratko Mladic takes command of the RS army 
and by December, the RS controls three quarters of Bosnian territory. 
 
1993: The Vance Owen Peace Plan is finalized in January but is never fully implemented. 
The Serbs attack Sarajevo and Srebrenica until UN demands compel them to cease. 
 
1994: A ceasefire is signed between Bosnian Croats and Muslims and a Muslim-Croat 
Federation is formed. Bosnian Serb forces take 200 hostages in Gorazde. 
 
1995: Serb troops murder thousands of Muslims in Srebrenica in July. In August, the 
Croatian government runs 200,000 Serbs out of the Krajina region. A ceasefire is reached in 
October, and in December the Dayton Accords are signed. 
 
1996: Protests erupt in Serbia after Milosevic annuls local elections which bring opposition 
candidates to power; Milosevic is forced to give these politicians their rightfully earned 
positions but remains leader of Serbia. The Sarajevo Declaration is signed in a commitment 
to restore multi-ethnicity to Bosnia’s capital. 
 
1997: Ethnic violence in the Bosnian town of Mostar causes international alarm. 
 
1998: Serbia invades Kosovo. Bosnian elections affirm popular support for nationalist 
politicians. 
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1999: Milosevic declares war with Kosovo. The Hague Tribunal brings criminal charges 
against Milosevic. In June, NATO air raids halt after Milosevic agrees to a ceasefire. In 
December, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman dies. 
 
2000: Croatian elections remove the Croatian Democratic Union from power in the 
parliament and bring Stjepan Mesic, backed by a liberal coalition, to the presidency. Vojislav 
Kostunica defeats Milosevic in the Serbian presidential race; by October, Milosevic is 
overthrown. 
 
2001: Serb protestors disrupt mosque reconstruction ceremonies in Banja Luka and Trebinje, 
leading to great anger in the Muslim community. 
 
2002: A multi-ethnic museum is opened in Sarajevo celebrating the culture and faith of all 
three Bosnian communities. Eleven months later, a Muslim man shoots an entire Croat 
returnee family. 
 
2003: Elections bring the Croatian Democratic Union back into power in the Croatian 
parliament. 
 
2004: Boris Tadic is elected president of Serbia. An official Republika Srpska commission 
admits that Serbs participated in the Srebrenica massacre and issues an official apology to the 
Muslim community. The one millionth refugee returns to Bosnia. 
 
2005: The Croatian public re-elects Mesic as president. Croatian nationalist leader Ante 
Gotovina is arrested and brought to the Hague for prosecution. Croatia and Serbia both begin 
negotiations for Stabilization and Association Agreements with the EU. 
 
2006: Bosnia begins negotiations for a Stabilization and Association Agreement. 
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Appendix A: Balkan Opinion Polls 1994-2006 
Croatian Attitudes Toward Other Nationalities in the State and Region, 1994 
 
Nationality % favorable % unfavorable 
Serb Minorities in Croatia:   
 Krajina Serbs (occupied Croatia) 6 94
Urban Serbs (in Zagreb and elsewhere) 48 52
Serbs in Serbia 21 78
Montenegrins 29 68
Bosnian Muslims 45 54
Albanians 64 34
Macedonians 73 25
Slovenians 60 39
Hungarians 92 6
Cohen, Lenard J. “Embattled Democracy: Postcommunist Croatia in Transition.” 
Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe. Karen 
Dawisha and Bruce Parrott ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 
102. 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina Opinion Poll, October 2004 
With regards to blame and responsibility, please indicate whose role you consider to be "Very 
Significant," "Significant," "Of Some Significance," "Of Little Significance," or "Of No Significance." 
Bosniaks 
Very 
Significant Serbs 
Very 
Significant Croats 
Very 
Significant
Serbs role in 
starting the war 68 US role in the war 66
No one takes 
responsibility for 
starting the war 62
No one takes 
responsibility for 
starting the war 42
NATO's role in the 
war 64
Serbs role in 
starting the war 60
The international 
community did not 
act impartially 39
The international 
community did not 
act impartially 58
The international 
community did not 
act impartially 57
Everyone blames 
everyone else for 
starting the war 36
Bosniaks role in 
starting the war 54
Everyone blames 
everyone else for 
starting the war 55
International 
community's role in 
the war 32
International 
community's role in 
the war 50
The international 
community blames 
all sides equally 52
NATO's role in the 
war 32
Europe's role in the 
war 47
Bosniaks role in 
starting the war  37
US role in the war 31
Croats role in 
starting the war 44 US role in the war 30
The international 
community 30
No one takes 
responsibility for 
starting the war 43
International 
community's role in 
the war 30
Europe's role in the 
war 29
The international 
community blames 
all sides equally 34 UN role in the war 26
UN role in the war 28
Everyone blames 
everyone else for 
starting the war 34
NATO's role in the 
war 23
Croats role in 
starting the war 19 UN role in the war 32
Europe's role in the 
war 23
Bosniaks role in 
starting the war 8
Serbs role in 
starting the war 23
Croats role in 
starting the war 14
PeacePolls.org, "Bosnia and Herzegovina - October 2004 - A People's Peace Process for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina?" University of Liverpool Institute of Irish Studies, available at 
http://www.peacepolls.org/Resources/BosniaFull.pdf (accessed December 10, 2006). 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina Opinion Poll, October 2004 
With regards to inter-ethnic relations please indicate which factors you consider to be  "Very Significant," 
"Significant," "Of Some Significance," "Of Little Significance," or "Of No Significance." 
Bosniaks 
Very 
Significant Serbs 
Very 
Significant Croats 
Very 
Significant
The political impact 
of interference from 
Serbia 45
Lack of financial 
support for 
returnees 42
Lack of financial 
support for 
returnees 39
Lack of financial 
support for 
returnees 44
Ethnic stereotypes 
and prejudices are 
still very strong 40
Ethnic stereotypes 
and prejudices are 
still very strong 28
Significant numbers 
of people do not 
feel BiH is their 
state or homeland 43
Significant numbers 
of people do not 
feel BiH is their 
state or homeland 38
Returnees and their 
neighbors do not 
trust each other  27
The political impact 
of interference from 
Croatia 43
People are not 
allowed to return 
back to their homes 38
People are not 
allowed to return 
back to their homes 27
Ethnic stereotypes 
and prejudices are 
still very strong 43
Personal hatred and 
revenge 37
Significant numbers 
of people do not 
feel BiH is their 
state or homeland 27
Educational system 
based on ethnic 
segregation 36
Returnees and their 
neighbors do not 
trust each other  32
Discrimination 
against the 
members of ethnic 
minority groups 25
Discrimination 
against the 
members of ethnic 
minority groups 34
Educational system 
based on ethnic 
segregation 29
Personal hatred and 
revenge 24
Personal hatred and 
revenge 32
Discrimination 
against the 
members of ethnic 
minority groups 28
The political impact 
of interference from 
Serbia 23
People are not 
allowed to return 
back to their homes 32
Local communities 
do not want 
returnees 28
Local communities 
do not want 
returnees 22
Returnees and their 
neighbors do not 
trust each other  30
The political impact 
of interference from 
Croatia 21
Educational system 
based on ethnic 
segregation 21
Local communities 
do not want 
returnees 27
The political impact 
of interference from 
Serbia 17
The political impact 
of interference from 
Croatia 20
PeacePolls.org, "Bosnia and Herzegovina - October 2004 - A People's Peace Process for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina?" University of Liverpool Institute of Irish Studies, available at 
http://www.peacepolls.org/Resources/BosniaFull.pdf (accessed December 10, 2006). 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina Opinion Poll, October 2004 
With regard to inter-ethnic relations, please indicate which options you consider to be 
"Essential," "Desirable," "Acceptable," "Tolerable," or "Unacceptable." For the purposes 
of this poll: 
Essential means you believe this option is a necessary part of a secure, stable and better 
future and should be fully implemented. 
Desirable means this option is not what you would consider essential, but you think this 
option, or something very similar to it, is a good idea and should be put into practice. 
Acceptable means that this option is not what you would consider to be desirable, if you 
were given a choice, but you could certainly "live with it." 
Tolerable means this option is not what you want. But, as a part of a secure, stable, and 
better future, you would be willing to put up with it. 
Unacceptable means this option is completely unacceptable under any circumstances. 
You would not accept it, even as part of a secure, stable and better future. 
 Essential Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable
Become equal 
citizens of Bosnia 62 28 7 1 1
Religious leaders 
should work for 
peace 61 26 10 1 1
Become citizens of 
Europe 55 29 12 3 1
Some politicians 
should recognize BiH 
as their state 52 31 13 2 1
There should be 
acknowledgement by 
all groups of the 
wrongs they have 
done 50 34 12 2 1
Introduce EU 
standards for culture 
of nationalities 46 35 15 3 2
There should be 
some dedicated 
reconciliation process 41 31 21 3 3
PeacePolls.org, "Bosnia and Herzegovina - October 2004 - A People's Peace Process 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina?" University of Liverpool Institute of Irish Studies, available 
at http://www.peacepolls.org/Resources/BosniaFull.pdf (accessed December 10, 2006). 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina Opinion Poll: Ten Years After Dayton 
Which of the following two opinions is closer to yours? 
The sustainability of Republika Srpska is the 
only guarantee for the sustainability of Serbs 
in BiH 66.2
BiH integration into EU, together with other 
countries of ex Yugoslavia, is a guarantee for 
sustainability and prosperity of Serbs in BiH 25.9
None 3.1
Don't know/no answer 4.8
Respondents from RS only.  
 
Gerard Toal, John O'Loughlin, and Dino Djipa, "Bosnia-
Herzegovina Ten Years after Dayton: Constitutional 
Chagne and Public Opinion," Eurasian Geography and 
Economics, (Vol. 47, No. 1, 2006): 71. 
 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Opinion Poll: Ten Years After Dayton 
If the surrender of Radovan Karadzic would be a condition for BiH to join NATO and 
the EU, would you support his surrender? 
Response Bosniaks Serbs Croats 
Yes 91.5 37.4 86.6
No 5.8 53.8 5.9
Don't know/refuse to say 2.8 8.8 7.5
Gerard Toal, John O'Loughlin, and Dino Djipa, "Bosnia-Herzegovina Ten Years after 
Dayton: Constitutional Chagne and Public Opinion," Eurasian Geography and 
Economics, (Vol. 47, No. 1, 2006): 72. 
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Appendix B: Post-Dayton Election Results 
 
Croatia Presidential Elections, June 15, 1997 
Candidate % votes 
Dr. Franjo Tudjman (Croatian Democratic 
Union) 61.41
Dr. Zdravko Tomac (Social Democratic 
Party) 21.03
Vladimir Gotovac (Croatian Social-Liberal 
Party) 17.56
The Europa World Yearbook, 40 ed., s.v. “Croatia.” 
Croatia Presidential Elections, First Ballot, January 24, 2000 
Candidate # votes % votes 
Stjepan Mesic (Coalition*) 1,100,671 41.11
Drazen Budisa (Social 
Democratic Party/Croatian 
Social-Liberal Party) 741,837 27.71
Dr. Mate Granic (Croatian 
Democratic Union) 601,588 22.47
Slaven Letic (Independent) 110,782 4.14
Ante Djapic (Croatian Party of 
Rights) 49,288 1.84
Ante Ledic (Independent) 228,751 0.85
Tomislav Mercept (Croatian 
People's Party) 22,672 0.85
Ante Prkacin (New Croatia) 7,401 0.28
Dr. Zvonimir Separovic 
(Independent) 7,235 0.27
Presidential Elections, Second Ballot, February 7, 2000 
Candidate % votes  
Stjepan Mesic (Coalition*) 56.21
Drazen Budisa (Social 
Democratic Party/Croatian 
Social-Liberal Party 43.79
*Mesic's coalition included the Croatian Peasants' Party, the 
Liberal Party, the Croatian People's Party, and the Istrian 
Democratic Assembly) 
 
The Europa World Yearbook, 43 ed., s.v. “Croatia.” 
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Croatia Presidential Elections, 1st ballot, January 2, 2005 
Candidate # votes % votes 
Stjepan Mesic (Coalition*) 1,089,398 48.92
Jadranka Kosar (Croatian Democratic 
Union) 452,218 20.31
Boris Miksic (Independent) 396,093 17.79
Durda Adlesic (Croatian Social Liberal 
Party) 59,795 2.68
Slaven Letica (Independent) 57,748 2.59
Ljubo Cesic (Independent) 41,216 1.85
Ivic Pasalic (Croatian Bloc Movement 
for a Modern Croatia) 40,637 1.82
Anto Kovacevic (Croatian Christian 
Democratic Union) 19,145 0.86
Miroslav Blazevic (Party of Croatian 
Defenders) 17,847 0.8
Miroslav Rajh (Croatian Youth Party) 14,766 0.66
Doris Kosta (Independent) 8,271 0.37
Mladen Keser (Independent) 7,056 0.32
Tomislav Petrak (Croatian Popular 
Party) 2,614 0.12
Presidential Elections, Second Ballot, January 16, 2005 
Candidate # votes % votes 
Stjepan Mesic (Coalition*) 1,454,451 65.93
Jadranka Kosar (Croatian Democratic 
Union) 751,696 34.07
*Mesic's coalition included the Social Democratic Pary, the 
Croatian People's Party, the Croatian Peasants' Party, Istrian 
Democratic Assembly, Party of Liberal Democrats, Liberal 
Party, Primorje and Gorski Kotar Alliance, and the Party of 
Democratic Action. 
 
The Europa World Yearbook, 47 ed., s.v. “Croatia.” 
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Croatia Chamber of Representatives Elections, October 29, 
1995 
Party % votes # seats 
Croatian Democratic Union 45.23 42
Opposition Electoral Alliance* 18.26 16
Croatian Social-Liberal Party 11.55 10
Social Democratic Party 8.93 8
Croatian Party of Rights 5.01 4
Others 11.02 -
*The Opposition Electoral Alliance included the Croatian 
People's Party, the Croatian Peasants' Party, the Croatian 
Social-Liberal Party, the Croatian Party of Rights, the Croatian 
Independent Democrats, the Istrian Democratic Assembly, 
and the Social Democratic Party. 
 
The Europa World Yearbook, 40 ed., s.v. “Croatia.” 
Croatia Chamber of Representatives Elections, January 3, 2000 
Party % votes # seats 
Social Democratic Party  44
Croatian Social-Liberal Party 24
Primorian-Goranian Union 2
Slavonian-Baranian Croatian Party 
47 
1
Croatian Democratic Union 30.5 45
Croatian Peasants' Party 16
Istrian Democratic Assembly 4
Liberal Party 2
Croatian People's Party 2
Croatian Social Democrats' Action 
15.9 
1
Croatian Party of Rights 5
Croatian Christian Democratic Union 
3.3 
1
The Europa World Yearbook, 43 ed., s.v. “Croatia.” 
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Croatia Chamber of Representatives Elections, November 23, 
2003 
Party % votes # seats 
Croatian Democratic Union 35.91 66
Social Democratic Party, Liberal Party, 
Istrian Democratic Assembly 22.61 43
Croatian People's Party, Croatian Party of 
Slavona and Baranja, Primorje Gorski Kotar 
Alliance 8.02 11
Croatian Peasants' Party 7.15 9
Croatian Party of Rights, Zagorje Democratic 
Party 6.37 8
Croatian Social Liberation Party, Democratic 
Center 4.05 3
Croatian Pensioners Party 3.97 3
Croatian Democratic Peasant's Party 1 1
Others 12.92 -
The Europa World Yearbook, 47 ed., s.v. “Croatia.” 
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Serbia Presidential Elections, December 7, 1997 
Candidate % votes  
Milan Milutinovic (Socialist Party of Serbia, 
Yugoslav Left, New Democracy) 43.7 
Vojislav Seselj (Serbian Radical Party) 32.2 
Vuk Draskovic (Serbian Renewal Movement) 16 
Journal of Democracy, “Election Watch,” Journal of Democracy, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v009/9.1election_watch.html 
(accessed December 7, 2006). 
 
Serbia Presidential Elections, September 24, 2000 
Candidate # votes % votes 
Vojislav Kostunica (Democratic 
Party of Serbia) 2,470,304 51.71
Slobodan Milosevic (Socialist 
Party of Serbia/Yugoslav Left) 1,826,799 38.24
Tomislav Nikolic (Serbian Radical 
Party) 289,013 6.05
Vojislav Mihailovic (Serbian 
Renewal Movement) 145,019 3.04
Miodrag Viojvoic (Affirmative 
Party) 45,946 0.96
Election Guide, “Election Profile: Serbia and Montenegro, 
Presidential,” International Foundation for Election Systems, 
http://www.electionguide.org/results.php?ID=949 (accessed 
December 7, 2006). 
 
Serbia Presidential Elections, December 8, 2002 
Candidate # votes % votes 
Vojislav Kostunica (Democratic 
Party of Serbia) 1,699,098 57.7
Vojislav Seselj (Serbian Radical 
Party) 1,063,296 36.1
Borislav Pelevic 103,926 3.5
Psephos, “Serbia Presidential Elections 2002,” Australian 
Elections Archive, http://psephos.adam-
carr.net/countries/s/serbia/serbiadec2002.txt (accessed 
December 7, 2006). 
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Serbia Presidential Elections, November 16, 2003 
Candidate # votes % votes 
Tomislav Nikolic (Serb Radical Party) 1,166,896 47.9
Dragoljub Micunovic (Democratic Opposition 
of Serbia*) 893,906 36.7
Velimir Ilic (New Serbia) 229,229 9.4
Marijan Risticevic 72,105 3
Dragan Tomic 54,703 2.2
Radoslav Avlijas 20,782 0.9
*Coalition of 18 parties including the Democratic Party, the 
Democratic Party of Serbia, the Civic Alliance of Serbia, the Demo-
Christian Party of Serbia, New Serbia, and others. 
 
Psephos, “Serbia Presidential Elections 2003,” Australian Elections 
Archive, http://psephos.adam-
carr.net/countries/s/serbia/serbia2003.txt (accessed December 7, 
2006). 
 
Serbia Presidential Elections, First Ballot, June 13, 2004 
Candidate # votes % votes 
Tomislav Nikolic (Serbian Radical 
Party) 954,339 30.97
Boris Tadic (Democratic Party) 853,584 27.7
Bogoljub Kavic (Independent) 568,691 18.46
Dragan Marsicanin (Democratic 
Party of Serbia/G17 Plus/Serbian 
Renewal Movement) 414,971 13.47
Ivica Dacic (Socialist Party of 
Serbia) 125,952 4.09
Others 163,503 5.31
Presidential Elections, Second Ballot, June 27, 2004 
Candidate # votes % votes 
Boris Tadic (Democratic Party) 1,681,528 53.97
Tomislav Nikolic (Serbian Radical 
Party) 1,434,068 46.03
The Europa World Yearbook, 47 ed., s.v. “Serbia and 
Montenegro.” 
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Republican Legislature of Serbia Elections, September 21, 1997 
Party % votes # seats 
Socialist Party of Serbia, Yugoslav Left, New 
Democracy 34.3 110
Serbian Radical Party 28 82
Zajedno Coalition, Serbian Renewal Movement 19.2 45
Journal of Democracy, “Election Watch,” Journal of Democracy, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v009/9.1election_watch.html 
(accessed December 7, 2006). 
 
Republical Legislature of Serbia Elections, September 24, 2000 
Party % votes # seats 
Democratic Opposition of Serbia* 43.86 58
Socialist Party of Serbia - Yugoslav Left 32.95 44
Serbian People's Party of Montenegro 2.24 28
Serbian Radical Party 8.73 5
Serbian Renewal Movement 5.12 0
Other parties 7.1 3
*Coalition of 18 parties including the Democratic Party, the 
Democratic Party of Serbia, the Civic Alliance of Serbia, the 
Demo-Christian Party of Serbia, New Serbia, and others. 
 
Election Guide, “Election Profile: Serbia and Montenegro, 
Parliamentary,” International Foundation for Election Systems, 
http://www.electionguide.org/results.php?ID=950 (accessed 
December 7, 2006). 
 
Republican Legislature of Serbia Elections, Dec 28, 2003 
Party % votes # seats 
Serbian Radical Party 27.97 82
Democratic Party of Serbia 17.96 53
Democratic Party 12.75 37
G17 Plus 11.61 34
Serbian Renewal Movement/New Serbia 7.76 22
Socialist Party of Serbia 7.72 22
Others 14.23 -
The Europa World Yearbook, 47 ed., s.v. “Serbia and 
Montenegro.” 
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Bosnia State Presidency, September 14, 1996 
Candidates # votes % vote 
Bosniaks  
Alija Izetbegovic (Party of Democratic 
Action) 730,592 81.01%
Haris Silajdzic (Party for Bosnia-
Herzegovina) 124,396 13.79%
Fikret Abdic (Democratic People's 
Union) 25,584 2.84%
Sead Avdic (Joint List for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina*) 21,254 2.36%
Croats  
Kresimir Zubak (Croatian Democratic 
Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina) 330,477 89.76%
Ivo Komisci (Join List for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina*) 37,684 10.24%
Serbs  
Momcilo Krajisnik (Serb Democratic 
Party) 690,646 67.30%
Mladen Ivanic (People's Alliance for 
Peace and Progress**) 307,461 29.96%
Milivoje Zaric (Serb Patriotic Party) 15,407 1.50%
Branko Latinovic (Serb Party of 
Krajina) 12,643 1.23%
*The Join List for Bosnia and Herzegovina is a coliation 
including the Union of Social Democrats of Bosnia 
Herzegovina, the Social Democratic Party, the HSS, and the 
Muslim Bosniak Organization. 
**The People's Alliance for Peace and Progress is a coalition 
including the Socialist Party of Serbia for the Republika 
Srpska, the Independent Social Democrats of the Republika 
Srpska, the Social Liberal Party, the Yugoslav United Left, 
and the New Radical Party. 
 
The Europa World Yearbook, 38 ed., s.v. “Bosnia 
Herzegovina.” 
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Bosnia State Presidency, September 12-13, 1998 
Candidates # votes % vote 
Bosniaks  
Dr. Alija Izetbegovic (Party of 
Democratic Action) 511,309 86.79%
Fikret Abdic (Democratic People's 
Union) 36,446 6.19%
Sefer Halilovic 33,680 5.72%
Harija Ahlilovic 7,690 1.31%
Croats  
Ante Jelavic (Croatian 
Democratic Union of Bosnia 
Herzegovina) 189,408 82.27%
Gradimir Gojer N/A N/A
Kresimir Zubak (New Croatian 
Initiative) 40,811 17.73%
Serbs  
Zivko Radisic (Socialist Party of 
the Serb Republic 360,286 51.24%
Momcilo Krajinsnik (Serbian 
Democratic Party) 315,480 44.86%
Zoran Tadic 27,427 3.90%
The Europa World Yearbook, 42 ed., s.v. “Bosnia 
Herzegovina.” 
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Bosnia State Presidency, October 5, 2002 
Candidate # votes % vote 
Bosniaks  
Sulejman Tihic (Party of Democratic 
Action) 192,661 37.29
Haris Silajdzic (Party for Bosnia-
Herzegovina) 179,726 34.79
Alija Behman (Social Democratic 
Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina 90,434 17.51
Fikret Abdic (Democratic People's 
Union) 21,164 4.1
Others 32,625 6.31
Croats  
Dragan Corvic (Croatian Democratic 
Union of Bosnia-
Herzegovina/Croatian Christian 
Democratic Union) 114,606 61.52
Mladen Ivankovic-Lijanovic 
(Economic Bloc HDU for Progress) 32,411 17.4
Mijo Anic (New Croat Initiative) 16,345 8.77
Stjepan Kljuic (Republican Party) 9,413 5.05
Others 13,516 7.26
Serbs  
Mirko Sarovic (Serb Democratic 
Party) 180,212 35.52
Nebojsa Radmonovic (Alliance of 
Independent Social Democrats) 101,119 19.93
Ognjen Tadic (Serbian Radical Party 
of the Republika Srpska) 44,262 8.72
Desnica Radevojevic (Party of 
Democratic Action) 41,667 8.21
Mirko Banjac (Alliance  for National 
Rebirth) 23,238 4.58
Mladen Grahovac (Social 
Democratic Party) 22,852 4.5
Others 52,836 10.41
The Europa World Yearbook, 47 ed., s.v. “Bosnia 
Herzegovina.” 
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Bosnia State Presidency, October 1, 2006 
Candidate # votes % vote 
Bosniaks  
Haris Silajdžic (Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina) 288,321 62.1
Sulejman Tihic (Party of Democratic Action) 130,470 28.1
Mirnes Ajanovic (Patriotic Bloc) 38,412 8.3
Croats  
Željko Komšic (Social Democratic Party of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina) 97,267 40.8
Ivo Miro Jovic (Croatian Democratic Union of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina) 59,831 25.1
Božo Ljubic (Croatian Democratic 
Community) 42,424 17.8
Mladen Ivankovic-Lijanovic (People's Party 
Working for Prosperity) 20,954 8.8
Zvonko Jurišic (Croatian Party of Rights of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina) 16,018 6.7
Serbs  
Nebojša Radmanovic (Alliance of 
Independent Social Democrats) 216,631 54.8
Mladen Bosic (Serb Democratic Party) 98,329 24.9
Zoran Tešanovic (Party of Democratic 
Progress in the Serb Republic) 19,004 4.8
Psephos, “Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidential 
Elections of 1 October 2006,” Australian Elections Archive, 
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/b/bosnia/bosnia20061.txt 
(accessed January 4, 2007). 
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Bosnia House of Representatives, September 14, 1996 
Party # votes # seats 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Party of Democratic Action 725417 16
Croatian Democratic Union 338440 8
Joint List of Bosnia and Herzegovina* 105918 2
Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina 93816 2
Democratic People's Union 25562 -
Croatian Rights Party 14879 -
Serb Republic  
Serb Democratic Party 578723 9
Party for Democratic Action 184553 3
People's Alliance for Peace and 
Progress** 136077 2
Serb Radical Party of the Serb 
Republic 62409 -
Join List of Bosnia and Herzegovina* 30285 -
Serb Patriotic Party 14146 -
People's Party of the Serb Republic 13285 -
*The Join List for Bosnia and Herzegovina is a coalition 
including the Union of Social Democrats of Bosnia 
Herzegovina, the Social Democratic Party, the HSS, and the 
Muslim Bosniak Organization. 
**The People's Alliance for Peace and Progress is a coalition 
including the Socialist Party of Serbia for the Republika 
Srpska, the Independent Social Democrats of the Republika 
Srpska, the Social Liberal Party, the Yugoslav United Left, 
and the New Radical Party. 
 
The Europa World Yearbook, 38 ed., s.v. “Bosnia 
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Bosnia House of Representatives, September 12-13, 1998 
Party # votes # seats 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Coalition for a Single and Democratic 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 455403 14
Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 187152 6
Social Democratic Party 137990 4
Social Democrats of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 28740 2
New Croat Initiative 28572 1
Democratic People's Union N/A 1
Serb Republic  
Accord Coalition 214948 4
Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 163436 4
Coalition for a Single and Democratic 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 128277 3
Serb Radical Party of the Serb Republic 119026 2
Radical Party of the Serb Republic 27753 1
The Europa World Yearbook, 40 ed., s.v. “Bosnia Herzegovina.” 
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Bosnia House of Representatives, November 11, 2000 
Party % votes # seats 
Social Democratic Party of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 18 9
Party of Democratic Action 18.8 8
Serbian Democratic Party of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 16.7 6
Croatian Democratic Union of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 11.4 5
Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina 11.3 5
Party of Democratic Progress of 
the Serb Republic 6.4 2
Party of Independent Social 
Democrats, Democratic Socialist 
Party 5.1 1
Socialist Party of the Serb 
Republic 2.6 1
Serbian People's Party of the 
Serb Republic 2.6 1
New Croatian Initiative 1.6 1
Democratic People's Union 1.4 1
Patriotic Party of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 1.2 1
Democratic Party of Pensioners 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.1 1
The Europa World Yearbook, 42 ed., s.v. “Bosnia 
Herzegovina.” 
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Bosnia House of Representatives, October 5, 2002 
Party % votes # seats 
Party of Democratic Action 21.9 10
Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia-
Herzegovina 14 5
Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina 10.5 6
Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina 10.4 4
Alliance of Independent Social Democrats 9.8 3
Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia-
Herzegovina/Croatian Christian Democratic 
Union 9.5 5
Party for Democratic Progress of Republika 
Srpska 4.6 2
Socialist Party of Republika Srpska 1.9 1
Bosnian Party 1.5 1
Others 15.9 5
The Europa World Yearbook, 47 ed., s.v. “Bosnia Herzegovina.” 
Bosnia House of Representatives, October 1, 2006 
Party % votes # seats 
Party of Democratic Action 16.9 9
Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina  15.5 8
Alliance of Independent Social 
Democrats 19.1 7
Social Democratic Party of Bosnia 
Herzegovina 10.1 5
Serbian Democratic Party  7.7 3
Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia 
Herzegovina 4.9 3
Croatians Together 3.7 2
Bosnian-Herzegovinian Patriotic Party  2.7 1
People's Party Working for Prosperity  2.3 1
Party for Democratic Progress 2 1
Democratic People's Alliance  1.4 1
Democratic People's Union  1.2 1
Parties and Elections in Europe, “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 
Wolfram Nordsieck, http://www.parties-and-
elections.de/bosnia.html (accessed December 7, 2006). 
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